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ABSTRACT 
FRIEDRICH SCHILLER'S PLAY: 
A THEORY OF HUMAN NATURE 
IN THE CONTEXT OF 
THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDY OF LIFE 
Susan M. Bentley 
December 15,2009 
Friedrich Schiller's psychological theory of play, his hypothesis about human nature, 
is embedded in the Aesthetic Letters. Its trans-historical value owes much to the 
committed interest in life in the late Enlightenment, and the theory itself is an example of 
that period's enthusiastic study of living organisms. It is within this context - of 
eighteenth-century natural history, natural philosophy and medicine - that the theory can 
be profitably evaluated. That it is also an example ofthe connection of the humanities of 
the time and the emerging life sciences suggests its usefulness as a paradigm today: as a 
general theory of human nature, it might serve as a bio-cultural ground for the 
humanities. 
In this dissertation, Schiller's theory'S situation in several contemporary contexts is 
explored and its relevance to the contemporary humanities and biological sciences, 
asserted. Chapter II presents Schiller's theory of play. In hypothesizing a theory of 
species-specific drives, Schiller approached human nature as a unity. In us, the actions of 
two drives, the sense-drive and the form-drive, create a play-drive which, in relation to 
v 
beauty, promotes full personal development. Chapter III reviews the activities of mid-
eighteenth-century researchers whose attention was turned to the anomalies that defined 
life. From their work, Schiller drew ideas about nature and the human species. Chapter 
IV celebrates the identification of a program of life study, vitalism. Schiller's mix of 
mechanical and organic metaphors, his drives and his history of play are based on its 
science. Chapter V presents the period's vitalistic epistemology. In it, comparison, 
analogy and hypothesizing augment observation, experimentation and analysis. As a 
vitalist, Schiller combined Kant's epistemology with Goethe's scientific intuition. 
Chapter VI reviews Schiller's German aesthetic heritage. Special focus is given to his 
text as an example of art, as an organic product, and to Schiller's own life, as an example 
of the whole man in the process of development. The Epilogue notes current play 
research in biology and the humanities and suggests that Schiller's play is an 
evolutionary mechanism, a structural and behavioral adaptation and, as such, a firm 
ground upon which to steady the humanities against aspects of its own relativism. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: AT PLAY WITH SCHILLER 
Friedrich Schiller's psychological theory of play - his hypothesis about human 
nature - is embedded in On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters. It is a 
red thread laid down by his exploration of the labyrinthine structure of our humanity, a 
guide that can best be uncovered through careful excavation with the trowels, picks and 
brushes oflate eighteenth-century natural history and natural philosophy, the time's 
science oflife and science of man. I His theory's form, its content and its trans-historical 
value owe much to the committed interest in life at the end of the Enlightenment; the 
theory itself can be understood as an example ofthat period's enthusiastic and 
contentious study of living organisms. That it is also an example of the connection of the 
humanities of the time and its sciences, the complex reciprocal relationship between 
particular research, philosophy and the arts - among anatomists, physiologists, 
physicians, philosophers, historians and artists - suggests its usefulness as a paradigm 
today. As a general theory of human nature, it might serve as a bio-cultural ground for 
the humanities. 
I Citation to the Uber die Asthetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefim 
by Johann Christoph Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805), the Aesthetic Letters, will be made 
by letter (Roman numeral, I-XXVII) and paragraph (Arabic numeral), then footnote if 
appropriate (by number if more than 1). For example, XV.9 or XIII.4 fn 2. Citation to 
the Introduction, Commentary or Appendices will be to the translators: W&W. 
---------------------------------- ---------
Understanding Schiller's theory of play requires a changed perception of its contexts: 
given the Aesthetic Letters as the immediate context, the theory benefits from new 
attention paid to a broader frame, a coherent life-science research tradition of the late 
Enlightenment. Late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century life science was 
generally a neglected area of scholarship: before the last quarter century only the 
admittedly monumental activities of eighteenth-century classifiers, codifiers and 
popularizers were acknowledged by science historians.2 The identification of a program 
of life study that was neither animism, mechanism nor materialism, i.e., one that was 
essentially (but variably) vitalistic, grew out of insights possible only with the maturation 
of biological science (specifically evolutionary biology and genetics) and the 
development of a philosophy of biology that incorporated the content ofthe time-related 
biological disciplines. To many late twentieth-century science historians, it was evident 
that the scientific study of life was undertaken - avidly, carefully and creatively - during 
the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century but that it had been hidden by the 
2 Neither a diachronic, "vertical," progressive science narrative that emphasized the great 
men, great discoveries and great revolutions, nor a synchronic, "horizontal" 
historiography that elaborated connections between science and other endeavors focused 
on the study of life in the eighteenth century: only in 1977 after Kuhn proposed his non-
progressive discontinuous model of normal science and paradigm change did Richard 
Toellner argue "that the emergence of vitalism [was] a good example of a Kuhnian 
'change of paradigm,' and [that] Haller's discovery of irritability [was] responsible for 
that change throughout Europe." (Roger in Rousseau 276 fn 58. Toellner). Jacques 
Roger agreed that the shift to vitalism occurred but not with the timing of the shift. 
Likewise, Kuhn himselflater considered Lavoisier's chemistry a paradigm shift (K. on 
Lavoisier Structure 53-56). Cantor noted the Bachelardian perspective that "natural 
philosophy [exclusive of Newtonian mechanics] was a publicly-enacted pre-science 
containing elements of drama, paradox and wonder": such a view precluded taking the 
embryonically organizing study of life seriously (48). A contrary view was expressed by 
Ernst Cassirer: "d' Alembert called the eighteenth century the philosophical century but 
with equal justification and pride this era often labeled itself the century of natural 
science" (45 my emphasis). 
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celebrated parameters of physical science and by its definition of methods. The study of 
Schiller's theory of play in the Aesthetic Letters benefits from their contributions to this 
paradigm change. 
In addition to placing the theory of play within the study of life forms, 
contextualizing Schiller's theory within the eighteenth century's science of man, within 
the stirrings of psychology and anthropology that were part and parcel of both 
Enlightenment medicine and the German aesthetic tradition, is key to understanding his 
hypothesis as synthesizing the various concerns of the late Enlightenment. The polarities 
of mind and body, sense and thought, perceptions and ideas, autonomy and necessity, 
imagination and reason are all crafted into his general theory of human nature. It is 
important to understand as well the cosmopolitan nature of the late Enlightenment and 
the intimate place of science within the humanities. Even as physics, chemistry, and 
medicine were separating, psychology and anthropology were incompletely differentiated 
from philosophy, and biology was yet to have a name. In this environment, and 
specifically the Weimar community, the study of all life organisms combined with 
philosophy and aesthetics (the "science of the senses") to form a rudimentary science of 
human nature. It is within these parameters that Schiller's new definition of play as a 
drive and a state is to be discovered and appreciated. 
The above contexts of the theory of play to be explored then - the Aesthetic Letters 
itself, the study of life and the study of man in the late Enlightenment - are objective and 
subjective: they are environments but they are dynamic - past identities created by and 
being created by perceiving subjects. They are reality-based but must also be intuited 
and appreciated: they require the application of sense and experience, of ideas and 
3 
imagination. I hope to show that they function as a part of play and that our grasp of 
them is an aspect of an aesthetic education. 
The Text as Context 
Schiller's On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters is the carrying 
document for his theory of play, his theory of human nature. It is important to see the 
Aesthetic Letters not only as an aesthetic work - artistic and philosophical - but as a 
natural philosophical document as well. The effort to research and develop evidence of 
natural philosophy's importance to Schiller's Aesthetic Letters and the psychological 
theory of play within it, however, in no way argues to diminish the other numerous 
sources - artistic, personal, professional and philosophical - that have long been 
identified as contributory to his achievement. It is rather an attempt to draw attention to a 
liminal area of scholarship, to break out of the usual spaces marked by our disciplines and 
to make a contribution to strengthening the relationship of science and the humanities.3 
Contextualizing his theory is also an effort to elucidate what Schiller may have meant 
when he called himself a Zwitterart, perhaps not an artist-philosopher as we understand 
the dichotomy today, but as an artist-and-scientist-philosopher, a humanist negotiating 
the current of natural philosophy.4 
3 Wilkinson and Willoughby (W & W), remarking on aspects of their work as translators, 
noted that "some aspects of Schiller's thesis ... have been generally misunderstood, or 
totally ignored .... [T]here has been a marked tendency to play down his concern for 
science and politics in this particular work, if not elsewhere, and - though to a lesser 
extent perhaps - his concern for reason and morality too" (lxii). 
4 In a letter to Goethe dated 31. viii.1794 (Trans. W & W xxix; Briere on line). Comparing 
himself to Goethe he wrote: "My understanding works more in a symbolising method, 
and thus I hover, as a hybrid [Zwitterart], between ideas and perceptions [Anschauung], 
between law and feeling, between a technical mind and genius ... in my earlier years ... 
4 
What is the history of Schiller's most problematic work? What is the cultural 
understanding of it? 
The twenty-seven letters that make up the Aesthetic Letters were published in 1795 
in three issues of the Horen. 5 Their inspiration was Schiller's correspondence with his 
patron Friedrich Christian, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein-Augustenburg, and the published 
series was produced in agreement with him.6 These original letters, the Augustenhurger 
Briefe of 1793, were destroyed in a fire and only partially replaced by Schiller at the 
Duke's request. Two of the published sections, Letters I-IX and XXIII-XXVII, are based 
on the replacements; their vastly different contents provide a broad natural division 
within the finished work itself. The first group contains an apology for undertaking an 
aesthetic subject when Europe's attention was riveted by violent political change: here 
Schiller connected aesthetics and politics, giving an urgent, practical explanation for his 
interest in beauty. In the last section, Schiller superseded historical arguments about the 
effect of the arts on morality and against the capacity of beauty to accomplish civilizing 
ends with a new developmental argument about the appearance of artistic agency in 
humans. He traced the production of two varieties of actual beauty in the world and the 
possibility of individual development toward the goals of human life (through the 
beauties that we have). His summation is a meditation on the attributes of the aesthetic 
an awkward appearance both in the field of speculation as well as in that of poetry ... " 
(Trans. Schmitz 12). 
5 The stated aims of the Horen were the following: to "inquire of history concerning the 
past and of philosophy concerning the future, and be actively engaged in unobtrusive 
cultivation of those better insights, clearer principles, nobler morals, on which any 
improvement of our social condition must ultimately depend" (W&W xv). 
6 There are many presentations of the Letters in their historical context; I am following 
Beiser (121ft). 
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state in individuals and the Aesthetic State in the world. Between the two sections based 
on the original private letters, Schiller added an analysis of beauty, a section that was not 
anywhere part of the original: this new part (X-XXII) includes the hypothesis about play 
and an argument for the appreciation of beauty as crucial to human wholeness. 7 
The final work suffered from vicissitudes of influence and intention ("an almost 
astonishing vacillation and uncertainty"): was it to be a reaction to the violent events of 
the French Revolution (Beiser 122)? Would it be an analysis of beauty? A treatise on 
education? A critique of contemporary culture? A prescription for what ails the 
Enlightenment? Itself a work of art? Yes. 8 
In his Schiller as Philosopher, Frederick Beiser argued that the Aesthetic Letters is 
both a unified philosophical work of merit and a political document setting out the 
strengths and weaknesses of republicanism. Beiser tasked himself with placing the 
Aesthetic Letters in its historical context and with "understand[ing] it as a response to 
some of the cultural, political and aesthetic issues of the age" (120), finally finding its 
aim to be "precisely" this: "to rescue the causes of enlightenment and republicanism in 
7 This section about play was written and edited at the beginning of Schiller's intense 
friendship and collaboration with Goethe; the marks of Goethe's scientific interests and 
his epistemology are apparent and will be detailed in Chapter V. 
8 Schiller's theory of play is presented in no other work. Because, in The Aesthetic 
Letters, it is a small mechanism for his philosophical and political purposes and only the 
skeleton of that organic art object, and further, because my work involves a novel 
perception and focuses on a part, through the application of eighteenth-century natural 
history and natural philosophy like a magnifying glass, I have relied upon other 
approaches to the whole text. L. A. Willoughby and Elizabeth Wilkinson's translation of 
the text (with their reflections on etymology) and Frederick Beiser's understanding of 
Schiller's philosophical project have been indispensible. In addition, I am indebted to the 
examination, presentation and ideas of Elias, Martinson, Reed "Delights," Savile, 
Schaper and Sharpe among others. 
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the face of ... conservative criticism.,,9 But the Aesthetic Letters is a deeply political 
work on several levels, and this final aim is actually a harmonizing of conflictual 
purposes: it is at once a positive response to the promise of the French Revolution, to the 
possibility of political freedom and a just and interactive society - and it is a work 
reflecting passionate disappointment in the revolution's failure through lack of action 
with respect to basic needs (like safety and sustenance) and its horrible violence, 
especially exemplified in the execution of Louis XVI. As such, the violence of the 
revolution and the failure of the French constitution represented defeats of the 
Enlightenment's optimistic appraisal of the agency of reason to effect a safe environment 
for humankind and to further enlightenment itself. Schiller's optimism in writing implied 
that a battle had been lost, but that the war must be won. 
According to Elizabeth Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby, the latest and most 
authoritative of the English translators, what readers find in the text is 
an impassioned analysis of the cultural predicament of modem man: the 
evils of specialization, whether of knowledge or skill, or of one function of 
the psyche at the expense of the others; the dissociation of what once was 
united - sensibility and thought, feeling and morality, body and mind; the 
cleavage between different branches of learning, between sciences and the 
arts, between the development of the individual and the welfare of the 
community, between those who are too exhausted by the struggle for 
existence to think for themselves and those who are too indolent to make 
creative use of their leisure; the reduction of man to a mere cog in the 
wheel of an over-developed society; the de-humanization of the citizen in 
a State where he is valued for the function he performs rather than the 
being that he is ... (W & W xii). 
9 These criticisms included the intuition that Reason could not be sufficiently incentivized 
and that Reason was not and could not be practical, i.e. be applied to local and particular 
circumstances. 
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In this work, Schiller analyzed in order to repair, described in order to unify. He 
sought a harmonious balance, a unity of opposites and conflicted elements, of being and 
becoming, of thinking and doing, of subjective and objective, of experiencing and 
organizing, of feeling and valuing. He wrote as a synthesizer of the Enlightenment and 
Counter-Enlightenment, seeking a correction at a moment when he hoped cohesion was 
still possible. He was not in search of a meta-concept as had been attempted before in 
rational systems so much as an engaging and transforming experience for the whole 
person, an actual reflection of our own structure and the unity of nature. He sought a 
combination of self-with-experience that each of us as members of the species is 
specially equipped for, a subject-object relation that marshals our being - perceptions, 
our feelings and our thoughts - into harmony and balance. He believed that beauty as a 
regulatory ideal expressed the possibility that humans could have such experiences. 
Encounters with beauty, according to Schiller, would play out in the particular, as 
integrating occurrences in a life of continuous development. From this perspective, the 
Aesthetic Letters is a catalogue of the ills of modem man, a diagnostic survey and a 
prescription in advance of treatment. It is also a part of that treatment that is aesthetic 
education. 
Accompanying the argument for treatment is a further analysis, one of beauty. The 
whole is a treatise on aesthetic education and an analytic of the beautiful. Considering 
Schiller's consistent attention to unity and his drive to discover a third born ofthe 
combination of two poles, Frederick Beiser suggested that "the best way to account for 
both halves of the work, and so to explain its underlying unity is to describe it as an 
apology for beauty, a defense of the aesthetic dimension in life" (123). Schiller's intent 
8 
was to establish that we must develop ourselves through Beauty to be fully human, that 
each of us humanizes himself and his neighbors by striving to enact his potential, by 
seeking human wholeness. 
For Beiser, the Aesthetic Letters as an apology for beauty is also a critique of the 
progress of the Enlightenment in general, an exploration of his century's failure to dare 
to know, to have the courage to feel and the energy to explore the limitations and the 
possibilities of human nature. He presented Schiller as a philosopher for whom reason 
alone is a fragment of our nature. In order for man to be wise, to participate in his own 
experience passively and actively, Schiller believed that our capacities must be 
integrated: thought and feeling must function together. Beiser's Schiller re-evaluated his 
century's readiness for political change and, while upholding reason (our moral nature), 
re-introduced human physicality (our species-specific senses and feelings) as absolutely 
essential to enlightenment itself. The continuous work of developing an aesthetic state in 
each person's separate selfis a life-long prescription, a remediation for living with the 
chronic condition offalling-out-of-balance. For Schiller, it is beauty that develops 
mankind, making each whole, and it is the society of whole humans that makes a just 
political state possible. The developmental connection between aesthetics and politics 
justifies the attention he gave beauty at a time of crisis. Schiller's philosophic goal then 
was to maintain autonomous agency for mankind, for when he marked out humans as the 
playful species, he posited that our "sensuo-rational" nature is, in effect, free and pluri-
potential. 
The text is not just a philosophical work or a rhetorical argument; it is also a 
consciously crafted art object. The Aesthetic Letters in its English translation of by L. A. 
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Willoughby and Elizabeth Wilkinson displays the organic complexity, the form applied 
to content, that allows for creativity not just in its agent artist, but in the reader (and the 
translator (Wilkinson "Reflections"). Because Wilkinson and Willoughby's work with 
the text was one of translation and clarification -both of Schiller's intent and their own 
choices - they approached the Aesthetic Letters as an environment of developing word 
use and an organized whole, both rhetorically and artistically. Their exhaustive 
introduction, commentary and glossary, taken together, present an exegesis based on a 
perception of the text's organic unity, and their intent was to be persuasive in their 
presentation of Schiller as consciously crafting a representation [a Schein] that makes of 
his analysis an autonomous whole. Their etymological approach underscored the 
significance of development to the work and suggested the influence of contemporary 
organic theories. They posited that Schiller, through navigation of his dynamic use of 
language, created a complex organization productive of transformational elements 
analogous to that of a life form (lxviii-lxxiii, Appendix III). In essence, Wilkinson and 
Willoughby prepared an English text wherein it could be found that Schiller's art imitates 
the eighteenth-century understanding oflife. The Schiller of the Aesthetic Letters was a 
practical idealist, pressing for progress through our potentiality but acknowledging limits 
derived from the imperative of self-preservation, the innate teleology of our ratio-sensual 
nature. 
Politics, etymology, philosophy, and art do not exhaust this text: using the 
discoveries ofthe analyzers and the philologists, readers can engage the work of art as if 
it were an organism, an end in itself. They can follow Schiller's understanding of human 
nature, as one transformable by play, as drive-dependent and yet in need of a unifying 
10 
goal, one in need of both experience and ideal. In terms of its association with the study 
of life, the text is a rich and dependable site: it incorporates fragments of discoveries, 
contemporary research and popularizations, and it is energized by the controversies of the 
contemporary study of life. It is replete with life metaphors functioning in precarious 
balance with mechanical tropes. And the work itself functions like a living organism 
with complex organization and special capacities for interacting with its environment 
(readers) to create transformations. In short, the Aesthetic Letters both explains and 
models the enormously complex organization of a living form and is itself a labyrinth that 
represents the mindlbody problem of the late eighteenth century, complete with path 
toward its solution. And when carefully extracted from the text, Schiller's theory of 
human nature itself is expressed in terms of drives and an archetype, the language of 
eighteenth-century natural philosophy. 
The Organic Body as Context: A Vital, Late Enlightenment Life-Science Tradition 
One necessary approach to human nature is through the body, the body like other 
bodies, the organism existing in time and space. Life in all its known forms presented a 
tremendous challenge to naturalists of Schiller's century. 10 Their efforts to organize and 
catalogue relentlessly accumulating knowledge had them grappling with burgeoning 
nature: extensive exploration of the globe provoked discovery of a sublime nature of 
extreme habitats, a chaotic nature teaming with life forms. Naturalists were presented 
10 "One particularly arbitrary form of classification is the division of intellectual work 
into centuries .... Many eighteenth-century scholars have approached this bizarrierie 
with appropriate flexibility: while they may shorten their period by ending it in 1789, 
they can also colonize others by referring to the 'long eighteenth century (1660-1830)''' 
(Still 364). I follow the latter tendency which includes, of course, Weimar classicism 
imbedded securely within the period, as a synthesis of the Enlightenment and its 
correction. 
11 
with a superabundance of specimens; intensive observation by microscope provided 
previously unimagined complexity - environments within environments, where fleas had 
their own demonstrable fleas. I 1 Observers with a new appreciation of the fact, the 
historical nature of life, atomized time with their documentations: they watched sleepless, 
chronicling the life cycles, reproductive events and behaviors of their favored life forms. 
The efforts to manage this knowledge and to cater to the immense interest in it fueled the 
great knowledge enterprises: the dictionaries, the classification systems, the 
encyclopedias and the natural histories. After mid-century within this environment fed 
by intense interest in life, a vitalist research program developed, one that spanned the 
broad middle ground between the dualisms (whether mechanical or animistic) and 
materialism. For Schiller and many of his contemporaries it constituted a "mentality.,,12 
II "Fleas, so naturalists say, IHave smaller fleas that on them prey. IThese have smaller 
still to bite 'em, lAnd so proceed ad infinitum" (Jonathan Swift, "Poetry: A Rhapsody" 
633). 
12 Several science historians have written comprehensive narratives characterizing life 
studies of the eighteenth through the early nineteenth centuries; they identify variously a 
research program ("teleomechanism") research tradition ("Enlightenment vitalism"), or a 
mentality ("vital materialism"), all vitalistic life studies by different names and slightly 
altered time frames. Whether it be the Enlightenment vitalist language (term coined by 
Reill), research program, tradition or mentality (Roger) or the teleo-mechanist research 
program (posited by Timothy Lenoir), the discovery came out of historiography of the 
late twentieth century fostered in the expansion of the philosophy of biology by 
evolutionary theory. References: Ernst Mayr's The Growth of Biological Thought: 
Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance and his "The Idea of Teleology." (Mayr's tome, 
The Growth of Biological Thought, appeared in 1982; his essays and lectures on 
questions in the philosophy of science quoted in this dissertation in 1961, 1974 and 1985. 
He wrote more than 600 journal articles, 200 after his retirement in 1975, and edited or 
authored 20 books (NYT obituary, 2/5/2005)). G. S. Rousseau and Roy Porter's The 
Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of Eighteenth-Century Science. 
An overview and creative synthesis of many researchers' work is found in Jacques 
Roger's Ies sciences de fa vie dans fa pensee francaise au ){vIrt siecie (1963) (The Life 
Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought), Peter Hanns Reill's Vitalizing Nature 
in the Enlightenment and in Timothy Lenoir's The Strategy of Life: Teleology and 
12 
How is this mentality characterized? 
Natural philosophers then both accepted and challenged the mechanistic (Newtonian) 
worldview. They accepted, challenged and modified as well the place of mathematics in 
the science oflife, and they redefined the meaning of certainty by way of probability. 
They sought truth by falling away from a priori reasoning through induction to 
hypothetico-deductive theorizing. In understanding life, they began with Newtonian 
principles: these explained inanimate matter but could not in their view adequately 
explain some aspects of the living organism. For those in late Enlightenment studying 
living nature, there was something more to life, to living matter, than could be described 
and demonstrated by these known principles. 13 Their theories hypothesized/orees within 
living matter, and the researchers named these forces by function or effect (e.g. 
Bildungstrieb, Blumenbach's developmental drive), without expecting to be able to 
Mechanics in Nineteenth-Century German Biology. Robert Richards connected late 
Enlightenment life science to Darwin in his The Romantic Conception of Life: Science 
and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe. I have followed Reill's and Roger's narratives and 
language more closely but am also indebted to the others and to a number of historians 
whose research interests have been individuals and/or the relationship between 
individuals. The detailed description of the eighteenth-century tradition and Schiller's use 
of it as well as the reciprocal relations of the two time-separated traditions (life studies in 
the eighteenth century and the late twentieth century, play in the eighteenth century and 
play studies in the late twentieth century) combine with the importance of science to the 
current humanities project to undergird later chapters. 
13 An earlier Schiller, the medical student author of "On the difference between 
Inflammatory and Putrid Fevers" (Latin, 1780) commented, "I was certainly lost in 
various labyrinths of error before I was persuaded that the natural order is not as we have 
arranged it in our textbooks. 'There are more things in Heaven and Earth! Than are 
dreamt of in our [sic.] philosophy'" (Dewhurst 206, [sic.] is Schiller's). Such a point-of-
view, created a big tent that Steven Shapin summarized as follows: "Against an older 
view that the 'new science' (and especially the 'Newtonianism') of early and mid-
eighteenth century was the underpinning of 'the Enlightenment,' we now have a 
developing perspective which points out the existence of a number of species of natural 
knowledge, and a number of opposed 'Enlightenments'" (Rousseau 111-112). 
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explain from empirical research how they worked. This place-holding way of formatting 
theory allowed the characterization of living nature and living organisms in spite of gaps 
in knowledge. 
Their understanding and characterization of life followed from scientific engagement 
with several compelling issues. Natural philosophers struggled with the exceptional 
nature oflife. What made life life? Organizational complexity? Force(s) within matter? 
Intrinsic ends and teleological processes? How could its capacities be documented and 
described? In their search for answers, researchers experimented with particular plants 
and animals, making minute and often controversial observations; these observations then 
led to comparison, analogy and hypotheses about specialized life functions, particularly 
reproduction and development. What is generation? Is it preformation and 
encapsulation? Is it organization of unformed material? What is the male contribution? 
The female? What is the cause of monstrosities? They worked with a deeper history and 
a growing sense of dynamism. Puzzling over identity and change, they sought a way to 
nail down and acknowledge the historical fact. How can life's relation with time be 
scientifically expressed? What are the parameters of change in living organisms? How is 
development to be explained? How is change to be documented? And more particularly, 
do species transmute? Do human beings constitute a single genus and species? How are 
differences in races to be explained? What is our species' relationship with other 
species? 
Life was approached and described by these eighteenth-century natural philosophers 
and historians as organized in a complex and multi-leveled way; they conceived of this 
organization as somehow both cause and effect of forces within matter itself. These 
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forces-in-matter give rise to life's special functions, functions that (circularly) 
characterized life. For them, the harmoniously balanced tension of forces within each 
organism was analogous to the harmonious balance without - in local environment and of 
nature itself. Research, controversy and speculation then created a tradition that 
characterized life in the following general ways: 
1) Life is based on complex organization within a boundary system. 
From the naturalists' point-of-view, life exhibited complex organization, not just a 
multiplication of components, but a development of systems that was reciprocally 
coordinated and multi-causally involved. A life form was an individual, its own means 
and its own end, complete in itself due to the harmonious relation of its inseparable parts. 
Because of the boundary conditions, the whole was transfonnative; as end, it impacted 
the separate elements or parts. 
2) Forces-in-matter promote special life functions. 
Living matter was seen as distinguished by in-dwelling forces that promoted through 
reciprocal relations the functions specific to life - self-creation, nutrition, sensitivity, 
irritability, generation and development. These forces (also referred to as principles or 
qualities) were inseparable from matter. It was clear to many eighteenth century 
researchers that living organisms were the sites of events that could not be explained 
mechanistically, and that the forces within them seemed responsible for processes that 
appeared directed, planned or designed. That organisms often appeared to behave like 
agents, to seem purposeful or goal-directed [zweckmafSig], was the ground of the 
difference between life and lifelessness. Such seminal observations or descriptions like 
the above could not be followed up empirically at the time; in fact, many researchers then 
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believed that proofs of in-dwelling forces and the manner of their function would always 
be beyond human capacity. In sum, the organism appeared to natural philosophers of the 
time to be a privileged "middle ground" where something transformative happened; in 
this process, scientists hypothesized and philosophers speculated that polar forces 
contributed without being destroyed. The observations of life often countered or 
complicated the linkage that reason made between development and progress. 
Consequently, living organisms might only be understood through that regulatory 
conceptualization "as if': because of indwelling forces, life forms appeared as if agented, 
goal-directed or designed. 
3) Life exists in a harmonious balance, in a tension of maintained polarities. 
All of living nature was seen as related and structurally invested in balanced or 
harmonious economies in space. Each organ, each organism's own economy, each 
individual was likewise part of an environment, that is, of an infinite number of 
reciprocal and interdependent relations (oeconomia naturae). 14 Thus, balance and 
harmony were at the heart of the period's appreciation of the workings of nature in 
general, of capital-N nature (meta-nature personification).15 In such a system, means and 
ends were reciprocal, with time and oppositional elements providing dynamism. 
14 Oeconomia naturae was Linnaeus' concept of a natural economy, part of Adam 
Smith's calculations and a remote starting point for Charles Darwin's ideas. (Roger in 
Rousseau 269). 
15 "Nature miniscule merged with Nature majuscule in the figure of personification or 
prosopopeia, so ubiquitous in Enlightenment poetry and prose .... [P]utting the face to 
abstraction ... inspired neoclassical critics and electrified Enlightenment readers: how 
else to render a universal norm vivid and sensually intelligible, as sensationalist 
psychology demanded?" (Daston 123). Not to mention that it, according to Robert 




4) Life is intimately identified with time and therefore history. 
Time was the context of life and was the ground of life's characteristic dynamism: 
the harmonious balance presented above was a dynamic one, constantly adjusting in time. 
Implicit in this description is that life was change; life was its own history and as such it 
existed as distinctly individual, never to be repeated entities. This understanding - in 
reciprocal relationship with a budding historical consciousness - transformed the 
epistemological status of historical facts: with regard to nature, the existence of an 
individual both contemporaneously and historically was real. The individual existed over 
time, not only sustaining itself, self-creating and developing; it degenerated, became ill 
and died as well. 
Living nature - of which mankind is a part - was the continuous creation of time, 
ever-deepening time, and the interested and educated were increasingly aware of the 
constant change and the dynamic equilibrium in all environments, whether inside the 
body, within the ducal forests, or in civil society. A caveat: although the action of time 
on life forms was appreciated in terms of development and environmental variation, 
belief in transformation or transmutation of species was not broad-based in the late 
eighteenth century. Schiller does not appear to have been influenced by such a theory nor 
did he include ideas about any essential change in species (as Maupertuis, Diderot, 
Erasmus Darwin, or even Buffon conceived of it) as a possibility in his theory of play. 16 
What is the epistemology of this tradition? How was living nature studied by these 
vitalists of the late Enlightenment? This research program enlarged the usual empirical 
16 During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the word "evolution" referred to a 




methods of observation and experiment with comparison and analogy and with the 
determination of probabilities. The end of such exploration was the (historical) fact; truth 
was statistical, a probability that approached certitude. In short, theirs was a modest 
epistemology. In terms of human comprehension, careful combined attention might 
bring about an intuitive grasp [Anschauung] of the general from the particular, a way of 
knowing living phenomena and the whole of nature. By studying life forms, the 
researcher could have the experience [Erjahrung] of "seeing" the archetype [Urtyp, 
Urbild, Gestalt, Haupttypus, Haupt/arm], the original natural (and shared) form of a 
group of organisms. Goethe, for example, was over long periods of his life intimately 
involved in this kind of morphological exploration, and his theories about an original 
plant form and about vertebrate commonalities stem from this understanding of 
relationship. Influenced by Goethe, Schiller, I believe, based his idea of an archetypal 
human nature on a similar intuition. 17 
Enlightenment vitalists typically presented their findings and defined a direction of 
discovery through hypotheses that included terms representing unknowns. This black-
boxing of special qualities oflife (which were the incompletely understood properties) 
allowed observation, experimentation and comparison to continue and empirical data to 
be gathered. With unknowns segregated into regulatory space, even speculation could 
proceed. As Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707-1788) said, "Let us gather 
facts in order to get ourselves thinking" (in Roger Life 440). 
17 Schiller-Goethe "fortunate encounter" over just this issue will be discussed in Chapter 
V. 
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Organic Body, Organic Mind: A New Working Context 
What is man? At the end of the eighteenth century, human nature was just such an 
area of speculation. Though much of what the Enlightened wanted to know about 
themselves could only be subjectively accessed and, therefore, was situated with the 
unknowns, the human mind was often studied as if it were an organism, more 
specifically, as if it were a function of an organ. In the context of vitalist science, this 
view was a part of Schiller's perspective. Such a study was infused with lively curiosity 
and contention about the methods, discoveries and theories relating to human nature - all 
before the life sciences themselves were distinct from the humanities and before 
psychology and anthropology as the sciences of human nature had their identities. 
Anthropology advanced within natural history through the study of cultures and the 
discovery of the ruins of ancient civilizations; psychology within philosophy and 
philosophical physiology proceeded by experiment, through dissection and study of the 
nervous system, by applying statistics to behavioral phenomena and by observing and 
examining the self and the behavior of others. By the end of the century, German 
psychological novels proliferated (e.g., Goethe's Die Leiden des jungen Werthers (The 
Sorrows of Young Werther) and Moritz' Anton Reiser) and the first German 
psychological journal had been published. The discoveries and theories about the human 
mind also generated a new discipline: they were the ground of aesthetics, the new 
"science of the senses." 
At the time, German aestheticians found the experience of beauty, in art or in nature, 
to be a pleasure. This experience had a natural theological ground in the discovery of 
divine agency. From early in the tradition, then, in addition to producing a valuable 
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physical response, art had a positive impact on man's moral aspect: pleasure was the 
perception of perfection in nature or in art, which in turn mirrors the perfection of God. 
Humans, in perceiving God's perfection, attained perfection and thus fulfilled their 
function in creation. Based on the value of beauty as perfection, Alexander Baumgarten 
began a rehabilitation of sense by examining its reason, the lower faculties' unique 
contribution to man's knowledge. This science identified Leibniz's confused ideas 
[petites perceptions, dunkle Vorstellungen] as profoundly important to understanding 
wholes, their relations and connections (including organisms and other objects - the 
knowledge about which was diminished or destroyed by analysis). 
As a new generation expressed itself in the popular literature of the Sturm und Drang 
movement in the 1760's and 1770's, the valorization of feeling washed through Germany 
like a cultural wave. This correction of rationalism established the capacity to experience 
powerful, integrating feeling [Empjindsamkeit], including pleasure, as a good in itself. 
Herder carried data and theories from the life sciences forward in the period's enthusiasm 
while at the same time attempting to protect the gains of Enlightenment reason. 
Developments in aesthetic theory (through the philosophizing of Mendelssohn, Kant and 
others) delineated the capacity of art, specifically, to provide pleasure by provoking play 
among the faculties of the mind or among ideas within the mind's sphere of attention. 
Part of the legacy of Shaftesbury and the Scottish school to the Germans, the recognition 
of the fundamental importance of disinterestedness of response as a distinguishing feature 
of art, served to distinguish aesthetics' independence as well. I8 This tum away from 
practical, didactic or sentimental effect toward reception and contemplation by an 
18 These philosopher's views were available to Schiller through his tutor Abel, through 
Mendelssohn, Garve (as translator) and Kant. 
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autonomous subject underscored the values of the whole Enlightenment: freedom from 
tutelage could be claimed for this kind of civilized development [Bildung]. Through 
Kant as well, beauty became more subjective, bound to the configuration of the mind, 
and as disinterested beauty, not related to any concept. In particular, beauty was not 
dependent on a concept of utility, any outside purpose. In a word, it was like an 
organism. 19 Art was an integrated whole, appearing to be at once its own means and 
end, as if organized to some interior plan or purpose. This assumption of internal 
teleology, of "purposeful purposelessness," constituted a function of reason, a regulatory 
judgment with respect to beauty. 
The "science of the senses" was not simply confined to the fine arts but extended to 
the art of living. The whole man came down to earth in the late eighteenth century -
particularly through the cultural dissemination of German aesthetics. A discipline 
fostering the rehabilitation of sense, both as a species of reason and as man's undervalued 
physicality, the aesthetic tradition presented man as a whole with all his connections and 
relations. It presented his products, science and art, as autonomous privileged areas of 
human endeavor. Schiller wrote: "Art, like science, is absolved from all positive 
constraint and from all conventions introduced by man; both rejoice in absolute immunity 
from human arbitrariness" in their search for truth (IX.3). The ideal relation of these 
endeavors with the community was the following: privileged exemption from dependent 
relations with power and independence from the distortion of influence and prejudice. 
Their creators as well, though they may be children of their cultures, must not be their 
19 Goldthwait on Kant's subjectivism: While "beauty seems phenomenally to belong to 
the object, the feeling of beauty is simply the sign of the harmonious working of certain 
faculties of the mind when they are attending to a particular object" (Kant Observations 
21). 
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creatures [Zoglinge, Giinstlinge] (IX.4). The scientist, on the one hand, must "approach 
[Nature] with his sense-organs untroubled, innocent and wide open .... [without] the 
tendency to prejudge [or the] premature hankering after harmony." He must come to 
phenomena with both a sense-faculty amenable to form and a reasoning faculty open to 
content (XIII.4 fn*2). The artist, whose commission it was to ensure that "Truth lives on 
in the illusion of Art, and [that] from this copy, or after-image ... the original will once 
again be restored," must strive "to produce the Ideal out of the union of what is possible 
with what is necessary" (IX.4, 5). He was to "surround [his contemporaries] with great 
and noble forms of genius, and encompass them about with symbols of perfection, until 
Semblance conquer Reality, and Art triumph over Nature" (IX.7). 
In his life and work, Schiller exemplified both artist and scientist-philosopher. In the 
Aesthetic Letters specifically, he wrote not only a treatise about aesthetics (including a 
theory a/human nature) but an aesthetic treatise, and he offered an aesthetic space to his 
readers where they might function as complete human beings - observing human nature 
contemplatively, as an organic whole, with all its relations and connections. Then, with 
him, they would be moved to analyze its separate elements, then encouraged to 
synthesize again. In the work, he questioned his experience openly, considered the 
contemporary situation critically and fashioned his creative response - so that readers, 
acting autonomously, might do the same. 
Schiller described the experience of beauty as a developmental force for human 
beings, and he modeled aesthetic education as a way of life, a journey for the whole man. 
For this purpose, he found autonomy and beauty to be necessary for mature involvement 
in civic life. Just as the concept of matter had been emiched in the vitalist tradition to 
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include something more so that it might approach the reality of life, so the concept of 
man as a rational being (actually, by that time, oflimited reason) needed to be enriched 
by full recognition of sensibility. The whole man and his whole life in the community 
was Schiller's subject. The work of art and the way ofliving aesthetically was Schiller's 
object. Beauty was the relation. In this way Schiller represented that play is about 
engagement. 
For Schiller, in summary, aesthetics was the study ofthe uniquely human, our 
capacity for Beauty. And German aesthetics was his birthright. His inheritance, aspects 
of which were expressed and elaborated in his theory of play and were connected to the 
study of life, included: 1) a respect for pleasure - in relation to motivation, happiness and 
the Ideals of human life, Truth, Beauty and Morality (and consequently a demand for a 
positive relation between Art and Morality); 2) a respect for the body and its primacy, for 
sense and its knowledge; 3) an interest in taste, its individual yet communal ground; 4) a 
movement from didacticism and eudaemonism to disinterestedness in art through an 
exploration of goal-direction in nature and agency in man, 5) an identification of the 
reciprocal relations between art and nature, art and organism, and 6) an enlargement of 
aesthetics from a study of a faculty of mind to an education of the whole man - and from 
art to the art ofliving.20 These issues are amply reflected in the Aesthetic Letters, and 
they are played out in Schiller's life and the lives of his contemporaries. 
20 It is also necessary to consider the sublime, an eighteenth century obsession, the 
fruitful relation of play and the sublime, the ongoing struggle to bring that which is 
beyond the bounds of pleasurable and enframed attention into human life. 
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Organic Environment: The Cosmopolitan Culture 
The humanities and the sciences in the late eighteenth century were involved in 
intimate, responsive interactions. Humanists (academic scientists and amateurs as well) 
had privileged access to the "facts;" they had the use of the discoveries and epistemology 
of the natural philosophy of life, and they both welcomed and incorporated, rejected and 
revised, analyzed and synthesized new creations - theory, metaphor and art - from the 
raw material research into nature provided. The familiar disciplines were not separate; in 
fact, even the cleavage among the human, social and life sciences [Naturwissenschaften 
and Geisteswissenschaften] had yet to occur. According to Peter Hanns Reill, 
"Enlightenment thinkers never conceived of separating the humanities from the study of 
nature. For them, nature served as the basic model informing all human activities, the 
grand analogue upon which existence was grounded.,,21 In The Sciences of Enlightened 
Europe, Lorraine Daston summarized the close-knit feel of the educated community: 
"[m]uch of Enlightenment intellectual life, including that of the sciences, resembled a 
great echo chamber, in which not a word was whispered but that multiple voices took it 
up, repeating and reshaping the sound" (Daston in Clark 498). The study of living nature 
then was part of the humanities - the results readily accessible and the theories 
controversial. And the methods and discoveries of science were still valorized by the 
majority of humanists. Empirical science was distinguished; a new modest epistemology 
21 Vitalizing 2. Reill continued: "Chemists trained as doctors, doctors who taught moral 
philosophy, moral philosophers who pondered the secrets of generation, polymaths who 
wrote poetry and studied comparative anatomy, amateur and professional natural 
historians bent upon collecting as many new specimens as possible, mathematicians who 
wrote about chemistry and chemists who wrote about mathematics, theologians, civil 
servants, diplomats, and educated lay persons - all were fascinated by the need to 
establish a new vocabulary to account for living nature" (11). 
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of the emerging sciences of life and man grounded their knowledge base. Observation, 
serial observation, comparison and experimentation were the accepted methods of this 
philosophy and the probabilities that repeated observation provided addressed their needs 
for practical certainty. 
Schiller saw and lamented the increasing fragmentation of the individual and of 
society but from a context of an achievable synthesis. He had struggled with himself, 
worked to integrate his capacities and inclinations, and he saw his social circle as a 
community that provided the support for aesthetic living. Schiller's intellectual milieu at 
Weimar received science as the leading edge of the humanities project, a situation that 
continued to the end of the eighteenth century. There, an intense web of visits, 
correspondence and reading kept the small community current with regard to life science 
controversies. Goethe, Herder, Fichte, Reinhold, Kant, Forster, Blumenbach were all in 
the mix. There, Schiller, educated as a physician, became Goethe's colleague and 
confidant.22 They met in 1794 at the home of August Batsch (the botanist) at a meeting 
ofthe Natural Historical Society of lena and began a 10-year period of intense 
collaboration after one evening's earnest discussion and amicable disagreement about 
epistemology and natural archetypes.23 Goethe, in addition to his literary efforts, studied 
22 Roger: "The study of living beings was traditionally reserved for medical doctors. 
Medical studies had for a long time been the only regular scientific training available. 
Anatomy, physiology and botany were regularly taught in medical schools, and a 
professorship in medicine was the only way to make a living out of those studies. It was 
therefore accepted that a professor of medicine should be primarily interested in anatomy 
or botany, provided that it was human anatomy and botany considered essentially for its 
medical uses. This state of affairs lasted and even developed during the eighteenth 
century, especially in countries such as Germany ... " (in Rousseau 258-9). 
23 Schiller had experienced, perhaps been saved by, a previous community: his friends in 
Leipzig, Komer and his circle. He and Komer continued their intimate correspondence, 
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and wrote scientifically; his interests included morphology, geology, mineralogy and 
optics. The Humboldts lived nearby; they, grounded in natural philosophy, at that time 
were studying anatomy. Goethe often accompanied them to dissections, and he 
communicated his enthusiasms to Schiller. Schiller, for his part, despite his disclaimer, 
was widely read, known particularly to rely during the composition of the Aesthetic 
Letters on the synthesizing naturalists, Herder, Rousseau and Kant?4 
This functioning community of humanists [Gesellschaft] was for Schiller objective 
humanity, the outward, the empirical, pledge of man's capacity for harmony and balance 
and an indication of his unifiable internal organization. For us today, the close connection 
between the humanities and its life sciences could represent an example of the 
organization of knowledge, one that grounds the humanities not just in culture but in the 
world of nature and civilization. 
Organic Environment: Reciprocal Relations over Time 
What is man, and what has he to do with play? The exploration of humanness as a 
part of nature and the scientific approach to the phenomenon of play - each of these has a 
history, and these histories are interdependent, co-ordinate and subordinate to other 
one that included the seminal Kallias letters. Schiller to Komer, 7.v.1785: "I feel that we 
have attained the goal which I had but dreamt of. The brotherhood of minds is the surest 
key to knowledge. Alone we are powerless. If the bold flight of our imagination carry us 
into the most distant spheres of truth, we should suddenly start at our own loneliness" 
(1:23). 
24 Schiller's disclaimer: "My ideas, derived from constant communication with myself 
rather than from any rich experience of the world or from reading ... " (1.2). A 
prodigious number of his sources were documented by Wilkinson and Willoughby in 
their Introduction and Commentary. The natural philosophy and history involvements of 
the three just mentioned were explored by Denby, Hulliung, Larson (Interpreting), 
Nisbett (Herder and "Herder"), Roger, Sloan ("Kant" and "Performing"), and Zammito 
among others. 
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endeavors. The study of life in the late eighteenth century and the designation of playas 
the ground of humanity (as a profoundly important behavior) were revolutionary 
endeavors. But the occurrence of change (of a paradigm shift) and its recognition are two 
separate operations. The first is a change in real time; it is a shift in science on the 
ground arising from an accumulation of transgressive content (things that just don't fit 
the accepted frame) and a change in retrospection. The second is the awareness of 
change in the history of science. Then, new interests, new discoveries or new techniques 
reflect backward allowing for a deeper and more empathic questioning of time past or a 
fuller appreciation of the roots of current knowledge. Vitalistic life studies in the 
eighteenth century constituted a paradigm shift by Kuhnian standards, but one that could 
not be appreciated until biology had incorporated genetics and evolution into its body of 
knowledge.25 It was neither genetics nor evolution itself that compelled Enlightenment 
scholars, but rather they were impelled by their own epistemological black-boxing of 
these unknowns, the recognition that their current understanding of matter could not 
explain life's functions or complexity. Their modest epistemology (knowing what they 
could not know), their understanding of the importance of the individual, their acceptance 
of probability in a dynamically altering environment, and their acknowledgement of the 
need for natural classification were retrospectively valorized by late twentieth-century 
philosophy of biology. 
25 The change previously was encoded as a reaction against the past, propelling humanity 
from mechanistic dualism to Naturphilosophie and nineteenth-century biology; this view 
left the natural philosophy Schiller and Goethe together flourished in, like a town without 
a railroad station, an underserved moment in that history of science. Cantor commented 
in his review of The Ferment of Knowledge that "[w]hatever ferment of knowledge there 
was in the eighteenth century ... [there is] another very real ferment, productive of much 
heat and considerable light, among scholars of the eighteenth century" (62). 
27 
Schiller's theory of play gave full weight to the aesthetic: he made feeling an equal 
partner with reason, allowing leisure and purposeful purposelessness to be the pre-
requisites of personal and societal development. The historic and scientific significance 
of his ideas could not be fully appreciated before the re-characterization of natural 
philosophy and natural history ofthe late eighteenth century. His place in the history of 
the study of play cannot even now be properly identified - his contribution must be 
carefully teased from its literary context and placed with contemporary research on play. 
Then Schiller's theory, seen as a scientific model, can be updated into the program of the 
biological and social sciences. And as a general theory of human nature, formatted by 
today's evolution-based life science, the theory of play can then be productively 
integrated into today's humanities as well. To rephrase the possibility, the reciprocal 
relations between the study of life and the study of man in each time period can inform 
each other. Just as we learn about the character of eighteenth-century unknowns and 
apply the knowledge that has become available to us since the late Enlightenment, we are 
alerted to the size, shape and possible content of our own black boxes. As such, 
Schiller's theory of human nature might prove a valuable counterbalance to two 
contemporary trends: the rootless, self-referential, post-modem cast ofthe humanities 
and, in popular science, the modular theories of evolutionary psychology. The theory's 
appearance [Schein] was a contribution to the science and study of man in the eighteenth 
century and it is our legacy today. 
The late eighteenth century presents another paradigm: the humanities functioned 
then as the study and the celebration of the sum of human endeavors. Through a 
continuous revision of facts and reworking of empirical surfaces provided by its scientific 
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programs, through the correction of interpretive assumptions arising from previous 
science, humanists directed attention toward both universally held meaning and value and 
toward the practical implementation of those values in politics. Life science was the 
forward edge of the endeavor until it had extended as far as technology would allow, not 
only because such curiosity about nature drives humans generally but because it is 
practically necessary to well-being. Organic syntheses of human activities, the 
reciprocal, co-operative relations of knowledge, were basic to Schiller's sense of practical 
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Many stances in the argument about human nature dating from the Enlightenment 
are still part of common sense about what it means to be a human being in the world. 
What is man? And what is mind? Schiller began and ended with mindlbody relations: 
what kind of existence does the mind have - is it an idea, an experience or an entity? 
What is its relation to the body? Like him, we also work from the polarities of 
nature/nurture: are there innate ideas, or are we solely the products of our senses? Do we 
unfold, are we pieced together by our experience or are we productions of yet another 
mother, culture (as Schiller would say, our second creatress, Beauty)? Of 
nature/civilization: are we corrupt or corrupted? Of heredity/environment - is there a 
common ground of humanity? These questions, and the barely conscious life-stances 
referable to them, play out moment by moment in civic and personal behavior. All are 
addressed by Schiller who was intimately concerned with behavior, with our capacity to 
learn and improve. His theory, rather than attempting "to break down the wall between 
26 The argument can be made that the maturation of chemistry, the "fact" of the cell, the 
theory of evolution by natural selection, the discovery of radiation and the science of 
genetics did the heavy lifting in opening up the late Enlightenment unknowns about life 
forces and functions, about regulatory ideas and teleological processes. 
29 
matter and mind and explain human nature by the physical workings of the body," bends 
along the walls of separation (Thomson 1). He traces the labyrinth of our nature, the 
bounds of which surround and juxtapose polarities. There, in an internal field where 
abstractions materialize, where complex space is emptied and filled with new or different 
appearance, he found our specific ground. Play felt organic to him, and Schiller 
described it both as a place of being and a place of becoming. 
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CHAPTER II 
SCHILLER'S THEORY OF PLAY 
But how can we speak of mere play, when we know that it is precisely 
play and play alone, which of all man's states and conditions is the one 
which makes him whole and unfolds both sides of his nature at once? 
What you, according to your idea of the matter, call limitation, I, 
according to mine - which I have justified by proof - call expansion. 
(XV.7).1 
What is Schiller's theory of human nature? Schiller believed that the capacity to 
play with beauty is specifically human, and that playing with beauty develops each 
individual into a human being. Although he set his explanation in a literary essay, he 
proposed his theory using the language of the natural philosophy and the natural history 
of his time. His theory suggests a basic type for humanity, an archetype that is both 
observed and intuited. It describes a system of life forces or drives, organized in a 
complex way to promote the possibility of a dynamically balanced, internal environment. 
The interaction between drives that stimulates the reciprocal relations among the 
capacities of the mind also fosters a dynamic equilibrium between the individual and his 
environment. 
Schiller's theory redefines play: he posited playing as genus- and species-defining, 
that is, as a peculiarly human capacity and behavior. We are, he wrote, human because 
we play, and only humans play. The word "play" he made specific, like many words 
1 "Also there was the pleasant rhetorical shock produced by saying that play, not reason, 
duty, or religion, was the highest fulfillment of humanity" (Engell 236). 
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used when bent to science. He meant to attach it to a particular set of parameters; for him 
play is a drive state that signifies the human species, and that drive state has a particular 
goal, the sensate ideal (beauty), and a particular resolution, the aesthetic state. 
Schiller's theory of human nature is crafted out of the raw materials of his time's 
vitalistic science (familiar to us from the previous chapter): his forces in the mind, drives, 
were forces in living matter. According to him, humans share a sensate drive with 
animals, but only humans have a sufficiently independent rational drive to counter, in a 
fruitful and reciprocal relation, their physicality (their perceptions and feelings). Only 
humans have this opposition of drives, as a balanced antinomy. The drives' polar 
tension and interaction create a composite drive. It, through its goal-direction, can in tum 
promote development of the individual toward a harmonious balance of free and gracious 
living. In short, the play-drive he intuited as the ground of our uniqueness is produced by 
two polar drives acting reciprocally in a dynamic equilibrium. Our drive for content (for 
matter, for stuff or reality) called the material-drive or the sense-drive [Stofftrieb], and its 
opposite (one that develops later in time), the drive to form and manage that content, 
called the form-drive or rational drive [Formtrieb], interact. Consciously and 
unconsciously, we crave experience and we are equally intent on framing that experience. 
That dynamic interaction creates the play-drive [Spieltrieb] and a mental arena of thought 
and feeling, a middle-ground for contemplation called the aesthetic state.2 The play-drive 
is in tum developed and matured through experiences with beauty. Such experiences 
2 "The sensuous drive awakens with our experience oflife (with the coming of our 
individuality); the rational drive, with our experience of law (with the beginning of our 
personality); and only at this point when both have come into existence": essentially, only 
with the possibility of the play drive, are we human (XIX. 12). 
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change the drive's object of satisfaction so that an individual's way ofliving shows his 
approach to the ideal. 
But, Why Call It Play? 
"Violation or distortion of a previously unproblematic scientific language 
is the touchstone for revolutionary change" (Kuhn "What" 21). 
By choosing to use the word "play," Schiller must have intended the richness of its 
dynamic history to be subsumed into its new particularity. He used a familiar word with 
a surfeit of associations and connotations, a concept with a curious aesthetic feeling of its 
own. And its additional complexity? Play is an amorphous combination of subjective 
experience and objective conditions. Play's subjective components are many: 
unconscious playfulness (in-the-flow), a player's own awareness of pleasure and desire, 
his recognition and acceptance of play's forms, and the player's and spectators' empathic 
identification of playfulness in others. All these combine with a variable repertoire of 
observable (empirically describable or objective) behaviors that occur in other contexts as 
well. Human personal experience floods the concept "play" with memories and 
anticipation; historical cultural convention has already defined playas a class of 
behavior. Play is tricky territory for Schiller and everyone else who investigates it. 
Schiller's new use is problematic: it both calls upon and transgresses this old word's 
etymology. It is a function of his redefinition of play that, through his theory, we will 
come to see playas the common structure of human activity, as a whole where once we 
saw parts. Before the Aesthetic Letters, we knew what mere play was; we were familiar 
with our pleasures, with the activities of animals, of children, gamblers, of various 
faculties or states of mind. Through reading his text, however, we are to gain a new 
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understanding of play as a specific mental operation and a general category. We will 
appreciate it as a potentiator of our own freedom. By reframing our perception of play 
through redefinition and by providing a semblance of play to encourage autonomous 
human development (in the form of the Aesthetic Letters), Schiller offered us, his 
readers, a transformational experience of human nature. 
One of the most difficult challenges in the study of play is defining "play" itself -
both in Schiller's time and in our own. The concept "play" covered a broad field of 
meaning in the eighteenth century. It was an activity of living things in general and of 
social animals, a type of human activity or way of human doing, and an internal capacity 
of mind specific to humans and dependent on self-consciousness: all these were in use 
before Schiller presented his own ideas in the Aesthetic Letters. Das Deutsche 
Wdrterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm presents a long and productive use of the 
word - documented in prose and poetry beginning in the eighth century with Otfrid of 
WeiBenburg. There was a huge explosion of its use in literature during and beyond the 
period of Weimar Classicism - represented by Kant, Goethe, Lessing, Hamann and, 
superabundantly, by Schiller.3 "Spiel" [play] itself conventionally refers to non-goal-
directed, pleasure driven activities of children, older humans and animals, including with 
one-sided play, exemplified by an ironic Luther: "The cat's play is death for the mouse" 
[der katzen spiel ist der miiuse todJ.4 By the time Schiller wrote, although physical play 
3 On line resource: http://germazope.uni-trier.delProjects/DWB. 
4 This last brings up the ambiguity, the deep structure of "purposeful purposelessness" 
and practice - an issue that has dogged evolutionary explanations of play, particularly 
with reference to animals. 
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and games of all sorts were still denoted, "Spiel" was very much associated with mental 
and verbal activity, the interaction between faculties of the mind, from joking to 
contemplating, from judging to fantasizing. With the help of Leibniz' s petites 
perceptions [dunklen Vorstellungen, unclear, obscure representations], Germans, like 
English-speakers, played much within the theatre of their minds. 5 "Spiel" carried the 
meaning of an act, a theatrical piece, the execution (of an artwork), role-playing, and it 
5 Regarding the use ofthe word play in English: "The Indo-European root behind the Old 
English 'plegian' - a root also found in Celtic, Germanic, Slavic and possibly Latin - is 
dlegh-: meaning, 'to engage oneself. ' [At a root level then] play is about engagement" 
(my emphasis). The English word "play" includes activity and mode (a way or manner 
of doing something). As activity, it includes performance (of an action or role) or use of 
a musical instrument, participation in a contest, a gambling activity or recreation. As a 
mode, "play" is used in English often to indicate a frivolous, jesting, irregular, free, child-
like, graceful, light or trifling manner of doing something or moving freely in a bounded 
space (e.g. gears). It is often combined in a phrase to connote some pretense, 
manipulation, or illicit sexual activity: "play along" (pretend to co-operate), "play 
around" (philander), "play down" (minimize), "playoff' (set one person against another), 
"play on" (manipulate someone's feelings), "play out" (use up, exhaust, drive to an end), 
or "play up" (emphasize). As an idiom, it appears in constructions about conduct in life 
("to play fair," "to play fast and loose," "to play the game," "to play cards close to the 
vest," "to play with .fire," "to play into the hands of' or "to play with a full deck"). It also 
appears in constructions about freedom, scope and room ("to give full play"), inclusion 
("to be in or out of play"), co-operation ("to play ball"), manipulation, covert motives or 
pretense ("to pitch," "to play it in Peoria," "to play for time," "to play possum," "to play 
dumb" and " to play up to someone"), devaluation ("to play with feelings"), simulation or 
mimesis ("to playa role or part") of course, sex ("to play around," "to play the field," "to 
play with oneself," and "foreplay"), or in referencing or receiving internal mental 
operations and language ("the play of the imagination" or "to play with words, ideas, to 
write a play"). The etymology of the word "game," so much a part of our concept of play, 
is as follows: "perhaps derived from obsolete' gamel,' to play games, from Middle 
English 'gamen, ' 'gamenen,' to play, from Old English 'gamenian,' from 'gamen,' fun," 
to which the world "gamble" (to risk or hazard, to bet) is closely related. Game includes 
wild animals (on the hoof or as food) as well as human activities and modes of being. A 
game is a competition, contest or sport played with rules within the boundaries of set time 
and space, with a defined goal. As a mode it indicates accommodation to the way things 
are run ("playing" the game, the system), willingness ("I'm game"), duplicity or mockery 
("She's gamey." "They made a game of him.") and structured criminality (a "game," a 
"racket") (Play resources). 
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had hefty infusions of chance, as in gambling and card-playing.6 Risk as one of its 
common connotations extended its meaning to physical tolerance and slackness. 
Idiomatic constructions of "Spiel" allowed for dissimulation, trivialization, criminality, 
and manipulation, but also for freedom and separation from consequences. "Spiel" 
might, for example, stand opposed to "work" [Arbeit], but such an antithesis could easily 
break down: "Spiel, " although it forms an antimony with work along the lines of pleasure 
and utility, aligns with it through emphasis on the energy at its command. The scientific 
definition of work as energy expended later provided the paradoxical (and anachronistic) 
convergence. 7 
In eighteenth-century German culture, "play" then had at least three valences: First, 
the concept encompassed the superfluous activity of animals, the non-goal-directed 
behavior of children and the trivial pastimes of adults. Second, it described natural and 
mental processes that involved relation, reciprocity and dynamic interconnection. "Play" 
denoted the interactivity of the faculties of the human mind and particularly the activity 
of its imagination and ideas. The internal capacity to create representations, both 
knowledge-apprehending concepts and whole-picture intuitions that relate and create, is 
referenced in this use of play. Third, the word "play" included the imitation or 
representation [Schein] of ideas and objects - included are all the art forms and 
particularly the literary ones, poetry, fiction, satire, and drama. It was as well the 
descriptor of Rococo style. In summary, "play" came to Schiller as an admixture of 
6Schiller wrote and worried about this connection. 
7 Schiller never played with this antithesis. A scientific definition of work came through 
Gauss, louIe and Kelvin who developed the relation of work to heat in the mid- 1800's. 
36 
outward and visible, empirical and subjective, rational and self-observational fields. It 
not only described organismic interaction but also was itself described as a mimic of 
organisms and complex phenomena. In the late eighteenth century, playful phenomena 
were not only being avidly studied and but that investigation led to a new understanding 
of reciprocal relations in the individual, the environment and history. 8 
Was Schiller's use of the word "play," burdened as it was with so many associations 
and manifestations, playful? Well, yes. It has the feel of wildness, and it was and still is 
a feat to manage the word, to control the damage of its unintended consequences. 
Schiller, however, counted on the joy and energy it engendered, the unexpected fertility 
and life of the concept, and all of the facets of experience it commanded. Schiller's goal 
of ensuring human freedom required a play that opened up our potential as human beings. 
By describing our nature as a coupling of drives to form another drive, one that orients to 
beauty, he sought to protect and further our capability to choose. That natural ability to 
pause, to incorporate into our repertoire moments of contemplation, defines our genus 
and species. 
8 Weather and cloud formation constitute examples of the complex phenomena studied in 
the late 1700's, information about which was taken immediately up into the arts. Luke 
Howard's work on clouds coupled Linnaean classification with a capacity to manage 
indeterminacy and dynamic phenomena due to organic paradigms. Goethe wrote a series 
of poems in tribute to Howard after reading his "Essay on the Modification of Clouds" 
(1803) and was instrumental in introducing Howard's cloud classification in Germany, a 
system he extended and refined. He prevailed upon Howard to write an essay which he 
then translated into German, "Wolkengestalt nach Howard' (1822). In addition, Goethe 
set up a local weather observation network. John Constable, who wrote that painting 
should be considered a science, documented in his art the interest in weather - one of the 
many complex physical phenomena that can only be framed probabilistically. His series 
of cloud studies (1820's) perpetuated Howard's influence by way of Alexander Cozen. 
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By calling the drive and state that distinguishes the human being by the name of 
"play," Schiller combined two archetypal intuitions and made two distinct classifying 
maneuvers based on those apperceptions. He posited the human mind as unitary (a 
natural whole) in the individual and in the species (even if its potential is incompletely 
expressed in each particular person). Schiller defined humanity as a historic entity, a 
reproducing kindred, separate from any other species (and yet in analogous relation with 
other playing entities). The choice of the word was the result of years ofliving and 
research, the research of a physician and a dramatist. It was as if Schiller gathered 
together all the playing he had observed, all the complex interactions in nature and all the 
objective behavior among animals and in humans. In humans, he observed all historic 
and current behaviors that were not directly related to the survival drives for food, sex 
and shelter. He collected histories of his own mental activity and the subjective accounts 
of others. He read and he compared. He chose the word because its uses, spin-offs and 
connotations only underscored the enormous and successful versatility of its simple 
skeleton. He intuited the deep structure of the concept, "play" and found that it includes 
all our doing and being. Generally play is pleasurable and expectant attention (a 
modulated drive-state attention to things), promoted and intensified by enjoyable framing 
and reframing (conscious and unconscious drive-state application of forms to attention). 
Whether we play, work, read, imagine, think, even when we perceive, we play: all are the 
flesh on the bones of enjoyable and framed attending. He recognized that behavioral 
morphology of humans - our pleasure in attention and its conscious and unconscious 
flexible structuring. Of all the playing, only one kind of play was associated with human 
development, however; our play can and should include interaction with beauty, the 
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sensate ideal. This tethering of play makes it species-specific: only then can we be 
whole, only then can we develop our human potentiality. Again, he synthesized: he 
simplified and clarified a mental category and applied it to the world of experience. Play 
became, by his use of it, a natural classificatory device - a way of both distinguishing our 
species from other species and also uniting all our varieties into one genus and species. 
The experience of beauty is fundamental to Schiller's human play, and it has both 
objective and subjective components. As object, the beautiful draws and fixes our 
attention. As a subjective experience it (combined with the play-drive) is a distinctly 
human purpose/perception/goal, one that has an organic form, a reciprocal manner of 
developing each individual along the lines of his potential humanity. It engenders a state 
of harmonious balance, a contemplative position that opens the individual up to internal 
possibility and external chance. We can play, but to be fully human, we must play with 
beauty. 
The Theory of Play in the Aesthetic Letters 
What then are the specific references to playas a drive and a state, as archetypal for 
human beings? The following excerpts from the Aesthetic Letters highlight Schiller's 
argument, and they take added meaning from the eighteenth-century understandings 
about forces in living matter and from a changed epistemological stance, a new way of 
knowing the general from the study of the particular (by intuiting similarities through 
observation, comparison and analogy to derive an archetype, Urbild, or Haupttyp). 
Schiller's choices also reflected contemporary philosophical controversies about natural 
and artificial classification, the emerging biological meaning of the categories like genus 
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and species and the current understanding(s) of generation (reproduction, continuation of 
organic forms).9 
Every individual human being, one may say, carries within him, 
potentially and prescriptively, an ideal man, [Anlage und Bestimmung] the 
archetype of a human being, and it is his life's task to be, through all his 
changing manifestations, in harmony with the unchanging unity of this 
ideal (lV.2). 
In this passage, Schiller's archetypal man has one aspect that functions like a sort of 
genotype available to all members of a species, and a destiny, an aesthetico-rational goal 
toward which a person functioning at his best might approximate. By using Anlage 
(embryological rudiment or predisposition) and Bestimmung (destiny, vocation) together, 
Schiller synthesized, perhaps conflated, concepts like Urtyp, Haupttyp or moule interieur 
[internal mold] - these closer to eidos, a concept from Aristotelian natural history - and 
the Platonic ideal form. He conceptualized the basic type of human nature as his friend 
Goethe might experience (apperceive) the common bone structure of vertebrates. He 
followed Buffon, Kant and Goethe in claiming commonly held biological predispositions 
for the species, and he depended on Buffon's single-species hypothesis of human origins 
as argued by Kant. According to Schiller, as a genus (and species), humans have a basic 
design: the play drive structure gives humans the capacity to be flexible, primed for 
possibility. \0 The template is given in nature and carried by each individual; the 
fulfillment is the destiny of each person to accomplish. I I 
9 These will be detailed in the next chapter. 
10 Homo is the genus, of which for the single-species theorists, sapiens was the single 
species; the races were "varieties." 
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Schiller continued: 
But can Man really be destined to miss himself for the sake of any purpose 
whatsoever? Should Nature, for the sake of her own purposes, be able to 
rob us of a completeness which Reason, for the sake of hers, enjoins upon 
us? It must, therefore, be wrong if the cultivation of individual powers 
involves the sacrifice of wholeness. Or rather, however much the law of 
Nature tends in that direction, it must be open to us to restore by means of 
a higher Art the totality of our nature which the arts themselves have 
destroyed (VI.15). 
Many eighteenth-century ideas about variation within species (the rise of races and 
varieties) held that each member of a species included within itself the whole range of 
species-possible traits [Keim und Anlagen] and that degeneration caused by environment, 
resources or climate modified or eliminated some possible expressions. From theories of 
the continued existence of unexpressed traits (e.g. Kant's modified prefonnationism, his 
Keim und Anlagen), Schiller hypothesized that while civilization as an environment 
caused fragmentation (degeneration), culture could also restore potential expression by 
means of development [Bildung] through aesthetic experience. In fact, he stated that 
human nature itself is based on maximizing flexibility, that humans have one special way 
of developing latent capacities, and that way is human play. 
[T]o mince matters no longer, man only plays when he is in the fullest 
sense of the word a human being, and he is only fully a human being when 
he plays. This proposition, which at the moment may sound like a 
paradox, will take on both weight and depth of meaning once we have got 
as far as applying it to the two-fold earnestness of duty and destiny. It 
will, I promise you, prove capable of bearing the whole edifice of the art 
of the beautiful, and of the still more difficult art of living (XV.9). 
II Buffon (1776) on human potential: "For what we already know should allow us to 
judge of what we will be able to know; the human mind has no frontiers, it extends 
proportionately as the universe displays itself; man, then, can and must attempt all, and 
he needs only time in order to know all" (Roger Life 458). 
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Play, a drive and a state, is described much as an organism would be described-
characterized by wholeness seeking wholeness through reciprocity. This balance and 
harmony of polar components essentially creates a state of contemplation of variable 
duration that gives individual's access to the genus' potential. 12 
[The aesthetic mode of the psyche] which contains within it the whole of 
human nature must necessarily contain within it in potentia every 
individual manifestation of it too .... because it takes under its protection 
no single one of man's faculties to the exclusion of the others, it favours 
each and all of them without distinction; and it favours no single one more 
than another for the simple reason that it is the ground of possibility of 
them all .... the aesthetic alone is a whole in itself, since it comprises 
within itself all the conditions of both its origin and its continuance 
(XXII. I). 
His theory turns of course on his definition of playing as a drive state. For him, 
playing is our broad way of doing and being, just as for him aesthetics is a way of life. 
He defined human beings as those who, driven (by the pleasure of it) to be attentive and 
to organize the objects ofthat attention, are the flexible ones in natureY Play for Schiller 
12 "Contemplation (or reflection) is the first liberal relation which man establishes with 
the universe around him" (XXV.2). "Admittedly the rapidity with which certain types 
pass from sensation to thought or decision scarcely - if indeed at all - allows them to 
become aware of the aesthetic mode through which they must in that time necessarily 
pass" (XXI.5fu). 
13 "The faculty of attention and its distinctive pleasures were objects of considerable 
theorizing in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries .... According to 
contemporary physiology, attention diverted nervous fluid from all other fibers of the 
brain so that no other external impression could register upon the soul in that rapt state. 
The saturated fibers held the soul in contented captivity, mingling intellectual 
concentration with sensory and emotional transports .... Bonnet posited that attention 
was proportional to the pleasure excited by the object. But the experiences narrated by 
the naturalists suggested that the equation could be reversed: attention also created 
pleasure ... " (Daston 117-8). There was considerable pathologizing of attention during 
this period; it was considered injurious to the health of the obsessive natural historian and 
the virtuoso. Schiller's archetypal play, on the other hand, with its contemplative state, 
is a type of attention protective of function and development. 
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then is a drive, a force in us, and a state (capacity, faculty). It is actually a combination 
of polar drives, reciprocally organized to create a transformational third. He 
hypothesized that play is a reciprocal, complex amalgam of two forces or instincts, the 
one craving reality and content [Stofftrieb], the other, a compulsion to form or to organize 
experience [Formtrieb]. These two energies bring forth a third drive, the play drive 
[Spieltrieb]. This new drive is itself in a reciprocal organization with an ideal that 
energizes and motivates, that is, with beauty. 
Here are the elements of Schiller's drive argument: 
[T]wo fundamental laws of man's sensuo-rational nature. The first insists 
upon absolute reality: he is to tum everything which is mere form into 
world, and make all his potentialities fully manifest. The second insists 
upon absolute formality: he is to destroy everything in himself which is 
mere world, and bring harmony into all his changes. In other words, he is 
to externalize all that is within him, and give form to all that is outside him 
(XI.9). 
In man's nature, which is nothing if not physical, mind always of the body, Schiller, 
like his contemporaries, observed and experienced two polar impUlses, sense and reason. 
Prevailing Enlightenment theory (i.e., Kant) demanded that reason must subordinate 
sense, that morality hold against desire, and that duty be enjoined without much respect 
for inclination. But Schiller was dynamic synthesizer: he saw the need to save the 
Enlightenment project by incorporating counter-Enlightenment corrections. He depended 
on insights from his psychosomatically based medical training, from mid-century 
skepticism and developed Lockean sensationalism as well as the German "science of 
sense" tradition. He demanded that sense have its place. Sense must be to be considered 
with reason, Schiller held, for feeling provides the energy, the motivation that reason 
needs for its purposes. 
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Towards the accomplishment of this twofold task - of giving reality to the 
necessity within, and subjecting to the law of necessity the reality without 
- we are impelled by two opposing forces [Krafte] which, since they drive 
us to the realization of their object, may aptly be termed drives. The first 
of these, which I will call the sensuous drive, proceeds from the physical 
existence of man, or his sensuous nature .... And since form is never 
made manifest except in some material, nor the Absolute except through 
the medium oflimitation, it is indeed to this sensuous drive that the whole 
of man's phenomenal existence is ultimately tied (XII. I, 3). 
The above statement is a late Enlightenment correction of the primacy of reason. 
The basis of humanness as a nature shared with animals, with other sentient beings, must 
be recognized in order to provide the energy necessary for the moral life, and Schiller 
introduced it as a drive component antecedent in time. It was a drive without which the 
other drive component, reason, could not be expressed. It is only within the strictures of 
phenomenal existence - material being-and-becoming in history - that man may have 
experience of the absolute or ideal. Schiller's deliberate equal treatment of the drives 
lifted the lower faculties that were the subject of German aesthetics. Then, 
The second of the two drives, which we may call the formal drive, 
proceeds from the absolute existence of man, or from his rational nature, 
and is intent on giving him the freedom to bring harmony into the 
diversity of his manifestations, and to affirm his Person among all his 
changes of Condition (XII. 4 ). 
Reason-the-faculty becomes reason-the-force, but it is an internal force, needing the 
sense drive for external action. It functions to hone, organize and structure the contents 
of attention at several levels - one of them being the experience of the self (Person) as 
stable in time. 
At first sight nothing could seem more diametrically opposed than the 
tendencies of these two drives, the one pressing for change, the other for 
changelessness. And yet it is these two drives which, between them, 
exhaust our concept of humanity, and make a third fundamental drive 
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which might possibly reconcile the two a completely unthinkable concept. 
How, then, are we to restore the unity of human nature ... [7] (XIII.1). 
Schiller's understanding ofthe interaction of drives includes the important unity of 
the parts; that unity is a transformation wherein a complex organization brings about new 
capacities while preserving the original polarities. 
Both [drives] ... are ... at once subordinated to each other and co-
ordinated with each other, that is to say, they stand in reciprocal relation to 
each other: without form no matter, and without matter no form .... 
Assigning each of them its own sphere, we are by that very fact excluding 
the other from it, and setting bounds to each, bounds which can only be 
transgressed at the risk of detriment to both (XIII.2fn). 
In his description of drives, Schiller relies on organic organization: complex 
reciprocal relations within boundaries that promote the creation of a transformative third 
space. The new state or space is a new environment that makes new functions possible. 
For him, drives are the motive forces. These mental drives (he abstracts) function like 
life-forces in animals (for example, the drive to sustain life or to reproduce): they have 
specific objects. Their satisfactions function like goals or ends. 
We have now been led to the notion of a reciprocal action between two 
drives, reciprocal action of such a kind that the activity of the one both 
gives rise to, and sets limits to, the activity of the other, and in which each 
in itself achieves its highest manifestation [hochsten Verkundigung] 
precisely by reason of the other being active (XIV. 1). 
The sense-drive demands that there shall be change and that time shall 
have a content; the form-drive demands that time shall be annulled and 
that there shall be no change. That drive, therefore, in which both the 
others work in concert, ... the play-drive ... would be directed towards 
annulling time within time, reconciling becoming with absolute being and 
change with identity (XIV.3) .... The object of the sense-drive, expressed 
in a general concept, we call life, in the widest sense of this term: a 
concept designating all material being and all that is immediately present 
to the senses. The object of the form-drive, expressed in a general 
concept, we call form, both in the figurative and in the literal sense of this 
word: a concept which includes all the formal qualities of things and all 
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the relations of these to our thinking faculties .... The object of the play-
drive, represented in a general scheme, may therefore be called living 
form: a concept serving to designate all the aesthetic qualities of 
phenomena and, in a word, what in the widest sense of the term we call 
beauty (XV.2). 
Since the satisfaction or goal of the archetypal human drive, the play drive, is beauty, 
beauty "would have to be shown to be a necessary condition of Human Being 
[Menschheit]" (X.7). 
In summary Schiller (in what might be considered ironically religious language-
figural of both the creation and the Incarnation [the Annunciation: hochsten 
VerkiindigungD had both drive "parents" participate equally in the generation of the play 
drive, a reproductive event that references the theories of Maupertuis and Buffon, and the 
sensibility of Herder: 
Reason, on transcendental grounds, makes the following demand: Let 
there be a bond of union between the form-drive and the material drive; 
that is to say, let there be a play-drive, since only the union of reality with 
form, contingency with necessity, passivity with freedom, makes the 
concept of human nature complete .... Let humanity exist, [thereby] it 
has by the very pronouncement also promulgated the law: Let there be 
beauty (XV.4). 
Sense First 
[T]hought needs a body, and form can only be realized in some material. 
(XXIII.4) 
In the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller posited that the human mind is an embodied mind. 
Schiller's human mind has no existence outside the body. It has necessary and reciprocal 
connections with the rest of the body, and its sensuo-rational nature has its locus in the 
nervous system. It impacts and is impacted by the functions of other organs and 
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systems. 14 Our human nature is embodied, organic; as such, the mind is complexly and 
reciprocally organized. Its sustenance is to maintain harmony and balance through the 
action of polarities within it. It has the capacity to create third entities, transformational 
structures, forces or qualities. Further, it works to be in harmonious balance, through 
reciprocal drive relations, with its immediate environment, the body, and its greater 
environment, the world. 15 As the seat of the self, of the experience of continuity of 
person amid the changes not only of his own individual attributes and capacities but of 
things in the world, the organic mind is both means and end of its own action in time, 
rather than the means to some other non-autonomous end (XIII). 
The mind, like the organ and the organism, has the capacity for development, for 
Bildung, especially through play. Schiller, as a vitalist, had a deep interest in change over 
time, development and history. In the Aesthetic Letters, partly as a critique of Rousseau 
and Herder, he traced the developmental path of play in both the species and the 
14 Because studying the mind is an occupation that cannot be based mainly on empirical 
methods, Schiller subjected human nature to analysis using the empirically derived 
descriptions of organisms and then used the features of organism to communicate his 
intuition (based on years of studying himself and others) about its historical development, 
its function and its fundamental or archetypal identity. The epistemological possibilities 
of this vitalistic position are explored in Chapter V. 
15 This Linnaean idea (1760) of natural economy was an eighteenth-century truism: as the 
view of Nature became more dynamic, balancing and harmonizing were seen to include 
tension over time. Already accepted and acknowledged as part of such a system was the 
violence, disadvantage to or demise of individuals or individual parts. As Schiller 
remarked of balance: "The scales of the balance stand level when they are empty; but 
they also stand level when they contain equal weights" (XX.3). Any organic whole is 
always becoming - always dynamically stressed as it is harmoniously balanced. 
Schiller's view of harmony in human nature is that it is dependent on access to that 
middle ground: "Nature is not meant to rule him exclusively, nor Reason rule him 
conditionally. Both these systems of rule are meant to co-exist, in perfect independence 
of each other, and yet in perfect concord" (XXIV.8). 
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individual. According to him, we do not as individuals and we did not as a species begin 
playing at our fullest potential. At first living as animals do, we played socially only in 
the absence of fear and want, out of exuberance. The sense drive came first, followed by 
a rudimentary reason, a budding rational drive. 
The sensuous drive ... comes into operation earlier than the rational, 
because sensation precedes consciousness, and it is this priority of the 
sensuous drive that provides the clue to the whole history of human 
freedom (XX.2). 
These interacting polar drives created a higher integration and a third, the early play 
drive. Then Schiller proposed that, human beings, through developing awareness of self 
and the beginnings of empathy, began to take pleasure in gratuitous adornment. "Man 
adorns himself. Disinterested and undirected pleasure is now numbered among the 
necessities of existence, and what is in fact unnecessary soon becomes the best part of his 
delight" (XXVII.S). This early form of play, the interest and delight in appearance, found 
pleasure in 'something added' to bare utility. 16 Attention was then broadened from basic 
needs, from the necessary satisfaction of hunger, safety or sex, to a mediated curiosity; 
sustained attention then extended to interest and delight in appearance [Schein]. 
Appreciation of beauty in reality, of Schein, the reciprocal relation of the object itself 
with the perceiving and forming subject, is the additional element necessary to keep us 
from getting trapped. We can be constrained either by what gets our attention or by 
16 "Whenever, then, we find traces of a disinterested and unconditional appreciation of 
pure semblance, we may infer that a revolution of this order has taken place in his nature, 
and that he has started to become truly human. Traces of this kind are, however, actually 
to be found even in his first crude attempts at embellishing his existence ... as soon as 
ever he starts preferring form to substance, and jeopardizing reality for the sake of 
semblance ... a breach has been effected in the cycle of his animal behavior, and he finds 
himself set upon a path to which there is no end" (XXVI!.l). 
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being possessed by our own creating. This appreciation of Schein is intimately and 
mysteriously connected and reciprocally involved with those two early capacities related 
to gratuitous adornment, self-consciousness (self-awareness, self-representation 
[SelbstbewuBtseinD and empathy, (i.e., a person who wants to please must attend to what 
gives pleasure to others) (XXVII.5). An organic relation, dynamic and reciprocal, with 
an ideal motivates and energizes when it is approached through such experience. For 
Schiller, that ideal is beauty. The ideal beauty functioned to enlarge the aesthetic space as 
a sort of mental arena. 
Our first representation, self-representation, according to Schiller, arose prior to our 
willing and is responsible for the original manifestation of personality: 
Only of him who is conscious of himself can we demand Reason, that is, 
absolute consistency and universality of consciousness; prior to that he is 
not a human being at all, and no act of humanity can be expected of him 
(XIX.ll). 
At first humans experienced reason as external because it was inhibitory. Then, as we 
developed further through self-representation, representation and contemplation, we came 
to identify reason as the law-giver within. Man, he wrote, was once "a creature of sense . 
. . an animal first devoid of reason .... [Then he became] an animal endowed with 
reason. What he is meant to be, however, is neither of these; he is meant to be a human 
being" (XXIV.8 my emphasis). We became human as a species because of complex 
aesthetic integration - and this integration is recapitulated in each individual and in each 
separate act of creative perception. First we are dominated by sense (which has its 
rudimentary reason); then by the slow process of aesthetic transformation we move -
from practicing virtues, comprehending truths, noticing a beautiful object and enjoying 
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happy hours - toward morality, truth, beauty and happiness (XVI). It is through the 
aesthetic that we become truly reasonable, and it is "only through Beauty that man makes 
his way to Freedom" (II.5). For Schiller, then, we are human because of beauty - and our 
humanity is reinstantiated in each individual and in each encounter with the aesthetic. 
Archeology: The Labyrinth as the Structure of Play 
In the above, Schiller appears to be working from a model of human nature. He 
begins with our animal nature: first sense - and to it he adds rudimentary reason. This 
common reason (for self-preservation) is necessarily present in animals. In us, it 
develops to create the primitive aesthetic spaces of self-awareness, of empathy (the 
capacity to experience another's humanity and subsequently his individual understanding 
of himself) and of response to representation, our general capacity to create and 
appreciate signs, symbols and art. Human capacity for representation is most highly 
developed in the elaboration of two senses, the eye and the ear. Expression in sound 
(language and music) and sight (materials including the written word) of our mental 
contents is the hallmark of our humanity. The three human capacities - self, other and 
object representation [Schein] - reciprocally develop each other, by modification and 
transformation, in association with beauty toward the full expression of potential 
humanity. Beauty as an ideal has important attributes in comparison to other ideals: it is 
sufficiently pleasurable (connected to sense) without needing a concept, and it does not 
have implicit in it a physical or moral demand (we are not impelled by physical need to 
pursue it nor enjoined to it by duty). 
Throughout the literature of the eighteenth century, the image and analogy of the 
labyrinth is used to describe aspects of the Enlightenment project - the collection and 
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organization of human knowledge, the psyche itself and the situation of the human being 
in the natural and civilized world. 17 It is the application of labyrinth as representation of 
the human mind that I hope will give an analogical boost, a graspable - at once artistic 
and didactic - appearance [Schein] to Schiller's theory of play and the conception of 
human nature described above. Imagine an excavation in progress of an ancient 
structure, a geometric form sunken in the landscape. As the dirt and fill of time are 
removed, debris carted away, some corridors can be traced. The walls of various 
weathered heights can be imagined to stand, but passages leading to lower levels remain 
covered, and the towers of course are down, their rubble obscuring the past. Schiller 
would reconstruct these towers. Were there ever domes or a roof'? Was the whole always 
17 "Let us ... / Expatiate free 0' er all this scene of Man; / A mighty maze! but not 
without a plan .... " (Pope, An Essay on Man, Epistle I: 4-6,272). In their introduction, 
Wilkinson and Willoughby wrote that Schiller's aesthetic construction itself was a 
"labyrinth ... devised for leading [the reader] to the centre and out again, not only in the 
most convincing and persuasive way, but in a way that has been determined by the 
conclusions meanwhile reached by the author" (lvii). Schiller to Komer, 7.v.1785: "It is 
said of Newton, that the fall of an apple revealed to him the whole system of gravitation. 
Through how many thousand labyrinths must an ordinary mind have worked its way 
before it would have made the discovery which the daring genius of Newton attained by 
one mighty spring!" (24). La Mettrie: "Physicians have explored and thrown light on the 
labyrinth of man; they alone have revealed the springs hidden under the covering which 
keep so many marvels from our gaze. They alone, calmly contemplating our soul, have 
caught it a thousand times unawares, in its misery and its grandeur, without either 
despising it in one state or admiring it in the other" (La Mettrie Trans. Thomson 4). Reed 
found the "labyrinth image singularly apt to express [a] dutiful perspective [of 'larger 
than human coherence, a divine plane for whose purposes our plans sometimes have to be 
thwarted']. It simultaneously connotes order and confusion - the order of an objective 
structure designed by divine Daedalus, and the confusion of man's subjective experience 
within it" ("Paths" 83). The labyrinth's dual aspects of order and incomprehensibility 
seem adequate to express the unknowns the psychologists of the late Enlightenment were 
facing. Like Schiller, they sought the theoretical "thread oftruth" to work themselves out 
of the puzzle of human nature. While the labyrinth was a metaphor for them of the 
confusing order of nature (that seemed designed), it was also a fixture in the gardens of 
the eighteenth century (92,93). 
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open to the sky? The structure runs like a maze - and not on a single level: high and low 
gates, a second level, towers .... We would follow Schiller's red thread. 18 The labyrinth 
is the self, known and unknown; the corridors are the drives of sense and reason, and the 
towers are each aspect of representation: self-awareness, empathy and art. These 
elevations, we know from our own experience, communicate with one another 
extensively to form a canopy of play, from which one can perceive and experience 
various aspects ofthe self, others (their labyrinths) and the world. And Reason? It is a 
hot-air balloon tethered by many cords, floating directly above. Some prospects will 
always be hidden - some turns in the maze always, even from each person's own heights, 
will remain unconsciously sensed but unknown. 
What Play Is and What Play Is Not 
Schiller's mapping of the labyrinth of human nature and his path of argument in the 
Aesthetic Letters provide a representation of playas an action of the embodied mind. 
Play stands as an archetypal intuition and a defining capacity of the species: it is a force-
in-matter tending toward dynamic harmony and balance. It is also an example of 
organismic complexity according to the standards of eighteenth-century natural 
philosophy, a product of polar entities functioning reciprocally to create a third force and 
18 "And if we succeed in solving this problem satisfactorily, we shall at the same time 
have found the thread which will guide us through the whole labyrinth of aesthetics." 
This problem for Schiller refers to the contradictory experiences and conceptualizations: 
"There must be a state midway between matter and form, passivity and activity, and that 
it is to this middle state that beauty transports us ... [on the other hand, it seemed that] 
Beauty links the two opposite conditions of feeling and thinking; yet between these two 
there is absolutely no middle term. The former truth we know from Experience; the latter 
is given to us directly by Reason" (XVIII.3). 
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promoting other transformations such as self-awareness, empathy and appreciation of 
representation. And it is a trait demonstrating a developmental history. 
Schiller also clarified, step-by-step, what human play is not. For him, although 
playing is a part of all nature, "even inanimate nature exhibits a ... luxuriance of forces, 
coupled with a laxity of determination which ... might be called play" (XXVII.3), this is 
not the play that he believed defined humanity. And though compelling, the "sheer 
plenitude of vitality," the "physical superabundance of living nature" is not Schiller's 
play either. The tree that "puts forth innumerable buds which perish without ever 
unfolding, and sends out far more roots, branches, and leaves in search of nourishment 
than are ever used for the sustaining of itself or its species" is not playing as Schiller 
defined it nor are the "insects swarm[ing] in the sunbeam" playing Schiller's archetypal 
play.19 Although birds and mammals are active under the stimulus of "sheer plenitude of 
vitality" rather than some lack, while these play, theirs is the play of a physical 
"compulsion of superfluity" and not the kind of play that is the focus of Schiller's 
attention in the Aesthetic Letters. 
Human beings, particularly children, playas animals do. Again, humans play 
mentally under the compulsion of energy: even "imagination [which] has its free 
movement and its material play, an activity in which ... it simply delights iIi its own 
absolute and unfettered power," is at base physical and natural (XXVIIA). Though 
19 "To know which is to nature's greatest credit - precise economy or superfluous 
profusion - it would be necessary to understand her designs .... We have, however, 
before our eyes many examples of the same profusion [i.e. the overabundance of 
spermatic animalcules in male seminal fluid] in the reproduction of trees and plants. 
How many millions of acorns fall from an oak to dry up or rot, as compared to the very 
small number that germinate and become trees!" (Maupertuis 16). 
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Schiller sees that Nature makes the transition through this kind of physical play to 
aesthetic play, even imaginative play (a capacity confined to our species) is not the 
ground of humanity. Physical play is driven by life's craving for content or material, but 
is formatted by outside forces - by available resources, by time and energy, by the safety 
ofthe environment, by the social situation. Much play even in us is formatted externally. 
We humans pour ourselves into projects, tasks, professions, interests, or games, 
contexts formed and limited by attention, reason and emotion. We seek through attention 
"a superfluity in material things, an aesthetic surplus, in order to satisfy the formal 
impulse too, and extend enjoyment beyond the satisfaction of every need" (XXVII.2). 
While form enters and attention is fixed, activity is driven. We are not living differently. 
While we might be tempted to call this paradigmatic human behavior, for Schiller it is 
not. Though we crave content and organize it, though the sense drive and the form drive 
are both active and in that sense are playing, we are not playing Schiller's play. We are 
rather the creatures of our creations or of someone else's: for, by "confining our activity 
to a particular sphere, we have given ourselves a master within, who not infrequently 
ends by suppressing the rest of our potentialities" (VI.6). By allowing the community to 
take our measure according to function, skill or office, we become isolates and are 
estranged from ourselves and each other.2o Even though the basic two drives are in play 
and interacting, the outcome is earnestness and limitation; men become martyrs to a 
capacity or a function. (Schiller's example is Kant.) Thus, Schiller warned that 
20 Society, according to Schiller, colludes with man by insisting on "special skills being 
developed with a degree of intensity which is only commensurate with its readiness to 
absolve the individual citizen from developing himself in extensity" (VI.8). 
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particularly in his enlightened age, men live as fragments or reflections of culture. Some 
remain savages, men living within the necessity of nature, or evolve into barbarians, 
those who eschew nature and reside in artificial niches of culture.21 And these, though 
one would not realize it from their ubiquity in experience, are not playing archetypically. 
The play of living nature and of animals, the play of children and primitives, and the 
play of savages or barbarians are but suggestions of Schiller's play. These types of play 
involve the original sense and form drives, but the drives not equally matched. Further 
the drives, when transmuted into the play-drive, are not modulated or collected by a 
sensate ideal. It is this collection and reciprocal modulation that allows for 
contemplation, free choice and free action. Schiller saw human nature as the archetypical 
provision of agency - free and autonomous thinking and doing - and he believed that it 
was secured through capacity to play in a way that involves an organic relationship with 
an ideal. According to Schiller, our human potential is potential: it is flexibility, but it is 
a dedicated flexibility. The play drive with its created aesthetic space is every 
individual's practical promise of possibility, but this potential broadens and deepens only 
if our drive's goal is an ideal that reciprocally motivates and energizes as it is 
dynamically conceived. And playing balances and harmonizes our humanity only if that 
drive functions as a means and an end. In order to make our development and our 
21 Again, while all specialized activity fulfills part of Schiller's definition of play, it could 
not lead to development of autonomous individuals: through it, "[ c ]ivilization, far from 
setting us free, in fact creates some new need with every new power it develops in us" 
(V.5). Schiller saw the behaviors around him lurching between savagery and 
barbarianism, "wavering between perversity and brutality, between unnaturalness and 
mere nature, between superstition and moral unbelief, ... only through an equilibrium of 
evils ... still sometimes kept within bounds" (V.5). For him, this trend was part of what in 
modernity fragments individuals for the sake of the whole: through it, some are sacrificed 
for the material progress of the species (VI.ll). 
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freedom possible, its goal must be ideal beauty, a dynamic combination of feeling and 
reason, of perception and creation. It is extremely important to Schiller that, as ideal, 
beauty can never be attained. Never to be realized, it is accomplished in the process of 
approach: it is "the Direction [that] is at once the Destination, and the Way [that] is 
completed from the moment it is trodden" (IX.6). "With beauty man shall only play, and 
it is with beauty only that he shall play (XV. 8). Schiller's archetypal human play drive 
depends on our capacity to be in a relation with a sensate ideal, that is, in a continuous 
dynamic relation with beauty. Through this relation, man in time is "ennobled to the 
stature of man as Idea" (IV.3).22 
22 ["dass der Mensch in der Zeit zum Menschen in der Idee sich veredelt. "] 
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CHAPTER III 
THE STUDY OF LIFE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
Scientific progress often consists not so much in a progress within science 
as it does in taking something that formerly was not science and making it 
part of science itself (Bondi qtd. in Rossi xiv). 
Schiller's theory of play, a species-specific theory of drives, is embedded in his 
Aesthetic Letters like a vine in a tree trunk. Both the theory and its carrying document 
are grounded in a vitalistic approach to nature, a tradition which gained its maturity in 
Germany at the end of the eighteenth century. Schiller was quite familiar with the natural 
history, natural philosophy, and medicine of the period, and he used life-science - its 
basic tenets, historical examples, epistemological values, language and metaphor - to 
recruit both feeling and reason to his argument for the development of autonomous 
human functioning through play. He called up data from its particular knowledge about 
nature, concepts from its speculative theories, perspectives from its epistemology, events 
from its history, energy from its controversies and even organizational templates from its 
literature. 
What was this rich tradition? Schiller lived at the confluence of three great streams 
of knowledge about nature, at a cultural delta: these wetlands teemed with facts and 
theories. His inheritance included the data and collections of natural history, the 
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experience and considerations of two medical traditions, and the theories and systems of 
natural philosophy.! 
Natural Philosophy and Natural History in the Eighteenth Century 
The character of the age must therefore ... on the one hand, emancipate 
itself from the blind forces of Nature; on the other, return to her simplicity, 
truth, and fullness - a task for more than one century (VII.3). 
Who collected and catalogued Nature's fullness and described her simplicity, 
discovered her blind forces, understood her truth? And how did Schiller synthesize these 
contributions in order to make his case for man's playful nature? From natural history, 
the eighteenth-century scholars of life gained facts, data collected both from a vastly 
! The contents of these categories, natural philosophy and natural history, are not 
necessarily self-evident, as the division of knowledge in the century was different than it 
is today. As d' Alembert wrote in the Discours prelim ina ire (Preliminary Discourse to 
the Encyclopedia of Diderot, reflecting on the abundance of information and the 
difficulties of organizing it, "[t]he general system ofthe sciences and arts is a sort of 
labyrinth, a tortuous road which intellect enters without quite knowing what direction to 
take" (46). The Encyc!opedie (which Richard Schwab described as envisioned "to 
contain nothing less than the basic facts and basic principles of all knowledge" and "a 
sort of war machine of the thought and opinion ofthe Enlightenment" (d' Alembert xxv» 
ascribed natural history to the mental faculty of memory, and natural philosophy to the 
mental faculty of reason. "Natural philosophy was still part of philosophy ["classical and 
humanistic traditions had placed natural philosophy in the category of letters, or 
literature"] and still struggled with philosophical questions such as those concerning the 
existence of the soul, the activity and passivity of matter, the freedom ofthe will, and the 
existence of God" (Hankins 8, 11). Thomas Hankins defined the categories of science 
further: '''physics,' at the beginning of the Enlightenment, was 'the science that teaches 
us the reasons and causes of all the effects that Nature produces,' and this included both 
living and non-living phenomena. Medicine and physiology, as well as the study of heat 
and magnetism, were part of physics ... [and] much of what we would now call physics 
was called 'mixed mathematics' in the eighteenth century. Mixed mathematics included 
astronomy, optics, statics, hydraulics, gnomonics (concerned with sundials), geography, 
horology (concerned with clocks), navigation, surveying, and fortification." Concerning 
the study of life, chemistry was the province of physicians (iatrochemistry): chemistry 
elided with the study of minerals, and therefore natural history, "the science that 
described and classified all forms of nature .... Our modem sciences of zoology, botany, 
geology and meteorology were all subsumed (at least in part) under natural history" (11). 
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enlarged known world and from a lengthened perception of time. From the divided 
medical traditions, came the iatromechanical art of comparative anatomy (with the 
accompanying philosophy of physiology replete with mechanical metaphors). From the 
iatrochemical tradition came a rapidly advancing and expanding interest in all of botany, 
rather than medicinal herbs alone. Natural philosophy supplied a dualist mechanistic 
philosophy which was further developed by Newton's and Leibniz' theories of force. 2 
2 Why are the terms "study of life," "natural history" and "natural philosophy" used in 
this text instead of the word "biology"? Foucault's caveat is widely known, that there 
was no biology before 1750: his comment reflects the absence of a discipline, not 
necessarily the absence of a distinction between living and dead nature, active and 
passive matter, matter and organized matter and the great interest in the latter members of 
each pair. The science of biology and "biology" as a word are mainly nineteenth century 
productions. Hankins wrote: "The creation of biology as a separate discipline came only 
after a strong reaction against the mechanical philosophy had separated the study of 
living things from inanimate nature and had explained 'life' by principles that did not 
apply to the inanimate world" (117). According to Joseph Caron (who provided a 
historiography of biology by examining the histories of biology where attempts were 
made to identity the discipline's beginnings), the word first occurred in the literature in 
1802(Treviranus and Lamarck), but the content of biological science and its 
institutionalization took the rest of the century. During that time, general physiology, cell 
theory and embryology predominated, Comte posited a trinity of physiology, anatomy 
and ecology (interactions between the organism and the environment) as its content, and 
morphology diminished (234). Evolution was not specifically mentioned in texts about 
biology until the mid-1870's and not in elementary texts until the 1890's (250). Two 
trends insured the discipline's survival: biology emerged as a "publicist science" in 
Victorian England, a powerful organizer of institutional possibilities. Even without 
specific specific disciplinary content, it functioned in an introductory capacity for all the 
life sciences. "Biology" thereby became a generic term for the life sciences, and with 
that successful designation, continued into the twentieth century (254-55).· According to 
Richards, Linnaeus (1736) used the term "biology" in Latin form to refer to botanists 
who researched the life cycle of plants - and it was carried forward in German botanical 
literature as a designator of the work of all such botanists. In 1797 a usage broadened its 
meaning to include the study of life force, and right at the turn of the century the meaning 
broadened yet again (by Karl Friedrich Burdach) to include "the study of human beings 
from a morphological, physiological and psychological perspective." In Biologie. oder 
Philosophie der lebenden Natur (1802-22), Treviranus wrote "the objects of our research 
will be the different forms and manifestations of life, the conditions and laws under 
which these phenomena occur, and the causes through which they have been effected. 
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Schiller's management of the individual in all his particularity and of human nature in its 
unity had its foundation in the content and controversies of natural history; his use of 
force in the play drive theory grew out of the mechanical philosophy and its elaborations 
by Newton and Leibniz. 
Fullness and Simplicity, Multiplicity and Unity: 
Data and Its Classification 
Several factors during the early eighteenth century opened the study of living nature, 
then based in the mechanical philosophy, to new theoretical perspectives.3 From the 
seventeenth century, "a flood of new information swept over the life sciences. Overseas 
exploration brought knowledge of a host of new plants and animals; the microscope 
revealed new realms oflife [including old life - the identification of fossils, 'marine-
mountainous objects' as petrified life forms or their casts - and] intensified anatomical 
research uncovered new information about what had been considered well-known" 
(Westfall 82).4 A growing recognition of a class of facts about things - the historical or 
The science that concerns itself with these objects we will indicate by the name biology 
[Biologie] or the doctrine of life [Lebenslehre]" (Richards, Romantic 4 fn 8). 
3 "The mechanical philosophy required that the changes observed in the natural world be 
explained only in terms of motion and rearrangements of the parts of matter. But beyond 
these basic assumptions, the mechanical philosophers were divided. Was matter moved 
by external powers, an internal power, or by no power at all?" Westfall identified 
Descartes with the last position, Newton (with caveats) and Malebranche with the first 
and Leibniz with the middle description. Leibniz' position, that "force was internal to 
matter" and his influence in Germany and France was the vitalizing impetus of late 
Enlightenment life studies (13-14). In this dualistic philosophy, even with Leibniz, a 
force outside nature was the source of motion orthe origination of motion, of complex 
creation even if, finally, forces became internal to matter: they originated with God. 
4 Briefly, fossil finds (fascinating for centuries) were often referred to as "sports of 
nature," jests made to show the limits of human reason or the creative power of God in 
Nature. For painter Agostino Scilla (1629-1700) however, they were "marine-
mountainous objects" and he countered the natural-theological speculation about them 
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genetic account of the manner in which present nature came to be in time -was 
augmented by extensive geological studies and by the intensive re-examination of the old 
inhabitants of curiosity cabinets, the fossils. Nature was rediscovered as spatially vast 
and it had a complex history as well. This explosion of knowledge about nature 
instantaneously moved from raw data to a deeply stirring, "startling influx of new ideas" 
(Hazard 9), to accounts too numerous to read: that is, it became the "early modem 
information overload" (Rosenberg). While this superabundance delighted some, who 
could never exhaust their own interest, investigations and accumulations, it also fueled a 
crisis of form; the eighteenth century was continuously involved in controversies of 
classification, the difficulties of definition, ordering and valuation. 5 How were accounts 
with a hypothesis wielded like Occam's razor: he sought the simplest, empirical 
explanation - that such objects were organic remnants or impressions of the forms of real 
animals deposited under layers of sediment in ancient bodies of water. In La vana 
specuiazione disingannata dai senso (1670) (Vain Speculation Undeceived by Sense), he 
wrote: "What I do know is that the corals, the shells, the sharks' teeth, the dogfish teeth, 
the echinoids, etc., are real corals, real shells, real teeth; shells and bones that have indeed 
been petrified" (in Rossi 22). Prior to the work of Fabio Colonna (circa 1616), Scilla and 
his contemporaries (John Ray, Robert Hooke and Nicolas Steno), there was no consensus 
that those artifacts we call fossils were the remains of organic life. In fact, Giossopetrae 
(tongue-stones) were common in Malta and throughout Europe and were believed to have 
sympathetic properties, symbolic value or miraculous capacity: Steno (an anatomist who 
had dissected a shark's head) and Scilla each identified giossopetrae as petrified sharks' 
teeth; their work and near simultaneous but independent conclusions would over time 
undermine earlier explanations and attributions, both secular and religious. Others had 
thought them natural growths from rocks analogous to crystal formation or through some 
"plastick virtue [Kircher's spiritus piasticus] inherent in the earth" (Hooke). The above 
naturalists claimed an identity: giossopetrae do not just look like sharks' teeth, they are 
sharks' teeth (Summary from Rudwick 49-60 and Rossi 3-24). 
5 Buffon complained that this perseveration led to "immense volumes on natural history . 
. . which could be reduced to one tenth their present size if all those things which are 
useless or foreign to the subject were removed. This prolixity (which, I confess, is 
overwhelming), [accounts for a man who] sits in his library and reads one after the other 
the Ancients, the Modems, the philosophers, the theologians, the jurists, the historians, 
the explorers and the poets ... copies down all the remarks, arranges them alphabetically, 
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to he verified? What was to be considered a fact? There were wonders and monsters; 
there were breathless travel narratives and painstaking descriptions with measurements 
and drawings, and there were experiments and flights of imagination. But there were too 
few anomalies, because an anomaly is an unusual occurrence that does not fit into an 
accepted structure of knowledge, into a recognized pattern of nature, and even the 
systems were in flux. 
There was so much spectacle in early eighteenth-century nature that doubt and 
method were the only ways oftaming the material and developing a truly natural system 
for understanding nature. What is the relation of one fact with another? How is all this 
information to be arranged? How should this knowledge be structured? By mid-century 
Linnaeus' method was established internationally (and not without continuing 
opposition), but by then more than two dozen other taxonomies had already been 
proposed.6 The attention to detail and the effort to make some sense of the incredible 
and, after having filled several portfolios ... he begins to work on a particular subject, 
wishing to let nothing that he has gathered go unused. Thus when writing a natural 
history of cocks or oxen, he tells you everything that has ever been said about cocks or 
oxen, everything the Ancients have thought about them, everything that has been 
imagined about their qualities, their character, their courage; all the things they have been 
used for; all the old wife's tales about them; all the miracles attributed to them in various 
religions; all the superstitious stories they have occasioned; all the comparisons poets 
have drawn from them; all the attributes which certain people have ascribed to them; all 
the representations of them found in hieroglyphics or on coats-of arms ~ in a word, all the 
stories and all the fables which have ever been noticed about cocks or oxen" (!Lyon 158-
9). 
6 Botany wa~ a huge enterprise, a new science taken beyond the iatrochemical specialty 
of medicinal remedies made from herbs: by the end of the seventeenth century, John Ray 
included 18,000 species of plants in his General History of Plants (Westfall 83). For 
reference: today, there are approximately 100,000 known tree species, and that number is 
25% of the total number of plant species. For the early eighteenth-century natural 
historian, the study of plants provided a fresh field; zoology, according to Westfall, had 
already been worked by Aristotle. According to Mayr, in the 1750's, Linnaeus knew 
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number of observations, methods of discovery and description, and the explanations 
spinning from them, encouraged the development of a more inclusive perspective. 
Attention turned from the multiplicity of life forms to the phenomena that characterized 
life. What is life? 7 
The academic medical professionals continued dissecting and experimenting, but with 
the changed focus of distinguishing living tissue. The coupling of close anatomical 
dissection with explanation grounded in the iatromechanical philosophy of physiology 
connected the largesse of observation with great gains in description through repeated 
demonstrations and experiments. This philosophy proliferated mechanical metaphors and 
elaborate analogies: for example, in these theories the heart was described as a pump, "'a 
about 6,000 species of plants, 4,000 species of animals; he estimated that about 10,000 
species in each group would be identified. In 1778 Zimmerman made more realistic 
estimates of 150,000 plant species and 7 million animal species: for reference, Linnaeus 
knew of236 species of Swedish algae, lichens, and fungi; 13,000 are known today 
(Growth 172). To draw attention to the profusion of organic nature, Buffon did a number 
of calculations meant to amaze, and one of his hypotheticals related to chickens: "if we 
were to hatch every egg produced by hens for the space of30 years there would be a 
sufficient number of fowls to cover the whole surface of the earth (Lyon 179). 
7 There was a great hope that the microscope would bring about a qualitative change in 
the understanding of nature. Its use created and multiplied the knowledge of small 
organisms in the late seventeenth century: what it did for the small, it also did for fossils, 
allowing very close examination of ambiguous objects for the purposes of discrimination 
or entertainment. In many ways, however, the microscope simply confirmed the 
impenetrability of function: what was observed by natural historians was more of the 
"outsides" of beings, unimaginably small complex things rather than their workings. So, 
with this new technology came great disappointment. Unlike the telescope which, 
directly responsible at the hands of Galileo for discoveries of orbits of moons that should 
not have existed and the very real pocks on our perfect moon, effectively challenged the 
Ptolemaic universe and supported Copernican theory, discoveries by microscope 
generated more information and imaginative reporting but no refutation: in spite of all the 
detail and the delighted amazement at the complexity (not chaos) revealed at a whole new 
level of seeing, microscopy provided mainly a cascade of phenomena to be organized but 
no way into history and no empirically-based explanations of function. 
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system reminiscent of the waterworks which ran the elaborate fountains admired by 
seventeenth-century monarchs" (Harvey), a bellows and a tea kettle, and the body, a 
clock with "counterweights and wheels" (Descartes), a "hydraulic machine contrived 
with the most exquisite art in which there are numberless tubes" (Dr. Richard Mead), and 
a mechanism filled with microscopic pipes and channels. In his survey of eighteenth-
century science, Richard Westfall reviewed this analogical simplification and found it 
symptomatic of a deficiency in the understanding of matter itself: "Beside the subtlety of 
biological processes, the ... mechanical philosophy [in its "urge to prune all that 
smacked ofthe occult from the body of natural philosophy" (120)] was crudity itself. 
Above all, it lacked a sophisticated chemistry which has turned out to be a prerequisite 
for the rapprochement [between] the physical and biological sciences" (examples 82-104, 
quote 104). Roger wrote in his contribution to The Ferment of Knowledge, "The great 
weakness of the mechanical model though was that, in fact, it was almost entirely 
imaginary" (Rousseau 271). The mechanical analogies, inadequate and unsatisfying, 
were coupled with explanations in the service of existing beliefs so tortuous that they 
became the templates for the period's satire.8 Fontanelle's challenge serves as an 
example: "Do you say that beasts are machines just as watches are? Put a male dog-
machine and a female dog-machine side by side, and eventually a third little machine will 
be the result, whereas two watches will lie side by side all their lives without ever 
producing a third watch" (qtd. in Roe, Matter 1). Taken too far the explanation of living 
8 Regarding earlier satirical use of the mechanical philosophy, see Voltaire, Candide, 
(Leibniz' harmonious balance), Swift, Gulliver's Travels (the value of microscopy) and 
Sterne, Tristram Shandy (preformationism, studies of generation). The religious tradition 
satirized is the physico-theological one. 
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things by mechanism (i.e. mechanism's own early simplicity and popularity) proved self-
defeating but, as the concept of matter became fuller and more nuanced by the end of the 
eighteenth century, materialists adopted the intemallogic ofthat philosophy: all 
explanations must be from nature and all life functions based on physicochemical 
reactions. The vitalists accepted mechanism as ground, and as a group, they held that a 
broader set of "unknowns" - whether yet-to-be discovered physico-chemical forces or 
never-to be known entities - was possible. 
Matter and Forces: Mechanical Philosophy, Newton and Leibniz 
Natural philosophy itself was augmented - many felt completed - by Newton's late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth-century contributions. According to the judgment of the 
eighteenth century, "what Galileo had called for became reality in Newton": in his laws 
"the victory of human knowledge [had been] decided and an elemental power of 
knowledge had been discovered which seemed equal to the elemental power of nature. 
In this sense the whole eighteenth century understood and esteemed Newton's 
achievement" (Cassirer 43-44). In crafting Newton's eulogy, Pope wrote for the age: 
Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night, 
God said: 'Let Newton be,' and all was light (272). 
Newton's postulate, that forces act between particles and that forces act at a distance, 
coupled with his mathematical expression of it, "constituted a major break with the 
prevailing mechanical philosophy of nature." With his second law of motion, he added 
an ontological category to the mechanical universe: "Newton ... considered forces 
between particles, not as a denial of the mechanical philosophy, but as the conception 
needed to perfect it. By adding a third category, force, to matter and motion, he sought to 
reconcile mathematical mechanics to the mechanical philosophy" (Westfall 142-3). 
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The idea of force, for Newton, was an abstract construct of relationship measurable in 
mathematical terms, but as an idea it was so powerful and so native to our conception of 
things that it - like an anointed offspring - developed an unimagined life of its own. In 
1686, in an objection to Descartes which "fluttered the philosophic dovecots," Leibniz 
made a distinction between living and dead force. And in an effort to argue for 
conservation ofliving force [vis viva], "he ... coined the word 'dynamics' to describe a 
mechanics built on his concept of force. ,,9 According to Phillip Sloan, 
the Leibnizian conception of matter, based on a centre of force rather than 
on material extension or mass, gave reality a dynamic character which was 
applied to nature as a whole. It also restored the Aristotelian concept of an 
immanent teleological agency in nature itself. Leibnizian nature was not 
an inert system acting by contact action. Instead it followed out an 
internal, telos-laden career, governed by in-dwelling law, directed to 
rational ends. God's intervention was unnecessary in this system precisely 
because it carried out by its own power its divine mandate. In this respect, 
Leibnizian nature was at least practically autonomous, and able to fulfil 
and even create by its own internal dynamism without divine intervention. 
For eighteenth-century thinkers able to draw upon these developments, the 
ideal of a science of Nature distinct from rational mechanics or 
experimental physics, presented new possibilities ("Natural" 302-303).'0 
9 In the full quote, Westfall was ambiguous in his attribution of "dynamic" but multiple 
sources credit Leibniz with the term. "Leibniz's concept of force, however, was a 
different concept from the one that modem physics, following Newton, employs. 
'Force' as Leibniz used it can be most readily translated into our term, 'kinetic energy.'" 
(137). In another context Westfall queried: "What is force? In the context of the 
prevailing mechanical philosophy, it could mean only one thing: 'Force is the pressure or 
crowding of one body upon another.' Descartes, who tended to think of the moving 
particle as a causal agent, had spoken ofthe 'force of a body's motion.' On the other 
hand, Newton was thinking in terms of an abstract quantity which could measure the 
change in the motion of a moving body. Impact was the sole origin of force which he 
was then prepared to admit, so that 'force' as he used it did not differ ontologically from 
Descartes' 'force of a moving body' .... There can be no serious doubt that Newton 
considered the forces between particles as ontological realities, and not just appearances. 
In so far as he was prepared to discuss their cause at all, he referred them directly to the 
agency of God" (145). 
10 The concept of Bildung as physiological development as well as cultural development 
is reflected in Leibniz' system of monadology: "The monads are the subjects from which 
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Implicit in Leibniz' stance is the immanence of time and space. For him, they are 
phenomenal and did not exist absolutely, but were realized through things: "time does not 
exist apart from objects, but is grounded in their successional existence ... [and] space 
exists only in the relationship of bodies, and not as a container in which they are located" 
(ibid).!! Leibniz' dynamic organic philosophy with its distinction of living force became 
an underground current for change: it emerged in mid-century through Maupertuis and 
Buffon in France and naturally in German aesthetics. It had an enormous impact on the 
study of life in the late eighteenth century. 
The buoys of sea-change bounced and hurled then with the turn of the century. Not 
only was there change in the concept of matter by the addition of force but there was also 
a movement from multiplicity to unity, from the collection of particular living things and 
the data about them to the understanding of the concept of life. From Paul Hazard's 
perspective, the progressive focusing of interest toward establishing the object itself - not 
all events originate, and the principle of their activity, of their progressive development, 
is not the mechanical connection of causes and effects, but a teleological relationship. 
Every monad is a true entelechy; each strives to develop and improve its being, to rise 
from one stage of its development to another which is more complete ... the dynamic 
processes ... go on within substantial entities, within teleological forces" (Cassirer 83). 
!! Schiller used Leibniz's dynamics: "And so we would ... have the condition of all 
contingent being or becoming, that is to say, Time. 'Time is the condition of all 
becoming' is an identical proposition, for it does nothing but assert that 'succession is the 
condition of things succeeding one upon another'" (XI.4). Again, in another context, be 
began, "Since everything that exists in time exists as a succession ... " (XII.3), but there 
he sought a middle ground between Newtonian absolutes and Leibnizian phenomenology 
in this way: "Before we determine a point in space, space does not exist for us; but 
without absolute space we should never be able to determine a point at all. It is the same 
with time. Before we become aware of the moment, time does not exist for us; but 
without infinite time we should never have any awareness of the moment. We do then, 
admittedly, only reach the whole through the part, the limitless only through limitation; 
but it is no less true that we only reach the part through the whole, and limitation only 
through the limitless" (XIX.5). 
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man, not all natural entities, but the phenomenon of life, and the development of curiosity 
particular to that phenomenon, promoted yet another change. Intense curiosity coupled 
with changing methods and technology led to the understanding that life differed from 
other matter, but how it differed, was the subject of hypotheses throughout the century. 
The empirical, experimental and inductive base of these operations underscored that such 
efforts (however amateur some participants might be) were scientific, in that those 
endeavors benefitted from accumulated information and effort. 12 
As a consequence of the new general focus on describing living matter as a class, 
exchange of information increased among disparate groups - amateurs and professionals, 
academics and clinicians, artists and philosophers. They grappled with a common 
problem, the definition of life, and their mutual interest functioned as a meta-category, an 
area of inclusion. Anatomists, physiologists and clinicians steeped in iatromechanism, 
the descriptive natural historians (the botanists, the entomologists, the microscopists, the 
travelers) and philosophers (natural and general) had a place of meeting in their common 
interest in life - and in the explosion of information about it in the popular and scientific 
press. The whole community incorporated scientific information and the theories that 
organized it. 
Two trends helped restructure the cultural space and prepare for what many believe 
were paradigm-changing mid-century developments. Nature, studied as a mirror of 
divine attributes, became an interest in its own right. With this change of emphasis, the 
12 This distinction between science and arts, developed out of the querelle at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. Roger: "If the historian, then, feels uneasy with the 
definitions of science offered by the scientist and the philosopher, what definition will he 
furnish himself? The simplest and broadest possible one is: every activity that aims at 
knowledge of nature" (Life xxi). 
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huge investment of time and energy in writing and reading natural theology diminished. 
With the focus on nature then, man, once apart, became more and more a part of nature 
itself. As a consequence of these changes, man's capacity for knowledge about nature, 
once perceived as complete (Descartes), was reexamined. The limits of man's own 
capacity to know (Locke) and the contours ofthat capacity came into question (from 
d' Alembert to Kant). Newton himself evinced an experimental and empirical modesty: 
in the Opticks (1704) he wrote, "[T]he functioning animal may manifest phenomena for 
which the physiologist could currently find no explanation in physical terms. In this 
situation one is better advised to exercise 'Newtonian' restraint by observing, collecting, 
and cataloging the phenomena than to formulate 'Cartesian' hypotheses" (Brown 189). 
Newton's 'restraint' was just one of his epistemological contributions to the science 
of the eighteenth century and the emerging study of living nature. He constituted the 
scientific method as we know it today, using analysis - a method of resolving 
mathematical problems by reducing then to equations - as part of a procedure that 
included both analysis and synthesis. He started with the complex phenomena of 
observation, analyzed them into simple components by experiment and then recombined 
the experimental results by synthesis into an explanatory theory. 
Throughout the seventeenth century, analysis and synthesis were regarded 
as two separate methods: analysis, or 'resolution,' was a method of 
discovery, whereas synthesis, or 'composition,' was a method of proof. 
With Newton, however, they became one method and were applied not 
merely to the course of thought but also to the actual doing of 
experiments. Analysis, for Newton, consisted in 'making experiments and 
observations and in drawing general Conclusions from them by 
Induction.' Analysis and synthesis meant the resolution and composition 
of nature to understand how it operated (Hankins 20_1).13 
13 Working with his ambivalence about epistemological necessities and constraints, 
Schiller used the metaphors of both chemical analysis and anatomical dissection with 
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On what grounds does the general follow from the particular? Starting with the 
particular, the individual fact, as the known quantity, and then moving from simple 
observation and experiment - that is, going beyond Baconian induction - by analogy and 
comparison to a general concept or theory was an epistemological leap ... and it was 
Willem Jakob 'sGravesande (1688-1742) who marked out the trajectory. According to 
him, the axiom of the uniformity of nature, by dint of which the epistemological weight 
of empirical observations becomes cumulative, is not a "strictly logical, but a pragmatic 
axiom; its validity does not lie in the necessity of thought, but in that of action. For all 
action, all practical relationships with things, would be impossible, if we could not 
assume that the lessons of former experience will be valid in the future." Therefore, 
scientific prediction is "a valid and indispensable conclusion by analogy .... whose 
denial would imply the negation of all man's empirical existence and all his social life" 
(Cassirer 61).14 As Haller wrote, considering the experiments he had performed 
reference to analysis (See Chapter V). Lavoisier, for example, used this method to 
"resolve the atmosphere into its constituents and then bring them back together again to 
create an 'air' indistinguishable from atmospheric air" (ibid.). Schiller (who may have 
thought of Lavoisier due to his execution in 1794 just prior to his writing the Aesthetic 
Letters) used the separated ideas of analysis and synthesis to show why Beauty as both an 
aspect of things and a psychological application of human nature to objects, was not easy 
to apprehend. Speaking of two opposing groups of aestheticians, he wrote: "The first are 
afraid that by a too rigorous dissection [Zergliederung, analysis] they will rob beauty of 
some measure of her freedom; the latter are afraid that by too audacious a synthesis they 
will destroy the precision of their concept." Schiller seeks the "freedom that is not just 
lawlessness but rather harmony of laws, not arbitrariness but supreme inner necessity" 
that is, the transformational process of dynamic interaction between these two. (XVIII.4). 
In the Aesthetic Letters he offered proof by deduction and analysis but he wanted his 
synthesis lived out through Bildung, a personal progressive experiment with Beauty. 
14 Schiller's posit, "Not because we think, will, or feel, do we exist; and not because we 
exist, do we think, will, or feel. Weare because we are; we feel, think and will, because 
outside of ourselves something other than ourselves exists too" (XI.3), referenced by 
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sufficient to support a specific opinion: "nature is too constant, and I have seen her act 
too often to be deceived on this point" (697). In this new epistemology, the accumulation 
of experience develops to a point where probability approaches a certainty. According 
to Buffon, 
Physical truths ... are in no way arbitrary, and in no way depend on us. 
Instead of being founded on suppositions which we have made, they 
depend only on facts. A sequence of similar facts or, if you prefer, a 
frequent repetition and an uninterrupted succession of the same 
occurrences constitute the essence of this sort of truth. What is called 
physical truth is thus only a probability, but a probability so great that it is 
equivalent to a certitude (Lyon 174). 
In summary, physics separated first from the humanities, becoming a new paradigm 
and the subsequent normal science tradition, mechanism. It was fulfilled in Newtonian 
laws and experimental philosophy. All of nature seemed its preserve: all matter was 
passive, uniform and characterized by extension, fully described by known 
physicochemical laws, and it made up the world of our sensations. A force above or 
outside nature put all things in motion. This view, however, did not always fit - and 
could not be made to fit - the behavior exhibited by life forms. The disparity was two-
fold: the science's own valorization of empirical basis of fact, that "[a]ll knowledge 
required empirical grounding, [that the] only argument worthy of the name was argument 
from fact" (Roger Life 150), was a lesson learned from the successful study of nature. 
Reasons therefore were more and more sought within the boundaries of nature itself. By 
definition, no argument from fact could prove the existence of a force outside nature; 
none could justify an explanation of motion as an action on matter by something other 
some as derivative of Fichte, as a grounding in plain empirical existence, has a nice 
Dutch common sense about it. 
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than matter. More, due to the abundance of discovery and the efforts to develop a 
vantage point, anomalies began to accumulate around the phenomenon of life, 
specifically when life was considered within the joint axes of space and time. Those 
qualities of life - like the establishment of complex structure and apparent goal-directed 
change in the individual over time - seemed beyond the explanatory capacity of 
mechanical science. 
The failure of the mechanical paradigm to account for life-in-time was part of that 
process that led to the reframing of problems. How is a particular characteristic function 
to be explained? Reproduction? Development? Activity? Much was retained to help in 
the work: the facts and their value, the value of the empirical method - these were lessons 
learned from the study of nature. The mechanical model remained as well to explain 
known functions, to be applied more often to the parts rather than the whole of 
organisms. Also, the view of nature's dynamic constancy that allowed for generalization 
and theory-building was carried forward; it would become the current that ran through to 
the modem evolutionary synthesis. D' Alembert (1751) described the change through a 
discussion of new method: 
All the properties we observe in these bodies have relationships among 
themselves that are more or less accessible to us. The knowledge or the 
discovery of these relationships is almost always the only object we are 
permitted to attain, and consequently the only one we ought to propose for 
ourselves. Thus it is not at all by vague and arbitrary hypotheses that we 
can hope to know nature; it is by thoughtful study of phenomena, by 
comparisons we make among them, by the art of reducing, as much as that 
may be possible, a large number of phenomena to a single one that can be 
regarded as their principle. Indeed, the more one reduces the number of 
principles of a science, the more one gives them scope, and since the 
object of a science is necessarily fixed, the principles applied to that object 
will be so much the more fertile as they are fewer in number. This 
reduction which, moreover, makes them easier to understand, constitutes 
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the true "systemic spirit." One must be very careful not to mistake this for 
the "spirit of system," with which it does not always agree (22-23). 
A natural, intense interest in life, a biophilia that seems basic to human orientation in 
the world, built through the century; men who would be systematizers found themselves 
focused on the individual in all its multiplicity - and then they generalizeq from 
individuals' complexity. IS Upon consideration, it is probably not possible to be 
intuitively satisfied with the description of living things as machines or automatons. 
Indeed, as Robert Young wrote, "the concept of matter bequeathed ... by the seventeenth 
century [was] simply too impoverished - too stripped of the qualities of lived experience 
- for it to be credible that that matter can produce life and mind" (708). The dualism of 
mechanistic philosophy put agency outside of matter and removed the questions of origin 
from science; it cast unfathomable beginnings outside of history and set man safely apart. 
However satisfying and useful this solution proved to be in rationalizing conventional 
religious beliefs, it was no match for man's intuitive interest in life. Life's complexity, 
each organism's seeming goal-direction and agency, and the ease with which human 
understanding was refracted in nature's mirror drove the study oflife. Dualism proved 
no match the human intuition of kinship with all life forms. It proved no match for our 
driving curiosity, nor did it stand up against Schiller's subjective sense of wholeness, the 
15 Re: biophilia. Schiller wrote in "Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung" (1795-6) 
("On NaIve and Sentimental Poetry"): "There are moments in our lives when we dedicate 
a kind of love and tender respect to nature in plants, minerals, animals, and landscapes, as 
well as to human nature in children ... not because it gratifies our senses, nor yet because 
it satisfies our understanding or taste ... rather simply because it is nature .... Every 
person of a finer cast who is not totally lacking in feeling experiences this when he 
wanders in the open air, when he stays in the country, or lingers before the monuments of 
ancient times; in short, whenever he is surprised in the midst of artificial circumstances 
and situations by the sight of simple nature. It is this interest, not infrequently elevated to 
a need .... (Nisbet German 180). 
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connectedness of the self, both feelings and thought - and how such harmony could be 
furthered and ensured. 
Mid-century Ferment: 
Complex Relations with Haller, Maupertuis, Buffon, and Trembley 
The first truth which issues from this serious examination of nature is a 
truth which perhaps humbles man. This truth is that he ought to classify 
himself with the animals, to whom he bears resemblance by everything he 
has that is material (Buffon in Lyon 150).16 
For the Enlightenment philosophers themselves, mid-century was the watershed. 
According to d' Alembert (1759), 
If one examines carefully the mid-point of the century in which we live, 
the events which excite us or at any rate occupy our minds, our customs, 
our achievements and even our diversions, it is difficult not to see that in 
some respects a very remarkable change in our ideas is taking place, a 
change whose rapidity seems to promise an even greater transformation to 
come .... Natural science from day to day accumulates new riches .... 
The true system of the world has been recognized, developed, and 
perfected .... natural philosophy has been revolutionized; and nearly all 
other fields of knowledge have assumed new forms .... Nevertheless the 
discovery and application of a new method of philosophizing, the kind of 
enthusiasm which accompanies discoveries, a certain exaltation of ideas 
which the spectacle of the universe produces in us; all these causes have 
brought about a lively fermentation of minds. Spreading throughout 
nature in all directions, this fermentation has swept with a sort of violence 
everything before it which stood in its way, like a river which has burst its 
dams (Cassirer 3-4, 46-7). 
Then, the skeptical critique of Hume, Buffon, de Maupertuis, and the French 
Encyciopedistes, coupled with a great many paradigm-disrupting intellectual discoveries, 
created a fluid intellectual environment where life became the focus - life and its unique 
properties. Publications of research and theory, based on empirical study particularly, 
16 This idea is not new (Aristotle). Linnaeus too agreed; however, in at least one edition, 
he put man in the order Anthropomorpha along with, as Buffon reported, "the ape, the 
sloths, and scaly lizards. One must indeed have a mania for classification in order to put 
together beings as different as man and the sloths, or the ape and scaly lizards" (Lyon 
165). 
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presented facts that could not, even ingeniously, be fitted into the settled way of 
experiencing the world. The discoveries and theories associated with these publications 
worked their way into culture. They stimulated natural history and natural philosophy -
to more observation, experiment and hypothesis - and they also stimulated philosophy, 
theology and the arts to reaction and incorporation. 17 
For the development of the vitalistic life science tradition of the eighteenth century 
as well - of the vitalism in all its variety - "the turning point was obviously the middle of 
the century" when, according to Jacques Roger, the approaches of Maupertuis and Buffon 
and the experimental research of Haller and Trembley "raised ... difficulties," provoking 
open and lively controversy about the general nature of life and the capacity of the human 
mind to discover satisfactory answers (in Rousseau 274). The degree to which educated 
persons were caught up imaginatively and intellectually in these efforts can be traced in 
language as Trembley's polyps, Maupertuis' seductive discourse about active particles, 
Buffon's panoramic natural history, his ideas of reproduction and diachronic species, and 
Haller's discovered properties, irritability and sensibility, diffused through the 
17 Re: the long century formulation. "The whole concept of a basic continuity stretching 
from the end of the seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth has been called into 
doubt. Reinhart Koselleck ... argue [ d] that a major shift in interests and thought - an 
Erfahrungswandel [experiential-shift] - took place around the middle ofthe eighteenth 
century" (Reill "Science 432-3). Neubauer's insight into the three different phases of 
scientific theory formation has application here: mid-century was a perfect storm, a 
period during which such phases of scientific dissemination were intensely compacted. 
"[F]irst of all, the formulation of a theory on the basis of a technological apparatus, 
existing theories, empirical data, and a verbal, mathematical, and lor pictorial 'vocabulary 
of representation'; secondly, the conceptualization and rhetorical structuring of the 
material to maximize its persuasive power with respect to the specialized disciplinary 
community by foregrounding the observational and experimental dimensions and the 
'reliability' of the results; and lastly, a reformulation of this highly specialized discourse 
in terms of concepts and ideas understandable to a broader lay public" (744). 
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atmosphere of the Enlightenment community. Their theoretical stances were also avidly 
taken up as positions of argument in art, philosophy, history, politics and theology by, for 
example, Rousseau, Herder, Kant, Goethe and of course Schiller. 18 These events, 
whether discoveries, theories or their publication, were seminal for the new vitalism of 
the late eighteenth-century Enlightenment. For Schiller, these mid-century developments 
were part of his medical and cultural education. His early responses to them were 
character-building and character-revealing - and his later use of them in writing, art. For 
example, Haller's work on the human nervous system, on irritability and sensibility, was 
referenced in Schiller's first dissertation (Dewhurst and Reeves), and the man himself 
made an appearance in the Philosophische Briefe (Aesthetical 390). Schiller used the 
theories of iatromechanical medicine and metaphors of the mechanical philosophy as 
signifiers of character in Die Rauber (The Robbers) and as indicators of basic function or 
diminution from organic function in the Aesthetic Letters. 19 In the latter, Schiller used 
18 There is a great deal of scholarship establishing the natural historical and philosophical 
connections and contributions of Rousseau, Herder, Kant and Goethe; many scholars in 
particular have traced the importance of Maupertuis and Buffon (who themselves were 
friends in the 1740's) to Kant and Goethe. Both of these last were conduits of natural 
history and philosophy to Schiller. With regard to Kant, John Zammito established the 
importance of Maupertuis to Kant and to the exposition of epigenesis in the Critique of 
Judgment §81, a direct connection to Schiller ("Kant's Early Views on Epigenesis: The 
Role of Maupertuis" in Smith 317-354). Phillip Sloan explored the intellectual 
connection between Buffon and Kant in "Buffon, German Biology and the Historical 
Interpretation of the Biological Sciences" (109-53). 
19 In Act 2, Franz disappointed by his father's heartiness and his expected recovery, 
considers how to bring about his death: "Doctors and philosophers have taught me how 
finely the motions of the mind are attuned to those of the machine that houses it. 
Convulsive attacks are accompanied by dissonant vibrations in the machine; passions 
disturb the vital force; the overburdened spirit weighs down its vehicle." Here Schiller 
had Franz resort to a staple of iatromechanical psychosomatic medicine, disturbing the 
"sweet peace and harmony of body and soul": Franz chooses terror as the weapon to kill 
his father -"no trace of a wound nor corrosive poison for an anatomist's knife to reveal." 
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the epigenetic theory championed by Maupertuis and Buffon as well as Trembley's 
polyps. There too, he employed Buffon's assertion of the biological significance of the 
individual, his natural definition of species and his argument for the unity of the human 
race. And he recalled Haller's research for his drives, the forces-in-matter that 
constituted his theory of human nature. As history, mid-century research and theories 
were, moreover, part of the natural philosophical (vitalistic) milieu he shared with his 
contemporaries and assumed in his readers. 
Haller's Sensitivity and Irritability, Forces-In-Matter and Schiller's Drives 
In my modest opinion, no psychology is possible which is not in each step 
determinate physiology. Haller's physiological work raised to 
psychology, and enlivened with mind like Pygmalion's statue - then we 
can say something about thinking and sensation .... Sensation is only the 
aggregate of all obscure irritations, just as thought is the luminous 
aggregate of sensation. Physiology is the shrine of the soul. Haller's 
work is Pygmalion's statue warming under the hands ofthe lover of the 
human soul (Herder, trans. Forster "On the Cognition" 197, draft). 
Through his study of life, Albrecht Haller became a reluctant foundational 
contributor to the mid-century ferment. Schiller knew Haller (1708-1777) from his time 
as a medical student - as something of an ideal - as a poet polymath whose interests 
ranged from anatomy, physiology (iatromechanical medicine) and botany (developing out 
of iatrochemical medicine) to theology and law. Haller composed original lyrics and 
literary translations of classical authors; he published texts in botany about the 
distribution ofjlora in the Swiss Alps, ones that included his own classification system, 
and he introduced the first volumes of Buffon's Histoire nature lie in the German 
The theoretical base is compatible with both the animism of Stahl and the early vitalism 
of Haller - the mechanical body is animated by the soul (Robbers 56-8; Neubauer 
"Freedom" ). 
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translation, Allgemeine Historie der Natur nach allen besondern Theilen abgehandelt. In 
his introduction to that work, Haller made the argument "that hypotheses are questions 
addressed to nature" (Larson Interpreting 15). Haller, himself sensitive and irritable, still 
had time to be quarrelsome - with both antecedents and contemporaries - particularly 
with Buffon, Linnaeus, La Mettrie and Wolff. 
Through his experiments on living tissues to establish sensibility and irritability as 
properties of matter, Haller accelerated the nascent vitalism, one he vigorously 
distinguished from the animism of Georg Stahl and Robert Whytt.20 As an 
iatromechanist mentored by Hermann Boerhaave, a cautious experimental physiologist, 
Haller was one who "turned from the description of the body's organs as levers, pulleys, 
pumps, and sieves to the investigation of those characteristics such as growth, nutrition, 
and regeneration that make living things different from machines" (Hankins 120). 
Working with a number of pupils and colleagues at the University of Gottingen, Haller 
actively and repeatedly experimented on a variety of animals and human beings using 
different methods of stimulation in an effort to isolate the phenomena of sensibility and 
irritability in living tissues. As Owsei Temkin wrote, these "phenomena ... were known 
long before Haller and the very terms had been coined by others. The significance of 
Haller's contribution lies in the method by which he approached the subject" (in Haller, 
20 "Dr. WHYTT, and the followers of STHAL, alledge that it is owing to the soul, which 
being sensible of touch, contracts the fibres that are touch, and pulls them back to prevent 
their being injured. However simple this theory may be, and however commodious for 
disembarrassing us from several difficulties, yet it is not agreeable to the phaenomena 
which are observed" (Haller 691 spelling and capitalization of the original is maintained). 
Haller used his findings to refute his opponents by name, particularly concentrating on 
the opinions of the animists and materialists. 
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"Introduction" 65l)?1 From his observations, he posited both sensitivity and irritability 
as properties of matter. He defined sensibility experimentally as a function of nerves, not 
their sheaths but their medullae; the fibers themselves carried information from enervated 
structures particularly the skin, heart and intestines (not the dura mater, the tendons, 
ligament or periosteum for example) to the brain.22 He showed by countless experiments 
that sensibility required attachment, connection between the periphery and the head of the 
animal, and that sensation was destroyed when the nerve was severed or tied off. He 
limited irritability (contractility) by experimental definition to muscles - finding that the 
heart ("the most irritable organ of all" (687)) and all muscles, the esophagus, stomach, 
intestines and uterus retained their capacity for response to stimulation even after death of 
the individual, removal from the body and division into pieces.23 By repetition with 
different agents and species, he established to his and others' satisfaction that l) "The 
nerves . .. are the source of all sensibility .... We have seen that the sensible parts of the 
21 "But the theory, why some parts of the human body are endowed with these properties, 
while others are not, 1 shall not at all meddle with. For I am persuaded that the source of 
both lies concealed beyond the reach of the knife and microscope, beyond which 1 do not 
chuse to hazard many conjectures, as I have no desire of teaching what I am ignorant of 
myself' (658). 
22Haller: "the skin is sensible, and indeed more so than any other part of the body; for in 
whatever manner you irritate it, the animal makes a noise, struggles, and gives all the 
marks of pain that it is capable of. This great sensibility of the skin has determined me to 
take it as a fixed standard of that property .... But a wound to the nerve produces the 
most violent symptoms ... " (660, 664). 
23 "I have seen the heart divided into several small pieces, each of which moved upon the 
table" (678). "But all the muscles are irritable. I do not know one that has nota natural 
palpitation after death; they all tremble, and are alternately contracted and relaxed .... 
with regard to the stemocostals, I have often seen with pleasure, that upon cutting away 
the sternum, they still preserved a sufficient force to bend the cartilages of the ribs" 
(683). 
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body are the nerves themselves, and those to which they are distributed in the greatest 
abundance." The nerves and brain are necessary to sensibility and by "intercepting the 
communication between a part and its nerve, either by compression, tying, or cutting, [the 
sensible part] is thereby immediately deprived of sensation" (674).24 2) Regarding 
irritability: Haller evidenced it to be a property of moist muscle tissue (690). He further 
maintained that his results were independent of and irrelevant to question of the existence 
of the soul: "For iflrritability subsists in parts separate from the body, and not subject to 
command of the soul, if it resides everywhere in the muscular fibres, and is independent 
of the nerves, which are the satellites of the soul, it is evident, that it has nothing in 
common with the soul, and it is absolutely different from it; in a word, that neither 
Irritability depends upon the soul, nor is the soul what we call Irritability in the body" 
(696). 
In Friedrich Schiller: Medicine, Psychology, Literature, Kenneth Dewhurst and 
Nigel Reeves noted that one of the standard medical texts at Karl Eugen's Military 
Academy was Haller's First Lines of Physiology (1747) and, based on quotations from 
Haller's poetry included in Schiller's dissertation, acknowledged that Haller "inspired 
Schiller not only as a physiologist but as a poet" as well (43-44). They believe that 
Haller's "early and influential poem 'Die A/pen' [was] one of the first sources of 
Schiller's admiration for simple cultures and intuitive naivete of mind." Schiller, as a 
medical student, however, questioned some of Haller's views; for example, Haller's 
24 Haller believed both that he refuted the opinion that the nerve sheath was the primary 
functioning part and that he offered support for the idea that the nerves themselves were 
conveyors of a subtle fluid that communicated sensation rather than that they were 
oscillating tense cords. 
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opinion that "euphoria in the moribund derived only from the soul's cheerful awareness 
of its imminent release from its early confines" did not square with Schiller's direct 
observation that "the true cause of such euphoria was relief from pain when the nervous 
system had become so deadened and disrupted that it could no longer register sensation" 
(115-116)?5 In this analysis, the young Schiller was practical and grounded in the natural 
world. Additionally, in his rejected dissertation, "The Philosophy of Physiology," 
Schiller explored one of Haller's positions ["into a labyrinth"] only to exclaim, "I cannot 
analyse this further without taking my reader for a fool .... I cannot understand how 
Haller contrived to be so superficial. Haller is too great for his stature to be diminished 
by this error. Quandoque bonus dormitat Hallerus" (162). The editors implied that 
Schiller may have misconstrued Haller's findings, a very unfortunate misunderstanding 
for a student desiring to graduate (169 fn 10). 
In the same dissertation, however, Schiller (1779) based his argument upon 
correlations made by Haller between emotions and physiological processes; he used the 
hypothesis that nerves were microtubules of dynamic subtle fluids and he extended 
Haller's above definition of sensitivity to include that notion of force. 26 "[F]inally," he 
wrote regarding the influence of matter on mind, "there must be a force at work that 
mediates between mind and matter [through the senses]." 
25 As Buffon wrote: "if you do not know how to die, do not worry; Nature will inform 
you immediately, completely, and sufficiently; she will do exactly that work for you; do 
not let that affect your life" (in Roger Buffon 172). 
26 This extension was a typical fate of Haller's experimental results at the hands oflater 
vitalists, and Schiller himself evolved and changed over the years until his Miltelkraft 
became the Spieltrieb in 1794. 
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A force which can be altered by matter and which can alter the mind. This 
would be a force which is spiritual on the one hand and material on the 
other, an entity that is penetrable on the one hand and impenetrable on the 
other. Is such an entity conceivable? Of course not! .... 
Be that as it may, a force in fact exists between matter and mind .... 
The transmutative force resides in the nerve ... After profound doubt I have 
reached the firm conclusion that the transmutative force resides in an 
infinitely subtle, simple and mobile substance, which flows through the 
nerve, its channel and which I call not elemental fire, not light or ether, 
nor electrical or magnetic matter, but nerve spirit. And from now on I shall 
refer to the transmutative force by this term (Schiller in Dewhurst 150, 
152, 154-5). 
Schiller's middle force [Mittlelkraft], his transmutative force present in the sense 
organs, nerves and brain, was responsible for changing perceptions to "material ideas;" 
these ideas then could be absorbed and transformed by the mind (soul) into true 
cognitions (171).27 As indicated by Schiller's inclusion of Haller's research, the 
trajectory of its use was secular: to Haller's dismay - he was a pious man - his research 
forwarded a vitalism without a religious connection; his discoveries lent themselves to an 
increasingly natural and historical tradition, one Schiller participated in and one that 
Haller fought in another arena, that of the generation controversy.28 
27Like the other vital forces hypothesized during that time, Schiller's early vital force was 
not entirely a/matter in the same way that later forces, like Blumenbach's Bildungstrieb, 
Herz' Lebenskraft or his own Triebe, would be. 
28 La Mettrie (writing as Demetrius) and the materialists also hijacked Haller's research; 
they "used irritability as an argument against the very existence of a spiritual soul. Haller 
... was highly indignant at De La Mettrie who in his writings moreover had ridiculed 
him and made him the laughing stock of all Europe" (Temkin Intro to Haller 653). 
Haller: "The deceased M. DE LA METTRIE has made Irritability the basis of the system 
which he advanced against the spirituality of the soul ... without ever having made the 
least experiment about it" (695). La Mettrie, the job of satirist made easy by an inflated 
target, would have been thrilled by Haller's arrogant irascibility. 
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The Generation Controversy 
From the last part ofthe seventeenth century, because observation was dependent on 
skill with a microscope and the activity of the imagination, competing and ambiguous 
discoveries fueled battles about generation. Individual researchers sought proof of their 
own hypotheses - particularly in this intensely interesting area. At first discoveries were 
associated with the ovist and spermist controversy within a larger theoretical position, 
preformationism (also called evolution or later encapsulation).29 Within that context, the 
29 Kant summarized the generation controversy in §81 of the Kritik der Urteilskrafi 
(Critique of the Power of JUdgment) (290-293). The following detail with respect to 
preformationism may be helpful. Preformation was the ground upon which ovists and 
animalculists fought. This theory, summarized in a review article from 1691, held that "it 
seems most probable, [that] the Stamina of all Plants and Animals that have been, or ever 
shall be in the World, have been form'd ab Origine Mundi, by the Almighty Creator, 
within the first of each respective Kind" (Garden quoted in Sloan "Buff on German 
Biology" 110). Each group felt that evidence of preformed individuals had been 
discovered in the products of one, either the male or female parent. Spermists like Anton 
Leeuwenhoeck discovered animalcules in male semen, and after much debate among 
themselves and in the greater community, established that they were not evidence of 
infection, whether from creation or by disease. Animalcules however were too terribly 
abundant to be the carriers of preformed individuals: such a possibility seemed wasteful 
beyond the bounds of a providential system. Ovists believed that eggs (which were far, 
far less numerous) were the female's own and not the combination of both female egg 
and male sperm. They gained their ascendency in the late 1600's when the belief in the 
spontaneous generation of insects succumbed to the proof of their emergence from eggs 
and when, by the use of analogy with birds, eggs were sought and discovered in 
viviparous animals. As preformationists, they prevailed beyond the middle of the 
eighteenth century. William Harvey, an enthusiast of the microscope as well, 
pronounced "Omnia ex ovo, " a succinct expression of many different interpretations of 
known facts about female anatomy. The following written in 1665 serves as an example: 
in all females, "there are seeds ... like eggs - so named either in the proper sense or by 
analogy, - which are fertilized through union with the male; among these eggs, some are 
laid before the fetus has been produced ... and others are retained until the fetus emerges 
from them, living and formed" (Deusing in Roger Life 207). Ovism established that 
females contributed something other than menstrual blood to the process of generation. 
Arguments against ovism generally developed around interpretations of female anatomy 
- questions about the actual existence of eggs on the ovaries and about the capacity of the 
Fallopian tubes to transport eggs. Cultural beliefs in the primacy of the male (in actual 
fathering) or in the failure of analogy from male structures characterized other arguments. 
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opinion of the ovists prevailed and the dispute progressed to arguments about the 
development of the embryo and fetus. Preformationists believed development was 
actually the growth (enlargement) of preformed miniscules, an evolutionary unfolding of 
individuals first formed at creation. Their opponents held that embryos developed by 
gradually gaining form from undifferentiated matter in a process directed by unknown 
forces. This last position, this alternative theory to preformation, was epigenesis. 
Preformationists believed that the new life was present in the seed of one of the 
parents, deposited there at creation, an event outside of or at the outset of time. This 
theory preserved the mechanistic view of reality - passive matter, the agency of a Creator 
- and the account of creation in Genesis. It was, on the other hand, unwieldy: it raised 
more questions than it could provide answers, and was difficult to square with the known 
facts. The ease with which it lent itself to satire may have actually prolonged its life: 
authors enjoyed provoking readers' imaginations about being co-eternal with parents, 
grandparents and Socrates, ifhe were an ancestor. They encouraged imagining the tight 
fit, being scrunched into the tiniest possible space with all the people ever to come into 
existence, a space which got successively more commodious as more and more 
individuals moved toward the moment of birth. As a seed developed, it simply grew 
larger, unwrapping itself like a peony. Besides working within the established paradigm, 
this theory explained the activity of the Creator (as non-occasional in his interventions) 
and the stability of species. It also precluded having to explain how organisms came into 
being and changed in time. Leibniz, for example, depended on it. 
84 
Performationists were left with one question to be answered: what part did each sex 
play in generation, and more specifically, what role did the following play - the 
"animalcules" or spermatozoa in male semen and eggs and the fluids of the female? 
The alternative, epigenetic theory, though known from classical times, did not gain 
wide notice until the mid-eighteenth century, and it figured prominently in the mid-
century upheaval and the late Enlightenment. Epigenesis described reproduction as 
development progressing from unorganized matter. Older epigenetic arguments posited 
that one parent (usually the male) provided the stimulation or some sort of principle of 
activation for organization or, alternatively, that he infused the matter provided by the 
female with form. The theories of mutual production of fluid or seed which posited the 
equal importance in action and involvement of the two sexes were known throughout 
history and were revived by Buffon and Maupertuis for epigenesis at mid-century. 
Epigenesis made reproduction, the creation of a new being, a historical event. As such 
epigenesis would become central to the Enlightenment vitalists' exploration of nature -
its polarities, middle spaces and life forces. Such a theory allowed generation to be 
reproduction and development to be transformational; it accepted organisms as self-
organizing in time. It, however, raised a terrific difficulty: such a theory necessitated 
hypothesizing a principle (or force) of life to begin and sustain the direction of new 
being's development to adulthood in a particular species, an apparent goal-directed 
activity. And it demanded the necessity of at least one event of spontaneous generation 
of life in the history of the earth, one too many for the Enlightened. 
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Maupertuis, the Generation Controversy and Schiller's Use of Reproduction 
Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698-1759) was a mathematician and 
astronomer who became interested in biological problems and probability studies.3D 
A strong proponent of the experimental method, he observed and dissected both 
salamanders and scorpions. As a result of his research, he believed in the dynamic 
constancy of nature: "no matter how great the variety of nature," he wrote, "the heart of 
things is always about the same. We all know what advantages are to be derived from 
comparative anatomy; the perfect knowledge of a single body is perhaps no more than the 
price one pays for the impossible examination of all the bodies in nature" (Maupertuis 
"Intro" xiv-v). He was France's first Newtonian, and in an effort to prove a Newtonian 
hypothesis about the shape of the earth - that it was flattened at the poles -led an 
3D "Might one not say that in the chance combination of nature's productions, since only 
those endowed with certain relations of suitability could survive, it is no cause for 
wonder that this suitability is found in all species that exist today? Chance, one might 
say, produced an innumerable multitude of individuals; a small number turned out to be 
constructed in such a fashion that the parts of the animal could satisfy its needs; in 
another, infinitely greater number, there was neither suitability nor order: all ofthe latter 
have perished; animals without a mouth could not live, others lacking organs for 
reproduction could not perpetuate themselves; the only ones to have remained are those 
in which were found order and suitability; and these species, which we see today, are 
only the smallest part of what blind fate has produced" (Maupertuis qtd. in Roger Life 
381). Regarding this excerpt, Roger wrote: "I would like to state here once and for all 
that it is absolutely impossible to see in this text an early anticipation of Darwin's theory 
of natural selection. For Lucretius, as for Maupertuis in this text, for La Mettrie in the 
Systeme d'Epicure (397-98), and for Diderot in the Lettre sure les aveugles, what was 
involved was the disappearance of beings incapable ofliving or reproducing for reasons 
of malformation. Competition with other species did not enter into the matter. ... But 
having been a disciple of Lucretius's does not suffice to make one a precursor of Darwin 
(Life 652 fn 66). Cf., this excerpt's use by Bentley Glass in Forerunners, 57-58. 
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expedition to Lapland in order to measure an arc of the meridian there.3l When it was 
realized that his measurements supported the theory of a foreigner (worse, an 
Englishman) an unpleasant and irrational dispute ensued, and in 1740 he accepted an 
invitation from Frederick the Great to reorganize the Berlin Academy of Sciences. 
Before he could begin, while trying to find Frederick in the midst of a campaign, 
Maupertuis accidentally crossed the battle lines, was captured during the Battle of 
Mollwitz and taken to Vienna as a prisoner of war (Hankins 35). Finally in 1745, he 
assumed the Presidency of the Academy. Conflict however followed him: he was 
accused of taking credit for the discovery of the Principle of Least Action when the honor 
should have been accorded to Leibniz, and his old friend Voltaire was enlisted against 
him. From that satirist, Maupertuis was granted another life in print: he was excoriated in 
"Diatribe of Dr Akakia," "Micromegas" and in numerous epigrams about his sexual 
escapades (Boas in Maupertuis xx). 
According to Jacques Roger, "a minor social event - the presence in Paris of an 
albino African child who was being exhibited in the salons," offered Maupertuis the 
opportunity to write two occasional works on reproduction," one of which, Venus 
Physique (The Earthly Venus 1745), was read throughout Europe (Life 383). The 
Earthly Venus affirmed the reciprocity of human sexuality, the pleasure of both sexes, 
and postulated the equal contribution of both to reproduction. In its pages, the generation 
controversies were described and the epigenetic theory of reproduction was popularized 
3l He was also an avid follower of Leibniz while opposing the rigid Wolffian 
interpretation of him. Cassirer: "It was especially Maupertuis who brought Leibniz to 
France" (86). 
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by a graceful, bright and somewhat seductive manner of explanation. 32 By presenting a 
pedigree chart of a family with polydactyly, Maupertuis introduced proofs of heredity 
involving both parents. Recording of genealogical data was a radical innovation, and its 
use by Maupertuis destroyed both the ovist and spermist positions (Boas in Maupertuis 
xxv). Though he knew that, in saying the fetus was formed from the mixture of two 
seeds, he really hadn't explained this formation at all, Maupertuis couldn't help himself; 
he augmented epigenetic theory in the following way. He held that 1) in the seminal 
fluid of every species were innumerable particles which perpetuate that species. 2) Each 
individual also had particles, more in number, which perpetuated individual traits, and 3) 
each particle produced germs that have the capacity to induce development of a specific 
organ or structure (53, "Intro" xxix).33 He theorized that chemical attraction of particles 
32 "The real merit of Maupertuis in this matter lay in his having reestablished the 
principle of epigenesis; in other words, in having brought the problem of generation back 
into the domain of secondary causes and having restored to science a question that had 
been abandoned to metaphysics. But the philosophical character of the undertaking was 
uncomfortably evidenced by the absence of any new fact .... After this, it would have 
been prudent not to purpose any system, and, indeed, Maupertuis was careful not to. He 
went on however to present some 'vague thoughts' and 'questions for examination,' 
which turn out in fact to be a theory of generation based on a mixture of the two seeds 
[male and female] ... " (! 385). 
33 In considering the assortment of particles in reproduction, Maupertuis wrote: "a 
uniform and blind attraction spread out through all parts of matter can no longer serve 
[making an analogy along the lines of gravity for generation] .... we must have recourse 
to some principle of intelligence, something similar to what we call desire, aversion, 
memory . ... The elements suited to the formation of the fetus swim in the seeds of the 
father and mother animals; but each, extracted from the part similar to the one it is to 
form, keeps a kind of memory of its prior placement; and it will resume it again when it 
can, in order to form the same part in the fetus" (Maupertuis quoted by Roger Life 390). 
Roger believed that Maupertuis "contributed to the extraordinarily important evolution 
leading from the Leibnizian idea of a soul added to matter to the idea of a 'dull 
sensitivity' granted to matter itself, an idea to be encountered again in La Mettrie and 
Diderot" (392). 
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in the two seminal fluids, each for the other, on the basis of the shared structure that 
would develop from them, allowed for proper assortment and reproduction of a new 
individual. 
Like Maupertuis' theory of the contribution of active particles by both sexes, in 
Schiller's drive theory, sense and reason as forces each made active contribution to 
human nature. Their union, as Schiller had Reason trumpet it in his text, reads like a 
marriage of the sexes, like a union of sex, particularly if Aristotelian bias is admitted: 
Let there be a bond of union between the form-drive and the material-
drive; that is to say, let there be a play-drive, since only the union of 
reality with form, contingency with necessity, passivity with freedom, 
makes the concept of human nature complete .... Let humanity exist .... 
(XV.4). 
As alluded to above, in Schiller, the generation of the play drive has an Aristotelian 
element, the (female) material drive is substance for the (male) form drive. Maupertuis 
summarized Aristotle for the readers of The Earthly Venus as follows: 
The ancients believed that the embryo originated from the mixture of the 
seminal fluids given off by the sexes. That of the male, when propelled 
into the womb, combined with that of the female. After this mingling had 
taken place, the Ancients found no difficulty understanding the creation of 
an animal. The operation was due to Generative Force. 
Aristotle, as may well be believed, was not more puzzled than others by 
the problem of generation. He differed only in believing that the 
generative principle came solely from the male. The female fluid's only 
function was providing food and growth for the fetus. To use Aristotle's 
terms, it supplied the matter while the male supplied the form (8). 
The format of Maupertuis' theory then had several features congenial to Schiller's 
point of view. From a meta-perspective, his theory helped establish the vitalistic 
paradigm of the creation of a third, that is, of polarities joining to produce a new entity 
without losing their own existence. Through an analogy from epigenesis, Schiller 
displayed this same intense interest in managing the polarities of human life and the 
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active forces of the personality in his psychology (W & W Appendix III). He emphasized 
the reciprocity of processes and forces in his theory of the drives that join to create the 
play drive, harmonizing without losing the character of the originals - i.e. two opposing 
forces which do not annihilate each other but create a third 'mixed' capacity. 
The sense-drive demands that there shall be change and that time shall 
have a content; the form-drive demands that time shall be annulled and 
that there shall be no change. That drive, therefore, in which both [the 
form-drive and the sense-drive] work in concert [I call ... ] the play-drive 
... [which is ] directed towards annulling time within time, reconciling 
becoming with absolute being and change with identity. (XIV.3) 
In L 'histoire naturelle (1749) one of the most widely read and owned series of books 
about nature in the eighteenth century, Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon posited 
a similar generation theory, with the addition of a moule interieur [internal mold] to act 
as a template of sorts, as a limiting dynamic archetype.34 In his article on the horse, 
Buffon placed the internal mold in the original of the species and in each individual: 
There is in Nature a general prototype of every species, upon which each 
individual is modelled, but which seems, in its actual production, to be 
depraved or improved by circumstances; so that, with regard to certain 
qualities, there appears to be an unaccountable variation in the succession 
of individuals, and, at the same time, an admirable uniformity in the entire 
species. The first animal, the first horse, for example, has been the 
external and internal model [moule interieur; Kastner: innerliche Form], 
upon which all the horses that have existed, or shall exist, have been 
formed. But this model, of which we know only copies, has had, in 
communicating and multiplying its form, the power of adulterating or of 
improving itself. The original impression is preserved in each individual. 
But, among millions of individuals, not one exactly resembles another, 
34 Many late eighteenth century theories are revitalized ideas from past traditions or are 
based on imports from specific natural philosophers. Maupertuis' and Buffon's theories 
of generation have Galenist origins (Terrall, Sloan); Sloan saw in Buffon's emphasis on 
the physical and his internal mold as a recovery of a William Harvey treatise on 
Aristotle's eidos, species as form (Sloan, "From logical universals to historical 
individuals; Buffon's Idea of Biological Species"). Vitalism itself resonated alchemic 
and animist positions (van Helmont (1648), Stahl, (1660-1734)). 
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nor, of course, the model from which they sprung. This difference, which 
shows that Nature is not absolute, but knows how to vary her works by 
infinite shades, is equally conspicuous in the human species, in all 
animals, and in all vegetables (Buff on Trans. Smellie 344). 
According to Reill, "Buffon's formulation established a rhetorical strategy that used 
Newtonian vocabulary but transformed its general meaning .... [Using a paradox to 
explain moule interier, Buffon wrote that it appears to] 'join two contradictory terms ... 
one, the idea of form' applied 'only to surfaces.' The other, 'inner' or 'internal,' was 
usually applied to mass .... " This mediating thought form, the moule interier, "became 
the physical symbol of the 'extended middle,' a formation designed to transcend binary 
forms of argumentation" (Vitalizing 46). Known to both Kant and Goethe, Buffon's 
conception of reproduction and his synthetic process was basic to Schiller's natural 
philosophical perspective. 
Buffon, Classification and Species Definition, and the Use of Species in Schiller 
Buffon, who maintained a research forest and a menagerie of animals on his own 
estate, produced - with Daubenton's assistance - thirty-six volumes ofthe Histoire 
nature lie, generale et particuliere between 1749-1788. Jacques Roger, Buffon's 
biographer, wrote that "in this immense work, he transformed the way of understanding 
nature. He did not give new answers to traditional questions; he opened new fields of 
research; he suggested a new way of conceiving natural history by his audacity and often 
by his mistakes.,,35 In The Growth of Biological Thought, Ernst Mayr marked Buffon's 
"monumental and fascinating" work: 
35Roger continued, "I have not ignored his inadequacies, knowing they added to his 
genius and to a system of thinking in which one must find the internal logic; in addition, 
had he been a 'model scientist' he would have been in what Thomas Kuhn calls 'normal 
science,' and he never would have had so many new ideas" (Buffon xvi). 
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It is no exaggeration to claim that virtually all the well-known writers of 
the Enlightenment, and even of later generations, in France as well as in 
other European countries were Buffonians, either directly or indirectly. 
Truly, Buffon was the father of all thought in natural history in the second 
half of the eighteenth century (330). 
Buffon's ideas evolved over his long literary career. Citing his "versatile, indeed 
almost mercurial mind," Mayr described Buffon as a scholar who "looked at many 
subjects from so many different sides that he not infrequently contradicted himself' 
(330). And, because of the political situation, many scholars believed that Buffon could 
not write with total candor. Roger, particularly, noted that Buffon wrote conventionally 
in introductory pieces and in articles that might come under the scrutiny of the Sorbonne, 
hiding his controversial theories about man, for example, in articles about animals. 
Buffon was not always appreciated: close observers like Bonnet (who was attacked by 
Buffon for anthropomorphizing his beloved bees) and the empiricist and mathematician 
d' Alembert both complained of his generalities, his Buffonades, seeing him more as a 
popularizer than a scientist. As noted earlier, it was Albrecht Haller who introduced his 
work into Germany; Kant and Herder carried his theories from natural philosophy to 
philosophy there. 
Given the three dozen volumes written over decades and his penchant for changing 
his opinions with new evidence or theoretical constructions, Buffon (especially mediated 
through Kant whose natural historical base and opinions changed over the years as well) 
was a tremendous source of indeterminacy - a compendium of points-of-view - for a 
synthesizer like Schiller. Most theories illuminated part of the picture; they both 
answered questions and raised further difficulties, and the discoveries and experiments 
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both overturned assumptions and were put to polemic use by all sides of a controversy. 
In the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller's concepts show the variability, inconsistency and 
possibility of an author synthesizing disparate and controversial theories, usages and 
understandings. Schiller played with classification, with the reality of the individual, 
species and genus, sometimes using the later two in a systematizing (rationalizing) way, 
sometimes striving for natural classification based on Buffon's concept of relation. In 
other words, some sense was to be made, but from Schiller's point of view, it was to be 
done in the combination of the theories, in the bending of concepts and the re-application 
of the known to human nature. Buffon was part of the milieu, a compendious source of 
form and content. 
Buffon, particularly in the early volumes and the Initial Discourse, fractiously 
opposed Linnaeus' system and espoused an iconoclastic nominalism: classification, he 
wrote, "is at the very most only a convention, an arbitrary language, a means of mutual 
understanding. But no real cognizance of things can result from it" (Lyon Trans. 152).36 
"It is a 'metaphysical error,' [Buffon] insists, to search for a basis for systemization in 
nature. The more divisions a would-be systematizer makes in nature, the closer he 
approximates 'truth.'" This 'biological calculus' brings humans closer to reality, for "the 
order we eventually find in nature is more the subjective result of the workings of the 
human mind and will than a reflection of objectively existing reality; for nature proceeds 
by imperceptible nuances or gradations ... " (Lyon paraphrasing Buffon, 134, 136). In a 
passage where Buffon arbitrarily multiplied Linnaeus' classes in an ironic application to 
improve accuracy of a system by atomizing it, he wrote: 
36 Lyon noted that Buffon later modified his nominalism significantly ("Intro" 134). 
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For, in general, the more one augments the number of divisions of the 
productions of nature, the more one approaches the truth, since in nature 
only individuals exist, while genera, orders, and classes only exist in our 
imagination (Lyon trans. 164). 
It is significant that Buffon did not include the category species in the above products of 
imagination. That exclusion is purposive: he contended that species as a group of related 
individuals can be biologically defined. 
Like Buffon, Schiller had nominalist inclinations. In an argument about the natural 
State as mechanical, as not functioning with the complex reciprocal relations of an 
organic entity, he saw classification as a straight-jacket that obscured reality and feed-
back: 
the State remains for ever a stranger to its citizens since at no point does it 
ever make contact with their feeling. Forced to resort to classification in 
order to cope with the variety of its citizens, and never to get an 
impression of humanity except through representation at second hand, the 
governing section ends up by losing sight of them altogether, confusing 
their concrete reality with a mere construct of the intellect (V1.9 my 
emphasis). 
Buffon proposed a new way of classifying organisms by relation in nature - in that 
way, he separated living forms from minerals, concepts or diseases. Living things were 
remarkable in their relationship to each other. Believing that a true classification must be 
based in nature and reflect this connectedness, Buffon proposed that the real relationship 
between animals was relation by historical descent from common origin. 
However marvelous [the individual] appears to us, it isn't in the individual 
that we find the greatest marvel. It is in the succession, in the renewal and 
in the duration of species that Nature appears almost inconceivable ... 
(Buffon quoted in Sloan "From logical" 120). 
Buffon contended that animals (including men) belonged to the same species if they had 
ancestors in common and breeding, produced fertile offspring, i.e. formed a historical 
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fertile lineage. This stance made species spatiotemporal and it gave history a different 
evidentiary status (if real relation could be proven). It also implied that the moule 
interieur (as the carrier of the eidos, physical form of the species) perpetuated the species 
in the individual. As a concept it held species and individual in polar tension as Schiller 
often did in his argument for play. 
Hiding his speculations in an article on the ass, Buffon reiterated the possibility that 
organisms showing "great anatomical similarities are related as one naturalfamille 
derived from a single archetype" (Sloan "Buffon-Linnaeus" 372). 
There exists, at the same time, a primitive and general design, which may 
be traced to a great distance, and whose degradations are still slower than 
those of figure or other external relations: For, not to mention the organs 
of digestion, of circulation, or of generation, without which animals could 
neither subsist nor reproduce, there is, even among the parts that 
contribute most to variety in external form, such an amazing resemblance 
as necessarily conveys the idea of an original plan upon which the whole 
has been conceived and executed (Buff on, trans. Smellie "The Ass"400, 
myemphasis)?7 
Buffon's contention that the biological species is the only reality in nature (''the 
individual is nothing in the Universe .... The species are the sole beings of Nature, 
perpetual beings, as ancient and as permanent as it is") is held in tension by his insistence 
on the reality and the importance ofthe individual: 
But Nature proceeds by unknown gradations ... passing, as she does, 
from one species to another species, and often from one genus to another 
37 Kant on archetypes [Urbilde]: "Many animal species resemble one another according 
to a certain common scheme, which scheme seems to lie at the foundation not only of the 
structure of their bones but also of the order of their other parts, so that the proliferation 
of species might arise according to a simple outline .... This analogy of forms - insofar 
as they seem to have been produced, despite their differences, according to common 
archetypes [Urbilde] - strengthens the suspicion of a real relationship of these forms by 
reason of their birth from a common, aboriginal mother [Urmutter]" (Kant A363-364, 
B368-69 in Richards, "Kant and Blumenbach" 28). 
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genus, by imperceptible shadings; so that there will be found a great 
number of intennediate species and of objects belonging half in one class 
and half in another. Objects of this sort, to which it is impossible to assign 
a place, necessarily render vain the attempt to a universal system .... In 
general, the more one increases the number of one's divisions, in the case 
of natural products, the nearer one comes to the truth; since in reality 
individuals alone exist in nature, while genera, orders, classes, exist only 
in our imagination. (Buffon, 1(1749)13,38 as qtd. by Lovejoy in Glass 90) 
Another Buffonian idea, that the species are fixed in time but can degenerate because 
of nutrition, climate and other environmental factors (which appears just above and in 
Buffon's considerations about the horse) allowed Schiller to claim by analogy that play is 
archetypal to the human species, that each of us carries it as potential, but a potential that 
can both be lost historically and be recovered individually. In his developmental history 
of play, he showed this sense of species, including in the implication that development is 
actually restoration of the full archetypal potential - a possibility because of degeneration 
and restoration to type. 
Just as Maupertuis posited particles for maintaining the species as well as particles for 
expressing individuality, Buffon hypothesized rnoule interieur, and Kant required both 
Keirn and Anlagen, Schiller synthesized as well. He combined the power of species 
inherited unchanged from generation to generation with the development of highly 
variable individual characteristics. In an implied theory of reproduction, his theory of 
play depended on a sort of modified prefonnationism involving species-defining 
characteristics (like our general morphology and the full capacity to play, rather than a 
tiny unfolded eternal self passed down from generation to generation). He added an 
epigenetic developmental sequence that included those stable species-detennining seeds 
and the individualizing traits (subject neither to the same necessity, nor to the simple 
workings of chance). Play, as the product ofa separate fonn drive [Forrntrieb] and a 
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separate sense-drive [Stofftrieb], was both epigenetic (i.e. unformed matter develops 
form) and Aristotelian, but the birth was an entirely new one: the resulting play drive was 
species-specific to humans. On the other hand, Schiller's developmental sequence can be 
read as allowing for successive, reciprocally-developing and transforming interactions 
between the sense-drive and rudimentary reason to produce intermediate play drives; 
these intermediates then interacted with the drives of sense and reason again (and all the 
while, reason increased its strength and breadth due to interaction, from self-awareness, 
to empathy, to use of the play drives representations, heightening its productions from 
material ideas to cognition). Each change was a transformation; that is, the capacity to 
play developed in history to develop us. 
In the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller worked with concepts of the human species, 
reflecting the taxonomical controversy raging at the time. He also juxtaposed humanity 
as a genus or species [Gattung, Art] and the individual human being in order to bring into 
reciprocal relationship the potential inherent in the species and the capacity in the 
particular individual for development, freedom and a graceful moral character. 
The Classification Controversy 
Reason does indeed demand unity; but Nature demands multiplicity; and 
both these kinds of law make their claim upon man (IV.4) 
Throughout the early eighteenth century there was growing acknowledgement that the 
representation of nature, by words and the concepts, did not approximate the object itself. 
Things were not fixed as words made them, not species, not individuals: time had to be 
accounted for, time and its products, the historic individual, the biological event. 
Linnaeus' useful system itself was artificial: it depended upon identifying characteristics 
that suited human senses, structures that humans could not only see but count without any 
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special apparatus other than a magnification devise. The tight fit with human needs and 
capacities was the Linnaean system's strength and its genius: anyone could be involved 
in the great natural historical project. The system itself however was rigid; over and 
above its dependence on certain countable traits, it required that each organism be lodged 
in seven hierarchical categories, species, genus, family, class, order, phylum and 
kingdom, an extraordinarily neat work of classification, good for curiosity cabinets and 
museums but not representative ofliving organisms' relationships to each other through 
common ancestry. 
Buffon opposed Linnaeus and his system and proposed the development of a natural 
system to replace it. The concerns about classification that led him into this controversy 
are best understood in the context of these intellectual changes at mid-century: first, man 
joined nature and came to be seen as sharing the limitations of physicality, in particular, 
the extent of his capacity to know the world and himself. Secondly, man's experience of 
time was changing. Many late Enlightenment natural historians worked to understand the 
dimension of time in the light of discoveries about life. A new appreciation of time and 
the historical record beyond the history of man evolved gradually into a capacity to 
perceive and describe nature's dynamism. No longer a static and harmoniously balanced 
entity, nature with all her living productions was recognized as continuously varying in 
time: the balance of nature became a dynamic tension of continuous change and 
adjustment, of constant reciprocal adaptation. 
From this perspective, then Buffon's biological definition of species, which he 
proposed in opposition to the static and task-friendly Linnaean system, proved prescient 
but impractical. As noted above, he identified an individual as a member of a species if it 
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were related through historical reproductive events to others in the group and if it were 
able to reproduce with a member of the species. According to Buffon, "[t]his power of 
producing its likeness, this chain of successive individuals . .. constitutes the real 
existence of the species." (Buffon qtd. in Lyon 170 my emphasis). 
This definition, hailed by Kant and others, still could not dislodge Linnaean 
classification, even among Buffon's admirers. Why? because it raised insurmountable 
practical problems. How could such events be observed and traced? How could 
relationship be discovered in history? Achieving the natural method that Buffon called 
for but could not fully conceive of would be the work of centuries. Such a shift required 
the inclusion of evolution into classification, a development that would require more than 
a hundred years; it awaited carbon dating of archeological finds, only possible after 
radioactivity in the earth was recognized in 1902. Also necessary to a natural system was 
analysis of DNA and RNA across species, a capacity that required as a prerequisite the 
recognition and isolation of those substances in the 1950's, and finally the establishment 
of cladistics, the system of classifying according to common ancestry (this science of 
establishing and diagramming homologies only became dominant in the 1990's).38 
38 There were classification difficulties inherent in the Linnaean system and naturalists 
felt the need to represent the real biological relation between beings over time, their 
connection through common ancestry. These motivations coupled with the explosion of 
technology capable of making such a project a reality provoked a revolution in 
classification, the details of which are being worked out now (e.g. birds and dinosaurs 
have common ancestry as do whales and hippopotami) The new scientific system, 
cladistics, classifies organisms based on evolutionary relationships, on common ancestry. 
A clade is a group consisting of a single (hypothetical) common ancestor and all its 
descendents. As late as 1976, John Lyon wrote: "The search for a natural system of 
classification in botany or zoology is somewhat like the chemists' - or alchemists' -
search for the philosopher's stone. Though the goal is never reached, useful things are 
picked up along the way. And without an imaginary goal we would never set out at all" 
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One of the difficulties pointed out by Buffon, the subtle gradation of living things in 
nature, cannot be properly represented by classificatory systems. It is a fact that the 
differences between beings - often so great within a species - can in fact be negligible 
and seem inconsequential or circumstantial (based on climate, nutrition or geographic 
isolation) when comparison is made and classification attempted between two individuals 
of a different species (even assisted by comparison with a third). As many traits are 
chosen for classification based on the ease with which humans can distinguish them, the 
hierarchy of their importance was potentially arbitrary. There were always intermediate 
forms, exceptions, beings that defied easy pigeon-holing and in fact called the 
assumptions of classification systems into question. Such a being was the Hydra, the 
fresh water polyp: its discovery and manipulation through experimentation by Abraham 
Trembley in the early 1740's created classificatory and theoretical havoc at mid-century. 
Trembley, the Polyp and Schiller's Idea of Organic Wholeness 
We really do not know nature: causes hidden in her bosom may have 
produced everything. Take your own look at Trembley'S polyp: does it 
not contain in itself the causes that give rise to its regeneration? 
La Mettrie, L 'homme machine (La Mettrie trans. Thomson 24). 
Abraham Trembley (1710-1784) was a children's tutor who noticed polyps while 
sitting beside a pond. What followed from this observation was a series of experiments 
and a publication considered by many to be "a classical model for a detailed biological 
investigation," a work that merited the Royal Society of London's prestigious Copley 
Medal for "those curious and surprising Discoveries ... entirely unobserved in the 
Animal Creation, and indeed never so much as thought of, till they were brought to light, 
(Buffon trans. Lyon 142). But now the goal of a natural system of classification is within 
reach. 
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and made manifest by ... diligent and exact Enquiries" (Lenhoff Hydra ix). Trembley's 
research on the fresh-water polyp (published 1744; Linnaean Hydra 1746) shocked his 
contemporaries because his observations and manipulations described a new kind of 
being, one outside the accepted classification of living organisms. 39 In addition, it called 
theories of generation like preformation into question. Acknowledging the world-view-
shifting possibility of his research, he began by setting out the model for investigation 
involving life forms: 
the little creature whose natural history I am about to present has revealed 
facts to me which are so unusual and so contrary to the ideas generally 
held on the nature of animals, that to accept them demands the clearest of 
proofs .... It is not enough to say, therefore, that one has seen such and 
such a thing. This amounts to saying nothing unless at the same time the 
observer indicates how it was seen, and unless he puts his readers in a 
position to evaluate the manner in which the reported facts were observed 
(Trembley (1744) in Lenhoff Hydra 1_2).40 
39 Vartanian noted that, in addition to playing a significant role in shaping La Mettrie's 
vital materialism, Trembley's discoveries and experiments had made an impact on so 
many, particularly on Buffon, Bonnet, Maupertuis, Lyonnet and Rousseau. (The last 
"listed its manner of multiplication among the six or seven leading problems of science 
and philosophy in his Discours sur les sciences et les arts," a classic Schiller read.) 
Diderot's Reve de D'Alembert included human polyps living on Jupiter and Saturn, and 
the Encyclopedie referenced this" 'insect singulier et merveilleux' ... perhaps the most 
fascinating single curiosity of natural history in the 1740's" (Vartanian "Trembley" 498). 
Maupertuis incorporated Trembley'S research into Venus Physique [The Earthly Venus 
1745]: "An aquatic worm, called polyp, has even more surprising means of multiplying. 
As a tree sprouts new branches, a polyp sprouts young polyps. When these have reached 
a certain size, they drop off, but often, even before leaving the main trunk, they 
themselves produce new polyps and all these descendants of various generations still hold 
on to the common ancestor .... In order to multiply itself, one of these animals only 
needs to be cut in pieces. The part with the head grows a tail, while the end with the tail 
produces a head, and those parts that have neither head nor tail produce both .... This 
Hydra, more wonderful that that of the fable, can be split lengthwise or mutilated in every 
way and soon all is repaired and each part has become a new animal. What can one think 
of this strange kind of generation - of this life-giving principle spread throughout the 
animal?" (Maupertuis 38-9). 
40 Details about Trembley'S methods of experimentation by tissue grafting are also 
available in a short article (Lenhoff "Tissue Grafting in Animals"). 
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Prior to Trembley, polyps were thought to be plants. Green as the algae that lived in 
them, they, however, behaved like animals. They moved and reacted to light but, then, 
they also regenerated lost parts like plants. They were real primitives, one of the missing 
links between plants and animals. After his initial observations, Trembley began a series 
of experiments; he amputated parts and divided the little creatures; he watched them and 
found that they regrew lost parts, or reconstituted themselves if, for example, he turned 
them inside out. He also diced polyps and saw that they developed into as many separate 
organisms. These series of experiments (even before their publication) sent the 
equivalent of a seismic shock wave through the intellectual system supported by the 
preformation theory. As Johann Georg Sulzer wrote in his Untrredungen fiber die 
Schdnheit der Natur, Moralische Betachtungen fiber besondere Gegenstiinde der 
Naturlehre (Moral Reflections on Certain Topics of Natural History 1745): 
I speak of the POLYPUS, the 'Many-footed,' a kind of worm that lives in 
water. This curious beast manifests qualities that declare war ... on all 
human reason. Polypus teaches us (if it were capable of pedagogy) that 
the man who would imagine it must be a dreamer, an enthusiast intent on 
mocking the universe - yet experience actually supports him. In this 
creature, of which everyone au courant has received notice, we have 
discovered a miraculous aptitude. The animal is divided into innumerable 
parts ... each fragment does not just survive, but it generates ... a whole 
new creature as perfect as the one from which it was severed (Sulzer 116). 
The preformation theory supported both Newtonian and Leibnizian mechanism: creation, 
ensoulement, embodiment and any new complex organization were thereby put outside 
time - saving the passivity of matter. As noted above, the theory posited that one parent 
contributes an embryo, one that has existed from the beginning of time. Like Russian 
dolls, embryos were, complete but miniaturized and enfolded, awaiting the stimulation or 
nutrition from the other parent's fluids to begin development. Naturalists, philosophers 
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and theologians alike found it hard to believe that Trembley's behavior could have been 
anticipated from the beginning of time and equally hard to believe that so many souls for 
the oddly-created polyps were at the ready for such an eventuality - all of which seemed 
necessary for the vindication of preformation theory. 
The power of the simple organism to create itself, to create wholeness (and change a 
system of thought), was a perfect metaphor for Schiller's understanding of the early 
Greeks and their states, and for the potential for modem humans to be returned to a 
contemplative unity (the unity possible in a more complex human nature) in the aesthetic 
state through play. The little polyps appear in an extended description of the Greek 
States, valorizing their autonomy: 
That polypoid character [Polypennatur] of the Greek states, in which 
every individual enjoyed an independent existence but could, when need 
arose, grow into the whole organism, now made way for an ingenious 
clock-work, in which, out of the piecing together of innumerable but 
lifeless parts, a mechanical kind of collective life ensued (VI. 7 my 
emphasis). 
Schiller's use of the polyp underscored the primitive perfection, the capacity of Greek 
states for an autonomy that would be impossible in modernity, and also it referenced the 
historic loss of flexibility of political institutions (indicated by a mechanical metaphor): 
those small states did not go on to develop the kind of cohesion and cooperation typical 
of a more complex organic body.41 For Schiller, each primitive Greek individual was 
characterized "by a simplicity to which our age is a stranger;" the Greek mind 
41 Others interested in the polyp or its metaphorical uses included Voltaire who examined 
"this natural process with all the attention [he] could muster," but nevertheless asserted 
'that this production called a polyp resembled an animal less than a carrot or an asparagus 
did'" (Roger Life (158). Roger used Voltaire's remarks to illustrate the change in natural 
history by 1750: by then "scientific observation was no longer accessible to mere 
amateurs"). 
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did indeed divide human nature into its several aspects, and project these 
in magnified form into the divinities of its glorious pantheon; but not by 
tearing it to pieces; rather by combining its aspects in different 
proportions, for in no single one of their deities was humanity in its 
entirety ever lacking. How different with us Modems! With us too the 
image of the human species is projected in magnified form into separate 
individuals - but as fragments, not in different combinations, with the 
result that one has to go the rounds from one individual to another in order 
to be able to piece together a complete image of the species .... we see 
not merely individuals, but whole classes of men, developing but one part 
of their potentialities, while of the rest, as in stunted growths, only 
vestigial traces remain (VI. 3). 
The trouble with modems is the same trouble with complex living beings - if they are 
divided they cannot regenerate missing parts. Many must function only as parts of 
themselves or die if a function necessary for life cannot be performed. Healing is 
possible but the result will be imperfect, a scar or a "stunted part." The early Greek, as 
individual, simple as a polyp, could stand for the whole and could project wholeness into 
representations: for Schiller "the individual Greek [was] qualified to be the 
representative of his age, and ... no single Modem [could] venture as much" (VI.4). 
Summary 
After the 1750's the dualism ofthe mechanical system collapsed into avid 
exploration of living nature through observation, experimentation and theorizing. The 
very mechanical philosophy that had failed to accommodate the discoveries about life 
and the growing understanding of life and its processes became the ground upon which 
scientists built other conceptual frameworks - materialism, neo-mechanism, and vitalism. 
Amateur and professional natural philosophers who had been deluged with things to 
describe and classify continued to seek a transformative empirical surface but did so in 
the service of examining the phenomenon of life. The geometrical spirit that created the 
architecture of the mechanical systems broke into mathematical pieces, and there rose the 
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promise, through calculus, that probability would emerge as the future empirical 
language. The contribution of the medical community gave some access to explanations 
of "how things work" through anatomy and physiology: vivisection coupled with 
experimentation allowed several life actions to be discovered and described. But even 
the real-time experimentation had not answered quandaries about generation, 
maintenance and development, functions of life with quasi-teleological qualities. These 
capacities became more and more the focus of attention. 
After mid-century, history had more dimensions - not just Biblical time (6000 years) 
or personal time based on the our experience of seasons, years and personal milestones or 
retrospection into human history, but deep geological and cosmological time as well as 
the relative time of other natural entities, the aphid, the dog, or the animals represented in 
the fossil record. The facts were plotted between two axes: that of space - "Of all the 
lessons derived from the idea of space, perhaps the latest had to do with relativity. 
Perspectives changed" (Hazard 11) - data from travel and travel literature, from the 
description of all those exotic places, of all things in nature, large and microscopic, and 
the varieties of human society that were encountered.42 Not just space but also time-
time had changed. It had grown relative, suddenly lengthened by discoveries on the 
strata of the earth's surface, suddenly shortened with respect to the amount of change 
that could be perceived over a lifetime. The context of experience involved a 
42"Just as in human history one consults documents, examines coins and medals, and 
deciphers ancient inscriptions in order to determine the revolutions and epochs in the 
intellectual life of man, so in natural history one must search the archives of the world, 
unearth the oldest relics, collect remnants, and unite all signs of physical changes which 
are traceable to the various ages of nature into one corpus of evidence. This is the only 
way to determine any fixed points in the infinity of space and to leave behind a few 
milestones on the unending pathway of time" (Buffon qtd. in Cassirer 79-80). 
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combination of sensibility about life forms and the restlessness of reality, a new 
understanding of the dynamism of life and of the complexity of the environments 
inhabited by all life forms. Mechanistic science's description of matter did not 
encompass what was available to observation and description, partly because the 
connection between life and time was a felt experience: "It was just that living things 
have been affected ... by historical processes .... The results of those processes are 
systems different in kind from any nonliving systems and almost incomparably more 
complicated" (Simpson in Mayr 35). Life-deposition and its maintenance, once 
considered either an occasional intervention or an infusion outside of time, was after mid-
century regularly conceived of as an historical event and a capacity of life. No longer 
outside of history, the beginnings of life could and would be studied like any other 
phenomenon in nature. Reality looked less like a ladder spanning to perfection and more 
and more like a net spread on an ever-moving sea. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SCHILLER AND LATE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VITALISM 
From mid-century, living nature was increasingly described as a complicated, 
balanced system of complexly organized individuals with singular capacities for 
reproduction, self-development and self-sustenance. In the last part of the century, an 
understanding had developed about life: living organisms were reciprocally affecting, not 
only in a spatial economy, but in a historical one. Each individual was not only 
complexly-organized, self-developing and directing, but each was an instantiation of 
forces within matter, unique in history. 
Fueled by accumulating data and opinion, the acrimonious classification controversy 
and the dispute about generation continued throughout the period. Many with concerns 
about classification focused on the human species, on the question of the unity and 
varieties of mankind, while other researchers provoked new interest in the generation 
controversy and in epigenesis as the development of life from unformed matter. With 
contributions of Maupertuis and Buffon as ground, with Haller's work near to hand, a 
new generation of natural historians in Germany, working as embryologists, marshaled 
evidence favoring epigenesis. This ascendency of epigenetic theory made not only 
spontaneous generation a distasteful logical necessity but it also made a postulate of 
something within matter to begin, guide and promote the development of new life. This 
something was a force-in-matter. Throughout the rest of the century, the possibility of 
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forces in matter was explored repeatedly and understood variously by both natural 
historians, like Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, and 
physicians, like Theophile Bordeu and Jean Barthez of Montpellier as well as Marcus 
Herz and Johann Christian Reil in Germany.l It was within this active environment of 
research, publication and discussion that Schiller hypothesized about playas a species-
specific force [Spieltrieb] rising from the interaction of two originating polar forces (the 
material- or sense-drive and the form-drive). 
The interest in epigenesis (which put origins within time) and the efforts to apply the 
species concept to humanity combined with an expanded experience of history itself to 
provoke Jean Jacques Rousseau and Johann Gottfried Herder to projects of 
developmental human history. Schiller, emulating and amending their accounts, wrote 
into the Aesthetic Letters a history of man as developed through play and beauty. 
All these advances in the study of life took place within the context of a broad field of 
competing positions, from animism through vitalism to materialism. In Germany, 
particularly, the fertile natural philosophical ground was a vitalistic one. 
Vitalism? 
The true essence of nature is not to be sought in the realm of the created 
(natura naturata), but in that of the creative process (natura naturans). 
Nature is more than mere creation ... the dualism between creator and 
creation is thus abolished. Nature as that which is moved is no longer set 
over against the divine mover; it is now an original formative principle 
which moves from within (Cassirer 40-41). 
"Vitalism" is a word like "play," freighted with historical meanings that are not 
value-neutral. Just as "play" in both English and German culture is an example of a 
1 Blumenbach's insight into the developmental force [Bildungstrieb] included yet another 
appearance by the polyp and Trembley'S experimental techniques. See page 146. 
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concept which popular understanding has captured, "vitalism" is a designation in biology 
that is laden with historical meanings and connotative values. A problem of language use 
became a complicated hermeneutic problem: the term "vitalist" was used as a designation 
for some ancient theories of life, for characterizing the philosophical positions of many 
early modem physicians and natural philosophers as well as some nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century biologists; it pooled everyone who "felt that a living organism had 
some sort of constituent that distinguished it from inert matter. These people were 
customarily lumped together ... even though ... they held widely differing views of 
what that constituent might be" (Mayr, Toward 9-10)? The difficulty in nuce was this: 
the terms "vitalism" and "vitalist" have been applied to a broad range of positions, 
persons and theories, some of which could profitably be distinguished from one another. 
The meaning of the concept, "vitalism," depends on two parameters, the period 
under discussion and the time period of the commentary. Francois Duchesneau (1985), 
seeking "an exact and limited meaning of 'vitalism'" in order to situate some vitalists of 
the Enlightenment, referred the problem to a split that occurred after the tum of the 
century. At that time, an anti-reductionist trend (Naturphilosophie) became identified as 
vitalism, and the physiology of the nineteenth century - one that reacted violently against 
Naturphilosophie and defined itself in opposition to it - gained approbation as science, as 
the legitimate science. 3 This "standard dual model," vitalism vs. reductionism, was then 
2 For example, Harvey, the discoverer of the heart's action and circulation was labeled a 
"vitalist" in some texts (e.g. Westfall); and in the twentieth century, vitalism emerged in 
new forms - in Bergson's philosophical system and in organismic biology (Hein). 
3 I have included the publication dates for many of the articles and books that follow 
because they evidence a watershed and a change in perception of the past. Roger's sense 
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applied to other historical periods. Forthis reason, Duchesneau wrote, "connotations of 
'vitalism' should be spelt [out] into a variety of meanings according to the historical 
period and to the specific blend of methodological principles and ontological 
presuppositions involved in the historically situated theories" (259-60). 
For much of the modem period - and that included the eighteenth century - vitalists 
were not considered scientific: painted with a broad brush, they were the ones that 
postulated something extra for life. Commenting on this trend, Ernst Mayr wrote in 1985 
that vitalism had become "so disreputable a belief in the last fifty years that no biologist 
alive today would want to be classified as a vitalist" (Toward 13). On that account, when 
he sought to define a legitimate scientific tradition of life studies in the eighteenth 
century, Peter Hanns Reill took himself somewhat to task for choosing to name it 
"Enlightenment vitalism" (Vitalizing (2005) 9). Others had felt the need to explain the 
terms they coined, like "teleomechanism," "vital materialism" or "vital mechanism," all 
in an effort to avoid the same pejorative associations.4 In short, all who have attempted 
was that "biology did not appear suddenly at the end of the eighteenth century, as Athena 
sprang from Zeus's forehead;" it had antecedents and one of those important antecedents 
was the eighteenth-century vitalist tradition (Rousseau 277). After 1980, many science 
historians focusing on the eighteenth century researched natural philosophers and natural 
historians who, because of their 'vitalist' inclinations, had not been considered in the 
scientific mainstream. They had no status as precursors of the modem life sciences. 
4 Reill suggested his revision as early as 1995 in "Anthropology" and used it in a number 
of his publications up to and including Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment (2005). 
Others carving out parts of vitalism for science with the above terms include Lenoir, 
Larson, Roger and Vartanian, for example. 
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to explore the middle ground between materialism and animism needed to manage 
ideology and connotation by qualifying their terms.5 
Beyond the general devaluation, there was a problem with "vitalism," its specificity, 
its power to designate particular content. So Reill, as noted above, followed the custom 
of classifiers; he used "vitalism" as a genus and he added "Enlightenment" as a species 
designation, fully aware that there were varieties.6 He believed the use of "vitalism" as a 
mediating term between animism and materialism began with Dumas' history of 
physiology (1807) and credited the mid-century ferment, the popularizers and the 
researchers, the natural philosophers and historians, with its generation (295-6 fn 6). 
Within the enlarged middle between animism and materialism, some of those vitalists 
merged toward animism, seeking a non-material addition to life, a spirit or an essence; 
5Using technical words with ideological uses and connotative or emotive qualities is seen 
as a problem for translators, but it is also a problem of word use in the history of science 
and the history of ideas (Love). 
6 On taxonomy and the division of knowledge: "Living forms - their production, growth, 
organization, modifications, characters, affinities, and distributions - were the central 
concern of natural history and physiology throughout the century. The sciences of living 
form included two branches of taxonomy: the primary divisions of the plant and animal 
kingdoms and the study of species and their modifications. A separate but related inquiry 
studied the organization of the living world as a whole, the distribution of natural forms. 
These sciences, separate divisions of natural history, took the Gestalt of living forms as 
their point of departure. The science of formation, Bildung, was part of physiology and 
studied the principles and mechanisms of organic generation. Naturalists and 
physiologists treated these inquiries as largely independent ... " (Larson, Interpreting 7). 
(Note that Bildung denoted physical before it referred to cultural development.) One of 
the innovations of the Linnaean classification was the general use of binominal 
nomenclature, the combination of a genus name and another term: the two together 
uniquely identify each species of organism. Research on cultural naming and folk 
taxonomies found that reliance on two names for accuracy is extremely common (See 
Carol Kaesuk Yoon, "Reviving the Lost Art of Naming the World," New York Times 
Science Section, August 10, 2009). 
111 
others aligned toward materialism, simply seeking an enlargement of the concept of 
matter, an extension that would include components, functions or organizations 
characteristic only of living forms. Many sought in this broad space an opportunity to 
explore solutions to the problem of life by using the hypothetico-deductive method: in 
that research force acted as a sort of placeholder until an epistemological or technological 
breakthrough carved away part of the unknown. 7 
7 With each deVelopment in vitalism, another history grows that presents the development 
of the idea of matter itself. There is then a sort of homeostasis, a maintenance of 
environment between the polarities of matter and the unknown (something more) as 
postulated by life scientists: what the vitalists are able to describe aptly by analogy is 
integrated into matter through technology over time; the analogy is then obsolete in terms 
of knowledge production for those who accept the new definition of matter. In general, 
the term "vitalism" has had a long history, a history of hypothesizing something more to 
the current understanding of matter. The following example illustrates that history, one 
where "vitalism" can be observed changing like Proteus. In his The Strategy of Life: 
Teleology and Mechanics in Nineteenth-Century German Biology, Timothy Lenoir began 
a short survey of vitalism with Stahl: "Vitalistic positions assume in some form or other 
the existence of an agent which actively selects and arranges matter in the organism," he 
wrote. "Some vitalist approaches assume furthermore that this agent, which may be a 
rational soul, can exist separately from matter and that the organism is in a healthy, 
functional state so long as the vital agent remains in control. Such a position was 
defended by Georg Ernst Stahl, for instance." This "vitalism" (more accurately 
designated animism, but described as Lenoir did above) and its practitioners 
complemented the Cartesian view of matter as defined by passivity, uniformity and 
extension in space. This position was the one that Haller marshaled his experimental 
evidence against. Lenoir continued, "A vitalistic position similar to this renounces the 
role of a rational, purposeful agent but continues to acknowledge special vital forces, 
such as sensibility and irritability. These forces are characterized as the organic 
analogues of Newtonian forces." Here Lenoir separated out the work of Haller (See 
Chapter III), an early vitalist who espoused an empirical epistemology. "This [type of 
vitalism'S] 'scientific' status depended very much on the prevailing confusion in the 
characterization of Newtonian forces; for many capable scientists treated forces as active 
powers superimposed upon inert matter," he continued, positing the next development as 
an accidental movement away from the old epistemology to an idea of emergent forces. 
"This position was only slightly removed from one version of teleological argument ... 
[which restricted] the specific vital force [to dependence] upon the organization of the 
constituent elements of the organ exhibiting it. The force was not to be conceived [of] as 
some independent entity but rather as an emergent property dependent upon the specific 
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Again, in the late twentieth century, the received wisdom around which historians 
circled was the position that natural philosophy (which included the popular spectator 
sports of electrical and magnetic demonstrations and phrenological mapping) along with 
its cultural hybrid, vitalism, was not really a part of the history of science. In his 1985 
Messenger Lecture at Cornell University, delivered just as renewed interest in the 
order and arrangement of the components" (Strategy 9). Lenoir argued for the next 
transformation, one that included the work of Schiller's contemporaries, Reil and 
Blumenbach, as a "teleo-mechanist research program" he believed originated in Kant's 
philosophy of biology, one fundamentally different from Naturphilosophie. Caron called 
Lenoir's work a "major historical reconstruction, lending a new richness to our 
knowledge of German life sciences in the nineteenth century" (238); however, many 
came to feel that Lenoir incorrectly suggested that such a tradition started with 
metaphysics rather than with active natural historical and physiological research. Some 
thought as well that he had misjudged the impact Blumenbach and Kant had on one 
another. (Caneva, Huneman, Larson, Look, Richards ("Kant"), Sloan ("Performing"), 
Smith and Zammito "Genesis")). Lenoir to his great credit took the late eighteenth-
century and early nineteenth-century life science seriously, drawing attention and 
controversy to a neglected area. Another example of rehabilitation of a strand of the 
"vitalist" natural philosophy is found in the seminal work on Julien Ouffray de La Mettrie 
by Aram Vartanian (1960). He, recognizing the vitalist aspects of the argument in 
L 'homme machine. categorized La Mettrie's project as follows: "His idea of the 'living 
machine,' defined hypothetically by its purposive self-motion, may thus be said to 
express a 'vitalo-mechanisme a base dynamique.'" Vartanian appeared intent on 
distinguishing a type of vitalism, one specifically separate from the vitalism that at the 
time of his writing included what came to be identified as animism. "The biological 
philosophy implicit in this view of things cannot, properly speaking, be classed as either 
mechanistic or vitalistic [i.e. now animistic] in a restrictive sense, for it really represents 
an attempt to combine those two traditionally opposed attitudes into a unified standpoint. 
La Mettrie has by no means neglected the specifically vital characteristics of the 
organism; but at the same time he remains entirely convinced that these are knowable to 
science only insofar as they are seen sub specie machinae" (La Mettrie's 20). Vartanian 
placed La Mettrie with Haller in the early phase of an emerging vitalism. Just as Lenoir's 
distinctions tease out a "teleo-mechanism" within vitalism in an effort to legitimize 
eighteenth-century science to a twentieth century epistemology based on the physical 
sciences, others - using appellations like "vital materialism" - also tried to bypass vitalist 
difficulties, letting compounds do the work of agency, oflife/form causality. As will be 
evident, this idea of forces emergent from the organization of matter was but one of the 
positions regarding forces represented in Enlightenment vitalism. 
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vitalism of the Enlightenment was beginning to produce a wave of publications, Ernst 
Mayr (1985) summarized the classical vitalist position as follows: 
The classical vitalist ascribed life to the organism's possession ofa 
tangible thing, a real object, whether called a vital fluid, life force, or 
Entelechie. He believed that this vital force was outside the realm of 
physico-chemical laws; in fact, it had a rather metaphysical flavor in the 
writings of some vitalists. All attempts to substantiate the existence of this 
force failed, and the need for it became obsolete when the phenomena it 
had tried to explain were eventually accounted for by other means, for 
example, the genetic program. 
Other vitalists, he added, "rejected the idea that [the force mentioned above] was a 
nonmaterial force; rather, they view life as an organizational property of certain material 
systems" (Toward 12-13). In the years that followed, these latter efforts - expressed 
analogically - provoked comparison to the mid-twentieth century discovery of DNA in 
terms of function and properties, and Kant's interpretation of Blumenbach's 
Bildungstrieb as an "as if' [als ob] construction was seen by some to bridge the gap 
between vitalism and genetics.8 Of the developmental force [Bildungstrieb], Blumenbach 
himself wrote with epistemological delicacy (perhaps intended to appeal to Kant) that it, 
"like names applied to every other kind of vital power, of itself, explains nothing: it 
serves merely to designate a peculiar power formed by the combination of the mechanical 
principle with that which is susceptible ofmodification.,,9 In terms of time, Blumenbach 
and Kant were at the heart of the Enlightenment vitalism that Reill carved out between 
8 The reciprocal relationship of Kant's and Blumenbach's theories and the 
(mis)understanding between two men is the subject of considerable controversy, cf. 
Richards "Kant," Lenoir, and Reill (Vitalizing 304-5n28). See page 195 fn 30. 
9 Blumenbach as qtd. in Helmut Muller-Sievers 43. Blumenbach: "Vital forces are 
merely terms given to effects known a posteriori, such as Nisus formativus 
[Bildungstrieb]" (Larson, Interpreting 164). 
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Newtonian mechanism and Naturphilosophie; they also were basic to the teleo-mechanic 
research program that Lenoir described, as well as the vitalistic mentality that Roger 
identified as in need of investigation. And they were also a part of the tradition which, 
according to Robert Richards, communicated to Darwin that experience of nature 
necessary for his theory of evolution by natural selection. And, as coupled in §81 of the 
Third Critique, they were part of Schiller's study before he wrote the Aesthetic Letters. 
One of the great values of the vitalistic philosophy of Schiller's time, however, was 
its ambiguity, its capacity to be the holding environment of a contemplative "expanded 
middle." As a large, fractious and competitive group, the vitalistic natural philosophers 
and physicians worked with an indeterminacy that allowed research to progress in spite 
of the lack of technical capacity or community agreement. They sometimes 
misunderstood one another, yes, but they practiced by maintaining the unknowns in a 
milieu of epistemologic modesty. Whether the constituent associated with life were a 
substance, a force, an unknowable or yet-to-be discovered property of matter resulting 
from complex organization and boundary conditions or whether it be simply (!) a 
regulative idea necessary to human conceptualization of life, it was a subject of 
speculation rather than knowledge for the vitalistic natural philosophers and natural 
historians of the late Enlightenment. 10 
10 Larson's article "Vital Forces" explored these options. History makes strange 
bedfellows in such a wide bed: researchers, medical practitioners, natural philosophers 
and historians identified as eighteenth-century vitalists (of various stripes by various 
historians and in various degrees of contention with one another) include Barthez, Bichat, 
Blumenbach, Bordeu, Buffon, Cullen, Diderot, Forster, Girtanner, Goethe, Haller, 
Herder, Herz, the Humboldts, Hume, Hunter, later Kant, Kielmeyer, Kolreuter, La 
Mettrie, Lavoisier, Maupertuis, Monro, Muller, the incipient Naturphilosophen, 
Needham, Pallas, Rousseau, Reil, Stahl, Caspar Wolff, Whytt and Schiller. The tradition 
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As a participating historian, Roger (1980) described the new approach to the study of 
the life sciences during the eighteenth century this way: 
What interests us [now] ... is the slow and complicated process which led 
from the Cartesian bio-mechanism and the Stahlian animism that prevailed 
at the beginning of the century, with all their metaphysical implications, to 
a vitalism that abandoned neither the mechanical nor the chemical 
explanations but recognized the originality of living beings and made 
possible a more phenomenological approach. As far as theories are 
concerned we may summarize that development by the sequence: 
Cartesian bio-mechanism, Newtonian biomechanism, and vitalism" 
(Rousseau 277 my emphasis). 
Given the big tent of vitalism, Schiller was a vitalist. As Mayr summarized, the term 
can be "attached to anyone [in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries] who did not 
accept the ... dogma that matter in motion is an adequate explanatory basis for all 
aspects of life, and that organisms are simply machines. [ Again] all those ... were united 
in their belief that a living organism has some sort of constituent by which it can clearly 
be distinguished from inert matter" (Toward 12). Vitalism ascribed to living matter both 
a qualitatively and quantitatively different level of complexity than did mechanism, 
animism, or materialism. Mechanism and animism are dualist; materialism is monistic, 
and vitalism inhabited an expanded middle where its practitioners found "force" or "vital 
principle" variously single or multiple, from "additional to the soul and body" (Barthez) 
to inseparable from matter (Schiller, Blumenbach).11 As Reill explained, "Enlightenment 
is traced to Leibniz through Maupertuis and Buffon, and includes Rousseau and Herder 
as philosophers with a deep commitment to natural history. 
II It is helpful to keep in mind the current understanding of life and status of the various 
theories today. According to Mayr: by the 1930's "biologists almost universally rejected 
vitalism .... First because it virtually leaves the realm of science by falling back on an 
unknown and presumably unknowable factor, and second, because it became eventually 
possible to explain in physico-chemical terms all the phenomena which according to the 
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vitalists sought to bridge or dissolve this dichotomy [ force/matter; mind/body] by 
positing the existence in living matter of active or self-activating forces, that had a 
vitalists 'demanded' a vitalistic explanation .... The.rejection of vitalism was made 
possible by the simultaneous rejection of a crude 'animals are nothing but machines' 
conceptualization. Like Kant in his later years, most biologists realized that organisms 
are different from inanimate matter and that the difference had to be explained not by 
postulating a vital force but by modifying rather drastically the mechanistic theory. Such 
a theory begins by granting that there is nothing in the processes, functions and activities 
of living organisms that is in conflict with or outside of any of the laws of physics or 
chemistry. All biologists are thorough-going 'materialists' in the sense that they 
recognize no supernatural or immaterial forces, but only such that are physico-chemical. 
But they do not accept the nai"ve mechanistic explanation of the seventeenth century and 
disagree with the statement that animals are 'nothing but' machines [my emphasis]. 
Organismic biologists stress the fact that organisms have many characteristics that are 
without parallel in the world of inanimate objects. The explanatory equipment of the 
physical sciences is insufficient to explain complex living systems and, in particular, the 
interplay between historically acquired information and the responses of these genetic 
programs to the physical world" (Growth 52). In the late Enlightenment, however, 
"falling back on an unknown and presumably unknowable factor," i.e. holding to a 
modest view of what can be known and how it might be known, allowed for research to 
continue, allowed the "naIve mechanistic explanation of the seventeenth century," the 
impoverished view of matter, to be superseded and amended. According to the historical 
narratives about the science of the late eighteenth century fashioned after the publication 
of the Growth of Biological Thought, vitalistic hypotheses allowed the characterization of 
life processes to continue and very likely to contribute to Darwin's insight into evolution 
by natural selection. Mayr continued: "Attempts have been made again and again to 
define 'life.' These endeavors are rather futile since it is now quite clear that there is no 
special substance, object or force that can be identified with life. The process of living, 
however, can be defined [as follows, by paraphrase of Mayr] .... Living organisms 
possess certain attributes" including: complexity and organization, chemical uniqueness, 
qualitative (relational) phenomena, uniqueness and variability (individuality), genetic 
programming, historical nature, derivation by natural selection and indeterminacy 
(impossibility of temporal prediction due to great complexity and unexpected novelty 
(emergence) (53-59). Many of these attributes were empirically and intuitively grasped 
by Schiller and his contemporaries. In the late twentieth century, the mechanism! 
vitalism controversy was addressed by Hilde Hein, who saw the dispute as a perennial 
one that actually pitted two non-rational perspective types against one another. Julius 
Elias found the practical Schiller making the same point about the impossibility of 
agreement on certain basic philosophical issues, i.e. because there are two basic 
personality types, the realist and idealist. It seemed Hein then followed Schiller (the 
German classical tradition) in her reasoning. 
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teleological character. Living matter was seen as containing an immanent principle of 
self-movement or self-organization whose sources lay in active powers, which resided in 
matter itself" (Vitalizing 7 my emphasis). 
Vitalism in the Late Enlightenment: The Schillerian Mittelgrund 
Vitalism appeared very soon, that is, in the 1760's, in nearly all fields of 
research, and almost simultaneously in England, France and Germany. 
Unfortunately, we still have no comprehensive study ofthe phenomenon, 
whose importance was enormous, not only in the history of biology but in 
the general history of ideas as well (Jacques Roger (1980) in Rousseau 
275). 
Vitalism was a recognized position in the eighteenth century, but as a scientific 
tradition it had neither been described nor systematically explored until the late twentieth 
century.12 Then, historians of science began to turn their attention to the elaborating 
study of life, finding there, a coherent program, an autonomous tradition with all the 
hallmarks of science. According to Thomas Kuhn, such changes come about through 
novelties of fact and through inventions, novelties of theory: 
Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e. with the 
recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced 
expectations that govern normal science. It then continues with a more or 
less extended exploration ofthe area of anomaly. And it closes only when 
the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become 
the expected. Assimilating a new sort of fact demands a more than 
additive adjustment oftheory, and until the adjustment is completed -
12 Then, some of those scholars working in the Enlightenment period on individuals-
their careers and contributions - began writing with a broader view. Earlier in the 
twentieth century, while Arthur Lovejoy, through the history of an idea, and Bentley 
Glass, through tracing the beginnings of evolutionary theory in the eighteenth century, 
sought continuity in the life sciences, Jacques Roger, James L. Larson, Timothy Lenoir, 
Peter Hanns Reill, Phillip Sloan and many others focused on the life science tradition in 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth century and, finally, on vitalism itself. As mentioned 
earlier, Robert Richards also traced a lineage to Darwin from eighteenth-century vitalism 
and Naturphilosophie through Goethe. 
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until the scientist has learned to see nature in a different way - the new 
fact is not quite a scientific fact at all (Structure 52-53). 
"Until the scientist has learned to see nature in a different way - the new fact is not quite 
a scientific fact at all": the natural historians and philosophers of the time recognized life 
as an anomaly vis a vis the mechanical philosophy, and the historians of a later period in 
tum recognized their new approach to nature. 
In his as~essments, Kuhn concentrated on language and representation of nature, an 
emphasis that served as a conduit between the science and the humanities. Adopting 
Kuhn's schema and building on a score of his own individual studies and the research 
efforts of many others, Peter Hanns Reill took as his task the description and 
characterization of a language of nature at the end of the eighteenth century. This 
tradition he named "Enlightenment vitalism," and from his perspective, it represented a 
scientific revolution according to Kuhn's own criteria. In the following, Kuhn's intuition 
the basic characteristics of scientific revolution, of the basic structure (Urtyp!) of 
paradigm change, is summarized. In Kuhn's view of paradigm change, changes cannot 
be made piecemeal: "In revolutionary change one must either live with incoherence or 
else revise a number of interrelated generalizations together." There are not therefore 
changes, but change, and change is holistic. Paradigm change involves a "change in the 
way words and phrases attach to nature." Not only do the words change (and "the 
criteria by which terms attach to nature") but the referents are different as well, "the set 
of objects or situations to which those terms attach." As a consequence, there is "a 
change in several of the taxonomic categories prerequisite to scientific description and 
generalization." This change requires either the creation new categories or the 
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redistribution of objects/ideas into new categories (Kuhn "What" 18-21 my emphasis). 
In all, the new paradigm provokes a "major change of metaphor, analogy, or model; that 
is, the basic juxtapositions one used to bring things together in a pattern of understanding 
and recognition were irredeemably transformed" (Reill Vitalizing 118 my emphasis). 
Reill himself described Enlightenment vitalism as a scientific language of the late 
eighteenth century, the use of which began in the ferment at mid-century and culminated 
in the work of the Humboldt brothers. 13 He argued that the natural philosophy relating to 
living matter developed into a coherent tradition, a paradigm, during the last half of the 
eighteenth century. As a "reanimation of nature" and a "naturalization of humanity," 
Enlightenment vitalism was for him a cultural system and a way of perceiving the world 
("Anthropology" 245). And from his perspective and that of many contemporary 
13 Reill's work is a culmination of years oflabor on a variety of individuals, including the 
Humboldts, Herder, Buffon, Goethe, and Schiller, and of scientific trends in the late 
Enlightenment. I found his organization of the material both invaluable and reassuring, 
as I had come to see Schiller's sources much as he described the tradition. Reill's 
understanding apparently evolved from his research into the change in historical 
consciousness during the Aujkliirung, the German Enlightenment. He found that the 
Enlightenment historicism fostered, among other things, a concept of development and an 
idea of individuality. These, as dynamic transformations of Leibniz's idea of 
perfectibility and his theory of the monad, were part of a new intuitive and historicized 
experience ofliving organisms: for Reill, they became the wheels and track-bed for the 
sciences oflife in the late eighteenth century (214). In many ways, Enlightenment 
vitalism functions as a deeply-felt defense of the value of the Enlightenment project: it 
captures the Counter or late Enlightenment for the period, as distinctly and 
incontrovertibly Enlightenment, rather than proto-Romantic or modem. Reill, who like 
Schiller is determined to save the enlightenment project, countered the "instruments taken 
directly from Foucault's toolbox," Foucault's characterization of the time by discipline, 
control, dehumanization and colonial exploitation with descriptive categories of 
Enlightenment vitalism. He proposed that harmony and free play trumped discipline, 
goal-directed development refined control, humanization displaced dehumanization and 
levels of reciprocal control in complex organization eclipsed colonial exploitation - in 
terms of serving our understanding of the period. In essence, his formulation described a 
late Enlightenment scientific correction (Vitalizing 4,252-3). 
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historians of science, those vitalists inhabited the middle ground between mechanism and 
animism, and they approached the unanswered questions about life with a lively, abiding 
interest and a keen sense that the known physico-chemical laws fell short of describing 
the phenomenon of life. They developed their knowledge based on a modest 
epistemology and a specific methodology. That vitalism's vocabulary and its worldview 
extended beyond its practitioners to the broader culture, yet that these extensions were 
limited to the particular time of the late Enlightenment, were profoundly important to its 
characterization. 
A short but extremely fruitful program, Enlightenment vitalism was distinguished by 
its basic understanding of nature and individual organisms including man. As a tradition 
it organized around the description of the particular attributes of life. These recognized 
hallmarks of life were complex organization, a dynamic and harmonious structural 
balance in nature and in the individual, and in-dwelling forces that promoted, through 
reciprocal relations, the functions specific to life - self-creation, nutrition, sensitivity, 
irritability, generation and development. 14 Implicit in this description is life's relation to 
time. For vitalists, life was change. Life was extension in time as history. ,And history 
as a consequence was reciprocally affected by vitalism: it became developmental, 
complexly organic - replete with forces, economies, types and special functions - and 
attained a potentially different epistemological status. 
14 Life fOTIns not only self-sustained, self-created and developed; they degenerated, 
became ill and died as well. Part of defining life was distinguishing the state of death: 
because of the questions 'and the intellectual uncertainties about what makes an organism 
alive, there was a wave of angst about being taken for dead [Scheintod] and buried alive. 
Because of Jewish customs surrounding death required quick burial of the body, Moses 
Mendelssohn and Marcus Herz, in particular, were active in this controversy, counseling 
delay (Cf. Reill, Vitalizing 170-82). 
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Late Enlightenment vitalism valued methods of discovery that included observation, 
experimentation, comparison, extension by analogy and determination through 
probability. It encompassed a way of thinking about life forms, their structure and 
function, that would provide more information in the following way: typically hypotheses 
defined a problem in terms of polarities and then carved out a third, ambiguous space, a 
complex issue identified by an unknown - be it a force, an energy, potentiality or 
substance - to hold the incompletely understood aspect oflife, to allow observation, 
experimentation and comparison to continue. 
Many of Enlightenment vitalists were academicians and independent scholars in the 
German states but, as the life science disciplines themselves had yet to be demarcated, 
many educated persons were familiar with, fascinated by and involved in a wide range of 
knowledge-developing and codifying activities related to living forms and human nature. 
Accessibility and active participation made the intermingling of ideas, their language and 
metaphor, inevitable. The light ofthe Enlightenment was "a sociable light. It was not the 
inner light of mystical vision, but rather the outer light of letters, lectures, treatises, 
memoirs, novels, journals and conversations" (Daston in Clark 497).15 The intercalation 
of philosophy (including natural philosophy) and art provoked hypotheses by creative 
analogy and discovery by technical innovation. Science was then part of the humanities, 
perhaps even a forward position. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century (yet long 
enough to create a tradition that would promote evolutionary biology), life science and 
15 Schwab: The modem "reader is surprised by the degree of compactness and intimacy 
ofthe lively universe that existed in Europe just before the vast mushrooming of 
population during the past two centuries. A very large percentage of the men of letters 
knew one another well enough to be great friends or to hate one another" (In d' Alembert, 
"Translator's Introduction," xiii.). 
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the humanities were intimately connected in an expanded middle - and the physical 
sciences and the arts were the poles. Within, at the center of activity and interest, the 
emerging" life science disciplines, the new way of "doing" history and the coalescing 
social sciences germinated and began to develop. And Schiller spanned this center: as 
physician, natural and political philosopher, aesthetician, playwright and poet, he both 
contributed to and exploited the breadth of knowledge available in his time. 
Vitalism then was everywhere evidenced in intellectual culture. Art, philosophy, 
history and study of the life sciences all contributed reciprocally to the gradual 
intermingling of mechanical metaphors favored by the early Enlightenment with organic 
metaphors that would come to characterize the Romantic period. Mechanical metaphors, 
significantly, continued through vitalism and often had special functions. At first, one of 
those functions was to guard against the assumptions of animism. Words like 
"assemblage," "aggregation," or "sum," for example, might be used in building a 
description about an organism; they often signaled a rejection of "a single universal 
organizing principle, logos, soul, or spirit. Life was not, for Enlightenment vitalists, a 
uniform attribute of all the parts of the body" (Reill, Vitalizing 138). A second and more 
common use of mechanical imagery signaled an acceptance of the view that physical and 
chemical processes supported life: mechanical functions were the foundation upon which 
transformation by organization, complexity or generation occurred. 
What made living organisms distinct - their complexity, their internal organization 
(within which operated a variety of reciprocally-interacting, hierarchical and coordinated 
systems that functioned harmoniously), their forces, their connection with the greater 
environment, their wholeness and function, growth and development - contributed to a 
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growing organic metaphor system. This analogy encompassed not only life forms, but 
their parts, not only the human body but also the mind, its unity and creativity, and all its 
social and political products. At the time, such a system was reciprocal: physiologists, 
historians, philosophers and artists incorporated the theories and information about 
discoveries into their projects, adjusting for their own purposes. Facts became examples, 
old structures of meaning were atomized and then emerged like developing embryos, and 
old world-views burst like exoskeletons in the process of metamorphosis. 
Human creations and productions were represented by metaphors and analogies from 
living nature. For Schiller, while the state (when functioning as it should) and art (when 
participating in our aesthetic Bildung) merited elaborate organic metaphors, the State had 
another function as well - it was also the objective, the empirically observable, stand-in 
for human nature: 
Every individual human being, one may say, carries within him, 
potentially and prescriptively, an ideal man, the archetype of a human 
being .... This archetype, which is to be discerned more or less clearly in 
every individual, is represented by the State, the objective and, as it were, 
canonical form in which all the diversity of individual subjects strive to 
unite ... " (lV.2 my emphasis). 
The state was, then, potentially a life-like entity in its own right and an appearance (more 
than an analogue) of human nature. As such it had a mechanical ground, basic functions 
that by necessity continue, and something more as well: layers of complexity, of balanced 
reciprocity and self-generated action associated with life. For the state then, basic 
services were mechanical just as in human nature; many instinctual or maintenance 
functions were natural and arbitrary. At the level of organic metaphor, the state provided 
for individual freedom and full potential, for aesthetic education and moral behavior. 
When it functioned fully, it performed transformatively in a manner the mechanical 
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simply could not. It allowed for autonomous human functioning under reciprocal 
regulation of self and society (like organs and the body); it fostered the extensive 
development of the individual over and above his mere survival, and it encouraged the 
co-ordination of nature's necessities and moral duties. In short, it honored man "at last as 
an end in himself' (V.2). Likewise, the representation of the state reflected on human 
nature. Just as the state could create the circumstances that made individual 
development a more likely possibility, a fully functioning human being - ifhe thought 
for himself and acted as a citizen of the world [Selbstdenker, Weltburger], ifhe applied 
himself to the problems of his age - might raise "himself from an individual into a 
representative of the species" (IlA). 
"Imagine ... [how] man existing in time can coincide with man as Idea, and in 
consequence, just [how] the State can assert itself in individuals: [in one way,] ... the 
ideal man [would] suppress empirical man, and the State annul ... individuals (lV.2). 
When things go wrong, the state might enforce a uniformity of function and behavior that 
disregarded the individual. Men would be pigeon-holed for the good of the whole; they 
would become their jobs and be limited to repetitive and reflexive existence. Likewise a 
man could martyr himself, limiting his being to a fragment of his potential. Particularly 
if a state were not dedicated to a reciprocal development of its parts, without the support 
of society and the capacity to manage and develop himself, "man [would end up being] at 
odds with himself in two ways: either as savage, when feeling predominates over 
principle; or as barbarian, when principle destroys feeling. The savage despises 
civilization, and acknowledges Nature as his sovereign mistress. The barbarian derides 
and dishonours Nature, but, more contemptible than the savage, as often as not continues 
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to be the slave of his slave" (IV.6).16 Schiller saw savages and particularly contemporary 
barbarians behaving without consideration for the whole: they neglected the contributions 
each must make for society to function - i.e. they behaved like rogue or damaged organs, 
tissue and systems in an organism. 
When Schiller introduced terms like the "complex machinery of State" (VI.6), he 
related those functions to the unconscious operations of life, the ones that sustained and 
maintained the organism. 17 And, when survival was at stake, Schiller was extremely 
practical. The nuanced co-operative social powers came into play and could be counted 
on only after safety and security are assured. 18 In the face of civil violence or catastrophe 
(like the aftermath of war, revolution, earthquake or tsunami, epidemic or famine - all of 
which could serve as examples in his century), there was danger of a failed state and of 
16 The passage continues introducing a third type, the cosmopolitan, who develops 
himself within society: "The man of Culture [gebildete Mensch], makes a friend of 
Nature, and honours her freedom whilst curbing only her caprice." 
17 In an Aristotelian system such functions would be provinces of the vegetative or 
animal souls. The rational soul of that system is infused with the organic imagery and is 
brought into matter as a force. Alternatively, the human anima became localized to the 
sensorium communis and, in tum, physiologized into the medullary brain mass with 
extension to the whole nervous system by Haller and others around mid-century. In a 
letter to Goethe, Schiller wrote about the dependency of humans on the elemental forces 
of nature: "How tied we are, for all our vaunted independence, to the forces of Nature! 
And of what avail is our will if Nature leaves us in the lurch? What I have been 
fruitlessly brooding over for the last five weeks has been released within me by a warm 
ray of sunshine within three days" (as qtd. W&W xl). 
18 Schiller made this observation of play - that it only occurs in security and abundance, 
when basic needs are met. "It is true that Nature has given even to creatures without 
reason more than the bare necessities of existence, and shed a glimmer of freedom even 
into the darkness of animal life. When the lion is not gnawed by hunger ... " (XXVII.3). 
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devolution to chaos. In such a situation, governments [Naturstaaten] must sustain 
themselves at a mechanical or arbitrary level for the sake of all the individuals involved. 
Can the State be blamed for having disregarded the dignity of human 
beings as long as it was still a question of ensuring their very existence? 
Or for having hastened to divide and unite by the [mechanical] forces of 
gravity and cohesion, while there could as yet be no thought of any 
[organic] formative principle from within? ... [F]or society, released 
from its controls, is falling back into the kingdom of the elements, instead 
of hastening upwards into the realm of organic life (VA the addition of 
[organic] and [mechanical] by Wilkinson & Willoughby). 19 
Here Schiller depended on the mechanical for basic functions just as his contemporaries, 
the theorizing physicians and embryologists, did. When he used mechanical imagery in 
the example above and the one that follows, he underscored the difficulty of broad reform 
or any sudden change in government. 20 In such a case, there was the imperative for 
continuous functioning: basic services must be provided. Like an organism, the state 
must maintain itself throughout change and development. The passage also implied that 
the development of the human being must be aesthetic, i.e. rise naturally out of the fabric 
of the self. The jarring inadequacy of mechanical repair (described below) to any historic 
19 Wilkinson and Willoughby added the clarifying words "mechanical" and "organic" to 
reiterate Schiller's polarizing language, "to bring out the implied contrast between the 
State conceived as mere physical mechanism and the State conceived as living organism. 
The forces of gravity and cohesion belong to the Newtoni~ world-picture of mechanical 
forces; the formative drive (nisus Jormativus was a term used by the contemporary 
biologist, Blumenbach) reflects the interest of the late eighteenth century in the newer 
sciences of living things" (229). The original German text: "Das er eilte, durch die 
Schwerkraji zu scheiden and durch die Kohasionskraji zu binden, wo an die bildende 
noch nicht zu denken war? ... Die losgebendene Gesellschaji, anstatt aufivarts in das 
organische Leben zu eilen, Jallt in das Elementarreich zuriick. " 
20 Schiller's contention was that Reason is not so reasonable when she seeks to institute a 
state of principles for one of forces. Before man "has had time to cleave unto the Law 
with the full force of his moral will, [Reason] would have drawn from under his feet the 
ladder of Nature" (IIL3). 
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institution carried Schiller's judgment. The self-maintenance of an organism was vastly 
to be preferred to a watch reduced to its parts, lying on ajeweler's bench: 
When the craftsman has a time piece to repair, he can let its wheels run 
down; but the living clockwork of the State must be repaired while it is 
still striking, and it is a question of changing the revolving wheel while it 
still revolves (IlIA). 
When harmoniously dynamic, the entity's parts function as organs, semi-autonomous 
units in reciprocal communication with and subordinated to the purposes of the whole: 
for "just because the State is to be an organization formed by itself and for itself, it can 
only become a reality inasmuch as its parts have been tuned up to the idea of the whole" 
(lV.S). The solution for these ills, then, in the state and in the individual was a 
harmoniously-balanced equilibrium, the aesthetic state. Within such an environment, the 
parts and the whole were each other's means and ends. When and ifthe State would not 
only respect "the objective and generic character in its individual subjects; ... [but] also 
honour their SUbjective and specific character, and in extending the invisible realm of 
morals take[s] care not to depopulate the sensible realm of appearance" (lV.3), the 
individual(developing aesthetically) could become a self-correcting dynamic equilibrium 
of feeling and thinking, of sense and morality. Man then, in a situation of reciprocal 
development, might more easily weave an extensive (internal and external) space of 
personal freedom out of necessity and possibility. The situation mimicked a spiral in 
nature: "Wholeness of character must. .. be present in any people capable, and worthy, of 
exchanging a State of compulsion [Staat der Not] for a State of freedom" (lV.7). 
Primitive wholes, according to Schiller, broke down; more complicated entities 
devolved grotesquely: they sickened and became disabled. They decayed and died. The 
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organic problem of sickness, decay and death, for him, was a modem problem, again, a 
problem of complex societies and complex individuals. In the scheme of things, then, 
perhaps the ancient Greeks were to be envied in their dissolution. They (simple 
organisms that they were) were apt to disintegrate into mechanical parts. "It was scarcely 
to be expected that the simple organization ofthe early republics should have survived 
the simplicity of early manners and conditions," wrote Schiller, "but instead of rising to a 
higher form of organic existence it degenerated into a crude and clumsy mechanism" 
(VI.7). 
When a modem state self-destructed, the result was a rotting mess (V.2), and 
Schiller's deep concern of course was with the fate ofthe French organism - and by 
extension, the rest of Europe. Because of modem fragmentation and the breakdown of 
the reciprocal relations in society, the European states were subject to decay, "to 
disintegrate into a state of primitive morality, in which public authority has become but 
one party more, to be hated and circumvented by those who make authority necessary, 
and only obeyed by such as are capable of doing without it" (VI.9). In a sort of Jeremiad, 
Schiller lamented the "repugnant spectacle of lethargy, and of depravation of character 
which offends the more because culture itself is its source .... As some philosophers 
say, 'The nobler a thing is, the more repulsive it is when it decays"'(V.5). 
Schiller's Aesthetic Letters is full of both mechanical and organic metaphors that 
attest to the vitalistic ground. For his theory of human nature, Schiller also imported 
concepts and hypotheses into his text, complete with their natural historical and 
philosophical details (and their epistemological ambiguity). With them he constructed a 
representation of nature and a representation of human nature, of man placed firmly 
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within nature itself.21 One of the most fruitful concepts for Schiller wasforce. The 
vitalistic theories offorces-in-matter, bespoke the unity of the psyche, of mind and body, 
and of the economy of Nature. Forces and drives were part of Schiller's objective reality 
and his subjective understanding of himself and others. 
Schiller and the Panoply of Vitalistic Forces 
Theories of forces in living organisms were abundant during Schiller's time. Natural 
historians, natural philosophers and metaphysicians, many of whom were experimenters 
themselves, had data at their disposal, results of efforts at analysis of the special problems 
of life. Their active interest in the capacity of organisms to reproduce, develop, grow, 
and self-sustain generated research work, theories, and publications about forces-in-
matter. By their lights, forces appeared responsible for effects, for the functions of life, 
and these forces, whatever their ontological status, became the default explanatory 
concepts in vitalism. 
In medicine and natural history, a number of forces were represented. Some were 
principles or emergents of organization within structures, powers of particular body 
systems like the nervous system, and others were drives or forces to solve the dilemma 
posed by epigenesis, life or developmental drives (whether for plants or animals). The 
first group of forces appeared to be the outcome of organizational complexity; these 
forces worked in reciprocal, hierarchal (sometimes co-operative, sometimes conflictual) 
dynamism, coordinating within tissues, organs and systems in bodies. Theories about 
21 The epistemology of vitalism will be addressed in Chapter V and the organic nature of 
works of art, specifically the Aesthetic Letters (as an organismic whole showing 
complexity of organization, polar structuring of rhetoric and conceptual content, and 
reciprocal relations with the environment, its readers), in Chapter VI. 
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these forces emphasized the complex, dynamic interiority of organisms and designated 
boundaried complexity as a precondition of transformation or emergent entities. 
Hypothetical forces specific to particular organ systems, particularly the nervous 
system, developed out of physiological and anatomical study. The site of the mind, the 
mind/body connection, and the actual mechanics of the animal capacity to relate to the 
environment through sensation had long been subjects of interest. During the eighteenth 
century the nervous system became the "bridge between the philosophical/psychological 
inquiry into the soul and nature of man and animals on the one hand, and the 
anatomical/physiological study of their structure and function on the other" (Figlio 178). 
F or the vitalists, especially the physicians, that bridge became a habitation. An empirical 
experimental data base about nervous system anatomy and function (complete with 
theories about the precise action and involved constituents) had been established by 
Haller: he did not exactly locate the seat of the soul, but an anatomical sensorium 
communis, the medullary structures of the brain?2 The next generation of researchers, 
(and this group included the young medical student and Zwitterart Schiller), furthered the 
union of matter and force, moved mind more into matter in terms of psychosomatic 
medicine and struggled with the "the simple model" of sensation. This simple model, the 
impression theory, held that nervous fluid (force or some substance) reacted to 
mechanical impact by movement. The vibration or pressure was transmitted to the brain, 
where the "mind was a passive recipient of the powers of bodies to impress sensations 
22 For Haller and others, the soul was "present" to the sensorium; "'presence' was a 
common and suggestive way to specify the location and manner of interaction of the 
incommensurable substances which could neither be .located in the same terms, nor affect 
each other" (Figlio 182). 
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upon it" (195). For the philosophers of the late Enlightenment, the mechanical analogy 
was completely unsuitable as explanation of the various, active capacities of mind. 
At the height of vitalism, in the scientific literature of German States, the word Geist 
most often indicated "mind," an undivided entity. Schiller used Geist frequently in the 
Aesthetic Letters (over seventy cognates): there, it entailed the whole human mind, the 
active aspect of mind, or an active spirit in an individual, people or time period. 
Occasionally Schiller opposed it to the sense-drive as a part of human nature. Its use was 
closely related to the concept of freedom. For example, in exploring the play of the 
imagination, Schiller wrote: 
From this play of freely associated ideas, which is still ofa wholly 
material kind, and to be explained by purely natural laws, the imagination, 
in its attempt at free form, finally makes the leap to aesthetic play. A leap 
it must be called, since a completely new power now goes into action; for 
here, for the first time, mind [Geist] takes a hand as lawgiver in the 
operations of blind instinct ... (XXVII.4). 
"Soul" [SeeZe], by comparison, Schiller used only a half dozen times and ,in every case, it 
connoted passivity, an aesthetic whole with all its relational emotionality. 23 
As the sensorium communis, Geist became a part of nature, referencing the 
anatomical nervous system's central structures. These terms came to be understood 
phenomenologically, as a way of representing experience: the mind was not known 
empirically, but it was known subjectively and intersubjectively. What was not known 
23 "Hence the abstract thinker very often has a cold heart, since he dissects his 
impressions, and impressions can move the soul [SeeZe] only as long as they remain 
whole" (VI. 1 0). "But not everyone whose soul [SeeZe] glows with this ideal was granted 
either the creative tranquility or the spirit [Sinn] oflong patience required ... " (IX.6), 
and "[r]eleased from its dark bondage, the eye, less troubled now by passion, can 
apprehend the form of the beloved; soul [SeeZe] looks deep into soul [SeeZe], and out of a 
selfish exchange of lust there grows a generous interchange of affection" (XXVII.7). 
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(perhaps, what could never be known precisely), however, many still considered a 
province of the study of nature. "By the end of the eighteenth century," summarized Karl 
Figlio, "the nervous system had become not just the transmitter of external reality to the 
place of the mind, but a physiological common substrate in which the union of mind and 
body was accomplished" (190-191). 
The other type of force was a postulate demanded by epigenesis. Given pure 
epigenesis, something had to do the organizing of unformed matter (or something, the 
explaining about organic developing from inorganic precursors). Such a force must have 
organizing power, the capacity to transform elements into structure in space and to 
develop rudiments to wholes in stages in time. It functioned as ifit were an agent of 
planned change.24 
The site of Schiller's theory about human nature was the nervous system. Schiller's 
description of his originating drives (the material-drive and the form-drive) followed the 
paradigm of interacting forces even as it participated in the type of a developmental 
drive. His material-drive [Stoffirieb} and form-drive [Formtrieb], as polar drives, perhaps 
both in sympathy and synergy, as reciprocally coordinated and organized, combined and 
24 Not only are the forces themselves many and varied, but their ontological nature is 
inconstant: whether they are constructs, descriptors of relations, regulative principles, 
entities or placeholders has been difficult to distinguish; often like Schiller who used 
words in any number of ways to stress their different connotations, authors themselves 
seemed to drift and readers throughout history have misjudged meaning repeatedly. 
Richards suggested and it is now generally accepted that Kant's commendation of 
Blumenbach on his conception of developmental force [Bildungstrieb] and Blumenbach' s 
acceptance of the compliment were based on mutual misunderstanding (Richards ("Kant 
and Blumenbach"), Huneman (Intro) and Smith). How this new nature is to be known 
and if it can be completely known are deeply concerning to those who hypothesize 
forces. The developing and open-ended epistemology of vitalism is represented in 
ChapterV. 
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promoted a higher third function, the play drive [Spieltrieb]. But, in this case, form took 
on matter and developed it as well. The play drive also functioned as a developmental 
drive, the second type, and not only of the individual's potential (himself) but also of 
human products and productions, of the species and of itself, continuously renewing and 
developing in the individual and throughout cultural history. Schiller's theory of human 
nature flowed naturally out of this cultural hypothesizing tendency: his Aesthetic Letters, 
published in the protected environment of (and following the intentions he outlined for) 
the Horen, imported both empirical research and speculation about these forces into 
literature. 
Schiller had access to the natural history, natural philosophy and medicine of his 
time and he had an array of forces from which to choose. Research and hypotheses were 
available to him through his experience in medicine, but they were also available to the 
public through abstracts. He was deeply immersed in Kant, whose philosophical 
arguments were filled with examples of and allusions to both Newtonian science and the 
new life studies. He was well-versed in Rousseau who followed Buffon and the 
Encyclopedistes, and finally he had the company of Herder and Goethe. Well-known at 
the time was the work of physicians Theophile Bordeu and Paul-Joseph Barthez of 
Montpellier, who emphasized the place of forces in the organization ofliving beings, and 
the theories of Marcus Herz and Johann-Christian Reil, also physicians, who focused on 
the nervous system and tried to work within Kant's epistemology with the concept of 
force in the mind. The studies of natural historians, Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Johann 
Friedrich Blumenbach, who posited developmental forces made logically necessary by 
the current theory of epigenesis, were a source of German pride. 
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The following short vignettes are intended to show the variety of thought and 
research about forces and the growing commitment to naturalism. They are examples of 
problems that attracted researchers and consumed the attention of the Enlightened public 
(particularly interested Germans [Aujklarunger]). They are an effort to explain what was 
learned through painstaking observation and experiment and what sort of clinical 
observations and practice promoted theory. They also attempt to speak to the variety of 
ideas about forces in playas well as to the many individual concerns about those ideas' 
real relation to data each researcher had collected. These exemplary men grappled with 
problems without the theory and technology that would finally lead to their 
simplification. Schiller posed the same problems to himself: he imported forces from 
contemporary theories of life or the mind and struggled with epistemological issues, ones 
Kant attempted to clarify. 
Forces from the Medical and Natural History Traditions: 
Source-Drives for Schiller's Human Nature 
Educated at Montpellier, Theophile Bordeu (1722-1776) spent a decade in the 
further study of anatomy and physiology and in clinical hospital practice before settling 
in Paris, where he attended the powerful, including King Louis XV in his last illness. A 
friend of the Encyc/opedistes, Bordeu was immortalized as the physician character in 
Diderot's D' Alembert's Dream [Le Reve D'Alembert] and in medicine as the father of 
endocrinology.25 Another portrait of him, written by a clinician more recently, described 
25 This work has a scofflaw's amazing history of reverses and recoveries: written around 
1769, it was denounced by one of its characters, thrown into the fire, poorly 
reconstructed, found in copy, rehabilitated, hidden, spirited to Russia, stolen and in copy 
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him as the possessor "'of a high degree of [of] Intuition, that faculty more artistic than 
scientific, which in Medicine consists in seeing the patient from the inside, in assessing 
rapidly his total personality, physical and mental and thus ... understanding the whole 
... because patients are not Hearts or Stomachs but are human problems" (Cawadias 95). 
His publications show a synthetic approach to illnesswith emphasis on the integrated 
organization of nervous and endocrine systems.26 He wrote: 
Weare led to believe that every organ has an impulse coming from the 
brain, which itself is so constituted that its different parts have different 
functions and corresponding nerves, so that what takes place in the organs 
is but the effect and image of what first occurs in the brain. In a word, we 
believe that functions first begin in the brain, which is divided into as 
many compartments as there are organs .... [And each] of the organs 
serves as a factory and laboratory of a specific humor .... Every organ 
sends ... continuous emanations and thus the blood caries in its torrent 
extracts of all organs, which are indispensable for life as a whole ... 
(Bordeu qtd. by Cawadias 95-96). 
The mind, as an aspect ofthe nervous system, was included in Bordeu's emphasis on 
interrelationship of body organs. Bordeu was a practitioner of psychosomatic medicine; 
he understood health as a working connection between mind and body, and illness as a 
disordered relation. This approach characterized by his principles of constitutional 
medicine: first, he held that the whole human being was affected in health and disease. 
The body is a whole and acts as a whole; disease, as a psychosomatic reaction, affects the 
whole body, including the mind. The second principle concerned the etiology of 
sent to Paris, and there published in 1830 (Preface, 89-91). Diderot introduced Bordeu's 
concept of force-as-sensibility into the Encyclopedie in 1765 (Haigh 40). 
26 Among others, Recherches anatomiques sur la position des glandes et sur leur action 
(1751) and Recherches sur quelques points d'histoire de la medecine (1764) had wide 
circulation. 
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disfunction: disease, he felt, is a combination of environmental and individual 
constitutional factors. Third, he recognized a principle of natural healing powers. Cure 
was based on the natural, self-regulating power of the organism and its efforts to restore 
its own balance (Cawadias 97). Bordeu approached the human being as an individual, a 
sensible being, and while taking into consideration the environment, centered attention on 
the man's organic interior. 
As a theoretician, Bordeu was committed to protecting two frontiers, the autonomy of 
vital phenomena over and against the soul and the "autonomy of vital phenomena vis a 
vis mechanical phenomena." In his presentations and writing, he intended to elaborate "a 
pattern of organic matter [of "ceaseless reciprocal interaction ... in complex 
dynamism"] that would explain the nature and the different aspects of life in reliable and 
verifiable terms" (Moravia, "From Homme" 52-54). From his research on the nervous 
system, he hypothesized that the whole body had a sensorium for which the brain was 
responsible but that the organs of the body, including the glands, had their own functions 
which were relatively autonomous and unconscious.27 Though the brain with the nervous 
system constituted the residence of the vital force, Bordeu considered that, as 
consciousness, it was not in a position of control like a monarch. His vitalism was a 
"federation of organs" (Moravia 56). 
27According to Moravia, Bordeu's empiricism was based on Hippocratic 
experimentalism, as well as on Bacon and Locke (51). The soul in his system was 
restricted to a rational and conscious physiological role, and automatic functions were 
dependent upon another "vital sensibility," a sort of dual control, one external to matter 
(the soul) and the other somehow part ofliving matter. (Haigh 38). 
137 
Schiller used this theory of organization in a republican metaphor in his final letter. 
There, he described the autonomy of the imagination but placed it within the organization 
of nature, independent but subordinate. 
Like the bodily organs in man, his imagination, too, has its free movement 
and its material play, an activity in which, without any reference to form, 
it simply delights in its own absolute and unfettered power. Inasmuch as 
form does not yet enter this fantasy play at all, its whole charm residing in 
the free association of images, such play - although the prerogative of 
man alone - belongs merely to his animal life ... is still of a totally 
material kind, and to be explained by purely natural laws ... (XXVII.4 my 
emphasis)?8 
Paul-Joseph Barthez (1734-1806) was an extraordinarily active polymath. A 
physician and physiologist of Montpellier and later conservative aesthetician, he 
contributed to the Encyclopedie, authored Nouveaux elements de fa science de l'homme 
(1778) and was considered the originator of the "principal model of French vitalism" 
(Reich 16). In his research, he focused on describing the variety of interactions he 
thought were orchestrated by a governing vital principle. This explanatory principle 
coordinated the actions of different organs and systems of the body. Regarding 
all functions of the animal oecomony, [he wrote] certain conditions 
prevent their being resolved into mere mechanical or chemical 
phenomena, as well as their being explained by simple vital reaction .... 
[A ]ctions composing those functions are continually directed by a higher-
order cause which links, coordinates, adjusts them to an end, and induces 
on organs modifications needed to adapt them at all times to the actually 
required mode of action (Barthez qtd. in Duchesneau 261). 
28Reil (see page 144) like Bordeu used republican metaphors: "The animal body is like a 
large republic, which consists of many parts. These parts, of course, stand in a 
determinate relationship with one another and they contribute to the maintenance of the 
whole. But each part operates through its own force and possesses its own perfections, 
deficiencies, and failures independently of the other branches of the body" (qtd. in 
Richards, "Rhapsodies" 710). 
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Given that the vital principle is responsible for the "autonomous correlation of the 
motive and sensitive forces [that constitute] the genuine dynamic unity of the living 
body," Barthez focused particularly on relations among the functions governed by the 
principle. These he termed sympathies and synergies (Duchesneau 263). Synergies 
promoted organismic stability (keeping up the normal activities of life), while 
sympathetic reactions were responses to environmental challenges (like stress) and were 
by their nature episodic and idiosyncratic. Barthez identified the latter complexly 
interactive response-forces as productive of new perspectives into the animal economy. 
Based on his observations, taken from the standpoint of past, present and potential states, 
the organism proved to be a dynamic, responsive unit both with respect to the external 
environment and within itself.29 
From his medical school days, Schiller believed in the reciprocal action of mind and 
body, a stance reflected not only in the tradition of Montpellier but carried forward in 
Germany as well. Intensely interested in psychosomatic medicine, Schiller was 
committed to a united psyche. He was sensitive to polarities and conflicts and often 
expressed himself dualistically; nevertheless, he was, according to Wilkinson and 
Willoughby, impelled to seek and represent a "wholeness of personality, conceived as a 
changing pattern of behavior in time." They warned that "to dismiss him as a Kantian 
dualist has been a recurrent failing of Schiller scholarship: it has obscured his life-long 
inclination to think of the psyche as an organic unity" (xxx). For him, the human 
29 For the physicians of Montpellier, the autonomy of the individual was paramount: "free 
individual agency characterizes alike the vital actions in living beings, the unique 
liberties of the human soul, and the cultures in which mankind creates itself' (Reich 21 ). 
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personality was not to be understood "in terms of simple antithesis, common enough in 
his day, between a mechanical 'aggregate of elements' and a living 'organized whole' -
not even with the added rider 'in which part and whole are reciprocally means and end.'" 
The whole person was one of the "living forms," where interacting forces of mind, in a 
real body functioning in a real environment, displayed characteristics of "imbalance, 
asymmetry, dominant principle and hierarchical subordination" and participated in the 
unstable harmony of transformation through the synthesizing play drive (W&W lxxxiv). 
In health, Schiller saw harmonious function; in disease he saw derangement by force 
in both directions, either through ideas affecting the function of the body (e.g., 
Grammont's melancholia and his religious enthusiasm [Schwarmerei]) or through bodily 
illness (e.g., infectious fever) affecting mental capacities. He envisioned his program of 
education through beauty as a prescription for bringing the independent reciprocal forces 
into a dynamic balance. In the medical sense, then, Schiller's cure for man's divided 
state is his capacity to play, to approach the beautiful (Dewhurst, 354). 
Marcus Herz (1747-1803) - physician, philosopher and correspondent of Kant and 
friend of Mendelssohn - was extremely influential through his medical practice and his 
interest in Kantian philosophy. He practiced out of the Jewish hospital in Berlin and gave 
informal lectures to the community on medicine, experimental physics and Kantian ideas. 
Particularly interested in teaching from and applying the First Critique, he, in addition to 
his other occupations, oversaw the details of publication and distribution for Kant. 
Herz was also quite influential through the social milieu of his wife's salon. 
Henriette Lemos Herz' salon brought Jews and women into the mix with Lessing and 
other older literary figures and scientists, with Johann Christian Reil, Goethe, the 
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Humboldts, Schlegel and Schleiermacher among others. Because of the difference in 
age, temperament and preferences of Herz and his young wife, the salon, as a gathering 
of overlapping circles of influence and acquaintance, was itself a "metaphor for the 
transition from Aufklarung to romanticism." (Hansen "From Enlightenment" 43, passim). 
In his own work and like Schiller, he focused on the relationship of the mind, the 
emotions and the body, approaching this interest from his background in clinical 
medicine and physiology. Efforts to apply Kantian categories to medical problems left 
him in a state of contradiction; as a philosopher he could not justify positing hypothetical 
nervous fluid, but as a "theoretically inclined physician, he could not do without [it]." He 
was "forced to postulate the existence of a nervous fluid that travels through the nerves to 
the brain, ... which is the 'heart' of the system, the origin and final destination of all the 
nerves, [and] the source of the living force [Lebenskraft] that maintains the constant 
motion of the nervous fluid through all parts of the body" (Hansen, "From 
Enlightenment" 49, 48).30 For Herz, the brain was the place of meeting for mind and 
body, and the Lebenskraft, which can be stimulated mentally by ideas or physically by 
sensation or motion, the regulator of nervous fluid. On a clinical level, disturbances in 
Lebenskraft were the cause of symptoms of mental illness; in this Herz was one of the 
first to associate boredom with pathology (55). In 1791, Herz also hypothesized 
"material ideas," organic (yet at once composites of real and ideal) substances that 
30 Schiller used Lebenskraft in the Aesthetic Letters as a synonym for the sense-drive: 
"For there is, after all, a moment in which the life-impulse [Lebenskraft] , just because the 
form-impulse [Formtrieb] is not yet running counter to it, operates as nature and as 
necessity" (XX.3). In the late eighteenth century, life-force was used more generally to 
denote the vital capacity associated with a living body or in reference to Hallerian 
irritability oftissue (A. Humboldt in Reill Vitalizing 299 fn 79). Illness diminished and 
death finally destroyed Lebenskraft (171-182). 
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functioned in the brain as intermediaries to mind. Further, for Herz, the mind itself was 
an active power, its ability to represent to itself things or ideas, the Vorstellungskraft. All 
other capacities were modifications or aspects of this single force, whether they be will, 
imagination or understanding. Herz held that the fundamental law of the human mind 
was that perception of perfection is identified with happiness. This, a familiar ground of 
German aesthetics, Herz further particularized: he suggested that certain relationships 
create liveliness and pleasure. These relationships included the perception of unity and 
diversity, similarity and contrast, order (harmony and symmetry) against disorder and, 
very importantly, causality (53). 
Herz published his work (including the above considerations) in the professional 
literature, in essays about the causes of medical illness like vertigo or in the form of 
letters to physicians. Such a pattern of publication exemplified how very blurred "the 
lines between epistemological concepts, their psychological equivalents and their 
physiological embodiments" had become (57).31 Herz felt this situation very personally. 
In a letter to Kant, he shared a self-representation, one that resonated with Schiller's 
characterization of himself as a Zwitterart.32 
You see, dearest sir, that I am not entirely disloyal ... [but rather like] a 
deserter who still wears your uniform and who, while associating with 
31 Briefe an Arzte (1777, 1785) and Versuch uber den Schwindel (1786, 1791). The letter 
to Kant related to the publication of the latter; it is dated 27.viii.1786. 
32 See Chapter I, page 3. Schiller also expressed to Goethe (in a letter dated 16.x.1795) 
that he, in order to write philosophic poems, had "been forced to keep both these powers 
[of poetic imagination and philosophic abstraction] at full stretch, and only by a constant 
movement within himself been able to maintain the two heterogeneous elements 'in einer 
Art von Solution' [in a species of solution, an apparent chemical analogy]" (qtd. in W & W 
223). 
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other[ s], is still in your service .... I enjoy wandering around the border 
towns of both countries, philosophy and medicine, and it gives me joy 
when I can make arrangements for their common government. I think it 
would be a good thing if similar border areas between philosophy and its 
neighboring territories were diligently visited by philosophers as well as 
by people in practical studies and artists of all sorts. The one would avoid 
thereby the frequently valid charge of useless mediation, the others, that of 
empiricism (51).33 
Johann-Christian Reil (1759-1813), professor at Halle and Berlin, personal 
physician to Goethe after 1802, psychiatrist, anatomist and physiologist, was an admirer 
of Schiller and Goethe who "began to intermix his lectures on therapy and diseases of the 
eye with poetry from Schiller and Goethe, so that the delicious fruits of his research were 
hidden among flowers" (Binder 1094).34 Known later in life (from 1802) for his 
shocking switch from the materialistic edge of vitalism to Naturphilosophie and for his 
creative but idiosyncratic theories about the causes and treatment of mental illness, he 
was in the late eighteenth century, committed to the work of moving medicine more in 
the direction of science.35 In an effort to advance medicine as a theoretical discipline 
33 "There is only one way to unite the great branches of learning and end the culture wars. 
It is to view the boundary between the scientific and literary cultures not as a territorial 
line but as a broad and mostly unexplored terrain awaiting cooperative entry from both 
sides" (Wilson 137). 
34 Reil, according to Binder, was one of the first to recognize the need of physicians 
assistants or auxiliaries in areas of limited access. His legacy includes many named 
anatomical features and pathologies - several heart and brain structures, insula of Reil, 
Reil's band, ansa, triangle, sulcus and ribbon, and two pathological changes in the digits 
ofthe hand. 
35 He wrote Rhapsodies on the Application of Psychological Cures for the Mentally III 
[Rhapsodieen uber die Anwendung der psychischen Curmethode auf 
Geisteszerruttungen]. He was known for treatments that included the theatre and the 
tongue-in-cheek call for a cat piano, an instrument whose cat-yowl notes brought the 
mentally ill back to reality. Reil's conversion had some relation to his study of the gravid 
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(over and above its practical clinical aspects), he published the first journal of physiology 
in Germany, Archiv fur die Physiologie (1795). In its first number, he critiqued the use 
of the concept of force which he limited to a regulative role: 
Force [Kraft] is a subjective concept, the form according to which we 
think the connection between cause and effect. If it were possible for us to 
think clearly of each body as it is - simultaneously of the nature of its 
constituent elements and their connection, of their composition 
[Mischung] and structure [Form], then we would not find the concept of 
force necessary, a concept that produces so many erroneous conclusions 
(qtd. in Binder 1092). 
Because he followed the essentially Newtonian epistemology of the First Critique, "Reil 
advanced a quite ... mechanistic conception of organic processes. The fundamental 
operations of assimilation, growth, and reproduction occurred by way of the elective 
attraction of external matter (in the form of food) to the right parts of an animal body and 
then to the chemical alteration of nutrient material to tissue through a kind of 
'crystallization of animal matter.'" This inorganic metaphor served "his fundamental 
assumption that organic life derived from basic chemical and physical forces," and it 
developed a life of its own in Naturphilosophie's opposing camp, nineteenth-century 
reductionist physiology (Richards 709). 
Caspar Friedrich Wolff (1734-1794) served as a military physician before 
becoming an academic in Berlin and then St. Petersburg. Wolffs doctoral dissertation, 
Theoria generationis (1759), formed the platform for his lifelong research. In it, he 
proposed 
the ability of plant and animal fluids to solidify, and a force, which he 
named the essential force [vis essentialis]. According to his system the 
uterus, its remarkable capacity to be both means and end, i.e. a natural purpose (Richards, 
"Rhapsodies" 706-710, 728-731). 
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origins and subsequent fonnation of the embryonic plant or animal are 
produced through the secretion of fluids which then solidify into structures 
.... As each part begins to solidify, it becomes 'organized,' acquiring 
vessels and vesicles, which are produced by the fluid to the new part .... 
What else but a force could cause this movement? 'It must be assumed [to 
exist],' Wolff contends, 'if plants and their nourishing liquids are 
supposed, which is confinned through experience: This is sufficient for 
the present purpose, and it will be called by me the essential force of 
plants' (Roe, "Rationalism" 6-7). 
In the case of animals, the flow is through the umbilical area, and the same force, the vis 
essentialis, "transfonn[s] inorganic matter into organic through the fonnation of vessel 
and cells" (Larson, "Vital" 240). Force plus unfonned matter led to solidification of 
structures. 
Wolff s remarkable work on the fonnation of chick embryo intestines was 
considered at once the crowning proof of epigenesis and the coup de grace administered 
to eighteenth-century prefonnationism (Aulie 125). It was also an outstanding example 
of exacting and protracted observation and experimentation. Wolff, who "occupied 
himself with natural science and chiefly with observations on the procreation of animals, 
in which he was indefatigable," discovered by serial and sequential observations and 
dissections that the intestine was fonned from a flat sheet of tissue. The folding of this 
flat structure into a tube was evidence of a development of a temporary part into a 
structurally complicated organ (Roe, "Rationalism" 11). This painstakingly documented 
discovery answered the complaints by prefonnationists that observability in Wolff s 
system was existence. As a result ofthis discovery, Wolff could and did counter that it 
was not the "parts [that were] hidden because of their infinite smallness thereafter 
gradually emerging" as opponents had charged, but rather that, if generation by 
prefonnation came about through the enlargement of a miniscule whole, one "should not 
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be able to see its constituent parts before one sees the complete structure" (10). "Time 
and cost were not spared" in his work and neither was logic (11). One of his former 
student's wrote of Wolff that he "lectured on logic better than it had perhaps ever been 
taught before, and used it with excellence in medicine, creating through it, as it were, a 
new spirit in his numerous listeners, so that they now could grasp and digest his other 
teachings more easily" (Mursinna qtd. in Roe 4-5). 
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840) was a natural historian and 
philosopher, a comparative anatomist, embryologist and the father of anthropology. 
While he was still a very young man, his Ober den Bildungstrieb (an extension of some 
considerations from his dissertation, "On the Natural Varieties of Human Beings" (1775)) 
and his subsequently published Handbook of Natural History (1779) (which went to 
eleven editions) brought him immediate and sustained recognition. Originally not a 
partisan of epigenetic theory, he developed his life work on epigenesis with the energy 
and enthusiasm of a convert. He was but one more eighteenth-century naturalist affected 
by an encounter with the Hydra. While on vacation he, sitting beside a pond, noticed the 
little polyps; he collected and examined them and then repeated Trembley's classic 
experiments (Larson "Vital," Richards "Kant" 17-18). Such experimental activities 
provoked the following insight about all living things: 
there exists in all living creatures, from men to maggots and from cedar 
trees to mold, a particular inborn, life-long active drive [Trieb]. This drive 
initially bestows on creatures their form, then preserves it, and, if they 
become injured, where possible restores their form. This is a drive (or 
tendency or effort, however you wish to call it) that is completely different 
from the common features of the body generally; it is also completely 
different from the other special forces [Kraften] of organized bodies in 
particular. It shows itself to be one of the first causes of all generation, 
nutrition and reproduction. In order to avoid all misunderstanding and to 
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distinguish it from all other natural powers, I give it the name of 
Bildungstrieb (Nisusformativus). (qtd. by Richards "Kant" 18).36 
In Blumenbach's explanatory system, this one drive, the Bildungstrieb, was 
responsible for generation, that is, it accounted for reproduction, maintenance and 
restoration together.37 It was also the source of all other necessary drives, vital forces 
that accounted for motion in tissues and the nervous system (vis cellulosa and vis 
muscularis, and vis propriae and vis nervea) (Larson "Vital" 238). After the late 1780's, 
possibly in light of Kant's critique of his work, Blumenbach identified the Bildungstrieb 
as a more explicitly teleo-mechanical principle, a combination of physic-chemical 
(mechanistic) explanation within a teleological framework (Richards, Duchesneau). As 
Blumenbach conceived it, Bildungstrieb was a force acting upon unformed matter that 
manifested a "comprehensive architectonic character: it directed the formation of 
anatomical structures and the operations of physiological processes of the organism so 
36 Lenoir suggested that Blumenbach's change of heart resulted from a consideration that 
the paternal contribution to a new organism had to be greater than simple agitation. 
Additionally, Blumenbach recognized that hybrids would be impossible in a 
preformationist world: not only had K5lreuter adequately proven the existence of fertile 
hybrid plants, but his own research of all varieties of mankind (as fertile) forced the same 
conclusion (Lenoir "Kant" 82). 
37 Later in 1798, Blumenbach offered principles to assist readers in the interpretation of 
his system: 1) the name Bildungstrieb distinguished the developmental forces from all 
other orders of vital forces, and did not explain the cause of generation "since I believe 
that it is buried in the utmost darkness." It was a mere name imposed on an effect known 
a posteriori. 2) The drive was however more than a mere mechanical force, and 3) it 
consisted "in the conjunction of two explanatory principles on the nature of organic 
bodies, the physic-mechanical and the purely teleological (paraphrased from qtd. material 
in Duchesneau 271). 
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that various parts would corne into existence and function interactively to achieve the 
ends of the species" (Richards 19).38 
Like many vitalists, Blumenbach was concerned about the epistemological status of 
hypothetical force, particularly his own: 
I hope it will be superfluous to remind most readers that the word 
Bildungstrieb, like the words attraction, gravity, etc. should serve, no more 
and no less, to signify a power whose constant effect is recognized from 
experience and whose cause, like the causes of the aforementioned and the 
commonly recognize natural powers, is for us a qualitas occulta. 
What Ovid said pertains to all of these forces - causa latet, vis est 
notissirna [the cause is hidden, the force is well recognized]. The service 
rendered by a study of these forces is only that one can more carefully 
determine their effects and bring those effects into general laws 
(Blumenbach qtd. by Richards "Kant" 24). 
In spite of his caveat, the Bildungstrieb often functioned in his system and for others 
as a real cause with a real effect.39 
38 Duchesneau also emphasized the architectonic, quoting Blumenbach: "In the first 
place, there needs have been an acting nisus forrnativus, before we can become certain 
enough of the very existence of the embryo. Almost immediately, in the jellylike body of 
the initial embryo contractility intervenes. Then, as soon as the muscular parts have been 
effected, irritability takes place in their very motive fibres. Then, in ... organs [as well]. 
Finally, in man after birth there is beside those forces also sensitivity" (274 fn). Richards 
considered Blumenbach's concept of Bildungstrieb seminal for Herder who "frequently 
cited Blumenbach" and followed his reasoning about epigenesis: "one speaks improperly 
if one talks about a seed [Keirn] that only unfolds, [ wrote Herder] or of an epigenesis 
according to which limbs form by an external power. Bildung (genesis) is an effect of an 
inner force that forms the mass prepared by nature and in which it will be manifest" 
(Richards "Kant" 23 fn. 53). 
39 And Bildungstrieb found its place in the Aesthetic Letters: Schiller, concerned about 
the possibility that a man of feeling would act in response to political circumstances 
without consideration, wrote that "not everyone whose soul glows with this ideal was 
granted either the creative tranquility or the spirit of long patience required to imprint it 
upon the silent stone, or pour it into the sober mould of words, and so entrust it to the 
executory hands of time. Far too impetuous to proceed by such unobtrusive means, the 
divine impulse to form [gottische Bildungstrieb] often hurls itself directly upon present-
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Polarity, Conflict and Resolution 
Another component of the concept of force in vitalism involved the perception of 
dynamic opposition and conflict. The appearance in nature may be one of balance, but 
that balance was often violently obtained. Herder, for example, believed in dynamic 
polarity. Such opposition was "spread throughout the whole world order. Everywhere 
two forces [are] set against one another which nonetheless must work together and in 
which only by the combined and appropriate influence of both emerges the higher reality 
of a wise order, development, organization, life" (Herder, quoted in Zammito 319). In 
the following example, taking as his ground Haller's description of the property of 
irritability (varying it a good bit for his own purposes) and Maupertuis' manner of 
presenting human sexuality in the context of natural history, Herder wrote about love as 
an irritation, a union of polar beings (the sexes), one that produces a third. 
Finally, the deepest irritation, as it is the mightiest hunger and thirst: love! 
That two beings mate, feel themselves one in their need and yearning, that 
their shared stirring, the whole fount of organic forces, is reciprocally one 
and becomes a third in their shared image - what an effect of irritation in 
the whole living I of animal beings! Animals have still been able to mate 
without a head, just as a tom-out heart still beats on irritably for a long 
time. The deep abyss of all organic irritations and forces seems to be in 
reciprocal overflow; the spark of creation kindles and there comes into 
day reality and upon the life of action ... " (Ix. 6). In Letter XXVI. 7, where he described 
the development of the play-drive, Schiller wrote: "And as soon as the play-drive begins 
to stir, with its pleasure in semblance, it will be followed by the shaping spirit of 
imitation [Bildungstrieb], which treats semblance as something autonomous." And again 
in XXVII.8: "In the midst ofthe fearful kingdom of forces, and in the midst of the sacred 
kingdom of laws, the aesthetic impulse to form [Bildungstrieb] is at work, unnoticed, on 
the building of a third joyous kingdom of play and of semblance .... " In the three 
instances of Schiller's use, the artist's aesthetic impulse mimics the epigenetic 
Bildungstrieb: the artist (author) shapes unformed materials mentally in a manner that is 
not understood, but the results are known. The translators (1967) did not do justice to the 
word's contemporary significance in late Enlightenment natural history. 
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being a new I, the mainspring of new sensations and irritations, a third 
heart beats (Trans. Forster 193).40 
Schiller, who was very familiar with Herder, forged a model of the mind that 
combined two theoretical positions on force. The first, one of synthetic union rmd 
production of a transformational third, he introduced as follows: "Let there be a bond of 
union between the form-drive and the material drive; that is to say let there be a play-
drive .... Let humanity exist ... [and] Let there be beauty" (XV.4) The second position, 
an intuition of polarity, allowed him to emphasize and elaborate on the conflict of forces. 
For Schiller, while human nature is a synthetic process of interacting feeling and 
reasoned judgment, of sense and reason, the original drives are polar forces reciprocally 
working toward transformation. Of these drives, he wrote: 
At first sight nothing could seem more diametrically opposed than the 
tendencies of these two drives, the one pressing for change, the other for 
changelessness. And yet it is these two drives which, between them, 
exhaust our concept of humanity, and make a third fundamental drive 
which might possibly reconcile the two a completely unthinkable concept. 
How then, are we to restore the unity of human nature which seems to be 
utterly destroyed by this primary and radical opposition? (XII!. 1 ) 
According to Wilkinson and Willoughby, Schiller's emphasis on the conflicting polarities 
developed right out of his sense of himself; "the very violence with which Schiller tries to 
heal the dichotomy of modem man is further evidence of the reality of his own" division. 
They counted as one of the most important contributions to our understanding of human 
nature "his insight into the dynamic interplay - and interstrife - of opposing forces in the 
life of the psyche." And as Goethe scholars, they had only to compare the two friends to 
highlight the difference: 
40 See Chapter III, Haller and Trembley, pages 77 and 100. 
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Goethe [they wrote] sees the collaboration of the faculties as mutual aid; 
all is interrelation and overlapping of function, as between members of a 
family ... needing each other, helping each other out, synthesizing, 
permeating .... For Schiller, a fruitful 'collaboration' is only to be 
achieved through hostile forces holding each other in check; all is 
antagonism and arrogation of authority, the maintenance of a strict watch 
over frontiers and the invocation of immutable laws against trespassers 
(xxx). 
In another comparison, they cited Schiller's view of the famous friendship as "a 
dramatic encounter between two diametrically opposed types, meeting each other exactly 
half-way, and modifying each other by exactly proportional concessions and 
approximation ... " (xxx). 41 
From State of Nature to Developmental Stages in History 
"A history is a continuously moving statistics, a statistics is a halted history" 
(Sch16zer as qtd. in Reill, "Buff on" 673). 
The development of vitalism during the late eighteenth century was fostered by 
Time, time as a force, time as a current of thought, as a previously incompletely 
represented perception of the world. The intentional incorporation of history, the 
deliberate focus on the flowing stream instead of the configuration of the river, affected 
descriptions of organisms and provoked more dynamism in exploratory theories about 
living nature. This change was profoundly important to Schiller and to his argument in 
the Aesthetic Letters. As history itself began to move - to deepen, lengthening to 
cosmology, geological history, and archeology, and to broaden, overflowing with the 
addition of synchronic cultural perspectives and context to political chronicling, the early 
41 Goethe, they were quick to add, "saw it in terms of two different 'cycles of feeling, 
thought, and activity, which in part coincide, in part remain tangential'; it was for him not 
so much a question of altering the other as of bringing out the best that was in him, and 
warning him when he showed signs of becoming too one-sided" (xxx). 
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eighteenth century state-of-nature tableau (an elaboration of Genesis) gave way to 
developmental histories. The meditations of Pope changed to the speculations of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau; these in tum were antimonies against which Johann Gottfried Herder 
argued his developmental histories of mankind and language. Schiller's developmental 
narrative of humanity as the maturation of the play drive participated in this dynamic. He 
used its conventions and assumptions to raft his theory of human nature through the late 
Enlightenment intellectual rapids.42 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was something of a vagabond autodidact 
before he came to public notice by winning the Prize of the Academy of Dijon (1750) 
with an essay on the pernicious effects of the sciences and arts on happiness and 
morality.43 In his Second Discourse (1755) he enlarged on his original themes by 
providing a developmental history of humanity, documentedly indebted to Buffon's 
42 These developmental histories had the same hypothetical quality as the vitalist forces; 
they were meant to stimulate and free thought and establish a possibility of choice and 
action for their readers. Rousseau explicitly stated that "this 'state of nature' is not to be 
thought of as an historical reality" and Schiller did not mince words about the necessity 
of this operation and its purpose (W&W 225): "And even thus does [modem man], in his 
maturity, retrieve by means of a fiction the childhood of the race: he conceives, as idea, a 
state of nature, a state not indeed given him by any experience, but a necessary result of 
what Reason destined him to be; attributes to himself in this idealized natural state a 
purpose of which in his actual natural state he was entirely ignorant, and a power of free 
choice of which he was at that time wholly incapable; and now proceeds exactly as if he 
were starting from scratch, and were, from sheer insight and free resolve, exchanging a 
state of complete independence for a state of social contracts" (III.2 my emphasis). 
43 Schiller followed the argument of this First Discourse to explain the stalled 
Enlightenment: feelings (which are the motivations) were not accounted valuable and 
consequently knowledge did not find its way into behavior and action. The failure of the 
French Revolution, the violence of which marked the lack of preparation for freedom, 
was precipitated by the inorganic lack of feedback and integral involvement among the 
groups of citizens divided from one another by functions, interests and knowledge (the 
arts & sciences). 
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L 'histoire nature lie as well as to travel literature and popular accounts of feral humanity. 
According to Hulliung, just as energetically as he enlisted scientific arguments (e.g. the 
genetic method) to his projects, Rousseau pursued his own natural historical studies 
through observation of the natural world and human beings, especially himself. Most of 
Rousseau's work took as background the grand tropes of natural man and developmental 
history, but Schiller drew mainly from his Discourses and from the epistolary novel, Julie 
ou la Nouvelle Heloise for his own history of play. 
Johann Gottlieb Herder (1744-1803), one of the most significant contributors to 
the philosophy of history and languages, a pillar of early anthropology, a student of Kant, 
and a champion and elaborator of pre-critical Kantian positions, was avidly involved in 
natural history and natural philosophy, not as an experimenter, though he extolled 
experiment, but as a conduit of knowledge about living nature. Known for setting out the 
"fundamental principles concerning an intimate dependence of thought on language 
which underpin modem philosophy of language," for developing modem hermeneutics, 
and for laying the foundation of the modem anthropology and for making "vital 
contributions to biblical scholarship," Herder (with Kant) incorporated Buffon into 
German philosophy. He appreciated Buffon's epistemology, using his argument from 
analogy and his template of gradual developmental history in his explanation of the 
origins of both language and humankind.44 John Zarnmito summarized the innovative 
44 Description of Herder's contributions are Michael N. Forster's, from the Introduction 
to his translations (vii). Regarding Herder's relation with the natural sciences, Palti 
wrote: "Actually, we meet here a kind of 'hermeneutical circle': the study of the natural 
sciences of his time clarifies fundamental aspects of Herder's historical view, and 
conversely, the analysis of Herder's philosophy allows us to better understand how the 
above-mentioned process of redefinition [of historical constructs like "organicism," 
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thinker's commitment to do more than understand and then explain the world; for Herder, 
the task of a philosopher was to change it: "by analogy, metaphor, observation and 
experience, [Herder endeavored to bring] thought back down to earth and [turn the 
Enlighteners'] concern to the whole man (Birth 309_310).45 Herder was also intimately 
involved in the progress of German aesthetics and was highly critical of the late 
eighteenth-century developments in theory, regarding the play of faculties, the 
disinterestedness of the observer and the "purposeful purposelessness" of art forms, 
particularly as presented in Kant's Critique of Judgment and as taken up by Schiller in 
the Aesthetic Letters. Herder undertook a history of language development and, in the 
Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind [Ideen zur Philosophie der 
Geschichte der Menschheit] (1784), attempted to provide "a pure natural history of 
human powers, actions, and drives in space and time" (Reill Vitalizing 196).46 
animism to vitalism through epigenesis, and "evolution," preformationism to 
transformationism, during and after Herder's time] took place" (323). 
45 "If I were worthy and able to be such a philosopher, what my book would be is a book 
about the human soul, full of observations and experiences! I would like to write it as a 
human for humans: it should instruct and cultivate! The foundations of psychology, and 
after the development of the soul as well ontology, cosmology, theology and physics! It 
should offer a living logic, aesthetic, historical science and theory of art! [It should 
show] how from every sense a fine art develops. And from every power of the soul a 
science arises. And from all this a history of scholarship and science in general! and a 
history ofthe human soul in general, by ages and peoples! What a book!" (Herder 
(1769), manic, qtd. by Zammito Birth 315). 
46 Reill noted that Herder had antipathy toward the mechanical philosophy (in spite of 
using mechanical metaphors when referring to the body) rather than more generally to the 
Enlightenment and that he was widely read in the natural history and philosophy of his 
time: "he mastered this new [vitalistic] language of nature extremely well. His 
knowledge of contemporary chemical theory, the life sciences, and natural history was 
encyclopedic" (Vitalizing 187). Again, "Herder never attempted to separate the historical 
from the natural sciences and ... certainly did not reject late Enlightenment science; 
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Identifying the animal condition and the subsequent developments that indicated and 
established the human species is vitally important to all three thinkers. To this end, the 
two philosophers, sources to Schiller for his developmental history of play (as it is 
couched in the Aesthetic Letters), emphasized several positions in their own 
developmental histories, including the gradual transition from the animal to human state 
and the importance of certain human acquisitions, like language, to distinctiveness of the 
genus. Together, these positions constituted the type of natural man. This hypothetical 
construct was the site of a transformational zone from animal to man for them - and for 
Schiller, from the physical state toward aesthetic being. For all, humanity depended on 
the development of representation. For Rousseau and Herder, representation through 
language is the crux; for Schiller, creating visual representations of the self (beginning in 
self-adornment) and valorizing the symbolic generally ranked with language. Though he 
unquestionably drew upon both Herder and Rousseau, Schiller used several of 
Rousseau's devises and concepts in particular as part of his argument. Rousseau, in order 
to emphasize that man's present condition is neither rational nor natural, revised the idea 
of man in a state of nature. The common cultural ideas of natural law and natural right 
(Hobbes, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke) grounded his speculations; upon them, he 
created a hypothetical history of natural man that he justified by referencing Buffon' s 
cosmology. Herder and Schiller, given lee-way by the ascendency of a looser 
quite the contrary, he used it as the ground upon which to construct what he considered a 
sufficient science and philosophy of history. ("Herder" 13). Reilliisted eighteen natural 
philosophers and natural historians cited by Herder, including ones highlighted in this 
paper: Haller, Maupertuis, Buffon, and Blumenbach. I have found in my reading that 
references to Haller figure prominently in the arguments of two of his papers (Vitalizing 
309). 
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epistemology, followed his lead. It all began, however, with this beginning: man was 
Gust about) an animal. 
Man, according to Rousseau, began an animal: 
I 'homme sauvage commencera par les fonctions purement animales. 
Apercevoir et sentir sera son premier etat, qui lui sera commun avec tous 
les animaux. [His life, in short, was] that of an animal limited at first to 
mere sensation, scarcely profiting by the gifts which nature held out to 
him, and not even dreaming of seizing anything from her. (qtd. in Lovejoy 
16_17).47 
But Rousseau's mankind began in a hardy animal state - he had a healthy body, 
acute senses, (especially of sight, hearing and smell) and simple capacities suited to the 
necessities of nutrition, sex and protection. He was first an animal without language of 
course. Considering man, Rousseau wrote, "as he must have come from the hands of 
nature - I see an animal less strong than some, less agile than others, but all things 
considered, the most advantageously organized of all" (l05). As such, man had two 
capacities: a rudimentary reason (like other animals) capable of organizing ideas about 
self-protection and survival, and sensitivity, an ability to feel simple compassion for 
fellow creatures. For Rousseau the "first and simplest operations of the human soul" 
were 
two principles anterior to reason, of which one interests us ardently in our 
well-being and our self-preservation and the other inspires in us a natural 
repugnance to see any sensitive being perish or suffer, principally our 
fellowmen .... In this way one is not forced to make man a philosopher 
before making him a man .... as long as he does not resist the inner 
impulse of commiseration, he will never harm another man or even 
another sensitive being, except in the legitimate case where, his 
47 From the French: "In the beginning, primitive man was endowed with purely animal 
functions. Feeling and seeing were his first conditions, these he holds in common with 
other animals." 
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preservation being concerned, he is obliged to give himself preference 
(96).48 
Rousseau's natural man was adjusted to his environment. Because he had senses, he 
had ideas like those of other animals, and as an animal, a physical being, he was "an 
ingenious machine to which nature has given senses in order to revitalize itself and 
guarantee itself." He was unlike other animals only in the following way: nature 
functions for other animals through instincts and man must contribute through free 
agency to his well-being (1l3). In all, "Nature treat[ed man] precisely as the law of 
Sparta treated the children of citizens: it render [ ed] strong and robust those who are well 
constituted and makes all the others perish" (106). Schiller expressed a similar relation 
for man with regard to nature: "Nature deals no better with Man than with the rest of her 
works: she acts for him as long as he is as yet incapable of acting for himself as a free 
intelligence"(lII.l). The surviving human, therefore, was not timid or stupid. According 
to Rousseau, "living dispersed among the animals and early finding himself in a position 
to measure himself against them, [man] soon [made] the comparison" and, based on his 
appraisal of circumstances, "he always [had] the option of accepting or leaving the 
encounter and the choice of flight or combat" (l 07 -108). Rousseau found his human to 
be natively non-moral, but a good-natured brute. Like other animals, he was not 
malicious or cruel; his needs were modest, his horizon short. 
For his part, Herder attributed to animals the capacity to connect thoughts obscurely 
and clearly but not distinctly, and the ability to display memory and much recollection, 
48 "It seems, in effect, that if I am obliged to do no harm to my fellow man, it is less 
because he is a reasonable being than because he is a sensitive being: a quality that, being 
common to beast and man, ought at least to give the one the right not to be uselessly 
mistreated by the other" (ibid). 
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based on sense. Man in nature therefore was not "a great, clumsy, helpless machine ... 
[or someone who came] from Plato's cave," not 
a naked, instinctless animal, ... [not] weak and succumbing, abandoned to 
the contention of the elements, to hunger, to all dangers, to the claws of all 
stronger animals, to a thousandfold death, [not] lonely and alone ... ! He 
was from the first moment on the freely active, rational creature which 
was destined to help itself, and inevitably had the ability to do so .... All 
his shortcomings and needs as an animal were pressing reasons to prove 
himself with all his forces as a human being ... [these were] his nature 
(trans. Forster 128-9). 
The Human Difference: 
"It is reason that makes a man, but feeling that guides him.,,49 
For Rousseau and Herder particularly, man's difference and his perfectibility was 
based on his the capacity for language. "Man's first language, the most universal, most 
energetic ... [was] the cry of nature," Rousseau wrote, [and] "this cry was elicited only 
by a kind of instinct in pressing emergencies, to beg for help in great dangers, or for relief 
in violent ills" (122). In the ordinary course ofliving, Rousseau theorized, gesture which 
"requires attention rather than stimulates it" was gradually replaced by vocalizations, 
actions more serviceable in the dark and requiring no direct line of vision. In reinforcing 
both the importance and the difficulties attendant on the development of communication, 
Rousseau challenged his readers to a thought experiment: 
Let us consider how many ideas we owe to the use of speech; how much 
grammar trains and facilitates the operations of the mind; and let us think 
of the inconceivable difficulties and the infinite time which the first 
invention of languages must have cost .... how many thousands of 
49 The epigraph (which appears only in the Horen, used by Schiller is "Si c 'est la raison, 
qui fait I 'homme, Ie 'est Ie sentiment, qui Ie conduit" is from Rousseau's Julie ou la 
Nouvelle Helofse (III.7). Schiller called for this epistolary novel during his final revision 
of the Aesthetic Letters (To his wife: "Don't forget to bring me ... the Heloise . .. ") 
(W&W, Commentary 221). 
158 
centuries would have been necessary to develop successively in the human 
mind the operations of which it was capable (120). 
Given man's situation, that "the human being is a freely thinking, active being, whose 
forces operate forth progressively," Herder exclaimed: "Therefore let him be a creature of 
language!" (127 Trans. Forster). And, as far as Herder was concerned, man's language 
developed in purely natural human terms. Language was man's "center of gravity, the 
main direction of his soul's efficacies, [and it] fell as much on this understanding, on 
human awareness [Besonnenheit], as with the bee [who] falls immediately on sucking 
and building. '" the first moment of taking-awareness [Besinnung] was also the moment 
for the inward emergence of language "(128). Therefore, 
the genesis of language is as much an inner imperative as is the impulse of 
the embryo to be born at the moment when it reaches maturity. [Like a 
hard labor! t]he whole of nature storms at the human being in order to 
develop his senses until he is a human being. And since language begins 
from this condition, the whole chain of conditions in the human soul is of 
such a kind that each of them forms language further (128 my exuberant 
inclusion). 
For Herder, development progressed on the tracks of language. 
[T]he sense of feeling does not rule but the whole center of [his] nature 
falls on finer senses, vision and hearing, and these constantly give ... 
language, it follows that taken as a whole, 'there is also no condition in 
the human soul which does not turn out to be susceptible of words or 
actually determined by words' .... [and, consequently,] 'the progressive 
formation of language turns out to be as natural for the human being as 
his nature itself (132).50 
Rousseau's true child of nature was not an ideal; he was not even particularly 
attractive. Part of what developed him was the natural economy, the distinctly conflictual 
environment, a dynamic competing ecology of needs - his own and those of attacking 
50 Herder put his laws in quotes. 
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carnivores, for example. With the success of the species, increasing population provoked 
competition for food not only among different species but also within the human group 
(Lovejoy 23). Under this kind of pressure, man showed his difference. Man had the 
capacity to develop, and this capability was for Rousseau what separated him from the 
other animals. His faculty of self-perfection was the "specific characteristic of the human 
species," something, Rousseau recognized, that was not part of other animals' repertoire. 
Neither the pongo nor the orangutan, animals that otherwise were considered to have 
"striking conformities with the human species and lesser differences than those which 
could be assigned between one man and another," showed the slightest capacity in this 
regard (207). 
But if the difficulties surrounding all these questions [the discovery of 
anthropomorphic animals in Africa and Asia for example] should leave 
some room for dispute on this difference between man and animal, there is 
[a] very specific quality that distinguishes them and about which there can 
be no dispute: the faculty of self-perfection, a faculty which, with the. aid 
of circumstances, successively develops all the others, and resides among 
us as much in the species as in the individual (114 my emphasis). 
According to Herder, man differed from animals in that he was able to generalize 
experience for the improved condition of the whole species. Animals were confined to 
something of a behavioral reflex arc - the more reflexive, "the narrower the circle is," the 
more uniform the behavior. The law of nature that governs the succession of human 
ideas, however, is different: it is awareness: 
[The human being is] the most ignorant creature when he comes into the 
world, but immediately he becomes nature's apprentice in a way that no 
animal does; not only does each day teach the next, but each minute of the 
day teaches the next, each thought the next. It is an essential knack of his 
soul to learn nothing for this moment, but to marshal everything either 
along with what it already knew or in readiness for what it intends to link 
with it in the future .... And in this way the soul becomes a force of 
steadily collecting. Such a chain continues on until death. [He js,] so to 
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speak, never the whole human being; always in development, in 
progression, in process of perfection (Trans. Forster 130).51 
Man "came from the hands of nature, with his forces and fluids in the freshest of 
conditions, and with the best immediate disposition to develop himself from the first 
moment, "(128-9). And, as "the end of our present existence is the formation of 
humanity, to which all the meaner wants of the Earth are subservient, and which they are 
all contrived to promote, ... " Herder continued, "Humanity is the character of our 
species, which, although innate, is only a project" (qtd. in Palti 338). 
For Rousseau, Herder and Schiller, man's potentiality, his perfectibility, his 
wholeness, is made possible by the combination of passion with reason. Rousseau 
believed that it is by the activity of the passions that reason is perfected. "[W]e seek to 
know only because we desire to have pleasure; and it is impossible to conceive why one 
who had neither desires nor fears would go to the trouble of reasoning" (116). The 
Aesthetic Letters itself began with an epigraph from Rousseau, a call to combine reason 
with feeling: its prominent inclusion signaled the work Schiller meant to do in uniting 
these eighteenth-century polarities. 52 For him, man's potential depends on this sense-
and-reason synthesis. As a result of the reciprocal interaction of the sense-drive and the 
form-drive, of thought and feeling as forces, man has and develops a play-drive. This 
51 Herder on Kraft: "I do not say that 1 explain anything thereby; 1 have not yet known 
any philosophy which explains what 'force' [Kraft] is, whether it is active in one or more 
beings. What philosophy does is notice, arrange, clarify, after assuming force, stimulus, 
and effect, from the very beginning" (qtd. in Palti 334). 
52 The epigraph in French: "Si c 'est la raison, qui fait I 'homme, Ie 'est Ie sentiment, qui Ie 
conduit. " 
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play-drive is his pluri-potential capacity, and through it he has a future full of possibility. 
Essentially, man - as individual and species - can make of himself whatever he will. 
What makes him Man is precisely this [wrote Schiller] that he does not 
stop short at what Nature herself made of him, but has the power of 
retracing by means of reason the steps she took on his behalf, of 
transforming the work of blind compulsion into a work of free choice, and 
of elevating physical necessity into moral necessity (IlL 1 ). 
In his developmental history of man, Schiller established "three different moments or 
stages ... though which both the individual and the species as a whole must pass, 
inevitably and in a definite order, if they are to complete the full cycle of their destiny." 
Man begins an animal, develops into a rational animal and then, becomes truly human 
through encounters with beauty. "Man in his physical state merely suffers the dominion 
of nature; he emancipates himself from this dominion in the aesthetic state, and he 
acquires mastery over it in the moral" (XXIV.1). 53 As the human being develops 
aesthetically, his reason also enlarges, and the use of reason is freed through interaction 
with feeling in play just as play also perfects itself. The final moral stage however "is 
problematic": it, as an ideal, is never fully gained but is always to be attempted, to be 
approached (lII.3). 
53 At first, man was as near to an animal as he could be. Schiller's first stage is a stage 
without Beauty, "a monotonous round of ends, a constant vacillation of judgements; self-
seeking, and yet without a Self; lawless, yet without Freedom; a slave, yet to no Rule. At 
this state the world is for him, merely Fate, not yet Object; nothing exists for him except 
what furthers his own existence .... In vain does nature let her rich variety pass before 
his senses; he sees in her splendid profusion nothing but his prey, in all her might and 
grandeur nothing but his foe ... conscious of his own savage greed, he fears it in every 
creature which resembles him. He never sees others in himself, but only himself in 
others; and communal life, far from enlarging him into a representative of the species, 
only confines him ever more narrowly within his own individuality" (XXIV. 2). 
This is a construct, wrote Schiller, "purely an Idea," because man was never purely 
animal nor has he escaped from the animal condition. 
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In Schiller's developmental schema, man began with the common reason upon 
which survival depends, a capacity to connect cause to effect mandated by the need for 
nourishment, protection and reproduction. Then he slowly developed the capacity to 
represent himself internally, not just as a body as animals do, but as an idea, a self-
consciousness (XI). Then a sense of others grew in him, the capacity for empathy. 54 
This power was not Rousseau's sympathy (which animals have), the recognition of the 
physical state and the broad intention of fellows of one's own kind (for protection and 
companionship mandated by survival) or the recognition by visual and auditory cues of 
agent-enemies (for recognizing intent to harm), but the development of a theory of mind 
(XXVII.5).55 In Schiller, these representations came with other very important changes 
brought by a rudimentarily functioning play-drive. The play-drive fostered a reciprocally 
developing desire and capacity to use language and the desire to represent reality both by 
one's own agency as well as to symbolize one's own thoughts by real objects (to make 
54 "When a man walking ahead of me stumbles, my body immediately espouses the 
attitude that this man should adopt to keep from falling. We can hardly witness the 
suffering of others without feeling a part of the pain. Often our reactions are more acute 
than those felt by individuals under fire and sword. This is one of Nature's means of 
binding men to one another. She induces sympathy in them only when feeling similar 
pains. Pleasure and suffering are the world's two masters. Without the first, few would 
bother to continue the species of man, and if it were not for fear of the latter, many would 
not care to live" (Maupertuis 49). 
55 "It would be no less difficult to determine which does more to impede the practice of 
brotherly love: the violence of our passions which disturbs it, or the rigidity of our 
principles, which chills it - the egotism of our senses or the egotism of our reason. If we 
are to become compassionate, helpful, effective human beings, feeling and character must 
unite, even as wide-open senses must combine with vigour of intellect if we are to 
acquire experience. How can we, however laudable our precepts, how can we be just, 
kindly, and human towards others, if we lack the power of receiving into ourselves 
faithfully and truly, natures unlike ours, of feeling our way into the situation of others, of 
making other people's feelings our own? (XIII.4 fn *2). 
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outside inside and the inside outside) (XI. 9). These primitive efforts at representation 
[Schein] included, for example, adorning one's body or enjoying objects in the world 
without reference to their utility (XXVII.5-6). This play, putting form to matter in terms 
of shaping reality by conceptions, developed humans and also further develops the 
species. 
The aesthetic mode (stage, state and capacity) characterized by the functioning of the 
play-drive is a gift of nature -"the favour of fortune alone can unloose the fetters of that 
first physical stage and lead the savage towards beauty" (XXV!. 1 ). 56 For Schiller, the 
species developed in this way, and it is in this way that the individual must develop as 
well. Such development cannot mandate what a man will become; it only makes the all-
important moral reflection and behavior possible. By "means of aesthetic culture, the 
personal worth of a man ... remains completely indeterminate; and nothing more is 
achieved by it [other] than that he is henceforth enabled by the grace of Nature to make 
of himself what he will- that the freedom to be what he ought to be is completely 
restored to him" (XXI.4). In fact, that freedom to be human (his very humanity) "must 
be restored to him each time anew through the life of the aesthetic." In that way by the 
grace of the play-drive and the aesthetic state, he "possesses ... humanity in potentia 
before every determinate condition into which he can conceivably enter" (XXI.5). For 
Schiller, this organic pause made contemplation the natural result of attending to and 
living into beauty. Out ofthat state flowed grace, morality and creativity. Always 
56 For Herder as well, "Reason and reflection [Besonnenheit] were emergents from 
nature, not transcendental interventions .... 'Both in theory and in practice, reason is 
merely something acquired [Vernommenes] and learned, a proportion and direction of 
man's ideas and faculties [Krafte] to which he was predetermined by his organization and 
way oflife'" (Zammito Birth 316, 476 fn 43). 
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potentially available through beauty, the aesthetic state (of active-inactivity) destined a 
man for wholeness, but only if he could tolerate the following: a period of experienced 
indetermination, a state of aesthetic limitlessness during which time, there is no push to 
action and every choice is equal in the balance. Man must also be able to combine the 
aesthetic capacity with a sense of reality. This combined work is not a small task for 
each moment or for a lifetime (XX1.5 fn). 
Schiller addressed the same concerns as Rousseau and Herder did: modem man's 
state is an unhappy one; he is in a condition that knowledge does not improve. His 
culture does not encourage or guarantee virtue - quite the contrary - man's present 
condition seems to deny coexistence for knowledge and morality. The remedy for this 
complicated condition, one that inquiry into the true nature of mankind is meant to 
disclose, is a return to his nature and, thereby, to the active possibility of his potential. 
For Rousseau, that potential was the species-specific capacity to perfection ("the faculty 
of perfectibility"); for Herder it was man's development, a corrected enlightenment 
infused with the knowledge given by feeling. And for Schiller, of course, that capacity 
for developing full human potential was renewed in the aesthetic state and given by play. 
Rousseau's faculty of self-perfection also had the unintended consequences of 
Schiller's play drive (undirected by ideal beauty). With all its potential for development 
it carried with it an alternate propensity; it could potentiate degeneration. 
[T]his distinctive and almost unlimited faculty is the source of all man's 
misfortunes .... [J]t is this faculty which, by dint of time, draws him out 
of that original condition in which he would pass tranquil and innocent 
days .... [J]t is this faculty which, bringing to flower over the centuries 
his enlightenment and his errors, his vices and his virtues, in the long run 
makes him the tyrant of himself and of nature (115). 
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Likewise, according to Schiller, men can fail in two ways: man can and does lose 
himself by becoming perseverative - staying directed toward stockpiling things - then he 
falls to the service of the tyrant appetite and loses his freedom (XXVII.2). 57 Or he can be 
subject to play's own illusion and elaboration, and can thereby lose reality and the 
capacity to be free. In spite of all his intensely expressed criticism, Rousseau, like 
Schiller, encouraged an approach of realistic optimism: 
Far from thinking that there is no longer any virtue or happiness attainable 
by us, and that Heaven has abandoned us without resource to the 
depravation of the species, let us endeavor to draw from the very evil from 
which we suffer the remedy which shall cure it (qtd. in Lovejoy 35). 
And, isn't play just that, the hair of the dog? 
Summary 
Late Enlightenment vitalism was a tradition of studying the whole of nature and the 
living organisms within it based on an enriched concept of matter that included force(s). 
Some of these vital forces emerged from complex organization, representing capacities of 
organs or organ systems, and others interacted in complicated ways to produce a 
transformative third, usually a type of developmental force. All were identified with 
57 Part of the issue with the physical or natural state is the relative indolence of the 
appetite-driven life. Rousseau captured the extremes of need-driven activities followed 
by periods of languor and sleep, and Schiller registered the animality of early play this 
way, that the first inclinations to play occur as - unusual displays mostly in immature 
animals - overabundance of energy, an active superfluity of unnecessary acts, the 
experienced purposive purposeless, play. As man became more active and labored in 
agriculture, land seemed an entitlement, his own private property. As a result, society, 
according to Rousseau, became Hobbesian, and man had to deliver himself to a social 
contract in order to live in community. For Schiller, man was never really an isolate, and 
the physical State, that government assuring basic survival needs and conflictual but less 
destructive internal function, would be the transition zone to a more collegial form of 
government. 
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function, with movement, and it is little wonder that, at the same time, steady nature 
became steadily more historicized, and reality itself was transformed into epigenetically 
conceived, continuous change. 
The speculative emphasis on forces focused attention on connection and reciprocal 
relations between polarities and an expanded middle. As a result, within life study as 
well as in late Enlightenment culture as a whole, mechanical and organic metaphors 
functioned together to describe a two-tiered nature. At one level, nature was necessity 
and reflex; at another, it was the nature of transformations, a zone of complex function 
and potential choice. These descriptions of nature were applied to biological forces, 
functions and reactions; they were incorporated into understandings of human nature, 
human productions and institutions. Metaphors of vegetable life and animal economy 
naturalized human possibilities like creativity or development; they made human 
products like the state and art organic. Mechanical metaphors remained as the bedrock, 
but organic tropes, which first clung to those rock out-croppings like primitive plants, 
soon grew wildly, transforming the bare and jagged landscape to verdant terrain. 
This descriptive language system signaled a way of perceiving, a mentality: the 
natural philosophical tradition, Enlightenment vitalism, had fully matured by the time of 
Schiller's Aesthetic Letters. There had been new births - discoveries and theories - into 
this system, ones that were disseminated and elaborated by artists, historians and 
philosophers. Schiller was one of the disseminators and creators; his work teemed with 
vitalistic metaphors and the information from observation, collection and experimentation 
in medicine and natural history, and it depended on hypotheses arising from empirical 
evidence. Synthesizing the enormous variety of materials available to him, Schiller 
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formed a theory of human nature based on species-specific drives, forces-in-matter. His 
theory included a human development history of gradual acquisition of reason and 
aesthetic capacity that, at the same time, allowed for instantiation of the pluri-potential 
human archetype. 
Not only human nature, not just human productions, but history itself was 
transformed by its being perceived and experienced organically. As vitalism matured, 
organic complexity in descriptions of living matter and medical theories of the body's 
coordinated fimctioning were integrated into historical narrative and the philosophical 
experience oftime. Nature as dynamic, life as characterized by change and human 
institutions as organically-described entities were all carried along by a new intuition of 
history as epigenetic, as developing from unformed materials (rather than just unfolding 
out ofitselt). The concept of history as a system, an organized body, rather than an 
aggregate of events, lent new relational emphasis: cultures and nations became organs 
with internal dynamics, reciprocally co-operating and conflicting forces. They were seen 
as systems impacted by the external forces of nature, the climate and geography, and 
affected by the normal function and dysfimction of other entities through development, 
decay or dissolution. History had multiple foci and, as such, was as continuously 
interactive and complex as the world's weather system - some clear bright times, but 
many shifting and unpleasant conditions, banking clouds and sheer wind, sleet and fog. 
Adam Ferguson, a thinker influential to the young Schiller through his professor Abel, 
expressed his understanding of organized bodies as "progressive natures," as structures 
transmuted to stages. Ferguson wrote that such natures, like cultures, institutions or 
governments, or history 
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are subject to the vicissitudes of advancement or decline, but are not 
stationary, perhaps in any period of their existence. Thus, in the material 
world, [organized] subjects, ... being progressive, when they cease to 
advance, begin to decline .... [Stationary (mechanical) bodies] are 
described by the enumeration of co-existent parts .... subjects 
progressive are characterized by the enumeration of steps, in the passage 
from one form of excellence to another (as quoted in Reill, "Buffon" 671). 
Such ideas suited Schiller's sense of human potential. 
Vitalism too was an approach to the unanswered questions about life that 
incorporated the legacy of the past century and struggled to respond to the turmoil of 
recent discoveries and controversies. The zeal for discovery and categorization was 
unabated, and it was accompanied by a critique of systems and a critique of the human 
capacity for knowledge. As a result of these activities, a new epistemology - a loose, 
more open conception about knowledge of organism - developed over the last part of the 
century, one that Kant endeavored to bring under control. A more modest epistemology 
and an expanded methodology helped researchers and metaphysicians cope with the 
dynamic universe, not only with its particulars, but its classes and theories. The 
particular epistemology was part of a cultural movement of thought that ushered the 
conception of man from man-as-the-rational-being toward man as defined by his species-
specific (and peculiarly limited) reason and, at last, to man as a being of sense and 
reason. Man became complete, understood anthropologically and aesthetically by the 
end of the century. Many sought to hold on to these developments without premature 
closure. 
During the later part of the century, an understanding was established that forces-in-
matter - ones the current physico-chemical laws were inadequate to explain and 
perceptual methods were unable to isolate and examine - were responsible for the 
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phenomenon of life. How was this understanding to be addressed? What was its status? 
The Great Chain of Being had tipped and dropped. A partly-cleared path of stepping 
stones remained, disappearing in the distance as it traversed the undulating terrain of 
Time.58 Where was the map? 
58Herder referred to "Maupertuis' ladder," to the "idea of the great chain of being ... in 
the immanent and genetic sense that Maupertuis, Buffon and Diderot were developing 
over the 1750's" (Zammito Birth 317). 
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CHAPTER V 
A MODEST YET DARING EPISTEMOLOGY 
[O]ur first question must be what kind of objects is commensurate with, 
and determinable by, our knowledge. But the solution ofthis question ... 
cannot otherwise be attained than by examining the whole extent of its 
realm and by tracing the whole course of its development from its first 
elements to its highest forms. Thus the critical problem has its roots in a 
generic problem. A really adequate explanation of the human mind is 
only to be found in its evolution. Hence psychology is designated as the 
foundation of epistemology (Cassirer 93). 
Schiller had a problem: he was deeply committed to the freedom of the individual 
but saw the difficulties attendant on anyone's developing autonomy. His evidence for 
those difficulties was garnered by observation - modern man in all his particularity was a 
barbarian whose banal use of the benefits of culture dishonored its martyrs. Modern 
states as well proved recalcitrant: their neglect of individual potential and their 
dependence on force to establish basic security did little to foster complete human beings. 
For him the motivating catastrophe was the failure ofthe French Revolution, a leap 
toward Enlightenment values born out of the hopes of reason and killed by the excesses 
of it. He wrote the Aesthetic Letters to support those values and provided a definition of 
human nature that allowed for a development toward the full realization of the promise of 
the species in the individual. Even though enlightenment appeared to be held in such 
esteem, development [Bildung] proved to be a difficult process. In Schiller's experience, 
human beings must first conceive an ideal before they can actualize their desire for 
betterment. Then, to move toward it, they need audacity, they need drive, and the support 
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of an environment that favors such change. In fashioning the Aesthetic Letters as a 
philosophical treatise enforcing the Enlightenment hopes for man, Schiller meant to 
motivate. He intended to provide a contemplative object, an argument within the frame 
of art, which - after it was experienced and participated in - would promote action (VIII). 
He hoped for the action of self-development in its readers and their involvement in 
promoting a culture of autonomy in their world. 
Schiller, arguing, worked hard. And he asked his readers (and they complained) to 
work as well. i The difficulty was his manner of argument: in an attempt to adhere to a 
scientific epistemology, a vitalist one recently jiggered by Kant, and to a method of 
philosophizing, also modeled by the great thinker, he confined himself to an analytic 
process applied regulatively to discover simple concepts. Luckily, he also advanced his 
claims through facts and historical narrative like d' Alembert or Rousseau, recollected his 
material and his readers through circular inclusivity like Buffon and Goethe, surprised 
with occasional exuberance like Herder, and all the while remained the poet he was. All 
these stylistic strategies, moves and feints of genius, incorporated methods of passing 
iReferring to himself, Schiller commented: "They'll oppose him now, I'm afraid; but in a 
few years they'll be plundering him without acknowledgement." In fact, "negative 
reactions outnumbered, even if they did not outweigh, the positive .... Klopstock 
apparently dismissed [the Letters] as pretentious 'non sens,' Herder abhorred them as 
'Kantische Sanden [Kantian sinning].'" Garve wrote, "I would have thought they made 
heavy weather ofthings that are in fact very simple," and Ramdohr remarked that the lot 
contained "half-truths on poetical stilts, as in all Schiller's philosophical writings." An 
anonymous letter-writer informed Schiller that he had failed as an editor and an author to 
live up to his new journal's promise "to present the results of 'science' in a simple and 
agreeable form for the benefit of the common reader." Another wrote that '''obscurity' of 
style ... held him up on every page;" another that his '''metaphysisch-asthetische 
Sprache' ... simply resulted in 'an uninterrupted and distasteful mixture oflearned 
abstractions and fine phrasing, one long series of rhetorical sophistries and wearisome 
antitheses." Some offered to translate the work of the "philosophische Querkopfe" into 
German (W&W cxxxiii ft). 
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from the particular to the general, and from the general back to the particular; they 
applied a modest but daring epistemology to a dynamic and subjective phenomenon, the 
nature of man. 
The foundational rational and empiricist strains of this vitalist epistemology were 
summarized at mid-century by the French Encyclopedistes, especially by Jean Le Rond 
d' Alembert in the Preliminary Discourse? The "invention and use of a new method of 
philosophizing" outlined in the Encyclopedie was fundamental to the study of life. Its 
firm connection of the "careful examination of Nature and the grand study of mankind" 
was imperative to progress in the sciences (xxiv, 62). It upheld the centrality of doubt as 
a disposition; it reaffirmed the observation, experiment and analysis of Newton. It 
extolled mathematics, but saw probability rising from empiricism as the only certitude in 
time. And as such it was a map of knowledge about human nature that the mariners of 
mid-century carried with them when they set off. It was a beauty too: an architectural 
rendering of Bacon's columns adorned it, opening the way to the unknown, and 
2D' Alembert (1717-1783), the author of this "manifesto of the French Enlightenment," 
was a precocious mathematical genius. The natural son of an aristocrat and a renegade 
nun, abandoned on a church doorstep, he was well-educated through the support of his 
father. He published work on Newtonian mechanics and contributed to mathematics 
before gaining place and position as a spokesman for the philosophes as a result of the 
appearance of the Preliminary Discourse in 1751 (Schwab in d' Alembert xv-xix). The 
Encyclopedie, which the aforementioned introduced, totaled 28 folio volumes, 71,818 
articles, and 2,885 plates (Heilbron in Frangsmyr 20). Of rationalism and empiricism: 
"We may define 'rationalism' as an intellectual orientation (particularly notable in the 
metaphysical systems of the late seventeenth century) which assumes the existence of 
certain absolute principle or truths instinctively or clearly felt to be true, through which 
the chief truths of phenomena can be deduced, judged, or explained. 'Empiricism' is an 
intellectual orientation ... based on the assumption that 'hard facts' of experience, 
experimentation, and physical sensations are the essential elements from which our valid 
ideas are derived and which are the source of all true knowledge" (Schwab in d' Alembert 
xxxii). 
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admonishments of the other English philosophers, Locke and Newton, filled two of its 
comers. Scrolled along its bottom edge were the words: "Nothing is in the intellect 
which is not first in sense.,,3 And Descartes peered out from the fourth comer, reminding 
the explorers to question.4 "Doubt is the beginning of science; he who doubts nothing, 
examines nothing; he who examines nothing, discovers nothing; he who discovers 
nothing is blind and remains blind" (Chardin qtd. in Hazard 12).5 
Empiricism: Observation, Experimentation and Analysis 
Our first object, which we should never lose from sight, is the study of the 
human mind - not to discover its nature, but to learn to know its 
operations, to observe how they are combined and how we ought to use 
them in order to acquire all the intelligence of which we are capable. It is 
necessary to go back to the origin of our ideas, to work out their 
generation, to follow them to the limits which nature has prescribed for 
them, and by these means to establish the extent and limits of our 
knowledge and renew all of human understanding (Condillac qtd. in 
d' Alembert 5 fn 8 my emphasis). 6 
For d' Alembert, Newton was the originator of scientific physics and Locke, the 
creator of scientific philosophy (Cassirer 99). The author of the Preliminary Discourse 
3 Diderot expressly stated: "nothing is proved in metaphysics and we know nothing either 
concerning our intellectual faculties or concerning the origin and progress of our 
knowledge, if the old principle: nihil est in intellectu, etc., is not evidence of a first 
axiom" (as qtd. Cassirer 99). 
4 "Descartes dared at least to show intelligent minds how to throw off the yoke of 
scholasticism, of opinion, of authority - in a word, of prejudices and barbarism .... If he 
concluded by believing he could explain everything, he at least began by doubting 
everything, and the arms which we use to combat him belong to him no less because we 
tum them against him" (d' Alembert 80 my emphasis). 
5 Jean Chardin the traveler, here quoted by Paul Hazard, was mentioned in Rousseau's 
Second Discourse [Discours sur I 'inegalifl~] and in Montesquieu's Lettres persanes (Still 
365 fn 4). 
6 Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780), d' Alembert' s colleague, was a celebrated 
mathematician, a champion of Locke and generally a critic of systems. 
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therefore based his mid-century epistemology on the tried-and-true methods of the 
mechanical philosophy and on Locke's analysis of the contents ofthe mind. He also 
revered Bacon, whose tree of knowledge the Encyclopedistes used as a model for their 
endeavor, for his empiricism and his method of induction - however difficult it was to 
progress from particulars to general principles through the use of it. 7 
Part of Schiller's heritage through the French Enlightenment figures and through 
Herder, Humboldt and Goethe was a respect for the Chancellor Francis Bacon (1561-
1626), his project for the re-organization of knowledge, his belief in the advancement of 
learning and his empirical and inductive system.8 Bacon's valorization of practical 
7 General principles of natural science cannot arise from "mere induction in the sense of a 
simple aggregation of individual observations" wrote Cassirer reflecting on Tetens' work. 
Forms of relations require "what we call judging and combining, or inferring and 
concluding, [and these operations are] different from arranging ideas in sequence and 
connection; it is more than simply observing similarity and agreement among them." 
Comparison contains the continuously developing relation with a third entity which 
assorts objects to a hierarchy of organization as welL (129-131). Bacon's parable of the 
ants as empiricists, spiders as systems builders and bees as scientists that both gather and 
produce (develop) theories gave a sense of what he felt induction had to offer iliovum 
Organum Book I, Aphorism 95: "Those who have treated of the sciences have been either 
empirics or dogmaticaL The former like ants only heap up and use their store, the latter 
like spiders spin out their own webs. The bee, a mean between both, extracts matter from 
the flowers of the garden and the field, but works and fashions it by its own efforts. The 
true labour of philosophy resembles hers, for it neither relies entirely or principally on the 
powers of the mind, nor yet lays up in the memory, the matter afforded by the 
experiments of natural history or mechanics in its raw state, but changes and works it in 
the understanding. We have good reason, therefore, to derive hope from a closer and 
purer alliance of these faculties, (the experimental and rational) than has yet been 
attempted" (my emphasis of a concept, beloved by Schiller and all vitalists). 
8Goethe's interest and emulation of Bacon's empiricism is well-documented in his own 
reflections: H.B. Nisbet referred to Goethe's essay "Der Versuch als Vermittler von 
Objekt und Subjekt" (which I quote at the end of the chapter) as a recommendation for 
Baconian induction, and states that Goethe, aware of the pronounced empiricism of his 
thought, sought philosophical backing for his work on color from the "father of British 
empiricism, Francis Bacon, whose thought he described as a decisive influence on his 
own philosophical development (Gesprache II, 1105-6)" (Sharpe Goethe 226, 228). 
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knowledge and its accumulation (as the advancement of learning) was elaborated into the 
Enlightenment idea of progress by d' Alembert and his second generation colleagues. 
Bacon's inductive method countered deductive systems: he proceeded from laborious 
observation of and experiment with particulars, working by a gradual ascent to more 
general axioms. In addition to focusing on the data of experience, Bacon counseled 
vigilance against certain intellectual errors. He cautioned against what he termed "idols 
of the tribe," that is, epistemological problems ofthe species. Humans, according to 
Bacon, have natural tendencies and limitations. Our senses are limited; we impose 
organization or order where there is none, we find what we want to discover and we 
make premature judgments.9 He also identified "idols of the cave," idiosyncratic 
reasoning problems of the individual. Being a creature of a certain point-of-view, a 
disciple of a master or distorting reality according to one's own narrow life experience: 
these, for example, can be summarized as failures to think for oneself. They are errors 
that drew the Enlightenment polemic against immaturity, against the lack of courage to 
Daniel Steuer mentioned Goethe's understanding of Baconian science in his chapter 
"Goethe's natural investigations and scientific culture" in the same reference (Sharpe 
Goethe 176). The Humboldts' appreciation of Bacon is the subject of Dettelbach's 
"'Baconianism' in Revolutionary Germany: Humboldt's Great Instauration." Schiller 
was quite actively interested in all three of his friends' scientific researches. 
9Cassirer: As a result of their studies of the senses, the philosophes concluded that 
"[ e ]ach sense has its own world, and there is no other alternative than to understand and 
analyze all these worlds in a purely empirical manner without attempting to reduce them 
to a cornmon denominator." The spaces they define "all possess equal validity; none can 
claim higher degree of certainty, objectivity, and generality than any other" (115 cf. 
Gulliver's Travels). "Our mind seems to be destined to reason only from facts discovered 
by our senses. Microscopes and glasses have, as it were, provided us with new senses 
quite beyond our own normal capacities. They should belong rightfully to higher 
intelligences and often confuse our limited faculties" (Maupertuis 28). 
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counter conventional claims, to explore difficult problems or posit new hypotheses. 10 
"The idols of the marketplace" are the errors created by language. Abstractions and 
reification, according to Bacon, were continued by mutual encouragement and thereby 
gained a life oftheir own. For d' Alembert, while "we owe many errors to the abuse of 
words," it is perhaps the same with axioms. A proposition can be dispatched through a 
chain of reasoning, and as language is "imperceptibly altered, so that the proposition was 
successively expressed in different ways ... each of these states would be recognized in 
the one immediately neighboring it; but in a more remote state we would no longer make 
it out" (28). The concept "force" is an example of a cluster of meaning that changed 
through use and nuance during the late Enlightenment (a situation that drew Kant's 
attention). Bacon's last, the "idols of the theatre," are pitfalls of culture. Here Bacon 
cautioned against systems of thought - whether they be abstractly argued and speculative, 
narrowly empirical or a mixture of metaphysics and theology. As d' Alembert wrote: "it 
is by thoughtful study of phenomena, by the comparisons we make among them, by the 
art of reducing, as much as that may be possible a large number of phenomena to a single 
one that can be regarded as their principle .... This reduction which, moreover, makes 
them easier to understand, constitutes the true 'systemic spirit.' One must be careful not 
to mistake this for the' spirit of system'" of the type that Bacon condemned (22-23; 74-
77). 
10 See page 209. Kant: "Our age is, in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to 
criticism everything must submit .... [They that seek exemption from it] then awaken 
just suspicion, and cannot claim the sincere respect which reason accords only to that 
which has been able to sustain the test of free and open examination" (qtd. in Schmidt 
371 ). 
177 
The empirical methods of observation and experimentation clarified by analysis, 
were brought to stunning success in Newton's synthesis of mathematics applied to 
physics. l1 Newton's great accomplishments, wrote d' Alembert, 
gave philosophy a form which apparently it is to keep. That great genius 
... banish[ ed] conjectures and vague hypotheses from physics, or at least 
[thought] to present them only for what they were worth, and [saw too] 
that this science was uniquely susceptible to the experiments of geometry 
.... [He] invented calculus ... whose applications are so extensive ... in 
explaining the complicated effects one observes in Nature, where 
everything seems to take place by various kinds of infinite progressions 
.... But perhaps he has done more by teaching philosophy to be judicious 
and to restrict within reasonable limits the sort of audacity which 
Descartes had been forced by circumstances to bestow upon it (81). 
This uniQn of empiricism and analysis, coupled with eschewing all but the most careful 
hypothesizing, was carried forward by the Preliminary Discourse in the company of 
Locke's "historical, plain method.,,12 
II Both d' Alembert and Buffon emphasized the demonstration of Newton's theory. 
Buffon: "The most beautiful and felicitous use to which this method [the union of 
mathematics to physics] has ever been applied is to the system of the world. We must 
admit that if Newton had only given us the physical conformations of his system without 
having supported them by precise mathematical calculations they would not have had 
nearly the same force;" then speaking as a vitalist he continued, but "at the same time one 
ought tQ be aware that there are very few subjects as simple as this, that is to say, as 
stripped of physical qualities as Newton's universe" ("Initial" 176). 
12NewtQn's famous "nonfingo hypotheses" occurred in this context: "But hitherto I have 
not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phrenomena, and I 
frame no hypotheses; for whatever is not deduced from the phrenomena is to be called an 
hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities 
or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy particular 
propositions are inferred from the phrenomena, and afterwards rendered general by 
inductiorn. Thus it was that the impenetrability, the mobility, and the impulsive force of 
bodies, and the laws of motion and of gravitation, were discovered. And to us it is enough 
that gravity does really exist, and act according to the laws which we have explained, and 
abundantly serves to account for all the motions of the celestial bodies, and of our sea" 
(Princip,ia my emphasis). 
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"So many philosophers having written the romance of the soul," wrote Voltaire, but 
"a sage has arrived who has modestly written its history. Locke has set forth human 
reason just as an excellent anatomist explains the parts of the human body." (qtd. in 
Cassirer 94, 99). In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke analyzed 
the operation of the mind as follows: 
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, with paper, void of all 
characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence 
comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man 
has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the 
materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from 
experience: in that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it 
ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either about external, 
sensible objects; or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived 
and reflected on by ourselves, is that, which supplies our understandings 
with all the materials of thinking .... First, our senses, conversant about 
particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind, several distinct 
perceptions of things, according to those various ways, wherein those 
objects do affect them: and thus we come by those ideas [of] sensible 
qualities .... This great source, of most of the ideas we have, depending 
wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call 
SENSATION (33-34). 
There, according to d' Alembert, the results of Locke's own self-examination 
provided a starting point for studies of human beings. In doing so, 
he reduced the metaphysics to what it really ought to be: the experimental 
physics of the soul - a very different kind of physics from that of bodies, 
not only in its object, but in its way of viewing the object. In the latter we 
can and often do, discover unknown phenomena. In the former, facts as 
ancient as the world exist equally in all men .... Reasonable metaphysics 
can only consist, as does experimental physics, in the careful assembling 
of all these facts, in reducing them to a corpus of information, in 
explaining some by others, and in distinguishing those which ought to 
hold the first rank and serve as foundation (84). 
Laurence Sterne's Tristram described Locke's Essay as "'a history-book,' -
a history ... 'of what passes in a man's own mind'" (Locke "Intro." xv); as such it gave 
d' Alembert leave to construct his own history of knowledge beginning with "physical 
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sensations, material facts, and the demands of the body." Direct knowledge, he 
summarized, comes from sensations and these sensations convince us of our existence 
and the existence of everything else: indeed, "all our knowledge is ultimately reduced to 
sensations that are approximately the same in all men" (6-8, 31). The body, "that most 
complicated machine," is insistent and it 
turns our attention to itself, because of the necessity of providing for its 
endlessly multiplying needs. The care for its preservation must be 
directed either toward preventing the evils that threaten it or toward 
remedying those that have attacked it .... Stimulated as they were by so 
engrossing an aim as self-preservation, these men ... are able ... to make 
some progress along the path of knowledge (24, 14-15).13 
D' Alembert elaborated on this need structure by underscoring pleasure as the source 
of motivation (with the corresponding relief or avoidance of pain) and by recommending 
curiosity as a passion. "Moreover, in the hierarchy of our needs and of the objects of our 
passions," he continued, "pleasure holds the highest places, and curiosity is a need for 
anyone who knows how to think, especially when this restless desire is enlivened with a 
sort of vexation at not being able to satisfy itself entirely" (16). Need and passion had 
pushed knowledge forward historically and they would continue to do so: the 
Encyclopedie itself was a pledge of progress in the arts and sciences. 14 Since the study of 
13 Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet (1743 -1794), 
mathematician and political scientist, a student of d' Alembert's, enlarged on this theme: 
"The first fruits of continuous association are a number of arts, all concerned with the 
. satisfaction of simple needs. They include the making of weapons, cooking and the 
construction of the utensils necessary for cooking, preserving food and providing against 
those times of the year when fresh supplies are unobtainable ... " (qtd. in d' Alembert 15 
fn 28). 
14 "Everything is related to our needs, whether from absolute necessity, or from 
convenience and pleasure, or even from custom and caprice. The more the needs are 
remote or difficult to satisfy, the slower the knowledge intended to satisfy them will be in 
making its appearance" (43). 
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nature provided both necessities and amusement, however, d'Alembert believed that our 
active pursuit of it approached the limits defined by the capacity of abstraction to remain 
relevant to the natural world and by our own limits in understanding ourselves. To that 
end, study of the mind had progressed as well: the mind was considered by mid-century 
to be an active principle, not just a receiving surface for the imprint of sensations nor the 
scene for assembling retrieved ideas from memory in order to reason, to compare or 
judge. Its imagination created ideas (51). As catapulting to abstractions and creativity, 
loaded with perceptions and memories, yet circumscribed by specific sense capacities and 
moved by the passions, the mind was a problematic instrument of knowledge. The study 
of it by itself had proven difficult: "[ t ]he nature of man, the study of which is so 
necessary and so highly recommended by Socrates, is an impenetrable mystery for man 
himself when he is enlightened by reason alone; and the greatest geniuses, after 
considerable reflection upon this most important matter too often succeed merely in 
knowing a little less about it than the rest of men" (26). The best we can do in difficult 
investigations, is to "collect as many facts as we can ... arrange them in the most natural 
order, and ... relate them to a certain number of principal facts of which the others are 
only the consequences. If we presume sometimes to raise ourselves higher, let it be with 
that wise circumspection which befits so feeble an understanding as ours" (23-4 my 
emphasis). IS 
Psychology was a part of natural philosophy: "Its highest ideal was to become the 
'analyst of the soul' just as chemistry is the analyst ofthe inorganic world, and anatomy 
15Condillac held that the only legitimate system was one that explained facts by facts, and 
the best system was one in which one fact would explain all the others (29 fn 37). 
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of the organic world"- and so by his metaphors you shall know him(Cassirer 94). 
Schiller. Just as Newton "made the properties of light known to men by breaking it up 
into its constituent parts," into the colors of the spectrum, and as Locke analyzed the 
contents ofthe mind into simple ideas derived from sense, Schiller analyzed human 
nature into its original forces and its species-specific drive, the play-drive. 16 But he did 
so most reluctantlyY The following complex of mechanical and organic imagery 
161n his analysis, Schiller created the antimonies Person/Condition, Independence/ 
Dependence, Noumena [reiner Intelligenz]/Phenomena, as well as Form/Matter, 
highlighted above. Immediate philosophical sources for the analysis are considered to be 
Fichte and Kant; drives in the philosophic and aesthetic literature included Reinhold's 
Trieb nach Form and Trieb nach Stoff. Ramdohr's Charis (1793), which Schiller read, 
"applied the concept of play in a broader ethical and anthropological sense." Ramdohr's 
drives were two: a drive toward the fulfillment of basic needs and a drive toward freedom 
(Beiser 137-9, 143). 
17"The spirit of philosophical inquiry itself is wresting from the imagination one province 
after another, and the frontiers of art contract the more the boundaries of science expand" 
(11.2). D' Alembert, however, pointed out how necessary the imagination was for 
analysis: "Imagination acts no less in a geometer who creates than in a poet who invents. 
It is true that they operate differently on their object. The first shears it down and 
analyzes it, the second puts it together and embellishes it .... Of all the great men of 
antiquity Archimedes is perhaps the one who most deserves to be placed beside Homer. 
I hope that this digression by a geometer who loves his art will be pardoned, and that he 
will not be accused of being an excessive enthusiast; and I return to my subject" (52). 
The trouble with analysis, however, especially mathematical analysis according to 
Buffon, is that "one is obliged ... to make suppositions which are always contrary to 
nature, to strip the subject of most of its qualities, and to make of it an abstract entity 
which has no resemblance to the actual being. And after long reason and calculation on 
the connections and properties of this abstract entity, and after having arrived at a 
conclusion equally abstract, when it appears that something real has been found, the ideal 
result is transferred back upon the real subject. This process produces an infinity of false 
consequences and errors" (178). Goethe: "every analysis presupposes a synthesis .... 
Thus modem chemistry depends largely on separating what nature has united. We do 
away with nature's synthesis so that we may learn about nature through its separate 
elements. What higher synthesis is there than a living organism? Why would we submit 
ourselves to the torments of anatomy, physiology, and psychology if not to reach some 
concept of the whole, a concept which can always restore itself to wholeness no matter 
how it is tom to pieces?" (Scientific 49). 
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captured Schiller's own ambivalence about this chosen method of argument in the 
Aesthetic Letters. 18 If including the graphic metaphor allowed Schiller to register his 
dismay about the unintended but inevitable consequences of the analytic method of 
philosophizing (Kant's method as well as Newton and Locke's), it also exemplified the 
synthesizing function of vitalism, its acceptance of mechanism, of the known physics and 
chemistry as partially explanatory oflife, while insisting on something more built on that 
foundation as specific to life. The analytic method revealed the parts of the whole; as 
such, Schiller's original drives represented constructs; the method did not uncover a 
situation found in nature, but the planks and beams of an explanatory model. It is the 
same with the play-drive: its effects are part of nature, but it is a concept. And it is for 
Schiller a necessary one. 
After indicating his method of argument Schiller wrote in the first Letter, "For alas! 
intellect must first destroy the object of Inner Sense if it would make it its own. Like the 
analytical chemist, the philosopher can only discover how things are combined by 
analyzing them ... "(1.4). The eighteenth-century reader might think immediately of 
Lavoisier, recently beheaded in the Terror, the famous analytical chemist 
[Scheidekunstler] who experimented with air and water (these once thought to be 
elements), separated them into their elementary components and then - and this will not 
do for Schiller - reconstituted the original compounds! What happened with nonliving 
compounds cannot occur in living nature. In mid-sentence, Schiller (who began in the 
18 The benefit of a machine metaphor system is apparent today as well: the analogy of the 
computer and all its projections is extremely generative not only in biology but in 
cognitive science. Mechanical metaphors prove useful in describing processes that were 
empirically available, and they make some complex systems more accessible. As such, 
information technology adds a layer of complexity to machines and the machine 
metaphor system. 
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sentence above) changed the comparison from chemistry to vivisection and intensified it 
emotionally: 
... the philosopher can only discover how things are combined by 
analyzing them, only lay bare the workings of spontaneous Nature by 
subjecting them to the torment of his own techniques. In order to lay hold 
of the fleeting phenomenon, he must first bind it in the fetters of rule, tear 
its fair body to pieces by reducing it to concepts, and ~reserve its living 
spirit in a sorry skeleton of words (1.4 my emphasis ).1 
His analogy escalated from chemistry to iatromechanical physiology and 
experimental vivisection with which he was certainly familiar from his medical education 
and from Goethe's descriptions of recent forays to the anatomy laboratory with the 
Humboldt brothers. Within it, the unnatural divisions or distorting actions of reason were 
indicated by the actions of the anatomist in vivisection or necropsy, implying that 
19 In his famous paper De partibus corporis humani sensibilibus et irritabilibus (read in 
1752, published in 1755), Haller used similar language in describing his experimental use 
of vivisection: "1 have examined several different ways, a hundred and ninety animals, a 
species of cruelty for which I felt such a reluctance, as could only be overcome by the 
desire of contributing to the benefit of mankind, and excused by that motive which 
induces persons of the most human temper, to eat every day the flesh of harmless animals 
without any scruple" (657). In his procedure, Haller subjected living animals to "being 
burnt, tore, pricked, or cut till ... [certain parts were] quite destroyed" in an effort to 
promote a reaction "for it is very well known, that an animal, when it is in pain, 
endeavours to remove the part that suffers from the cause that hurts it; pulls back the leg 
if it is hurt, shakes the skin if it is pricked, and gives other evident signs by which we 
know that it suffers" (659). He described his procedure as follows: "I took living animals 
of different kinds, and different ages, and after laying bare that part which I want to 
examine, I waited till the animal ceased to struggle or complain; after which I irritated the 
part, by blowing, heat, spirit of wine, the scalpel, lapis infinalis, oil of vitriol, and butter 
of antimony. I examined attentively, whether upon touching, cutting, burning or 
lacerating the part, the animal seemed disquieted, made a noise struggled, or pulled back 
the wounded limb, if the part was convulsed, or if nothing of all this happened. The 
repeated events of these experiments ... " (559-60). He, however, made no experiments 
on the sensitivity of bones because "in that cruel torture which is unavoidable in order to 
lay bare the bones, it is very difficult to distinguish the new pains thereby produced" 
(666). 
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analysis precludes a surviving, much less restored, subject. The method, though it may 
gain clarity, will miss the whole, its dynamic organic functioning. 
Vitalist Epistemology: Comparison, Analogy and Hypothesis 
Unity of person necessarily presupposes the unity of a sentient being .... 
[T]he senses are not the cause but the occasion of all our knowledge. For 
it is not the senses which perceive; it is rather the mind which perceives 
when modifications of the bodily organs take place. We must carefully 
observe the first sensations of which we become aware; we must discover 
the foundation of the first operations of the mind, watch them in their 
development, and pursue them to their extreme limits. In short, as Bacon 
said, we must, as it were, create the whole human mind anew in order 
really to understand its structure" (Condillac qtd. in Cassirer 101-102). 
Enlightenment science historian, Sergio Moravia, presented a schema for 
understanding the vitalists' method. He found that late Enlightenment vitalism was 
characterized by "epistemological liberation," a character of exploration and discovery 
that allowed for a panoply of "epistemological options." The changes that ushered in this 
loosening, indicative of the effort to describe and orient toward a much enriched 
understanding of matter, included the following: a rediscovery of the importance of 
elemental facts and empirical description, the rehabilitation of sense and a pluralization 
of cognitive strategies. They involved as well a movement from formal and deductive 
approaches to empirical, inductive construction of explanatory models, and a retraction of 
mathematical privilege ("Enlightenment" 248).20 These changes not only transformed 
the study of life, they brought the "whole man down to earth": they placed "human being 
and human action within the coordinates of reality accessible to the instruments of 
science ... not only the body but the thought itself; not only the physique but also the 
moral; not only the nervous sensibility, but also the passions, emotions and higher 
20 For the "rehabilitation of sense," see Chapter VI. 
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psychic operations." This development fostered the redefinition of "human corporeity," 
opening to intensive study "the corporeal organization of man - in order to prove that 
such organization contained within itself all the forces necessary to organs for the correct 
functioning of vital, psychic and mental phenomena, none excepted." The body came to 
be seen as capable without a soul and able to produce autonomously even the most 
sophisticated and complex human acts. Finally, by valorizing only natural explanations, 
this new tradition placed the human being as body in his environment [the Umwelt], 
connecting him to the natural world by a complex web of relations (250-253, 256). 
There were so many favorable references to observation (as implicitly visual) that 
this approved method of knowledge was a virtual "epistemology of sight" (Moravia 249). 
Buffon counseled: "begin the study of nature by very broad observation ... almost at 
random," and as you are observing, observe yourself, " ... allow your mind to follow its 
lead, to get to know itself' (146). The next step, then, is description, a function that 
entails more than observation of an individual. It involves comparison, a function as old 
as having two ears separated by the space of one brain (for time), or two eyes by a nose 
(for space). Side-by-side observation of two and then comparison with a third are basic 
to our judgments: "Nothing is well-defined but that which is exactly described. Now, in 
order to describe exactly, it is necessary to have seen, reviewed, examined, and compared 
the thing which one wishes to describe. And it is necessary to do all this without 
prejudging things and without an eye to systemization" (157). 
According to Moravia, comparison "is one of the principal cognitive acts of the 
modem human science. It is quite significant that it was worked out in the 
Enlightenment" (250). For the scholars of the late eighteenth century, it was a sort of 
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middle road between observation and abstract formalization. They knew what they were 
doing: those who compared understood 
that reality is made up of discontinuous and individualized data, which are 
not, however, completely unrelated among themselves and, indeed, are 
susceptible to being juxtaposed and connected. They kn[ e ]w, in addition, 
that they [could] not be content with the mere visual inspection of the 
single datum, but that they must institute interfactual relations capable of 
penetrating to the meaning of the facts themselves, and eventually of 
constituting certain structures or constants useful for pursuing 
investigation (250). 
D' Alembert acknowledged that the mind moved from individual to the general through 
comparison: "We cannot repeat too often that nature is composed merely of individual 
things which are the primary object of our sensations and direct perceptions. To be sure, 
we note in these individual things common properties by which we compare them and 
dissimilar properties by which we differentiate them" (48-9). But Buffon believed that 
the method of natural history should build on this natural capacity of mind and he 
incorporated it in his description of the ideal natural historian: he should gather facts, 
then rise to "combinations of observation, the generalization of facts, linking them 
together by the power of analogies .... [Then] we can judge that particular effects 
depend upon more general ones; we can compare nature with herself in her vast 
operations; and finally, we are able to open new routes for further perfection ofthe 
various branches of natural science (171-2).21 This emphasis naturally led to the 
emergence of morphology and the intuition of "type." 
21 "Analogy frees our mind from having to imagine new things and from an even greater 
worry, that of remaining uncertain. It pleases our mind, but does it please nature as 
much?" (Maupertuis 32). 
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Mathematics lost some cache as life became more and more defined by qualities that 
were difficult to distill. Buffon reminded his readers that as unnatural and abstract, as 
products of human invention, "[m]athematical truths are only exact repetitions of 
definitions or suppositions ... [they represent only an] identity of ideas [that] has nothing 
of the real about it. Truths of the physical sciences, on the other hand, are in no way 
arbitrary, and in no way depend on us, instead of being founded on suppositions which 
we made, they depend only on facts." Truth itselfthen was redefined, by Buffon and 
others, in a way that related to the dynamic reality of the physical world. For them, "a 
sequence of similar facts or, if you prefer, a frequent repetition and an uninterrupted 
succession of the same occurrences constitute the essence of this sort of truth. What is 
called 'truth' in the physical sciences is thus only a probability, but a probability so great 
that it is equivalent to certitude" (173-174).22 
Combining all these functions and recalculating the value and reliability of each 
mental operation in relation to the others was necessary to a new system of knowledge. 
According to Buffon: 
The true method of guiding one's mind in such research is to have 
recourse to observations, to gather these together, and from them to make 
new observations in sufficient number to assure the truth of the principal 
facts, and to use mathematics only for the purpose of estimating the 
probabilities of the consequences which may be drawn from these facts. 
Above all, it is necessary to try to generalize these facts and to distinguish 
well those which are essential from those which are only accessories to the 
22 See page 182 (fn 17) for Buffon's attack on (mathematical) analysis. D' Alembert saw 
the change coming: "evidence is the result of the operations of the mind alone and is 
related to metaphysical and mathematical speculations .... [C]ertitude is more 
appropriate to physical objects, the knowledge of which is the fruit of the constant and 
invariable testimony of our senses. Probability applies principally to historical facts and 
generally to all past, present, and future events that we attribute to a kind of chance 
because we cannot perceive the causes of them" (44). 
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subject under consideration. It is then necessary to tie such facts together 
by analogies, confinn or destroy certain equivocal points by means of 
experiment, fonn one's plan of explanation on the basis of the 
combination of all these connections, and present them in the most natural 
order. This order can be established in two ways: the first is to ascend 
from the particular effects to more general ones, and the other is to 
descend from the general to the particular (178)?3 
Buffon issued a warning, a premonition of the heightening concerns during the late 
Enlightenment, about the limits of human knowledge. He recognized the particular spin 
on reality that is natural to us, and he fixed his readers with a rhetorical glance: "Here is 
the most delicate and the most important point in the study of the sciences: to know how 
to distinguish what is really in a subject from what we arbitrarily put there in considering 
it, to recognize clearly the properties which belong to it and those which we give to it. 
[T]his appears to me to be the foundation of the truth method ofleading one's mind in the 
way ofthe sciences" (178). 
The Hypothesis and the Unknown 
The French vitalist Barthez' premier research interest was to "investigate the laws by 
which the vital principle in each living being creates and commands bodily structures and 
23 Buffon saw that these approaches stemmed from different personalities: "the love of 
the study of nature supposes two qualities of mind which are apparently in opposition to 
each other: the grand view of the ardent genius who takes in everything at a glance, and 
the detailed attention of an instinct which concentrates laboriously on a single minute 
detail" (145). Nevertheless, there was "need for a [combined] methodical approach to 
guide the mind, ... for that method which sustains the very order of things, guides our 
reasoning, enlightens our views, extends them, and prevents us from being led astray" 
(172). Such a natural method was needed and sought throughout the century. According 
to Zammito, "Kant, [for example] taking up impulses from Buffon, intended to displace 
this [heuristic and classificatory natural history with Naturgeschichte] with a real and 
genetic conception of the order of living fonns (Naturgattungen in place of 
Schulgattungen), and therewith to make history central to the project of the life sciences. 
[In Kant's colleague's words] the new research program would ask .. .'what the primal 
fonn of each ancestral species of animals and plants originally consisted of, and how the 
species gradually devolved from their ancestral species'" ("This inscrutable" 79). 
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events to achieve its own intent." In that endeavor, he was deeply committed to process, 
to careful methodology. He recommended that "Science of Life ... abandon all 
premature attempts to define the final cause of this occult force, naming it by some 
'unknown expression' like 'vital principle'" (Reich 18). He continued: 
The names of occult faculties are useful to simplify the computation of 
phenomena, and to give it more extension. [But ift]hese names [are] used 
as letters in algebra, no prejudiced opinion hampers the search for the 
proximate and immediate causes of facts. Thus one obtains much more 
easily and directly formulas or general expressions of the analogies of the 
facts (Barthez in Duchesneau 266). 
This formulation was one of the clearest representations of force speculations as place-
holders for the data of future scientific study. Duchesneau developed Barthez' position 
as follows: 
The algebraic x in physiological analysis would have a specific meaning 
and role. It would signify the heterogeneity between the laws of vital 
functions and those of inorganic nature, as well as between the laws of 
vital functions and determinations of the psychological agent. It would 
afford a new combinatoire of phenomena showing the specific 
physiological connection involved, an intrinsic connection, and more 
fundamental than the order arising from anatomical, mechanical or 
chemical determinations. Indeed the experimental cause is hypothesis, but 
it should be framed on the ground of an 'analytic computation of 
phenomena.' Barthez considers that scientific knowledge can develop 
only once an adequate principle or experimental cause has been posited. 
The experimental cause represents [a] common 'area of research ' .... 
Barthez's experimental cause makes it possible to locate in the phenomena 
significant facts, that is faits-principes serving as grounds for explanatory 
analogies ... " (266-7 my emphasis). 
In this recommendation Barthez both cleared hypotheses of confusing concepts, took 
from the questions their already embedded answers, and he reminded his readers of the 
great value of hypothesis itself.24 
24 Reflection on this development based on recent philosophy of biology: to characterize 
science by "the rigor of its methodology, the possibility of testing or falsifying its 
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This hypothetico-deductive method moved easily from physics and physiology into 
the developing science of life and science of man, and it was also eagerly taken up by the 
broader culture. Rousseau, for example, commented in his Second Discourse that he was 
making an hypothetical history "not unlike those our physicists are in the habit of making 
every day" (Rousseau; also W&W xlvi). For his part, Schiller proposed that the play 
drive has a goal, Beauty, an Ideal: in essence he hypothesized that, unlike other animals 
whose goals are hard-wired (for example, goals like reproduction, development, 
maintenance), human beings, as a species, are characterized by an additional non-specific 
capacity, an ability to fix individual goal(s) by pleasurable attention. Human goals are 
potentially freely chosen and human nature pluri-potential in terms of its possible 
actualization. The species is therefore fixed though its flexibility - and it is culture as an 
environment that, in reciprocal relation with the individual, promotes increasingly 
conclusions, and of establishing non-contradictory 'paradigms' (systems of theories)" 
establishes a baseline, but it is one that must be understood in the context of discovery. 
According to Mayr, science is no longer considered to progress by Baconian induction, 
by observation, description and notation of experience without prior theorizing, but is 
seen historically to progress by the hypothetico-deductive method: observation leading to 
speculation that frames observation and dictates hierarchies of experience (i.e. what fits, 
what falsifies, what leads to other speculations). This way of proceeding valorizes 
scientific relativism, the anticipation of impermanence of findings and the activity that 
has conclusions continually tested. That facts give rise to questions, problems and 
theories rather than supplying answers gives science a dynamic quality. Evolutionary 
and other branches of biology with dependence on historical material have additional 
methods of inquiry beyond experimentation in real time: these biologists use observation 
and comparison (Growth 25-32). Historically, this basic epistemological change 
occurred during Schiller's time: then, according to Mayr and others, the geometrical and 
mathematical ideal of proof was challenged by a probabilistic model of evidence; the 
inductive method was edged out by the hypothetico-deductive method, and observation 
and experiment were augmented by comparison. During the eighteenth century, the 
probabilistic approach to truth and empiricism's connection to hypothesis found their 
way into fiction and into the considerations of fiction: "in Tristram Shandy, Laurence 
Sterne could declare that "it is in the nature of an hypothesis, when once a man has 
conceived it, that it assimilates every thing to itself' (Bender 16). 
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compelling and fulfilling goals. These goals are ideals, ones each person can strive 
toward, but never reach. 
Combining the results of the various techniques, from observation, experimentation, 
comparison and analogy into the frame of a hypothesis allowed for indication of the 
direction of further study. It focused attention by giving form to a problem, by creating a 
bounded area for the search. Hypothesis imposed on knowledge-making an organization 
worthy of a vitalistic analogy: the working hypothesis functions as if it were in a 
developmental drive. It creates an organism of intelligence out of both preconceived 
notions [Keim und Anlagen] and unformatted data. It uses some materials and discards 
others from the world in order to create an autonomous individual, a self-developing and 
self-maintaining environment for ideas. It continues to change, to develop and to grow as 
long as it is viable. For the reader it is like play, like contemplating or creating a work of 
art: author and reader's attention is framed and focused, and in the space that is created, 
each can contemplate the whole, each form and mature their judgment. If it is not 
beautiful, if something does not fit, is distorted or deadened, if there is an anomaly, the 
reader (even ifhe be the author) will rebel and dare to apply a new frame. 
Kant & Goethe: 
A Representation of Inquiry and Portrait of a Natural Historian [Naturforscher] 
Questions about human ability to interface with nature, then, immediately arise and, 
since Schiller took in both Kant and Goethe's organization of natural history and their 
stances of our epistemological relation to nature, he worked toward presenting his 
hypothesis in a way to satisfy both their claims. He followed the Critiques and 
audaciously used Kant's regulative category to hypothesize broadly about play, and he 
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used Goethe's intuitive technique to reassure himself about his own observations 
regarding human nature. 25 
Kant: Regulative Ideas and the Labyrinth of Unknowns 
It is absurd to hope that another Newton might one day arise who would 
make conceivable to us so much as the production of a blade of grass 
according to natural laws unordered by any intention (Kant Judgment 
§75). 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) had a long and fruitful involvement with natural 
philosophy.26 He was a "shrewd student of the life sciences who followed their 
development since the 1750s ... [and] one of the very few who followed - and 
understood the implications of - Buffon's distinctions" (Larson 170). From Buffon, Kant 
received a sense of the value of a natural system of classification and a concomitant 
appreciation of the importance of history to our understanding of living forms, 
particularly with respect to the definition of natural species.27 Throughout his academic 
life, Kant lectured and published in natural philosophy and anthropology, and he 
25 The analogy of epistemology to a map and our relationship to the map is, of course, a 
representation: Kant was the surveyor and Goethe, the boon companion: "Kant was proud 
to have 'not merely explored the territory of pure understanding, and carefully surveyed 
every part of it ... but also measured its extent, and assigned to everything in it its 
rightful place" (Muller-Sievers 65). Goethe was a master of journeys of becoming: he 
had his own experience of an Italian journey and worked on the composition of an 
"epitome of epigenetic literature," a Bildungsroman, Wilhelm Meisters Lehr;ahre, during 
the time Schiller was involved with the Aesthetic Letters (Muller-Sievers compared 
Tristram Shandy as a tome based on preformationist theory to Goethe's coming-of-age 
novel as a work that claims "a free cause and formation of self." 20). 
26There is a virtual academic industry of information about Kant's interest in, 
involvement with and influence on the natural sciences: see Huneman, Larson, Sloan, 
Steigerwald and Zammito. 
27 "Every species, every succession of individuals, who reproduce and cannot mix, shall 
be considered and treated separately; and we shall employ no other families, genera, 
orders, and classes, than what are exhibited by Nature herself' (Buff on, "The Ass" 406). 
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participated in major confrontations and controversies about the explanatory use of 
natural science, theories of generation and the species concept. He railed against 
"aesthetic" philosophers, the "speculative empiricists" like Herder, demanding a 
responsible use ofthe discoveries of natural history.28 In controversies about the 
application of data in theory, in the species controversy, he held the position against 
Kames and Forster that mankind was a single genus and species, that species were fixed 
and that Buffon's idea of natural species, however correct it might be, was empirically 
unworkable. Regarding reproduction, he posited a modified preformationism, one that 
allowed species characteristic to be inherited through germ material [Keirn und 
Anlagen].29 As an appreciator of the epigenetic theory (but an opponent ofhylozoism), 
he followed the work and initiated a correspondence with the natural historian 
Blumenbach regarding his hypothesis of a developmental force. Kant believed that 
Blumenbach, in positing a mechanical force that functioned as ifit were teleological, 
28 Kant: "Would not the whole of this learned industry be better off if those who are 
accustomed, as the public taste demands, to purvey a mixture of the empirical with the 
rational in all sorts of proportions unknown even to themselves and who style themselves 
independent thinkers, while giving the name of hair-splitters to those who apply 
themselves to the purely rational part, were to be given warning about pursuing 
simultaneously two jobs which are quite different in their technique, and each of which 
perhaps requires a special talent that when combined with the other talent produces 
nothing but bungling?" (Zammito Genesis 186). Having been a spectator to the flame-
throwing between Herder and Kant that produced this salvo and recently enamored of 
Kant, Schiller certainly kept his eye on the latter - in an effort to avoid being considered 
one of the careless. 
29 Sloan's "Buffon" includes evidence for Buffon's acquaintance with Leibniz, Kant's 
acquaintance with Buffon (though he did not own any of Buffon's works), and 
Girtanner's study of Kant through Reinhold, who was also Schiller's explanatory source. 
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created a regulatory or place-holding concept in the study of generation.3o For Kant, who 
adhered to the necessity of describing nature in all its manifestations within the frame of 
nature itself, and with reference to known mechanical (and chemical) laws, 
Blumenbach's refusal to attribute life's structure to a supersensual cause (e.g. the soul), to 
any action outside of history (by prior creation), or through some change in raw matter, 
seemed to support his own thinking about life and the epistemological problem it 
provoked. He celebrated what he considered to be Blumenbach's careful use ofthe 
vitalist concept of force. In other words, Kant founded a "new method of argumentation 
and legitimization" by favoring the "epigenesis of the categories: generatio aequivoca ... 
[to] the gradual growth of inorganic matter into organisms (or of empirical knowledge 
into knowledge a priori), and preformationism, the creation of all natural forms since the 
beginning ofthe world (or implantation of categories into the mind by 'our maker')" 
(Muller-Sievers 47,90). 
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant presented the principle of 
purposiveness without purpose as an a priori transcendental principle of judgment 
necessary for us because it "governs, justifies, and makes possible our aspirations to 
30 He commended Blumenbach's work as follows: "No one has done more for the proof 
of this theory of epigenesis as well as the establishment of the proper principles of its 
application, partly by limiting an excessively presumptuous use of it, than Privy 
Councilor Blumenbach. He begins all physical explanation of these formations with 
organized matter .... [H]e leaves natural mechanism an indeterminable but at the same 
time also unmistakable role under this inscrutable principle of an original organization, 
on account of which he calls the faculty in the matter in an organized body (in distinction 
from the merely mechanical formative power [Bildungskraft] that is present in all 
matter) a formative drive [Bildungstrieb] (standing as it were, under the guidance and 
direction of that former principle)" (§81, 292). For the references to the interaction of 
Blumenbach and Kant, the issues about mechanical forces with teleological appearances, 
including their possible misunderstanding, see page 114 fn 8, 146-48. 
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empirical knowledge" with regard to two subsidiary forms of judgment: teleological 
judgment concerning organic behavior and aesthetic judgment of natural beauty. In the 
second part ofthat work, the "Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment," Kant 
approached the problems of the scientific understanding of organisms. He saw that, from 
our point of view, organisms (in their being and action) were not satisfactorily explained 
according to known mechanical or chemical laws: 
An organized being is thus not a mere machine, for that has only a motive 
power, while the organized being possesses in itself a formative power, 
and indeed one that it communicates to the matter, which does not have it 
(it organizes the latter): thus it has a self-propagating formative power, 
which cannot be explained through the capacity for movement alone (that 
is, by mechanism) (§65). 
Further, it was difficult for humans to conceive of natural explanations of their 
existence, complex structure and functioning. We see organisms as both being purposive 
and as purposes of nature, as agented products. According to Kant, the principle that 
pertains to the above, that of purposiveness, is a reflective judgment: it "is a merely 
subjective principle, one needed and employed by subjects, but not properly applicable to 
objects; we may judge objects ... only as if they are purposive.,,3! More, natural 
3! An analysis of "teleology" by Ernst Mayr demonstrated the importance of isolating the 
word's connotations and uses today: Mayr found that historically, particularly in the 
description and explanation of living systems, several meanings were necessarily 
conflated in one term. Teleological language marshaled the following meanings-
endorsement of theological or metaphysical doctrines, a rejection of the physico-chemical 
explanations for biological phenomena, a perception of causation of the present by the 
future, or the connotation of anthropomorphic purpose and intention. He solved these 
issues to his and others' satisfaction by noting the natural differences between the 
processes described. His distinctions are useful to our understanding of the difficulties 
faced by the Enlightenment vitalists, who lacked both the knowledge to make these 
particular differentiations. He analyzed the heterogeneous concept as follows: its 
meanings included teleomatic processes in inanimate nature and teleonomic processes in 
living nature. 1) Teleomatic processes are simple consequences of natural laws, "end-
directed only in a passive automatic way, regulated by external forces or conditions." 
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philosophers studying organisms, "not only do, but must, employ the concept of a natural 
purpose in their investigation" (Zuckert 1-2). To be clear, "Kant identifies purposiveness 
not as an ontological characteristic of objects or nature, but as an epistemic principle that 
governs the unity of representations or judgments" (Zuckert 9-10 my emphasis). In other 
words, natural purposes [Naturzwecke] as organisms or organized beings [Organisierte 
Wesen] are our constructs; they are the only way we can understand life. Not what-it-is 
but what-humans-see-and-think-of-it constitutes life. And, as a principle of knowledge, 
presupposition or "regulative use" allows us to recognize the differences in living 
organisms without committing to a research program outside of the methods of natural 
history or physiology. Kant's summary ofthis function is as follows: 
Nevertheless, teleological judging is rightly drawn into our research into 
nature ... but only in order to bring it under principles of observation and 
research in analogy with causality according to ends, without presuming 
thereby to explain it. It thus belongs to the reflecting, not to the 
determining power of judgment. The concept of the combinations and 
forms of nature in accordance with ends is still at least one more 
principle for bringing its appearances under rules where the laws of 
causality about the mere mechanism of nature will not suffice. For we 
adduce a teleological ground when we ascribe causality in regard to an 
object to a concept of the object as if it were to be found in nature (not in 
us), or rather we represent the possibility of the object in accordance with 
the analogy of such a causality (like the kind we encounter in ourselves), 
and hence we conceive of nature as technical through its own capacity; 
whereas if we did not ascribe such an agency to it, we would have to 
represent its causality as a blind mechanism. If, however, we were to base 
nature on intentionally acting causes, hence were to ground teleology not 
merely on a regulative principle for the mere judging of appearances ... 
The end is a result. 2) "A teleonomic process or behavior is one which owes its goal-
directedness to the operation of a program." Program and end-point. The program, Mayr 
pointed out, may be coded in the genes as the developmental sequence of the nervous 
system which, functioning executively, enables the organism to, say, perceive food and 
eat it, or choose materials and make a nest (Toward 45). Mayr also distinguished human 
agency but found no place for cosmic teleology in biology: it is crucial to him that 
evolutionary theory be clearly understood as non-teleological. 
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but rather on a constitutive principle for the derivation of its products 
from their causes, then the concept of a natural end would no longer 
belong to the reflecting, but to the determining power of judgment (§61). 
For Kant, teleology was "an a priori principle about the relation between the human mind 
and the nature that surrounds it, including other human minds, that can give us 
confidence in the validity of our judgments without directly giving us new concepts of 
objects" (Guyer in Kant xxi). Kant argued his position with reference to the advances 
made in the study of life, from the work of the embryologists, the anatomists, the 
physiologists and the naturalists, Buffon, Maupertuis, Haller, Wolff and Blumenbach. 
From his familiarity with their publications, he judged that the life sciences ofthe time 
needed grounding, needed an epistemology that at once extended to them an authority 
based on past testing and success (empiricism composed of observation and experiment 
in physics) and one that gave a level of autonomy and encouraged an open-ended 
program for discovery through theory-building.32 
Schiller imbibed Kant in a three-year period of study, a terrific luxury (paid for by 
the Duke of Augustenburg) for a writer who had supported himself with his pen and lived 
much of his life hand-to-mouth. He took Kant's philosophy into his head and his heart, 
particularly the Third Critique. its emphasis on beauty, freedom and on mankind as an 
end of nature. When he disagreed, his variance was a movement toward the 
anthropological and the aesthetic, a shift underneath the fluttering flag of Kantianism.33 
32 For complete argument see Huneman, "Introduction." 
33 An example of Schiller's method of affirming Kant while distancing his own position 
from any "misconception" the reader might have: "In the Transcendental method of 
philosophizing, where everything depends on clearing form of content, and obtaining 
Necessity in its pure state, free of all admixture with the contingent, one easily falls into 
thinking of material things as nothing but an obstacle, and of imagining that our sensuous 
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He also took in Kant's epistemological distinctions with regard to organisms and art and 
made an effort at rigorous philosophizing according to Kant's standards. In the middle of 
his analysis, the thirteenth letter of the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller included a footnote 
deploring the effects of preconceived notions of goals in natural philosophy. There, 
Schiller publicly lamented the use by some physiologists, physicians and natural 
historians of concepts like force as reifications, as designations of principles in nature that 
function outside known laws (whether mechanical or chemical), uses that would force the· 
hypothesis of new laws or function as an appeal to a cause outside of nature. In it he 
also provided a gloss: his use of his drive concept should be read as adhering to Kant's 
explanation of organisms as natural purposes and products of nature. 34 The following 
excerpt of the footnote functions as an introduction to the intuitive scientist: 
One of the chief reasons why our natural sciences make such slow 
progress is obviously the universal, and almost uncontrollable, propensity 
to teleological judgments, in which, once they are used constitutively, the 
determining faculty is substituted for the receptive. However strong and 
however varied the impact made upon our organs by nature, all her 
manifold variety is then entirely lost upon us, because we are seeking 
nothing in her but what we have put into her; because, instead of letting 
her come in upon us, we are thrusting ourselves out upon her with all the 
impatient anticipations of our reason (XIII.4 fn 2 my emphasis). 35 
Much as he valued Kant, and though Schiller presented drives regulatively, he did 
not use concepts that imply purpose, plan or agency, (the drives) abstemiously - as Kant 
nature, just because it happens to be a hindrance in this operation must of necessity be in 
conflict with reason. Such a way of thinking is, it is true, wholly alien to the spirit of the 
Kantian system, but it may very well be found in the letter of it" (XIII.2 fn *2). 
34 In this reading I am at odds with Wilkinson and Willoughby who take Schiller's 
critique as one against scientists who would posit an agent outside of nature to explain 
the specific qualities of life (W & W "Commentary" 247). 
35 The rest of the footnote is discussed with reference to Goethe on page 202. 
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had specified - but much as others used them at the time, audaciously, to justify 
speculating about the unknowns in the vitalistic research program, including the nature of 
man. For Schiller, the epistemological value that resided in teleological concepts, 
otherwise without ontological stature, then, was that the 'as if posture allowed him to 
move the argument of the Aesthetic Letters forward. He developed the argument 
analytically in spite of his preference for empirical and historical evidence and for 
objective rather than subjective observation (if only they were possible). He judged 
human potential as if our natural constitution (a product of nature alone) were itself a 
natural purpose (developed as if according to a plan, not accounted for by known laws 
and internal to itself), one that behaved according to expectations (normative standards) 
(Ginsborg). All this he posited based on his understanding of archetypes and drives. 
And based on Kant's regulative concepts, including the presuppositions of the 
purposiveness of organism as products of nature, organisms as natural purposes, and 
species and genera as natural categories not subject to demonstration, Schiller approached 
humanity as one species but in two ways: he presented human nature itself as a an 
organization in the individual and he saw the species that functioned "as if' it were an 
agent of its own potentiality (cause and effect of itself). 36 Like many during the time, 
Schiller made the theoretical effort: he set out to explore the labyrinth of human nature, 
with his boon companion Goethe, unlocking the gate of the unknown with Kant's own 
36 The following sections are referenced §§ 64-68, 75, 77, 78,81; comparisons: bird §61; 
hexagon §65; thread/labyrinth §72. I am following Hannah Ginsborg's discussion of 
products of nature and purposive organisms as following normative laws. 
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keys, carrying a rucksack filled with information from the natural historians and 
physicians, packed by Rousseau and Herder.37 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe 
Experience and Intuition [Erfahrung und Anschauung] 
"A man can stand anything except a succession of ordinary days" (Goethe). 
What a force Goethe was, energetic and self-correcting: he led the German Counter 
Enlightenment [the charge of Empfindsamkeit] from Sturm und Drang to the end of the 
Romantic era, beginning with exuberantly written and popularly received poems, plays 
and a misunderstood self-parody (The Sorrows of Young Werther), a cautionary tale 
about his own depression. Then he engineered his own recovery with work and structure 
at Weimar, and indulged in some rowdying with the ruler Carl August. Then for the 
sake of his own Bildung he redirected himself by means of a two-year Italian journey. 
The trip led to another book, a renewed interest in classicism as well as some field work 
in botany (looking for the Urpjlanze), in anatomy (developing the insight that the bones 
of the head are modified vertebrae) and a unitary theory of natural philosophy based on 
archetypes. He wrote at Faust, Part I for years, finishing in 1808: too late for his good 
friend Schiller (1759-1805) and others who could not "hear what now I bring, belated, 
IWho listened to the early tunes I made: IGone is the throng by love so animated,lDead 
the responsive tribute that they paid" (trans. Wayne 29). Altogether his works fill 143 
volumes. 
37 Rousseau found himself in a analogous position regarding the status of the "historical 
fact": he, "keenly interested in tracing the succession of phases through which man's 
intellectual and social life has passed[,] ... recognized that the knowledge of his time 
permitted only raisonnements hypothitiques on the subject" (Lovejoy Ell 18). Schiller 
adopted the same stance with respect to his developmental history. 
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This polymath, poet, artist, scientist, administrator, also most probably had bipolar 
disorder. He was sometimes exuberant - a man of great energy and high ambition, of 
unapologetically eccentric lifestyle38 in whom impulse and feeling were controlled by the 
structure of living and the forms of art - but also someone who was profoundly and 
repeatedly depressed. He wrote in a letter of bereavement, "I know full well what it cost 
me then, in effort and in resolution, to escape the waters of death, even as I have had 
since then to save myself from many another shipwrecks by toiling effort and difficult 
recovery.,,39 Goethe's character Faust and his foil Mephistopheles play out many of 
Goethe's own character struggles (implied above) - temptation by curiosity, knowledge 
and sensuality, struggle against melancholy and cynicism with monumental programs of 
distraction and dissipation, working through guilt (sinning against innocent affection) 
and the redemption of a narcissistic Romantic hero through that same love. 
In "The Experiment as Mediator between the Subject and the Object," Goethe 
summarized the stance of the researcher into nature [Naturforscher]: 
when a person's thirst for knowledge kindles in him a desire to view 
nature's objects in their own right and in relation to one another ... he 
loses the yardstick which came to his aid when he looked at things from 
the human standpoint; i.e., in relation to himself. This yardstick of 
pleasure and displeasure, attraction and repulsion, help and harm, he must 
now renounce absolutely; as a ... true botanist [for example, he] must 
remain unmoved by beauty or utility in a plant; he must explore its 
formation, its relation to other plants. Like the sun which draws forth 
every plant and shines on all, he must look upon each plant with the same 
quiet gaze; he must find the measure for what he learns, the data for 
judgment, not in himself but in the sphere of what he observes (Scientific 
11). 
38 "Thomas Mann remarked that schoolboys learn [Goethe's] love-affairs by heart, like 
Jove's" (Faust Trans. Wayne 13). 
39 In a letter to Zelter in his bereavement (qtd. in Faust Trans.Wayne 20). 
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Goethe recommended "the calm exercise of the powers of attention" directed to an 
object in its natural context in order to develop a clear concept ofthe object, its parts and 
relationships. Goethe was not sanguine, however, about human seeing: "The scientific 
researcher strives to grasp and keep the definite aspect of what he beholds" but he "never 
sees the pure phenomenon with his own eyes, rather much depends on his mood, the state 
of his senses, the light, air, weather, the physical object, how it is handled, and a thousand 
other circumstances." He found it useful to consider three states of seeing: the empirical 
phenomenon (what everyone sees in nature), the scientific phenomenon, produced under 
controlled circumstances and conditions, and the pure phenomenon, which is what 
stands before us as a results of all our observations and experiments. It 
can never be isolated, but it appears in a continuous sequence of events. 
To depict it, the human mind gives definition to the empirically variable, 
excludes the accidental, sets aside the impure, untangles the complicated, 
and even discovers the unknown (Scientific 24-25). 
He extolled experimentation, a species of comparative analysis, as part of what produced 
the scientific phenomenon, but an experimentation that was careful, repetitive and narrow 
in scope in order that it not be overinterpreted. A group of experiments may illuminate 
an aspect of a problem, but Goethe believed that it took an extensive series of 
intentionally reproduced empirical evidence, under varied circumstances and different 
hands, to create an order that conforms to nature. In Goethe's system, the best course is 
to view the result of each experiment as isolated, as a kind of contemplation, to avoid the 
enthusiasm humans have for "hypotheses, theories, terminologies, and systems," a 
tendency, "to prove some relationship not fully perceptible to the senses but expressed 
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through the creative power of the mind" (14).40 Ideally, not to direct the experiment to 
prove a hypothesis but to "follow every single experiment through its variation is the real 
task of the scientific researcher." In this way he follows nature, for everything in nature, 
"especially the commoner forces and elements, work incessantly upon one another; we 
can say that each phenomenon is connected with countless others just as we can say that a 
point oflight floating in space sends its rays in all directions" (15-16). In short, 
we cannot exercise enough care, diligence, strictness, even pedantry, in 
collecting basic empirical evidence; here we labor for the world and the 
future. But these materials must be ordered and shown in sequence, not 
arranged in some hypothetical way nor made to serve the dictates of some 
system (17). 
These steps were the steps to the pure phenomenon and, in spite of abstraction, it was 
a phenomenon for Goethe, the end of the "practical and self-distilling processes of 
common human understanding as it ventures to apply itself to a higher sphere" (25). 
The Schiller-Goethe Fortunate Encounter 
"Science was the common ground on which the two men first met, 
nor was it ever left during the ensuing time.,,41 
For Goethe, his intuition about plants and animals, that is, his deep understanding of 
their form and structure, was the product of patient and repeated observation and 
experimentation. Goethe's intuitions were developed out of a rational empiricism (as 
described above), a profound attention to what the senses (particularly vision) collect, and 
a research program based on repetition (as a statistical method for increasing 
probabilities), on swinging back and forth between the phenomena and his collected 
40 "We often find that the more limited the data, the more artful a gifted thinker will 
become." 
41 Rudolf Magnus qtd. in Heinz Norden. Goethe as a Scientist. New York: Henry 
Schuman, 1949,23. 
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experience of them, in a spiral of correction and reinforcement, allowing a subsequent 
imaginative grasp [Anschauung] of the essence of the phenomena. This method of 
discovery allowed Goethe to elaborate the study of morphology, of dynamic form 
(Bildung and metamorphosis), and to a theory of plant and animal types.42 For example, 
in collecting and examining plants, he came to an understanding that many of their 
42 In addition to Buffon, Maupertuis (as Dr. Baumann), Diderot, Robinet and Bonnet 
recognized either Platonic or Aristotelian forms exemplified by living things. Many of 
these researchers, as well as the early Herder, considered man as the model in the theory 
oftypes (as microcosm, hieroglyph) and sought similarities to him in lower animals. By 
the early 1780's, Herder and Goethe reversed that organization: working from an 
empirical ground, they observed a pattern present in lower animals and sought the same 
physical formation modified in man or specialized in other animals, "[for] the lower 
levels of material and organization are represented in man, as well as the higher ones 
which are peculiar to him." (Nisbet "Type" 83ff, 101). Herder applied the theory not 
only to the skeleton, but to the anatomy of the whole organism (morphology, the common 
outward form), but also to the forces within the natural type, forces he regarded as 
"manifestations of the creative 'Urkraft' within all nature" (89). Goethe, in intimate 
communication with Herder and familiar with his manuscripts, followed Herder's more 
empirically-based constructs about plant and animal form quite closely. Additionally, 
both Herder and Goethe believed that the theory of types could be extended to 
physiology, to function, to the abilities and the drives [Geschicklichkeiten und Triebe]. 
Goethe, although he confined his experiments to anatomy and therefore to generating 
empirical data relating to morphology, theorized not only an outward form but a 
correspondent inner type of forces: "The type, regardless of size, includes a certain 
aggregate of forces" (100). Both describe the animal type as an Urbild, and both were 
involved in recognizing Urpjlanze and noting the similarities of plants, but Goethe did 
not seek a fundamental type for all living forms. Goethe differed as well in having an 
intense interest in applying the idea of types to organs, to leaves in plants and to the bony 
frame of the vertebrates, and in both placing the prototypes in the past (Urtier, Urpjlanze) 
and seeking them in the present, as on his trip to Italy. He continued to develop his 
theories of type for plants and animals from the 1780's, and he published actively in the 
1790's, including during the period of his early intimate relationship with Schiller. 
Goethe's publications during the 1790's were indications of what scientific issues were 
on his mind: Metamorphose der Pflanzen (1790), Erster Entwurfeiner allgemeinen 
Einleitung in die gleichende Anatomie (1795), Vorfriige aber die drei ersten KapUel des 
Entwurfs [continuation of the comparative anatomy] (1796), and the poem 
"Metamorphose der Tiere. " 
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structures were modified leaves,43 and he then sought the archetypal plant, an Urpjlanze. 
This particular commitment to the original plant form (the living form, the dynamic plan 
of a plant) was the subject of Schiller and Goethe's first intimate interaction. They had 
both attended a meeting ofthe Natural History Society of Jena [Naturforschende 
Gesellschaft zu Jena] in 1794 and continued talking as they left. Goethe shared one of 
his favorite obsessions. He said that he had had an experience of the archetypal plant, 
which he then drew for Schiller.44 Schiller cried out that it was not an experience 
[Erfahrung] that Goethe had had, but an Idea [ldee]!45 As it happened, one of Schiller's 
own ldeen, and he had many, was that human beings are at base playful and that this 
playfulness is the key to their development. In other words, Schiller, who made countless 
observations of mankind over the years Gust as his friend had of plants), had the 
Goethean "experience" that man is "fully human only when he plays," that human nature 
is archetypally playful. His idea of a human Urtyp was an intuition [Anschauung] of 
type, one he came to by moving back and forth between the particular and the general, 
43 The root, the stem, the bud, the bloom, the pistil, the stamen ... the seed. 
44 "I gave an enthusiastic description of the metamorphosis of plants, and with a few 
characteristic strokes of the pen I caused a symbolic plant to spring up before his eyes." 
The translator clarified his translation in a footnote directly following "symbolic plant": 
the footnote reads "the 'archetypal plant'" and then refers the reader to another footnote 
with a passage from the Italian Journey describing the "primordial plant" (Scientific 
Trans. Miller 20,321,328).· 
45 July 20, 1794. Schiller's words: "Das is keine Erfahrung; das ist eine Idee!" (Goethe 
Scientific 18-21; Richards, Romantic 1-2). Richards: "The individual who exercised the 
greatest impact on Goethe's intellectual and artistic life was undoubtedly Friedrich 
Schiller. Their intense friendship, which began in 1794 and ended only with Schiller's 
death in 1805, encompassed many dimensions of their lives": the pleasure of friendship 
and comfortable domesticity, constructive criticism of major works, exchange of poetry, 
mutual writing projects including the Horen, sharing Goethe's scientific interests, and 
agreement around the Third Critique (420-27). 
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between the individual as embodiment of a natural species and species as a concept of 
combining heritage and destiny. 
After the encounter, Goethe included the two aspects in his description, calling the 
type "one part concept/one part experience" [theils aus dem Begriff, theils aus der 
Erfahrung, 107], a movement toward a more regulative view oftype.46 
In one of the footnotes to the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller paid tribute to an unnamed 
scientist (who was Goethe). He used the following portrait to argue against rationalizing, 
against looking at the evidence with a theory already in mind (i.e. unconscious cherry-
picking) and saw his ideal researcher of nature as empirical first and then intuitive, 
respectful of the subjects of his interest, and intent on the apprehension of connectedness, 
of real relation. In it can be recognized Goethe's commitment to Baconian science, his 
conforming to a mentor, from whose methods and manner he sought justification. In this 
example, too, the binaries of form and content as well as a harmonious way of bringing 
them together for the advancement of knowledge represent the vitalistic understanding of 
antimonies participating in a harmonious whole: 
46 In Goethe's discussion ofthe scientific process, he noted that the company of others is 
the greatest help for two reasons: first, different people bringing different experience and 
expertise to the task, helping to edge the entrenched researcher out of his rut. He also 
recognized that "the greatest discoveries are made not so much by men as by the age" and 
saw that science (unlike art) benefited from early, even premature, exchange of 
information: "it is useful to publish every bit of empirical evidence, even every 
conjecture; indeed, no scientific edifice should be built until the plan and materials of its 
structure have been widely known, judged and sifted" (12-13). Both Goethe and Schiller, 
like the Encyclopedistes valued the company and "work of a society of men of letters" 
(d' Alembert 3). D' Alembert mentioned frequently the "incontestable advantages in 
being able to convey and receive ideas easily in mutual intercourse" (32), remarking 
further that "ideas which are acquired from reading and from association with others are 
the germ of almost all discoveries .... It is like the air one breathes without thinking 
about it, to which one owes life ... (61). 
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If, then in the course of centuries, it should happen that a man tries to 
approach her [Nature] with his sense-organs untroubled, innocent and 
wide open, and, thanks to this, should chance upon a multitude of 
phenomena which we, with our tendency to prejudge the issue, have 
overlooked, then we are mightily astonished that so many eyes in such 
broad daylight should have noticed nothing. This premature hankering 
after harmony before we have even got together the individual sounds 
which are to go to its making, this violent usurping of authority by 
ratiocination in a field where its right to give orders is by no means 
unconditional, is the reason why so many thinking minds fail to have any 
fruitful effect upon the advancement of science; and it would be difficult 
to say which has done more harm to the progress of knowledge: a sense-
faculty unamenable to form, or a reasoning faculty which will not stay for 
content (XIII.4 fn 2). 
In the late eighteenth century as Goethe used it, the theory of types was grounded in 
the empirical experience of observing, collecting, experimenting and comparing. Then 
its analogical power and epistemological value was at its height. At that time analogy's 
use as a function of knowledge-development was full of different degrees of relatedness. 
It contained the recognition of comparability between similar parts with similar function 
as well as the more rigorous (and in the nineteenth century differentiated by Owen) 
comparability of parts showing exact anatomical correspondence. Both these degrees of 
similarity were then revised much later: by definition homology came to mean 
resemblances due to common ancestry. Some eighteenth century comparisons and 
extended analogies then actually contained or were identical with evolutionary 
homologies, relations of biological relatedness, and consequently, these insights were 
validated by twenty-first century technologies. Because of its approximation to reality -
both dynamic nature and the processes of human understanding - the metaphor of animal 
or plant type was extremely fruitful in generating both evidence and theory. The 
hiddenness of homology (relatedness through a common ancestor) within the class of all 
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analogies, on the other hand, explains both the creative value and erratic accuracy of 
analogy itself. 
Is Schiller's positing of a theory of playas archetypical of human nature an intuition 
of biological relatedness? Like the vertebrae, several of which transmute over eons into 
the specialized structure ofthe cranium, does play, as a structural net in the brain and as a 
behavior in the environment, change over time with the evolution of mammalian social 
species, ending in the capacity to play with self-consciousness, empathy and 
. ?47 representatIOns. 
Epistemological Modesty to Epistemological Audacity 
Sapere aude! Dare to Know 
Enlightenment is mankind's exit from its self-incurred immaturity. 
Immaturity is the inability to make use of one's own understanding 
without the guidance of another. Self-incurred is this inability if its cause 
lies not in the lack of understanding but rather in the lack of the resolution 
and the courage to use it without guidance of another. Sapere aude! Have 
the courage to use your own understanding! is thus the motto of the 
enlightenment" (Kant in Schmidt 58). 
From mid-century, researchers, writers and philosophers often called for courage from 
their fellows, not just courage to break with tradition and think for themselves but also 
courage to delve, actively explore, and hypothesize about the nature of life and the nature 
of man: 
It takes a peculiar kind of genius and courage of spirit to be able to 
envisage nature in the innumerable multitude of its productions without 
losing one's orientation, and to believe oneself capable of understanding 
and comparing such productions" (Buffon 145 my emphasis). 
Buffon's words reflected not just on his own capacities and his colossal project but they 
aptly described his contemporary, Maupertuis. Zammito wrote that "it is hard for one to 
underscore too heavily the novelty, the epistemological audacity represented in 
[Maupertuis'] conceptions. Of course these hypotheses were very crude and they were 
47 In posing this question, I am taking play behavior in birds to be a phenomenon of 
convergence. 
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[at the time] incapable of experimental confirmation. Nevertheless ... " (Francois Russo 
qtd. "Kant's Early"). Among other things, Maupertuis opined the following: 
May we not say that, in the fortuitous combination of the productions of 
Nature, since only those creatures could survive in whose. organization a 
certain degree of adaptation was present, there is nothing extraordinary in 
the fact that such adaptation is actually found in all those species which 
now exist? Chance, one might say, turned out a vast number of 
individuals; a small proportion of these were organized in such a manner 
that the animals' organs could satisfy their needs. A much greater number 
showed neither adaptation nor order; these last all perished .... Thus the 
species which we see today are but a small part of all those that blind 
destiny has produced (Maupertuis qtd. by Glass Forerunners 57-58). 
Julien Offray de La Mettrie's work itself was an example ofthat cultural audacity. 
Theories of forces in living organisms were abundant during Schiller's time: they filled 
the black box of the unknowns to bursting. A labyrinth of speculation, home of the 
possible sublime - whether machine-man or an animal-man hybrid - drew in all the 
eighteenth-century natural philosophers and metaphysicians who dared. And many 
ventured in, because "to dare" was a strong value in the late Enlightenment. L 'homme 
machine (1749), La Mettrie's controversial and satirical materialist tract, got everyone's 
attention including in time Goethe's and Schiller's. It was intended to be offensive, in 
the sense of audacious, and it was. La Mettrie believed that "to know things as they are 
and without distortion, such methods as logical reasoning, empirical observation, 
experimental inquiry, while indispensable, [did] not necessarily suffice." What was 
needed was audacity, [hardiesse], a way of speaking truth [verite hardie] to power that 
breaks through the censorship of pre-conceptions and assumptions. And his bluntness 
began with an attack on self-censorship which "no less than outside censure, blurs and 
blunts the reflex of objectivity." Because the self-education of the I 'homme machine 
proceeds like a "surgical operation carried out by the patient on himself, audace is the 
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quality" that allows the necessary mentality for detachment (La Mettrie qtd. by Vartanian 
Science 54). From Vartanian's prospect, La Mettrie was first and foremost a physician, a 
humanist whose goals for man were not "merely good health but the good life." He was, 
therefore, 
predisposed ... to perceive the human being as an organism .... an 
individual, viewed biologically, [that] had a determinate and specific 
mode of being - an intransigeant tendency to be, like all physical objects, 
what it is .... This 'what it is' [precedes] temporally and cognitively, the 
innumerable myths, fictions, desires, fantasies, beliefs, custom, values, 
representations and prejudices with which the human race has a 
remarkable talent for clothing its underlying nakedness (Science 48). 
And man in his nakedness was La Mettrie's true object of study. 
Schiller had a use for courage too: his meditation on the difficulties of 
Enlightenment, of the progress of truth, ended in a call to a battle. 
There must ... be something in the disposition of men which stands in the 
way of the acceptance of truth, however brightly it may shine, and the 
adoption of truth, however forcibly it may convince. A Sage of old felt 
what it was, and it lies concealed in that pregnant utterance: sapere aude. 
Dare to be wise! It is energy and courage that are required to combat the 
obstacles which both indolence of nature and cowardice of heart put in the 
way of true enlightenment. Not for nothing does the ancient myth make 
the goddess of wisdom emerge full armed from the head of Jupiter. For 
her very first action is a war:-like one (VIII.5-6). 48 
48La Mettrie's use of "animal machine" or "organic machine," in addition to its capacity 
to rivet attention, actually had the effect of vitalizing mechanism. According to Aram 
Vartanian, La Mettrie's "primary task was to vitalize the Cartesian 'dead mechanism' 
approach to biology. In order to lift the homme machine beyond the reach of animistic 
criticism, La Mettrie had first to show that purposive motion could be a property of 
organized matter as such, or put differently, that the man-machine was automatic in a 
manner that no man-made machine, requiring direction from without, could truly 
duplicate." Such organic activity like irritability apart from the central nervous system 
was "taken by La Mettrie as conclusive proof of his contention that organic activity is not 
caused by any kind of soul .... The biological philosophy implicit in this view ... 
represents an attempt to combine ... traditionally opposed attitudes .... La Mettrie has 
by no means neglected the specifically vital characteristics of the organism; but at the 
same time he remains entirely convinced that these are knowable to science only insofar 
as they are seeq sub specie machinae. His idea of the 'living machine,' defined 
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"Dare to know" demanded Schiller of his readers, as Kant most famously did before 
him.49 And Schiller was as bold as he dared his readers to be: he audaciously proposed 
that human nature itself was grounded not in reason but in play. And playing off the 
certainty that he would garner attention, shocked attention, by suggesting an exalted place 
for "mere play," he explained that his play would, through the pleasures of attention and 
fixed on beauty, bring out what is best and most noble in humanity (1.1). Schiller dared 
contend that the aesthetic and only the aesthetic would make human wholeness possible. 
Summary 
Goethe's character Faust, in an agitated mood, began a translation: 
"In the beginning was the Word" - thus runs the text. 
hypothetically by its purposive self-motion, may thus be said to express a 'vitalo-
mecanisme II base dynamique'" (Vartanian in La Mettrie's 19-20). 
49 See above page 209. Regarding the history of the admonition: according to Eric 
Miller, translator of Sulzer's Dialogues on the Beauty of Nature and Moral Reflections on 
Certain Topics of Natural History, the frontispiece ofthat work's 1770 edition featured 
an illustration of Athena in battle dress with the motto "Sapere aude!" (Sulzer vii). 
That illustration matched the description of Athena in Schiller. Kant's famous use of 
"Sapere Aude!" in "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" (1784) 
probably was Schiller's source: as Wilkinson and Willoughby put it, it was "no doubt 
ringing in Schiller's ears, if not lying on his desk. By the same token, of course, in other 
ears, or on other desks too!" (lxxv). That essay also references La Mettrie: "When nature 
has, under this hard shell, developed the seed for which she cares most tenderly, namely 
the inclination and the vocation/or free thinking, this works back upon the character of 
the people ... and finally even on the principles of government, which finds it to its 
advantage to treat man, who is now more than a machine, in accord with his dignity" 
(Kant in Schmidt 63, my emphasis). The earliest occurrence in the eighteenth century of 
"Sapere Aude!" used as a motto apart from its course appears to be that of a medal struck 
in 1736 for the Society ofthe Friends of Truth in Berlin. A volume on numismatics found 
in Goethe's library included a reproduction of the medal (W&W lxxv). Horace is the 
original author; the phrase occurs in Epistles 1.2.40 (Schmidt, 63-64). The words 
"daring" and "audacious" are often used to describe the work of the researchers and 
philosophers after mid-century by others as well, e.g. Hulliung of Rousseau's First 
Discourse: a "remarkably daring essay" (173). 
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Who helps me on? Already I'm perplexed! 
I cannot grant the word such sovereign merit, 
I must translate it in a different way 
If I'm indeed illumined by the Spirit. 
"In the beginning was the Sense [Sinn]." But stay! 
reflect on this first sentence well and truly 
Lest the light pen be hurrying unduly! 
Is sense in fact all action's spur and source? 
It should read: "In the beginning was the Force [Kraft]!" 
Yet as I write it down, some warning sense 
Alerts me that it, too, will give offense. 
The spirit speaks! And 10, the way is freed, 
I calmly write: "In the beginning was the Deed [Tat]!" 50 
This struggle with meaning, and the work to get it right, can be applied to the history of 
epistemology in the eighteenth century. Concepts and words, as authorities, as 
descriptors or as guarantors, were discredited by the English philosophy - by Bacon, 
Locke and Newton. As Maupertuis remarked after disproving a legend of the 
incombustible salamander, "Whatever shame a physicist may have in doing a silly 
experiment, this is the price he must pay in order to destroy opinions consecrated by the 
ancients' accounts" (in Roger 155). "Everything from sense" worked as generator of data 
through observation and experiment and as a battle-cry, but it did not provide a basis for 
understanding. To take advantage of experience, even a scientific epistemology"needed a 
way to augment Baconian induction with methods of organization, with comparison, 
analogy and, finally, withforce as a regulative concept and by the force of hypothesis. 
Still, nothing works better than the combination of all: the action of the mind put to 
particulars, focusing attention, performing experiments, simplifying by analysis, creating 
hypotheses out of this frame. The sum of experience, the intuition, is really a deed of 
50Faust finished in 1801, published 1808. Faust Part One was accomplished with 
considerable encouragement from Schiller (English: Trans. Arndt 34; German, 41). 
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perception, a necessary creative insight into the nature of things. And then there is the 
necessary mustering of audacity to act upon it, of course. 
Life posed epistemological problems that authority, reason and mechanical models 
of matter, force and motion could not engage: all organisms had histories and were a part 
of history - individual life was described by time. And in the case of mankind, the 
Germans of the late Enlightenment and especially Schiller, had intense concern that 
freedom of agency in action, free human acts, be carved out between the two necessities 
- physical and moral. Individual actions, deeds, done by a free rational agent in science 
were critical to establishing facts and their relation to each other, and scientific action 
associated with the study of life involved deeds of observation, comparison and 
experimentation by an investigator working toward an intuition of nature through 
hypothesis. 51 
51 But what of the poodle? The scene in Faust's study was not the scene of a soliloquy: 
there were two beings there. There is great danger when a self-authorizing system 
concentrates great power into the present and acts, whether that system is an autonomous 
human being, a discipline or a nation. Jacques Roger, in his Preface (1993) to The Life 
Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought, reflected on the development of the 
sciences and the importance of understanding their history. "The problem is all the more 
serious in that science and the technologies deriving from it give man an unheard-of 
power over nature and over himself .... [I]t is becoming urgent to impose norms upon 
the exercise of that power. If all that is possible must be actualized ... which is one of 
the guiding maxims of the technological system, our civilization is in danger of going 
mad. The historical study of this evolution in Western thought, and of the forms of 
resistance that it has elicited, can possibly provide some enlightenment, and this too is 
part of the history of science." (Roger xxxvii). From the perspective of Faust's wager, it 
is vitally important to recognize the drive-like urgency of scientific activity, "that man's 
sense of curiosity about the world and himself is every bit as compelling as his need for 
clothing and food" (Laudan 225). Like the play drive that Schiller hypothesized, 
scientific curiosity too must be programmed by an ideal, lest "[ c ]ivilization, far from 
setting us free, in fact creates some new need with every new power it develops in us" 
(V.5). Such management by form also involves what Roger (after Laudan and consonant 
with insights expressed by d' Alembert in the Preliminary Discourse) calls 'rational 
choice,' a stance of the agent. He wrote that even though the problems posed by 
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Vitalism's modest epistemology was a map of the strengths and limitations of human 
nature's interface with nature, of what can be known by the human mind, and ofthe great 
expanse of the unknown. Schiller used it, accepting the primacy of empirical knowledge, 
of observation and experimentation. He extended observation to self-observation, the 
"objects of the Inner Sense" and the subjectivity of others, admitting Kant's proviso that 
these operations lacked epistemological status. 52 He imported the data of the physician-
scientists change, the real object of scientific research, nature, is permanent and the 
equipment of the observer, human rationality, is stable as well. "'Rational choice,' [is] 
the choice used by the scientist in all periods of history [and it does not change]. What 
changes historically is nonhe nature of this choice, but its terms - that is, what the 
scientist must take into account .... [A] scientific explanation must meet two conditions: 
first, resolve the problem 'rationally'; then, create the least number of possible 
'conceptual difficulties' that is, be in accord with the reigning philosophies of nature, 
ideologies, and even mentalities" (Laudan qtd. in Roger xxiv). This is not to say that 
there is not an evolving scientific rationality, but that there might be both grace and 
dignity in scientific endeavor. 
52 Re: Schiller's "Inner Sense." Locke wrote that the "fountain [other than sensation], 
from which experience furnishes the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the 
operations of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which 
operations, when the soul comes to reflect on, and consider, do furnish the understanding 
with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without: and such are 
perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the 
different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in 
ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings, as distinct ideas, as we do from 
bodies affecting our senses. This sources of ideas, every man has wholly in himself: and 
though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects; yet it is very like it, 
and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other sensation, so I 
call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only, as the mind get by reflecting 
on its own operations within itself' (34). Schiller's contemporary Karl Philipp Moritz, 
author of the psychological novel, Anton Reiser, and founder ofthe one of the first 
psychological journals, Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde als ein Lesebuch fur 
Gelehrte und Ungelehrte (Journal of Psychological Experience, a Reader for Scholars 
and Non-Scholars), gave self-observation a "more secure foothold in secular German 
thought .... [His aim was] to offer' observations of oneself for the improvement of 
others' ... [and his method was] distanced, dispassionate self-observation." According 
to Moritz, in this self-observation, "it is necessary to shelter from the 'whirlwind' 
[Wirbel] of one's desires and attain disinterestedness, 'to play the cold observer for a 
while, without being in the least bit interested in oneself" (Bell 91). 
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physiologists and natural historians about development and the nervous system, 
information upon which their hypotheses about force were based, and upon which he 
fashioned his own hypothesis about the forces of the human mind. He used comparison, 
metaphor and analogy. Before embarking on the hypothetical developmental history 
contained in the Aesthetic Letters, he commiserated with his readers, "Resign yourself 
therefore to one more brief sojourn in the sphere of speculation, in order thereafter to 
leave it for good, and proceed, with steps made all the more sure, over the terrain of 
experience" (XXVII.S). This map needs color and it is the German aesthetic tradition 
that will allow us to add that color, to vivify it with a "complete, anthropologic" view and 




AESTHETICS AND ANTHROPOLOGY: THE WHOLE MAN 
I am drawing ever nearer the goal toward which I have been leading you 
by a not exactly encouraging path. If you will consent to follow me a few 
steps further along it, horizons all the wider will unfold and a pleasing 
prospect perhaps requite you for the labour ofthe journey (XV. 1 my 
emphasis). 
Put down the map; come into the garden. Come in, through the gate - a fine 
primitive one it is - dry stack masonry with a low arch, grass volunteering on top. Mind 
your head! Schiller would have had to. The planning stakes are out, and some new 
plantings just in. Quite the landscape, almost wild. Mature trees, uneven ground, its own 
natural rock outcroppings, surrounded by hills. What a prospect! 1 
i Among the holdings of the National Goethe Museum is an etching of "Schillers Garten 
bei Jena" by Jakob Wilhelm Christian Roux. Schiller found and purchased this land in 
1797. The etching shows a low horizon, a house, garden shed and flat-topped hill to the 
far left. Above them Howard-like clouds hang and ride. There is high ground with a tall 
tree foregrounding the work on the right. The garden itself has a natural aspect with rock 
outcroppings and a variety of tree and plant species; it appears to spill over a wild edge 
beyond the tree. The gate is piled stone, rustic and narrow and, near it, a person kneels, 
weeding or planting. The garden plan appears to be in the process of execution. No 
labyrinthine ruins are represented. Where is Schiller? He is often ill and needing to 
conserve his energy, but perhaps we will see him approaching the garden on a donkey, a 
slouchy hat on his head and his long legs dangling almost to the ground (Schuster 745). 
The art of pleasure gardens, wrote Kant, "a beautiful depiction of nature [as well as a] 
beautiful arrangement of its products [is] ... given only for the eye, like painting" (Third 
§51). Kant was fond of architectonic metaphor, and Beth Lord suggested that the Third 
Critique functioned as a landscape garden that connected the two edifices on Kant's vast 
property, theoretical and practical reason. The garden itself also represented "the 
Enlightenment project to build an ideal community of rational beings in tune with nature" 
(263). 
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In late eighteenth-century Germany, philosophical interest in landscape architecture 
flourished both in the development of gardens and in the theorizing about that activity. 
Applied to the art of gardening, the patriotic sentiments of Empfindsamkeit and Sturm 
und Drang cultivated a Mitte/weg, a synthesis of French and English styles that defined a 
home-grown German tradition - and provided a "topography of thought" relating to its 
practice (Lee 5-6). Identifying the "burst of attention that the garden received ... in the 
two decades immediately following Kant's Third Critique" as unique in landscape 
architecture's history, Michael Lee described past German gardening styles as cyclical, 
moving between formal and informal approaches, broken by periods of eclecticism (Lee 
10, 11). Into this narrative, a new synthetic theory, expressed in Kantian idiom, was 
presented by Friedrich Schiller in his review of" Ober den Gartenkalender auf das Jahr 
1795." This reviewer (writing in the fall of 1794 while editing the Aesthetic Letters) 
applied his own theory about the middle state, the aesthetic Zustand, to landscape 
architecture. According to Schiller, the garden, an object of art, should be 
representationally complete, a whole in dynamic and harmonious balance. As a product 
of human nature, however, it was prone to the same distortions as the psyche. Under the 
influence of the tensed and overbearing form ofthe French [Baukunst] style, for example, 
the natural elements of the garden gave up their higher organic nature, exchanging their 
'beautiful autonomous life' (schone selbstandiges Leben) for a 'soulless symmetry' 
(geistlosen Ebenmass). The English, or Poetik, style, on the other hand, has a tendency 
to extend freedom to the point of willfulness and caprice, often flaunting a 'disorderly 
license' (regel/os Lizenz)" (Schiller qtd. in Lee 138-139). For Schiller, the formal style 
emphasized both physical necessity and rational purposes and, thereby, reified the 
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connection between understanding, purpose and order. It was the style of human 
agency. The opposite pole in garden art, the informal style, valorized the evocation of 
feeling through nature. Its landscape scenes [landschaftliche Szenen] were enjoyed as 
products of free nature [Werke der freien Natur]: they were, in a word, completely 
natural. 2 Schiller gave the two poles equal value - just as he did the antimonies in his 
theory of human nature, just as he juxtaposed reason against feeling, necessity (whether 
moral or natural) against freedom, and art against nature in the creative opposition ofthe 
original form- and sense-drives. He demanded from the art of German gardening, the 
Mittelweg, an acknowledgement of the power of both poles and a commitment to 
balanced economy created by their reciprocal interaction. By the active mixture of styles 
and by "conforming to the demands of sound agriculture," Schiller wrote, a garden might 
be fashioned that represented "a characteristic whole meant as much for the Eye as for 
the Heart and the Understanding" (Schiller qtd. in Lee 141 my emphasis). 
Welcome to Schiller's garden, an art object, an aesthetic space, an analogue of 
graceful human nature. His garden of aesthetics was planned and planted by Baumgarten 
and the rationalists and by the proponents of Empfindsamkeit as well as by the 
synthesizers Herder, Goethe and Kant. A place of contemplation for all humanity, it was 
reworked and transformed - then contemplated and enjoyed - by Schiller himself. 
The Science of Man: Early German Anthropology, Psychology and Aesthetics 
Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in 
our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingering method, which 
we have hither to followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or 
2 For Schiller, a Garten was a work of art wherein Kunst is apparent, and 
Gartenlandschaft was one where all evidence of human agency had been artfully 
removed, an illusion of artlessness (Lee 139). 
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village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or center of these 
sciences, to human nature itself; which being once masters of, we may 
every where else hope for an easy victory. From this station we may 
extend our conquests over all those science, which more intimately 
concern human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure to discover 
more fully those, which are the objects of pure curiosity (Hume "Treatise" 
xvi).3 
In the Enlightenment, the study of man, the "science of man," was the principal 
preoccupation. Through the various late eighteenth-century science traditions, whether 
materialism or vitalism, the whole man came down to earth. Human beings were more 
and more described as products ofnature.4 The recognized hallmarks of life, the new 
understandings of nature and individual organisms, were applied to man. He was seen as 
a complex organism, a dynamic and harmonious balance of reciprocally relating parts 
situated in a similarly interactive environment, characterized by in-dwelling forces that 
promoted the functions specific to life - nutrition, sensitivity, responsivity, generation 
and development. This organismic description synthesized from medicine, natural 
history and natural philosophy encompassed not only man's physicality and the human 
3 And this: "I have difficulty conceiving how, in a century taking pride in splendid 
knowledge, there are not to be found two closely unified men - rich, one in money and 
the other in genius, both loving glory and aspiring to immortality - one of whom would 
sacrifice his wealth and the other ... years oflife in order to study, not always stones and 
plants, but for once men and morals, and who, after so many centuries used to measure 
and examine the house, should finally make up their minds to want to know its 
inhabitants" (Rousseau 212). 
4"Much of this theorizing - and this is of immense importance for Schiller's thesis of 
education through art - had taken place within the wider context of investigation, 
empirical and speculative, into the natural history of the human mind. However much 
they may have differed on points of detail, or even in their basic convictions, Diderot and 
the philosophes, Hume, Rousseau, and Herder, German psychologists and logicians such 
as Tetens and Lambert who, in the wake of Leibniz, took the creation of art as a paradigm 
of the general formative activity of the human mind - they all in their several ways 
helped to replace the picture of the psyche as a collection of discrete faculties by a picture 
of the psyche as a unity and continuity" (W&W xxvii). 
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mind, but all his relations and connections - with his species, his products (including art), 
and nature at large.5 Developed out of previously institutionalized disciplines, this 
perspective was enlarged by information and theories reintroduced at odd new angles and 
under new organization. 
Early in the century for example, a burgeoning psychology [Seelenlehre, 
Psychologie], fueled by the terrific interest in the mind, grew active and became 
institutionalized in Germany.6 Just as his philosophy had directed much of the science-
5 Blumenbach: "the whole collective assemblage of all the faculties and laws ... by 
which the functions of the human body are performed and regulated from the opening, to 
the closing pulse oflife, is called human nature, or the nature of man; from whence 
arouse the name physiologie" (Reill 138). 
6 Psychology, like all the human sciences of the eighteenth century "developed through a 
rather complex historical process, full of theoretical detours and ambiguities," the origins 
of the discipline as obscure as interest in the mind and its nature, ancient (Moravia qtd. in 
Vidal 91). The word itself was coined by sixteenth-century theologians and so carries old 
connections of "soul," the rational, the immortal and immaterial. At first psychology was 
the study of "the nature of the human spirit or logical," the animus (spiritus, the 
immaterial, immortal soul) which was not the form of the body (i.e., it was distinguished 
from the anima, the life principle joined to the body). Treatises about the vital principle 
were not psychological but rather of the science of nature. Similarly, anthropology 
appeared in the early sixteenth century, sometimes designating the study of purely 
physical, the human body. In the eighteenth century, Buffon (who presented nine articles 
on anthropology in Histoire Naturelle and a monograph on man) and Blumenbach 
participated in the project of moving the philosophy of man to a science of the human 
species (Blanckaert "Buff on"). From the end of the seventeenth century through the 
early eighteenth century, "psychology" denoted the study of monads in general and 
pneumatology, "the science of intelligent monads, the human mind in particular" (Vidal 
91-93). Often the psychological was divided into logical, based on the empirical study of 
the understanding, and the metaphysical disciplines: in reference to this confusion, Hume 
wrote that the "sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our 
reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas .... [that to be incorporated] into the 
'science of Man' upon which all other sciences would have to depend (Hume qtd. in 
Vidal 93). In Wolffs system empirical psychology was an experiential, observational, 
study of the soul (the mind), and his rational psychology involved constructing proofs of 
the soul's immortal nature. According to Vidal, Wolff distinguished between 
'''historical' (a posteriori, 'empirical') knowledge of existing things and events, from 
'philosophical' (a priori, 'rational')." In his system, history alone was not scientific, not 
"a marriage of reason and experience." It was the philosophical or rational psychology 
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[Seelen-Wissenschaft] that was scientific, the '''science of possibles insofar as they can 
be'" of the human soul; empirical psychology [Seelen-Geschichte] "established principles 
through experience" using observation and experimentation to be used by rational 
psychology (Wolff qtd. 98). In the Encyclopedie, the entry "Psychologie" was Wolffian 
in content, but it functioned as a Trojan horse through which to introduce more 
controversial views. Because of its historical etymology, empiricists and sensationalists 
(like Hume or Condillac) refused to use the term "psychology." The Encyclopedia 
Britannica of the late eighteenth century challenged the multiplicity of terms: 
"Anthroposophy [anthropology], Psychology, and Pneumatology, if they be not words 
expressive of distinctions where there is not difference, seem to be at least very 
needlessly disjoined from each other ... " (97). Locke, of course, radically redefined it, 
reducing "psychology" "to what it really ought to be: the experimental physics ofthe 
soul" (Locke see page 179). In Germany beyond Wolff, according to Vidal, 
"psychology" was a term familiar to the academics of the Aujkliirung; it acquired traction 
there in relation to questions about the education of man (109). There was also a culture 
(exemplified by Moritz) of self-observation and self-experimentation for scientific 
purposes in the late eighteenth century, but the epistemology of such endeavors is 
controversial. Kant varied in his outright rejection of the possibility of a psychological 
science: he was quite critical of such claims, but his statements are not "all of a piece." In 
the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, for example, he wrote "empirical 
psychology must always remain outside the rank of a natural science properly so-called" 
(due to the impossibility ofmathematization?); in the First Critique he required that 
psychology should not be mixed with logic, and then rejected "rational psychology." 
Kant "could imagine that psychology can become a science if only we could develop 
such a [chemistry-like] law for the attractive and repulsive forces governing alterations 
of, say, our perception." But, according to Strum, "he takes that it be impossible: 'The 
territory of psychology is forever restricted to inner sense, to which the full range of 
categorical principles, most notably causality, is not cognitively applicable. For that 
causality be applicable to a set of phenomena, we must be able to distinguish objective 
from subjective successions of appearances (see AI93/B238). But such a distinction 
requires the determination of objects of outer sense. It follows that genuine causal 
relations cannot be attributed to psychological phenomena'" (a paraphrase of Kant in 
Sturm 163, 168). Rudolf Makkreel followed the fluctuations and ambivalence of Kant's 
attitudes toward human studies, psychology, anthropology and history. While these were 
sometimes labeled by him, Menschenkunde, i.e. studies of such low informational level 
that they do not deserve the designation of sciences, he continued to teach them. As an 
empirical observational discipline, psychology was subject to doubt and, as far as he was 
concerned, '" [s ] elf-observation is difficult, unnatural, can lead to revision and must not 
last long. '" Iri fact, Kant believed self-observation to be unhealthy at base: "the more 
attention one gives to oneself, the more hypochondriacal one becomes." The benefit of 
anthropology was that it is not merely the observation of the soul, but of objective traits 
of human nature. It was like geography and history, a historical science. "The world as 
an object of outer sense is nature, the world as an object of inner sense is the human 
being" (Kant qtd. in Makkreel 186, 187). Schiller, I believe, read Kant as making an 
impossibility claim and proceeded regulatively: he took Kant's position to be that 
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of-life theorizing (especially in France), Leibniz' theories about the human mind and the 
monad grounded German psychology as it was carried forward by Wolff. Liebniz' 
conception of the mind as an active rather than a passive entity was a counterpoise to the 
passivity postulated by empiricist and sensationalist philosophers. He conceived of the 
monad as an ultimate substance, each determined to represent the universe in its own 
way. It was a "windowless" entity operationally opposed to the tabula rasa of 
empiricism. And as a whole, each monad was capable of development by appetition, the 
desire to improve its own representations. Monads were hierarchical with respect to 
perfection; the lowest class was capable of perception, the next feeling and memory; the 
highest reason - a corollary to the faculties of sense (or desire), feeling, and reason. For 
Leibniz then, the psyche was "a single unit, powered by a single force (appetition) and 
grounded in a single activity, the production of representations" (Bell 18). At the lowest 
level of its activity, the psyche was involved with obscure and confused sensations, 
petites perceptions: 
To give a clearer idea of these minute perceptions which we are unable to 
pick out from the crowd, I like to use the example of the roaring noise of 
the sea which impresses itself on us when we are standing on the shore. 
To hear this noise as we do, we must hear the parts which make up this 
whole, that is the noise of each wave, although each of these little noises 
makes itself known only when combined confusedly with all the others, 
and would not be noticed if the wave which made it were by itself. We 
must be affected slightly by the motion of this wave, and have some 
perception of each of these noises, however faint they may be ... these 
minute perceptions ... constitute thatje ne sais quai, those flavours, those 
images of sensible qUalities, vivid in the aggregate but confused as to the 
parts; those impressions which are made on us by the bodies around us 
psychology was not a science, and, therefore, Schiller's hypotheses about the mind were 
made only "as if' data were empirical and "as if' scientific understandings could be 
applied. 
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and which involve the infinite; that connection which each being has with 
the rest of the universe. It can even be said that by virtue of these minute 
perceptions the present is big with the future and burdened with the past, 
that all things harmonize ... (Leibniz 54-55). 
Leibniz set the perimeters; Wolff wrote the texts, and by Schiller's time, Karl Philipp 
Moritz had begun the first German journal of psychology. This interest of course was 
also furthered by medicine, not just in the study of the anatomy and physiology of the 
nervous system, but in the practice of psychosomatic medicine and the theories about it. 
The young Schiller was a practitioner of this infant psychiatry (Fink 54-65; Dewhurst; 
Hansen "Metaphors," Diss.; Richards "Rhapsodies"). 
Another new perspective was provided by aesthetics, the "science of the senses." 
German aesthetics began in the philosophy and the philosophical psychology of the early 
eighteenth century which had, up to that time, emphasized the importance of reason and 
the mind's higher faculties as the site of our humanity, of knowledge discrimination and 
production (to the exclusion of sense). In spite of this emphasis, Leibniz and Wolff still 
found value in the experience of beauty, in art or in nature, because it was a pleasure. 
Their natural theological ground placed the pleasure of finding the agency of a perfect 
Creator at the center of the new discipline. From early in the tradition, then, in addition 
to producing a valuable physical response (that is pleasure), art was judged to have a 
positive impact on man's moral aspect (attractive perfection): the pleasure came from the 
perception of perfection in nature or in art, and the pleasure was in perfections that 
mirrored the perfection of God. 7 Humans, by perceiving God's perfection, attained 
perfection and thus fulfilled their function in creation. 
7 Schiller's "Ode to Joy": "Pleasure was given (even) to the worm ... " [Wollust ward 
dem Wurm gegeben]. 
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The German feel for the individual was also carried forward by Leibniz's monad 
theory; his idealism paradoxically opened out an appreciation of difference based on the 
particularity of each individual, his sense organs, his environment and his past life 
experience. This value was held in tension with experience of a common sense of taste 
among men as a species. Then, while this concept of a standard of beauty was 
maintained by the further Leibnizian commitment to harmony and the premise that 
individuals reflected the essence of the cosmos in as far as each was able, a new, dynamic 
experience of history and its application to nature, society, and language pressed the case 
for a more nuanced stance toward standards over time and across cultures. History, 
released from the restraint of Judeo-Christian affirmation and the chronicling of power, 
provided this perspective and provided as well numerous developmental hypotheses 
about mankind. These histories, ones like those of Rousseau, Herder and Schiller, found 
human beginnings very close indeed to animal life and posited our difference to be 
flexibility and perfectibility. Even Kant, who came late from the physical to the life 
sciences, taught an anthropology (in the 1770's) that was grounded in the understanding 
that man as single species developed from a four-footed ancestor (this theory, 
significantly, explained the occurrence of varicose veins and hemorrhoids).8 In this 
determination, he followed Buffon's rule [Buffonsche Regel] (as did Herder), defining 
species by fertile descent from fertile ancestors. These endeavors were pressed forward 
by discoveries in ethnology and by all the popular but uneven accounts of primitive 
peoples and cultures. Interest in the human species as a biological phenomenon 
8 The boundaries of the science of man at the time were such that when Kant prepared his 
Anthropology course in the 1770's, he used Baumgarten's "Psychologia Empirica" 
chapter as text and taught principally about aesthetics (Guyer in CPJ xvi). See page 221 
fn 5. 
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potentiated an enthusiasm for similar animals, the apes, for their description and 
comparative anatomy. The rudiments of both physical and cultural anthropology 
consequently can be traced back into the Enlightenment, back beyond their titular father, 
Johann Blumenbach. Archeological discoveries contributed to reexamination of past 
cultures; the enthusiastic gathering of data and artifacts from newly discovered and 
excavated sites at Herculaneum (1738) and Pompeii (1748) flooded the late eighteenth 
century with descriptions, casts and engravings, fresh perspectives and relativistic 
interpretations. These were avidly assimilated into both anthropology and the study of 
aesthetics.9 
In Germany, aesthetics was a discipline that sought to include all of man - all his 
powers, all his products and all his relations. By the time Schiller crafted his treatise on 
aesthetic education for the whole man, all the sciences of man and a bouquet of different 
aesthetic theories were available to elaborate that art of living. 10 
9 Herculaneum was first discovered in 1706; systematic excavations began in 1738. The 
information about the excavations was disseminated through Le Antichita di Ercolano 
Esposte [The Antiquities discovered in Herculaneum], published in 9 volumes from 
1755 to 1792. Many illustrations in the above were based on the work of Karl Jakob 
Weber, a Swiss architect and engineer in charge of the first organized excavations at 
Herculaneum, Pompeii and Stabiae. Pompeii was rediscovered in 1748 as the result of 
plundering by the Spanish treasure-seeker Rocque Joaquin de Alcubierre. Karl Weber 
again directed the first scientific excavations; after his death in 1764 military engineer 
Francisco la Vega continued the archeological work. 
10 In letters exchanged between Schiller and Korner in 1793, Schiller's aesthetics reading 
was partially enumerated. Schiller: "I already possess Burke, Sulz[ e ]r, Webb, Mengs, 
Winckelmann, Hume, Batteux, Wood, Mendelssohn and five or six others." Korner 
recommended Hogarth, Hagedorn, Duclos, Lessing, Herder, Reynolds and Moritz among 
others (11, 18. i.1793 Schiller-Korner on line). Wilkinson and Willoughby also 
recognized Baumgarten, Goethe, Home, Mirabeau, Rousseau and Diderot as sources. 
Schiller mentioned Kant, Fichte, Burke, Mengs and Herder by name in the Aesthetic 
Letters (W&W lxxiv). 
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Alexander Baumgarten, Father of Aesthetics 
The intention of the founder of aesthetics, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-
1762), was not to write a philosophy of art: what he attempted was "to provide an 
alternative approach to the philosophy of human knowledge, experience, and perception 
that [went] beyond the purely rationalist, empiricist, and sensualist approach. In short, 
Baumgarten transcend[ ed] the old opposition between rationalism and sensualism. His 
core theme [was] the improvement [perfectio] of human knowledge and cognition and the 
ways to reach this goal" (Gross 403)Y His work countered the objection, the early 
Enlightenment cultural stance, that "impressions received from the senses, fantasies, 
emotional disturbances, etc., are unworthy of philosophers and beneath the scope of their 
consideration." He believed, rather, that "the philosopher is a man amongst men and it is 
not good for him to think that so great a part of human perception has nothing to do with 
him" (Baumgarten "Prolegomena" Harrison 490). Further, 
[p ]hilosophers might still find occasion, not without ample reward, to 
inquire also into those devices by which they might improve the lower 
faculties of knowing, and sharpen them, and apply them more happily for 
the benefit of the whole world. Since psychology affords sound 
principles, we have no doubt that there could be available a science which 
might direct the lower cognitive faculty in knowing things sensately 
("Reflections" Harrison 488).12 
His rationalism was based not only in the philosophies of Leibniz and Wolff, but in a 
negotiation of the polarities of German Pietism. Raised in Pietism, Baumgarten was 
11 As late as 2002, there was no complete modem edition/translation of Baumgarten, 
whether in German or English (Gross 404). 
12 The passage is part of Baumgarten's inaugural dissertation, Meditationes philosophicae 
de nonnullis ad poema pertenentibus 1735 ("Philosophical Meditations on some Matters 
pertaining to Poetry" published as Reflections on Poetry). The previous quote's source is 
the "Prolegomena" of the Aesthetica 1750) 
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aware both of its attractive emphasis on feeling, interiority and authenticity and of its 
unenlightened absolutism (exemplified later in the dismissal from Halle of the popular 
professor of natural philosophy and mathematics, the rationalist Christian Wolff). This 
juxtaposition made him interested in the claims of sense and alert to avoiding its abuses. 
While Baumgarten's brother became a renowned cleric (Voltaire called him the "crown 
of German scholars"), Baumgarten became, according to Herder, "the real Aristotle of 
our time" and the one ofWolffs pupils who "really mastered the logical technique which 
Wolff taught and by which he first gave Gennan philosophy a definite shape of its own" 
(Cassirer 338).13 His thorough understanding oflogic made him quite realistic about the 
exercise of reason as well. He was uniquely aware of the "limits of every human 
approach to the real world [man's Grenzbewusstsein]" (Gross 407 my emphasis). 
According to Cassirer, Baumgarten 
was not only the outstanding scholastic logician who was a master of all 
aspects of this discipline ... [but] through his mastery ofthe subject he 
became especially conscious of both the intrinsic and systematic 
limitations offonnallogic. As a result ... Baumgarten was able to make 
his original contribution to the history of thought, which lay in the 
philosophical foundation of aesthetics .... Thus aesthetics evolves from 
logic [and in this] Baumgarten does not remain a mere 'artist of reason'; in 
him that ideal of philosophy is realized which Kant called the idea of the 
'self-knowledge of reason.' He was a master of analysis; yet his mastery 
does not lead him to overestimate its value but rather to define clearly, and 
to distinguish sharply between, the means and the ends of analysis. The 
highest development of analysis stirs it into productivity again, bringing it 
to the point where, as ifby itself, a new starting-point appears and a new 
intellectual synthesis opens up (339).14 
13 Herder wrote that Baumgarten "looked down into the abyss of the human psyche to the 
point where the feelings of the animal turn into the feelings of the human being" (W & W 
xxi). 
14 Kant, whom Cassirer noted referred to Baumgarten as an "excellent analyst," doubted 
his approach to aesthetics in the First Critique, only to embrace it in the Third. "The 
Gennans are the only people who at present use this word to indicate what others call the 
critique of taste. At the foundation of this tenn lies the disappointed hope, which the 
228 
The Leibnizian-Wolffian system from which he received a model of the mind 
distinguished higher and lower faculties. Higher faculties "housed" reason, the producer 
of "real" knowledge, of distinct ideas, those that led to the achievements of mathematics 
and natural sciences. The lower faculties were associated with aistheta, sensual 
perceptions that managed only indistinct concepts [cognitio con/usa] (Gross 407). 
Baumgarten's new science of aesthetics demanded recognition for a new kind of 
knowing, the knowing of the lower faculties, and that knowing included as its object, 
beauty. From Cassirer's perspective, that human capacity and its new science of 
aesthetics 
abandon [ ed] itself to sensory appearance without attempting to go beyond 
it to something entirely different, to the grounds of all appearance. For 
[any] such step ... would not explain the aesthetic content of appearance, 
but destroy it .... [B]eauty can be perceived only by undivided 
observation, by pure contemplation of the ... whole. Only the artist, the 
painter or the poet can reflect this totality and put life into every feature of 
his representation" (Cassirer 343-344).15 
eminent analyst, Baumgarten, conceived, of subjecting the criticism of the beautiful to 
principles of reason, and so of elevating its rules into a science. But his endeavours were 
vain. For the said rules or criteria are, in respect to their chief sources, merely empirical, 
consequently never can serve as determinate laws a priori, by which our judgement in 
matters of taste is to be directed. It is rather our judgement which forms the proper test as 
to the correctness of the principles. On this account it is advisable to give up the use of 
the term as designating the critique of taste, and to apply it solely to that doctrine, which 
is true science - the science of the laws of sensibility - and thus come nearer to the 
language and the sense ofthe ancients in their well-known division of the objects of 
cognition into thought and sense [aiotheta kai noeta], or to share it with speculative 
philosophy, and employ it partly in a transcendental, partly in a psychological 
signification" (Critique of Pure Reason A 21 note). 
15 Beauty, wrote Schiller, as the object ofthe Inner Sense was a phenomenon revealed by 
the common sense: "(fjor the whole magic resides in its mystery, and in dissolving the 
essential amalgam of its elements we find we have dissolved its very being" (1.5). 
Goethe: "Fluttering the fountain nigh! The iridescent dragonfly/ An hour mine eye has 
dwelt upon! Now dark, now light alternately/ Like the chameleon;/ Now red, now blue,! 
Now blue now green! How would its hues appear/ If one could but come near/ It flits and 
however, resting not - / Hush! on a willow bough it lights;/ I have it in my fingers 
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The goal of Baumgarten's cognitio sensitiva, reached through sensitive perception 
and the cultivated powers of representation, "is the grasp of the special, the particular, in 
the diversity and complexity of its relations and connections." This confused 
representation possesses 'extensive clarity,' and in order to preserve that quality, things 
must be dealt with as the complex assemblages they are (Gross 409-10). Then 
Baumgarten's abundance, magnitude, truth, clarity, light and certainty, all the wealth of 
meaning and significance, are preserved in the impression of the "life of knowledge" 
(Cassirer 347).16 Wilkinson and Willoughby reiterated the holistic aspect of 
Baumgarten's innovation but with a slight change of perspective: they experienced him 
as attending to a kind of knowledge that mediated between the lower faculties' ideas of 
sense and the higher "distinct" ideas, those analyzable to the truth behind appearance by 
reason. In the end, it came to the same thing: Baumgarten turned to "a mode of 
perception in which wholes are neither cursorily recognized for practical purposes and 
cursorily dismissed, nor yet subjected to the analytical procedures of science and 
philosophy, but dwelt on in their sensible and undivided appearance for the sake of the 
insight and delight such contemplation may afford" (W&W xx-xxi). For both Cassirer 
and the translators of the Aesthetic Letters, the etymology of confusa was key to 
caught,! And now I seek its colors true/ And find a melancholy blue -/ such is thy lot, 
dissector of delights!" (qtd. in Cassirer 344-5). 
16 Schiller used this concept in his idea of extensivity: "The more facets his Receptivity 
develops, the more labile it is, and the more surface it presents to phenomena, so much 
more world does man apprehend, and all the more potentialities does he develop in 
himself." Extensivity is a way of taking in content (passively), of suspending activity 
toward things. This cast of mind quality must be balanced by intensiveness: "The more 
power and depth the Personality achieves, and the more freedom reason attains, so much 
more world does man comprehend, and all the more form does he create outside himself' 
(XII1.3). 
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understanding the value of sensate perception. An exploration of the word's meaning 
also connected the intuition of wholes to the human experience of organisms, life forms 
seen as complex and boundaried. 
If the realm of aesthetics can be characterized by the expression "confused 
perception," this can only be done on the condition that we understand this 
expression in its strictly etymological sense. This would mean that in all 
aesthetic intuition a confluence, a fusing together, of elements takes place, 
and that we cannot isolate the individual elements from the totality of the 
intuition. But such a confluence creates no disorder; for this complex 
presents itself to direct perception as a definite and harmonious whole. 
According to the fundamental thesis of Baumgarten's aesthetics, no such 
organization is attainable solely by means of concepts .... These 
"inferior" cognitive forces also have their rational principle, and for them 
too a special epistemology, an "inferior knowledge" [gnoseologia inferior] 
is requisite" (Cassirer 346 my emphasis, also W & W xxi). 
A definite and harmonious whole that included all its relations and connections. 
The significant ideas that organize Baumgarten's work as the science of man are his 
concepts of beauty fpulchritudo] and of completion fperfectio]. These concepts work 
reciprocally to create a new idea of the human being, an anthropological image,felix 
aestheticus. "Baumgarten upholds the validity of sensibility; he [did] not, however, 
merely seek to release sensibility from all restraint but rather to lead it to its spiritual 
perfection. This perfection cannot lie in enjoyment but only in beauty. Beauty is 
pleasure, but this pleasure is specifically different from that other kind which is derived 
from mere sense impulses" (Cassirer 356). Beauty is the perfection of the sensate; 
through perfectio, pulchritudo aims at the whole, the all [Ganzheit], "the whole with all 
its connections and relations.,,17 And the aim of the discipline of aesthetics is to develop 
and improve human sensitive knowledge, wrote Baumgarten, adding, this too is beauty. 
17 Gross emphasized that this conjunction gave Baumgarten's aesthetics "an 
extraordinary dynamic." This dynamic was timely: it fit well with the change in the 
vitalist experience of history, taken forward by Herder. 
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Through perjectio, human capacities are improved and perfected. It followed then that it 
is a human duty to be mindful of the object, to think beautifully, i.e. "to be aware of and 
sensitive to the object, and not to the object alone but to all the relations ofthat object" 
(Gross 410-411). Because it is impossible to grasp the whole from any limited position, 
the possibility of knowledge from numerous perspectives both limits knowledge claims 
and makes each point-of-view significant. The art of thinking beautifully also made 
demands of the arts and specifically poetry. Poetry should "convey not only form but 
color; not only objective truth but sensitive force; and not only correct but vital insight," 
and the poet ought to use words, not as paint, but in order to provoke his readers to create 
their own "clear and vivid sensuous ideas." This position allows for a participatory 
creativity and a grounded contemplation of objects, a transformation through the use of 
abstract symbols. Like the philosopher, the artist must be "a man among men: nor does 
he rightly think so great a part of human knowledge alien to himself." Both must strive 
for totality: "the 'beautiful sciences' now form no longer simply a relatively independent 
province of knowledge; they 'activate the whole man' and are indispensable to man's 
realization of his true destiny" (Cassirer 348-353). In requiring philosophy to be more 
humanistic, Baumgarten spoke for the whole new science of man - for the psychological 
and anthropological sciences in their infancy. "The two faces of Baumgarten's aesthetics 
- theory of knowledge and philosophical anthropology - mirror each other," wrote Gross. 
"To think beautifully, that is, to grasp the object in a way that acknowledges its 
embeddedness in the various relations that constitute its specific character, unavoidably 
presupposes a person in a continual process of developing all his powers and senses, and 
exploring them in all possible dimensions" (412). 
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The Force of Feeling 
[T]he way to the head must be opened through the heart. The development 
of man's capacity for feeling is, therefore, the more urgent need of our 
age, not merely because it can be a means of making better insights 
effective for living, but precisely because it provides the impulse for 
bettering our insights (VIII. 7). 
The positive valence of pleasure made all of human physicality of interest to German 
philosophers: pleasure became important scientifically, artistically and culturally, not just 
as the possibility of another kind of knowledge but as a product of the senses and the 
ground and corollary of emotion. As the harbinger ofthe Enlightenment's neglected pole 
ofJeeling opposed to reason (animal/rational, sense/understanding, nature/art), it 
represented the undervalued aspect of humanness, sensibility - with all its perceptions 
and emotions. If sensitivity were restored - and with it humanity to equilibrium -
Enlightenment hopes and values might be salvaged. 
But before sense was restored to equality with reason, it was acclaimed and 
advanced as the remedy to every problem, the cure of ills and the cause of all that was 
sublime in human nature. Creativity, genius and spontaneity of mind, not to mention 
motivation for any purposive action, arose from feeling: the restatement of physicality 
and the rehabilitation of sense began with a vengeance. Physicality was carried into 
aesthetics through the English empiricists, and it moved even the rationalist theorizers 
toward the register of emotion and to subjects of creativity and genius. Psychology and 
art mixed to present the dramatic characters of Sturm und Drang, the man of violent 
action [Kraftkerl, Kraftmensch, urkriiftiger Mensch] and the suffering woman [leidendes 
Weib] (Bell 54, Leidner Impatient 47-62). 
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"In Germany, the emancipation ofthe senses led to a repudiation [of dualism] that 
promoted the rise of the discipline of 'anthropology' as the empirical science of the 
'whole man' in the latter part of the century" (1016). After the 1750's, the importance of 
the capacity for powerful, integrating feeling (Empfindsamkeit), including pleasure, was 
posited as a good in itself. According to Catherine Minter, this wave of sensualist 
philosophy, Empfindsamkeit, was carried forward by two impulses: the understanding of 
sensibility in its physical sense (derived from neurophysiology and current ideas about 
the functioning of the nervous system) and the valorization of moral sensibility, of the 
capacity to be powerfully emotionally affected. 
On one hand, moral Empfindsamkeit, the capacity to experience and be deeply 
affected by emotion, had an immensely positive valence as a late Enlightenment 
correction of reason with feeling. The goals of enlightenment after the Sturm und Drang 
period came to depend on both an autonomous reason and a vigorous life of feeling, upon 
the whole man. They depended on the feeling's participation in motivation and man's 
free agency in the world of action; they required the maintenance of a capacity for 
accurate perception and the development of an energetic emotional life. These became 
urgently important undertakings. Again, the physiological psychological model of the 
nervous system as the quick and vigorous processor of sensations by means of nerves 
("similar to electricity or magnetism" which is '''cleverly' contained in the nerve," 
according to Schiller's mentor Jakob Friedrich Abel), was central to descriptions of the 
"speed and power of emotions and ideas" (Dewhurst 129; Minter 1020). Emotions and 
passions grew by association and sympathy, and "typically, the bonds between friends 
and lovers were conceived of as physical forces, usually of a magnetic or electric nature" 
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(1022). There also developed an ideal of vigor, "of manly energy [that] informed and 
overlapped with a particular conception of sensibility." Vigor was associated with an 
[equally active drive toward an] "eminently healthy, invigorating type of solitude," a 
situation to be used constructively to consolidate inner strength [Geistesstarke, 
Festigkeit] and to ward off melancholy [Nervenzujalle, Kraftlosigkeit] (Minter 1023). 
The physiological model endowed "emotions with holistic potential because ... 
transitions between sensations, emotions and ideas are fluid" and interactive; in it, 
emotions and passions also had the capacity for transmutation and growth, and they, as 
active expressions of inner states and spurs to action, were testimony that "a person could 
be empjindsam without being a passive victim of emotion" (Minter 1024). Human minds 
were active, capable of incisive ideas and sublime imaginative constructions, generative 
of great deeds. 
As the most sensitive (and most widespread) part of the organism, the nervous 
system was conceptualized in late eighteenth-century Germany according to the popular 
understanding of Haller's studies on sensitivity and irritability and according to the 
psychosomatic traditions from Montpellier and England. From the medical 
(pathologizing) perspective, the influence of the psyche was also experienced as 
powerfully pervasive and capable of causing imbalance; consequently, descriptions of 
unhealthy or excessive feeling, including its symptoms and situations, found their way 
into professional and popular literature. The Sorrows of Young Werther and Karl 
Moritz's thinly disguised self-portraits in Anton Reiser and his journal are examples of 
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the period's fascination with this type of nervous illness. 18 Grammont's premorbid 
personality as described by the medical student Schiller (see page 274 fn 58) and 
reproduced in his character Julius show the linear entry of physicalism (psychosomatic 
medicine) into literature. 19 The symptoms of the unhealthily empjindsam, documented in 
patients in a case study or attributed to a character in a sentimental novel, included, for 
example, nervous fever, unrealistic aspirations to write poetry and cloying 
sentimentalization or over-sexualization of relationships?O Female characters are 
depicted as particularly prone, because of a perception of women's exaggerated capacity 
18 Goethe confided that he wrote "Werther ... to free himself from a 'stormy element' 
that threatened to destroy him." What worked for him didn't appear to work for his 
readers: in the reprinted version of 1775, he added the warning, "Sei ein Mann, undfolge 
mir nicht [Be a man: don't do as I do]" (Leidner Impatient 29, 115 fn 1). 
19G.S. Rousseau cautioned against considering this transmission one-way, only from 
science to literature. Introducing a study about the interface of English literature and 
psychology, Fox elaborated on that observation: "the flow can also move the other way, 
especially in an age when many doctors ... wrote for popular audiences and considered 
themselves men ofletters, or when 'literary' authors like Samuel Johnson wrote articles 
for Dr. James's Medicinal Dictionary (1743). In 1768, J.F. Zuckert, physician and 
physiologist, note[ d] that Richardson provide [ d] a textbook case in Clarissa of the morbid 
effects of 'heart-break' - 'slow consumption,' gradual wasting away of the limbs, and 
death" (R. qtd. in Fox 10). Diffusion is confused; it must be considered in all its 
connections and relations. 
20 It is worth noting that Simon-Andre Tissot (1728-1787), a physician who made his way 
in the world by elaborating on the dangers of masturbation to health, was invited to 
address the young men at Karlsschule while Schiller was a student. "Although Tissot 
condemned all sexual excesses, he stressed in particular that the unnatural loss of semen 
was most likely to cause innumerable disorders such as debility predisposing to 
consumption, visual deterioration, disorders of digestion and impotence. But its most 
serious effect was to produce an increased flow of blood to the brain, distending and 
weakening the nervous system and eventually causing insanity" (Dewhurst 42-43). In his 
chapter, "Onanism," Vidal described Tissot and his system of naturalistic ethics (based 
on health consequences), opposing it to Kant's morality of duties to oneself (Daston and 
Vidal 254-281 ). Vidal's work included a sequential illustration: in it the young man grew 
more and more debilitated with each frame, and finally appeared moribund, succumbing 
to consumption as a result of his unhealthy habit. 
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for sympathy, to assimilating physically the qualities of whatever they saw or to 
transplanting their emotions to the site oftheir sense organs, a sort of "heart on one's 
sleeve" phenomenon. "Relocalization of the soul to the senses," wrote Catherine Minter, 
"is at least nourished by the vitalistic neurophysiology of Empfindsamkeit, which makes 
fast and fluid transitions possible throughout the body and opposes polarization of body 
and soul, of sensations and ideas" (1018-20, 1021). 
Sense was established in two camps then, as a rationality all its own and as a 
neglected aspect of our nature, the contribution of our physicality to humanness. Both 
traditions, the theoretical and the experiential, made claims for the rehabilitation of sense 
for the benefit of the whole man. If it can be said that Baumgarten sought to establish the 
senses from the top down, by securing for them a reason and an epistemology, Herder 
can be seen as enforcing the value of the senses and emotions, empirically, from the 
bottom up. And his effort at aesthetics, the science of feeling, was in the service of 
complete humanness. "A man who desires to be solely head," he wrote, "is just as much 
a monster as one who desires to be only heart; the whole, healthy man is both. And that 
he is both, with each in its place, the heart not in the head and the head not in the heart, is 
precisely what makes him a human being" (Aesthetics 3).21 
21 From Daniel Dahlstom's perspective, Hamann, Herder and Schiller were among those 
most responsible for the holistic turn in German thought - the Counter-Enlightenment 
correction (Ameriks 76). In this series of men, each fifteen years the other's junior, the 
whole man's plunge to earth is quite dramatic: for Hamann, natural man is divine; in 
Herder natural man stands in relation to God and his purposes, and in Schiller natural 
man is secularized. Hamann was convinced that "highest act of reason, which embraces 
all Ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that truth and goodness are brothers only in beauty" 
(Bernstein viii-ix). This idea descends intact through the genealogy. Herder struggled to 
balance Haman and Kant's influence in his intellectual life, while Schiller lived the 
synthesis of Kant and Goethe. 
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Herder, much as he admired Baumgarten, felt that in the end the father of aesthetics 
had managed his subject abstractly and from a distance. He insisted on bringing 
aesthetics down to the particular, to philosophizing about beauty, taste and aesthetic 
education in the flow of sense, feeling and emotion. So, he wrote, "I feel! 1 am!" 
(Aesthetics 14). Led by Winckelmann's study of Greek sensuality and Lessing's 
understanding of the art object as directly presented to the intuition, Herder moved the 
emphasis from systematic aesthetics to philosophical anthropology (Moore in Herder 
Aesthetics 5, Cassirer 353). He proceeded empirically; he did research, examining 
artifacts and tracing the artworks back to their cultures and periods. In doing so he 
stressed both the subject's entire experience (whether artist or perceiver) and the object's 
sensuous properties. He upheld genius as a power, a force, and taste as the judgment or 
ordering ofthat power. He proselytized for education by belles lettres, beginning in 
childhood. 
Herder was the protagonist in the establishment of emotion as central to healthy, 
more, sublime individuality. The understanding of emotion as part of the active life of 
man, not only in terms of motivation, but in a vibrant internal environment, found 
expression in his theories of force. For him, the essence of life and of organism was 
force. "Genius is an aggregation of natural forces" he wrote; genius is a second creator, 
one who imitates nature organically, and only nature. He developed themes (and 
metaphors) made popular by Edward Young, whose Conjectures on Original 
Composition had two separate German translation by 1760. Young wrote, "An Original 
may be said to be of a vegetable nature; it rises spontaneously from the vital root of 
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Genius; it grows, it is not made" (11 §43 Young, on line )?2 Herder made force the 
essence of art as well. He believed that in poetry force is responsible for the transmission 
of the meaning of arbitrary signs to the reader. An analogue of natural forces, this power 
of words (transformed) acts like the "force [that is] responsible for charging a storm 
cloud with electricity and discharging it through lightning" (Moore in Herder Aesthetics 
10). 
After mid-century, genius loomed large; charisma was all, and great deeds formed a 
correction of a muted enlightenment. Then taste opposed feeling, originality, creativity 
and genius; taste was derivative, reasoned and conventional. In the midst of Strum und 
Drang, "the worship of genius meant also a one-sided celebration of 'feeling,' and the 
denigration of taste signaled a rejection of the rational culture [Verstandeskultur] of 
French neoclassicism and the Enlightenment" (Moore in Herder Aesthetics 21). Then, 
Herder entered the fray to safeguard "the equilibrium of human powers." He balanced 
individual force in his aesthetic philosophy through the identification of a drive-like 
empathy basic to human life, the common feeling for other human beings, Mitgefiihl. 
Consideration of past cultures, of great ages, led him also to value taste as a part of 
genius creation, to see the reciprocity between the creative artist and his community. 
Herder enthusiastically tended the vegetable metaphor to make his point: the vegetable 
genius must come first, then taste cultivates him and his fellows: 
So if taste can arise only through geniuses - that is through natural powers 
that operate quickly and vivaciously - then taste must also desire to persist 
in them; otherwise it is nothing but reverberation in the air, an echo. An 
abundance of trees, plants, and meadows makes a garden; and once the 
garden exists, then order, taste, and landscaping can develop. But without 
22He continued: "Imitations are often a sort of Manufacture wrought up by those 
Mechanics, Art, and Labour, out of pre-existent materials not their own." 
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a garden we cultivate air .... [Only a] dunderhead [could fail to] use or 
comprehend it; taste is only order in the application of powers of genius, 
and hence taste without genius is an absurdity. Conversely, the more 
powers a genius possesses, the quicker the powers operate, then the more 
necessary is the mentor of good taste, so that the powers do not 
overwhelm and destroy one another ... (Aesthetics 310). 
Taste then was not simply an instinctive or intuitive judgment, but judgment applied to 
life and living one's particular life. "Only when genius is exercised in conjlllction with 
what Herder calls true reason does that order of our instinctive powers arise which 
constitutes taste. Only the misuse of reason, only pedantry and irrationality can ever 
corrupt taste. Finally, taste and virtue overlap but are not identical: taste is the order of 
our sensuous nature, but virtue is the equilibrium of all the powers of the mind" (Moore 
in Herder Aesthetics 21). 
Herder was committed to aesthetic education. The experiences of belles letters, 
should begin early. They must 
cultivate the so-called lower faculties of the soul, sensuous cognition, the 
wit, the imagination, the sensuous appetites, enjoyment, the passions and 
inclinations. Is not this very definite sufficient proof that they therefore 
exert the finest and best influence on the higher sciences, which concern 
themselves with judgment and understanding, the will and convictions? 
.... [A] sound understanding is impossible without sound and well-
ordered senses, a decisive judgment is impossible without an imagination 
tamed and heedful of its duty, a good will and character are impossible 
without passions and inclinations in good order. Hence it is both wrong 
and foolish to cultivate the higher sciences without the belles lettres, to 
plow the air when the soil lies fallow (Aesthetica 338). 
Studies in literature and the arts are, in short, a school of the senses. The humanities help 
human beings to avoid premature and narrow specialization; they "inspire and nurture in 
us the feeling of humanity by which we realize ourselves and develop our potential to its 
fullest extent." The result is a balanced human being; like the felix aestheticus of 
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Baumgarten, a reasoned thinker who is in love with the sensory world (Aesthetics 23, 
24). 
Schiller incorporated Herder's synthesizing achievements into his anthropology: 
sense came first to the human being who was an amalgam of sense and reason. Genius 
had a high value for Schiller as well, but taste was the objective indication, the outward 
and visible sign of our common humanity. From that perspective, humans in community 
make beauty. And Schiller, of course, looked to aesthetic education as the means to the 
end - and as the end as well, but as the approached, never gained end of man. For man to 
develop toward wholeness, 
[h]is education will therefore consist, firstly, in procuring for the receptive 
faculty the most manifold contacts with the world, and, within the purview 
of feeling, intensifying passivity to the upmost; secondly, in securing for 
the determining faculty the highest degree of independence from the 
receptive, and within the purview of reason, intensifying activity to the 
upmost. Where both these aptitudes are conjoined, man will combine the 
greatest fullness of existence with the highest autonomy and freedom, and 
instead of losing himself to the world, will rather draw the latter into 
himself in all its infinitude of phenomena, and subject it to the unity of his 
reason" (XIII. 3 ).23 
Schiller concurred with Herder, then, when he wrote, "[t]his much is settled: by itself 
the principle 'imitate Nature!' leads mostly to arid observations. But the principle 
'pursue sensuous perfection!' concentrates, as it were, all the rays of Nature in my soul 
and is nothing other than the application of the oracular injunction 0 mortal! Know 
thyself!" (Herder in "A Monument to Baumgarten" Aesthetics 46). 
23 On the education of man: "Thus man, when he reflects, can conceive of Virtue, Truth, 
Happiness; but man, when he acts, can only practice virtues, comprehend truths, and 
enjoy happy hours. To refer these experiences back to those abstractions - to replace 
morals by Morality, happy hours by Happiness, the facts of knowledge by Knowledge 
itself - that is the business of physical and moral education. To make Beauty out of a 
multiplicity of beautiful objects is the task of an aesthetic education" (XVI.2). 
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Just as Herder intended to apply a new experimental method [Beobachtung und 
Erfahrung, observation and experience] to the study of man in the form of a genetic 
psychology, a developmental history of the species, Schiller intended to do the same and 
to extend the work. He added his own subjective capacities, sharpened through the 
necessities of characterization in drama, that is, his intensified self-awareness, empathy 
and capacity for representation, to analyze the human type and the inner drives that 
organize human nature and human experience. 
"All the powers of our soul are only one power," wrote Herder (Aesthetics 338). 
Schiller too sought the unity of the psyche. He followed "the thread which will guide us 
through the whole labyrinth of aesthetics," the dynamic course that connects matter and 
form, negotiates passivity and activity, and leads to where feeling and thought meet. His 
intent was to "make this union complete; and to do it with such unmitigated thoroughness 
that both these conditions totally disappear in a third without leaving any trace of division 
behind in the new whole that has been made; otherwise we shall only succeed in 
distinguishing but never in uniting them" (XVIII.4 my emphasis). In his search for a 
unifYing state, one of the organizers for Schiller was his conception of beauty in terms of 
its situation. He held that beauty brings the sensuous man to form and thought, and the 
conceptualizer down to the particulars of reality, to a unity of the aesthetic state.24 On an 
individual level, this aesthetic state provides for free choice by allowing man to 
contemplate, to pause and disengage from what determines him. Within this pause, an 
individual has the opportunity, in essence, to start over once again, before he emerges. 
24 From Herder's perspective, "art activates the totality of the organism; it is produced by 
the cooperation of our sensuous, imaginative, and intellectual faculties, by our interaction 
with the world around us, and so an analysis of art will inevitably shed light on the 
complexities of human nature and experience" (Moore in Herder Aesthetics 3). 
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Schiller believed that a society full of such (aesthetically developing) individuals would 
also have the potential to develop and transfonn. 
In the midst of the fearful kingdom of forces, and in the midst of the sacred 
kingdom of laws, the aesthetic impulse to fonn is at work, unnoticed, on the 
building of a third joyous kingdom of play and of semblance, in which man 
is relieved of the shackles of circumstance, and released from all that might 
be called constraint, alike in the physical and the moral sphere (XXVII. 8)?5 
For Schiller, beauty and humanity then were conditions of each other's existence: 
without humans, no beauty, and without beauty no humans. Humans not a human being. 
Why? The development of the aesthetic requires society, culture in collaboration with 
each individual, and beauty also is upheld by a sense of commonly held judgment: the 
judgment of beauty is a reciprocal relation with other minds. 
To watch over these, and secure for each of these two drives its proper 
frontiers, is the task of culture, which is, therefore, in duty bound to do 
justice to both drives equally; not simply to maintain the rational against 
the sensuous, but the sensuous against the rational too. Hence its business 
is twofold: first, to preserve the life of Sense against the encroachments of 
Freedom; and second, to secure the Personality against the forces of 
Sensation. The fonner it achieves by developing our capacity for feeling, 
the latter by developing our capacity for reason (XIII.2) 
Theories of Art and Schiller's Theory of Art 
The whole labyrinth of aesthetics (XVIII.3) 
Beauty, then, is indeed an object for us, because reflection is the condition 
of our having any sensation of it; but it is at the same time a state of the 
perceiving subject, because feeling is a condition of our having any 
perception of it. Thus beauty is indeed fonn, because we contemplate it; 
but it is at the same time life, because we feel it. In a word: it is at once a 
state of our being and an activity we perfonn. (XXV.S) 
25 Throughout the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller, in moments of self-observation, recognized 
that his manner of argument, analysis, seemed paradoxical to his solution. In all he 
sought unity, but a unity gained by indirection: "Nature (sense and intuition) always 
unites, Intellect always divides; but Reason unites once more" (XVIII.4ftn). A reason 
that includes aesthetic judgment, that is. 
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Schiller's larger stance was that aesthetic education is education for life, and the 
Aesthetic Letters was an exhortation to each of its readers to develop himself toward 
wholeness while being active in the life ofthe community. In order to orient the 
development he encouraged, Schiller was determined to establish some perimeters for 
beauty in nature, in art and in graceful humanity. His intent was wholeness: a whole 
species united by the play drive, an archetype of humanity open to potentiality through 
beauty. He envisioned a developing individual seeking wholeness in a potentiating 
society, a person seeking his own freedom and that of others, not compartmentalized by 
civic claims on his talents and time. And he sought a unified psyche in balanced tension 
and equilibrium, graceful in virtue. He would have beauty to be a whole as well - like an 
organism with its connections and relations - subject and object, genius and communal 
taste, sense and emotion coupled with judgment. 
As a synthesizer, Schiller struggled to abstract the value of several classes of 
aesthetic theories with which he was familiar and to combine those elements in a 
formulation that stressed the sensual and the consensual. He incorporated features from 
the British empirical and French sensationalist thinkers, ideas from the tradition of 
Leibniz, Baumgarten and Mendelssohn, and methods, distinctions and metaphors from 
Kant's theory, itself a synthesis of all the former views. These he described in Letter 
XVIII: some theories, he wrote, remained at the level of the beautiful experience as a 
whole, at what would be synthesis if only analysis had been performed. Other theories 
succeeded in analyzing the components of the beautiful, the parts of the experience of 
both the subject and the object. Such theories presented the results of an analysis, which 
beauty did not survive; this theory-type's synthetic component was inadequate and could 
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not account for the whole. In other words, the former credited feeling and sense in order 
to protect beauty as a (dynamic) force, and the latter knowledge and intellect in order to 
preserve the logic of beauty. 26 The first he associated with Edmund Burke, who 
identified beauty with sensations and feelings. In this English empirical tradition, beauty 
was its sensual effect on us, the pleasure it brings. Its pleasure differed, however, from 
desire which includes possession.27 Burke, who noted that "when we go but one step 
26 W & W noted in their commentary that Schiller felt Letter XVIII was one of the most 
important for understanding what he is about, "analyzing as it does the two basic, and 
basically opposed, approaches to the problem of beauty, and proposing his own 
resolution of the conflict between them." In a much earlier letter to Komer, 25.i.1793, he 
had actually distinguished three possible ways of explaining beauty: "the sinnlich-
subjectiv (Burke and many others); the subjectiv-rational (Kant); the rational-objectiv 
(Baumgarten, Mendelssohn, and the whole tribe of 'beauty = perfection types'). The 
fourth way, his own, was to be the sinnlich-objectiv" (W & W 257). In the Kallias Letters, 
Schiller wrote: "It is impossibly difficult to construct an objective concept of beauty and 
to legitimate it completely a priori out ofthe nature of rationality, in such a way that 
experience may confirm the concept, but that such confirmation from experience is not 
necessary for its validity [and if I cannot do so, Kant will be right about taste always 
remaining empirical] .... It is worth noting that my theory is a fourth possible way of 
explaining the beautiful. Either one declares it subjective or objective; and either 
subjective sensual (like Burke and the others), subjective rational (like Kant) or rational 
objective (like Baumgarten, Mendelssohn and the whole crowd of men who esteem 
perfection), or, finally sensuous objective; a term which will mean little to you at this 
point, save if you compare the other three forms with each other (Bernstein Trans. 
Stephan Bird-Pollan 145-6). Beiser translated sinnlich as "empirical" and worked through 
different ways of approach, finally opting to "construe ... loosely and liberally" (53-57). 
27 Burke: "By beauty I mean, that quality or those qualities in bodies by which they cause 
love, or some passion similar to it. I confine this definition to the merely sensible 
qualities of things, for the sake of preserving the utmost simplicity in a subject .... from 
the direct force which they have merely on being viewed. I likewise distinguish love, 
by which I mean that satisfaction which arises to the mind upon contemplating any thing 
beautiful, of whatsoever nature it may be, from desire or lust; which is an energy of the 
mind, that hurries us on to the possession of certain objects, that do not affect us as they 
are beautiful, but by means altogether different. Which shows, that beauty and the 
passion caused by beauty, which I call love, is different from desire ... " (83). 
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beyond the immediately sensible quality of things, we go out of our depth" (117), 
confined his explanation of our attribution of beauty to the action of our senses. 
[S]ince [Beauty] is no creature of our reason, since it strikes us without 
any reference to use, and even where no use at all can be discerned, since 
the order and method of nature is generally very different from our 
measures and proportions, we must conclude that beauty is, for the greater 
part, some quality in bodies, acting mechanically upon the human mind by 
the intervention of the senses. We ought therefore to consider attentively 
in what manner those sensible qualities are disposed, in such things as by 
experience we find beautiful, or which excite in us the passion of love, or 
some correspondent affection (102). 
Schiller accepted the participation of the sensual part of human nature, a part that 
included the nervous system with its senses, the principals being sight and hearing, and 
our feelings, our passions?8 He wrote to Komer: "The Burkian is completely justified in 
insisting on the unmediated quality, on the independence of beauty against the Wolffian; 
but he is in the wrong against the Kantian to insist that beauty be posited as a mere 
affectation of sensuousness" (Bernstein 146).29 In his Philosophical Enquiry, Schiller 
summarized later, Burke "makes beauty into mere life" (XV.5 fn). 
The rationalists, Schiller's analyzers, reached a kind of perfection themselves in 
Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786). An aficionado of Jewish mediaeval philosophy and 
mediaeval Aristotelianism, mentored by Torah and Maimonides scholars, he was 
28 Schiller on the importance of seeing and hearing: "In the case of the eye and the ear, 
she [Nature] herself has driven importunate matter back from the organs of sense, and the 
object, with which in the case our more animal senses we have direct contact, is set at a 
distance from us. What we actually see with the eye is something different from the 
sensation we receive; for the mind leaps out across light to objects .... Once he does 
begin to enjoy through the eye, and seeing acquires for him a value of its own, he is 
already aesthetically free and the play-drive has started to develop (XXVI.6). 
29 Burke against function: the structure of a watch, "for all the perfection of its parts and 
their fitness to the whole, yet it is not beautiful - whereas its engraved case may be so, 
since in beauty 'the effect is previous to any knowledge of the use'" (Burke On the 
Sublime iii.7, qtd. in W&W 226). 
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linguistically competent in Latin, French and English and uncommonly welcoming and 
well-versed in diverse knowledge traditions. Mendelssohn was a decades-long friend of 
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing who modeled "the religious tolerance and good will of the 
protagonist in his dramatic poem, "Nathan the Wise," after his friend. Mendelssohn's 
own work included numerous essays, philosophical dialogues (including one, "On 
Sentiments," reflecting Shaftesbury's influence), a piece on probability theory, letters to 
Lessing on tragedy, a contribution to the debate on the Enlightenment, and a work 
elaborating a theory of beauty in opposition to Batteux and Hutcheson, "On the main 
principles of the fine arts and sciences" (Dahlstrom in Mendelssohn ix-xxiv).3o 
Mendelssohn valued the life of feeling: "We are called in this life not only to 
improve our powers of understanding and willing, but also to educate feelings by means 
of sentient knowledge and to raise the obscure impulses of the soul to a higher perfection 
by means of sensuous pleasures" (140). For him beauty was this perfection of a sensuous 
cognition, and it followed that the pleasure arose from our own sensuously perfect 
30 Mendelssohn's complaint about Hutcheson was that he referenced the Deity in a way 
that precluded further discussion of the causes of our response to beauty, precisely the 
question to be explored. Hutcheson posited a "sense of beauty" (and a civic sense as 
well) and his ideas about aesthetic response appealed to wholes: "Let everyone here 
consider, how different we must suppose the Perception to be, with which a Poet is 
transported upon the Prospect of any of those Objects of natural Beauty, which ravish us 
even in his Description; for the cold lifeless Conception which we imagine in a dull 
Critick, or one of the Virtuosi, without what we call afine Taste. This latter Class of Men 
may have greater Perfection in that Knowledge, which is deriv'd from external Sensation; 
they can tell all the specifick Differences of Trees, herbs, Minerals; they know the Form 
of every Leaf, Stalk, Root, Flower, and Seed of all the Species, about which the Poet is 
often ignorant: And yet the Poet shall have a much more delightful Perception of the 
Whole; and not only the Poet but any Man of a fine Taste. (Beauty LXII) (as qtd. in Fox 
155). His ideas were incorporated into German theory through translation by Lessing; his 
speculation about internal senses of man - of beauty and sociability, for example-
fleshed out the skeleton of Common Sense (See Chapter VII). 
247 
representations.3l Since "the final purpose ofthe fine arts is to please ... the essence of 
the fine arts and sciences consists in an artful, sensuously perfect representation or in a 
sensuous perfection represented in art" (172-173). As such, the "arts have a mediating 
role to perform between what a person knows and what he or she desires" (Dahlstrom 
xxi). For Mendelssohn, the source of beauty's pleasure is three-fold: unity of diversity 
(sensuous), harmony in the manifold (rational perfection) and enjoyment of our own 
well-being in the contemplation of it (Dewhurst 122). The three-fold pleasure required of 
Mendelssohn a three-part model ofthe soul. In both explanations, his tendency (repeated 
in other perfection theorists) was to conflate the beautiful and the good: 
[b ]etween the ability to know and the ability to desire lies the ability to 
feel, by means of which we feel pleasure or displeasure in some subject 
matter, approve of it, deem it good, and find it pleasant or disapprove of it, 
find fault with it, and find it unpleasant .... The goal of the ability to feel 
is the good. That is, insofar as we possess an ability to feel, we strive to 
make the objective properties agree with our concepts of goodness, order, 
and beauty (309).32 
Though Schiller was critical of Mendelssohn, he may have been a direct inspiration: 
his "On Sensations" [Briefe uber die Empjindungen] (1755) seemed to many to be a 
31 "Each individual representation stands in a twofold relation. It is related, at once, to 
the matter before it as its object (of which it is a picture or copy) and then to the soul or 
the thinking subject of which it constitutes a determination). As a determination of the 
soul, many a representation can have something pleasant about it although, as a picture of 
the object, it is accompanied by disapproval or a feeling of repugnance. Thus we must 
indeed take care not to mix or confuse these two relations, the objective and the 
subjective" (132). The implication is two-fold: as an activity of mind a representation 
can be pleasurable purely as "play" of the faculties. But many representations provoke 
an ambivalent mix of emotions. Prior to the passage, Mendelssohn reflected on the 
Lisbon earthquake of 1755: after evil has occurred and nothing can be done to prevent or 
ameliorate it, he wrote, "we are powerfully attracted to the representation of it and long to 
acquire that representation" (131). 
32 "We must not, says Mendelssohn, 'confuse the "heavenly Venus" which consists in 
perfection, in the perfect adequacy of all concepts, with the "earthly Venus," that is, with 
beauty'" (Cassirer 354). 
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template for Schiller's presentation of the problems of aesthetic response and their 
solution. There, Mendelssohn reiterated that the "beautiful object is neither one of mere 
knowledge or one of mere desire; it slips through our fingers if we try to treat it as an 
object of knowledge and to approach it by means of scientific method, by the process of 
analysis and definition." More, he held that the "nature of the beautiful object also 
escapes us if we approach it from the 'practical' viewpoint, making it the object of 
wishing or acting, because as soon as an object is desired or striven for, it ceases to be a 
beautiful object, an object of artistic contemplation and enjoyment." For those reasons, 
he postulated a faculty of approval [Billigungsvermogen], a faculty for what is special 
about beauty. For beauty "is contemplated with calm pleasure, ... pleases even if we do 
not possess it, and if we are ever so far removed from the desire to possess it.")) This 
faculty, with its capacity for contemplation, has similarities to Schiller's aesthetic state 
(XXV.2). 
In spite of Schiller's dismissal of the perfectionists, the rationalist aesthetic tradition 
contained important considerations for him. Of course, Baumgarten's work had defined 
the field and the other theorists like Mendelssohn quite simply tilled his ground (as Kant 
did as well): weeding, pruning or hybridizing their ideas added value to value. Though 
they focused too consistently on intuitive perfection, their holistic approach to beauty was 
33 (Mendelssohn qtd. and summarized in Cassirer 126; Dewhurst 114-5, 122). Schiller: 
"Contemplation (or reflection) is the first liberal. relation which man establishes with the 
universe around him. If desire seizes directly upon its object, contemplation removes its 
object to a distance, and makes it into a true and inalienable possession by putting it 
beyond the reach of passion .... In his sense there results a momentary peace; time 
itself, the eternally moving, stands still; and, as the divergent rays of consciousness 
converge, there is reflected against a background of transcience an image of the infinite, 
namely form .... as soon as it grows still within him, the storm in the universe abates 
and the contending forces of nature come to rest between stable confines" (XXV.2). 
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absolutely necessary. They underscored the importance of sense, perceptions and 
feelings, even if they emphasized the particular rationality of the aesthetic faculty and the 
rational aspects of beautiful objects, specifically perfection, which they identified as a 
trigger of our response. Their valorization of sense reestablished the possibility of a 
harmoniously functioning psyche with its polar forces in tension, and allowed for its 
union, for human wholeness. Schiller reached back into the tradition of German 
aesthetics for these understandings as well - and Leibniz (and, with Leibniz, Wolff of 
course), for whom beauty and the power to act were connected, for whom beauty, 
morality and happiness together attainable, flowed through the tradition. 
All intensification of being I have called perfection, [wrote Leibniz] for 
just as sickness is a diminution of health, so is perfection something which 
rises above health ... perfection appears in the power to act. Indeed, all 
being consists in a certain force, and the greater this force, the higher and 
freer the being. Furthermore, the greater the force, the more we see 
multiplicity from unity and in unity ... harmony ... beauty, love ... so 
happiness, joy, love, perfection, being, force freedom, harmony, order, and 
beauty are all linked together a fact which few people rightly understand 
(as qtd. in Cassirer 122). 
In spite of his objections, Schiller's contention that beauty was our second creatress 
also involved the rational part of our "sensuo-rational" nature.34 How could this be? 
How could the logical be involved, yet subsumed and transformed? The rational 
included for Schiller, according to Frederick Beiser, a very broad understanding of reason 
as the "power of combination or synthesis, a power which unite [ d] all kinds of 
representations among themselves, and even representations with other faculties, such as 
the will." He continued: "[Schiller's] general concept of reason [was] strategic and 
34Mendelssohn: "Beauty is the self-empowered mistress of all our sentiments, the basis of 
all our natural drives, and the animating spirit which transforms speculative knowledge of 
the truth into sentiments and incites us to active decision" (170). 
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significant: it allow[ ed] him to bring all forms of judgment within the general domain of 
reason" (Beiser 58-59). This domain includes a theoretical reason (knowledge-based 
concepts or sense-derived intuitions) as well as practical reason (representations for 
action). Each type of reason corresponded to a judgment: "the application of theoretical 
reason to concepts [was] a logical judgment ... to intuitions [it was] a teleological 
judgment, [while] the application of practical reason to free actions [was] moral 
judgment." Aesthetic judgment was a form of practical reason, "namely that form that 
appli[ed] its principles to events in the natural world." A counterpart of moral judgment, 
aesthetic judgment's task was to discern "how freedom appears in the sensible world. In 
other words, the fundamental principle of aesthetic judgment - the general concept of 
beauty - was nothing less than the appearance of freedom in the sensible world, 'freedom 
in appearance' [Freiheit in der Erscheinung], 'autonomy in appearance' [Autonomie in 
der Erscheinung]," and in the Aesthetic Letters, living form [lebende Gestalt]. (Beiser 
59-60; XV.2). In dividing the psyche between reason and sense this way, Schiller placed 
the sensing of the object of beauty with one drive and the in-forming or typing of beauty 
with the other drive: only in the combination of capacities can the judgment be made, can 
the full experiencing of passively sensing and actively creating be had. The object must 
have sensual aspects that gain and keep our attention; the object as material must be 
conformable to our drive to externalize ourselves into it. 
Beiser anchored his descriptions of Schiller's faculties/forces of reason on the 
Kalliasbriefe, Schiller's effort to work out an objective theory of beauty in response to 
Kant's subjectivist stance in the Third Critique. These letters to his friend Komer, 
exchanged during the winter and spring of 1793, were full of ideas and partial proofs, but 
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ones that appeared to one correspondent or the other to be flawed or to open up further 
difficulties. Through his construction of an objective concept of beauty, Schiller, frankly, 
had hoped to do what Kant had not done, to become a Newton of aesthetics. But Schiller 
did not finish that project. Consequently, while Baumgarten laid the foundation of an 
anthropological aesthetics and "Schiller did not dream of starting his treatise on aesthetic 
education without first coming to terms with Baumgarten, it was not he who presented 
him with a challenge. It was Kant." (W&W xxiii).35 
Kant accomplished many things necessary for Schiller's art and argument: he 
solidified the turn toward the subjective into a position (Third § 1 ,8), and then he 
developed the expression of individual taste into the "form of a universal judgement by 
subjecting it to the rigour of his 'transcendental' method." Kant further defined that 
judgment as one "'free of 'interest' as the pure moral act is free of 'motive,' [i.e.] one 
characterized by disinterested pleasure even as the other is characterized by disinterested 
duty" ( Third §§2, 6, 8, xxiii). In these operations Kant freed art from subservience to 
ends, granting it the autonomy dear to Schiller's heart: 
for beauty produces no particular result whatsoever, neither for the 
understanding or the will. It accomplishes no particular purpose, neither 
intellectual or moral; it discovers no individual truth, helps us to perform 
35 According to Beiser, Schiller differed from Kant in the following ways: Schiller 
rejected the transcendent Christian conception of the highest good, managing human 
rationality and moral obligation in immanent and secular way. Schiller held that moral 
worth proceeded from character as well as action. Schiller's concept of freedom was 
anthropological: it did not entail acting on the moral law "independent of sensibility" but 
on the freedom to act according to the moral law or not, the freedom to act within the 
sphere of nature or not, to apply principles and execute ideas (112, 131). With reference 
to judgments about art, Schiller believed that reason should and could be given, reasons 
referencing the objective qualities of the work. In short, Schiller's "ideal of complete 
humanity consist[ ed] in an aesthetic whole, the harmony of sensibility in grace ... 
[beauty rising] from the appearance of freedom in the sensible world" (2-4). Schiller of 
course battled with his own understanding of Kant. 
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no individual duty and is, in short, as unfitted to provide a firm basis for 
character as to enlighten the understanding. By means of aesthetic culture, 
therefore the personal worth of a man, or his dignity, in as much as this 
can depend solely upon himself, remains completely indeterminate; and 
nothing more is achieved by it than that he is henceforth enabled by the 
grace of Nature to make of himself what he will- that the freedom to be 
what he ought to be is completely restored to him (XXI.4). 
In sum, Kant had "crowned what Baumgarten had begun by widening the field of 
aesthetics to embrace far more than art itself; to embrace not only the beauties of nature 
but even such phenomena as human conduct, thus opening up possibilities which Schiller 
was to explore and exploit to the full for his idea of aesthetic education (xxiii). 
For all that Schiller valued in Kant's service to freedom of man and the autonomy of 
art, however, he differed with him with respect to the derivation of beauty, and he held 
out for a level of seriousness in artistic forms, believing that they could support intensity 
of life import and still promote the play of the faculties and imagination. He also differed 
with Kant on the definition of man and opposed his aesthetic man to Kant's man of 
reason. From Schiller's point of view, beauty was both an objective and a subjective 
phenomenon: "[b ]eauty, then, is indeed an object for us, because reflection is the 
condition of our having any sensation of it; but it is at the same time a state of the 
perceiving subject, because feeling is a condition of our having any perception of it" 
(XXV.5). Kant's subjective bias was "dissatisf[ying]": "like Goethe [Schiller] felt that 
from it one could learn much about man but all too little about art and beauty" (Third §9, 
34, W&W xxiv-xxvi). Beauty resided in relation: Schiller followed Henry Home, Lord 
Kames, in theorizing that "beauty ... for its existence, depends upon the percipient as 
much as upon the object perceived, [and] cannot be an inherent property of either" (Lord 
Kames qtd. by W & W xxvi). 
253 
Schiller also insisted on the capacity of art to represent profound human significance. 
He wrote Komer that, while many in the German tradition and elsewhere "have tried to 
situate beauty in intuitive perfection [and thus have caused] the logically good [to be] 
confused with the beautiful," it was Kant [who] wanted to cut [and succeeded in cutting] 
precisely this knot" (Bernstein 146). By Schiller's lights, however, when Kant cut the 
knot, he lost the beautiful again. What Kant had suggested was that "beauty presents 
itself in its greatest splendor only once it has overcome the logical nature of its object" 
and he gave as an example an arabesque, a beauty without any logical interest or 
resistance to be overcome (§ 16). It was this formulation, the loss of beauty replete with 
human content, that gave Schiller further pause. For, while Schiller celebrated "Kant's 
demand that in aesthetic experience the psyche should delight in the free play of all its 
faculties [as] all very right and proper," he firmly believed that free play of the faculties 
did not preclude vital, serious, even disturbing interests (W&W xxiv-xxvi.) Wilkinson 
and Willoughby applied Schiller's metaphor of the balance to this problem: just as genius 
is encouraged by strong taste, intense content and robust or audacious en-forming will 
manage each other: for Schiller, "[t]he scales of the balance stand level when they are 
empty; but they also stand level when they contain equal weights" (xxiv, XX.3). 
Likewise he held that humans should act with the whole force of their personalities, 
develop themselves, completely and fully, and that enlightenment encompassed the 
whole man, not his rational part. Human actions and products should be "expressive of 
life as it is felt and thought, in all its concrete uniqueness and irreducibility to categories 
and abstractions" (xxv). 
[For] in the complete anthropological view ... content counts no less than 
form, and living feeling too has a voice .... Reason does indeed demand 
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unity; but Nature demands multiplicity; and both these kinds of law make 
their claim upon man. The law of Reason is imprinted upon him by an 
incorruptible consciousness; the law of Nature by an ineradicable feeling. 
Hence it will always argue a still defective education if the moral character 
is able to assert itself only by sacrificing the natural (IV.3). 
Many of the ideas from those letters to Komer were reworded and incorporated into 
the Aesthetic Letters; they provided a background for his new analysis of beauty. There, 
he developed a two-fold theory of beauty. Beauty was the means of aesthetic education 
of man, the only process through which a complete person might develop. But beauty 
was not just a means but an end in itself: understood as part of the world and part of 
human experience, it was for Schiller what we create out of what we sense. It was both 
dependent our sensate experience of it and necessary to our very humanity. Beauty and 
humanity then are conditions of each other's existence: without humans, no beauty, and 
without beauty no humans. From the context of vitalism and aesthetics, Schiller 
conceived his theories under the influence of Kant's ideas about biology and aesthetics 
and he developed them in the climate of Goethe's interest in beauty and organism.36 As 
36Reill noted that combining and harmonizing the extreme styles of philosophical 
reasoning and popular fiction, as schone Schreibart, was Schiller's strategy in history-
writing ("Anthropology" 262). Schaner Vertrag below refers to both Goethe's nature 
writing and Schiller's aesthetic discourse considered as cultural reproductions of natural 
phenomena through a complex interaction. Goethe was interactive with and supportive 
of the Aesthetic Letters project, reading it and providing perspectives (Boyce 215-233). 
About a month after their first meeting, he sent Schiller a short piece, "The Extent to 
Which the Idea 'Beauty Is Perfection in Combination with Freedom' May Be Applied to 
Living Organisms": in it he noted that an animal appearing to us to be "capable of 
manifold andfree use of all its members whenever it wishes" engenders a sense of beauty, 
of repose together with strength, inaction together with power" and that the most "intense 
feeling of beauty is connected with feelings of trust and hope" (Scientific 23). Regarding 
beauty, on the singularity of the object and observer: according to Goethe, "When ways 
of looking disappear from the world, the objects perceived often go. missing too. In fact 
one can say that, in a higher sense, the way oflooking is the object." (Stephenson 554, 
561). 
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philosopher and artist then, he poured them into a dynamic form, an energy, really - and 
they metamorphosed into the Aesthetic Letters, an artful philosophy, a beautiful treatise 
[schoner Vertrag].37 He intended art that holds its community in an aesthetic state. He 
wished to synthesize all, but to emphasize the relational, and one of the results was an 
effort to connect the object to our interiority, and another to derive an objective aesthetic 
or principle of beauty, one that would explain the standard of taste, the fact that we 
expect judgments about beauty to be normative (X-XVI). For him, the sensate 
(empirical) was organized both by the world we perceive outside ourselves and by the 
capacities of the nervous system itself. The mind was already involved and active in 
perception (though for the most part unconsciously). This judgment circularly conflated 
our judgment of organicity and human agency as humanly delightful and reinforced our 
other sensate experiences of the object. 
Beauty, Organism and the Aesthetic Letters 
The Aesthetic Letters represents Schiller's theory of art: it reflects the German 
aesthetic legacy, its reason of sense and its valorization of feeling's part in motivation, its 
love of the object and its scrutiny of the subject. In spite of his work's debt to Kant, 
however, its autonomy is clear: through it Schiller dared to make play the ground of our 
nature instead of reason, and he had the audacity to imagine aesthetics both as the means 
37 An "energy" is a dynamic work of art defined by James Harris as follows: an 
'''energy' is 'every Production, the Parts o/which exist successively, and whose Nature 
hath its being or Essence in a Transition.' An energetic art operates through time. It 
does not deliver a complete object that can be surveyed at once; rather, its effect lies 
precisely in a succession of moments because each moment is effective only as a link in 
this chain. A 'work,' on the other hand, is 'every Production, whose Parts exist all at 
once'" (Harris qtd. by Morris in Herder's Aesthetics 9). Herder knew Harris' work; his 
Three Treatises: The First Concerning Art, the Second Concerning Music, Painting and 
Poetry, the Third Concerning Happiness was translated into German in 1756. 
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to wholeness and as the representation of the whole man. The Aesthetic Letters then 
functions as a semblance [Schein], an art-form [Gehalt] that transforms life-materials and 
vital life-interests into a kind of play which "yet has its own seriousness [ein ernstes 
Spiel]" (W & W xxvi).38 "[E]very genuine work of art presents us with [ a] standard; it not 
only displays a wealth of observations but it masters this wealth" wrote Cassirer, " it 
molds it and causes its inner unity to appear in the form which results" (345). There is a 
standard to be found in the Aesthetic Letters. The work, a confused whole with all its 
relations and connections, is a profoundly relational entity, with connections to its 
readers, a profound commitment to grave import and a lively and infectious play with 
representations. 
In the late eighteenth century, both art and organism were identified as sites of 
boundaried complexity and transformational activity. Schiller intended the Aesthetic 
38 In a long footnote to Letter XIII, Schiller described play's first earnestness, its own 
dynamic of reciprocal relations. The complexity of this interaction between the original 
drives is a representation of the life of the mind, and the capacity to play is an analogue 
of life processes described in philosophical physiology. In this formulation, he began by 
countering Kant: one can't just have subordination of sense. From such a solution, "only 
uniformity can result, never harmony, and man goes on forever being divided. ' 
Subordination there must, of course, be; but it must be reciprocal. For even though it is 
true that limitation can never be the source of the Absolute, and hence freedom never be 
dependent upon time, it is no less certain that the Absolute can of itself never be the 
source of limitation, or a condition in time dependent upon freedom. Both principles are, 
therefore, at once subordinated to each other and co-ordinated with each other, that is to 
say, they stand in reciprocal relation to one another: without form no matter, and without 
matter no form. How things stand with the Person in the realm of ideas we frankly do not 
know; but that it can never become manifest in the realm of time without taking on 
matter, of that we are certain. In this realm, therefore, matter will have some say, and not 
merely in a role subordinate to force, but also co-ordinate with it and independently of it. 
Necessary as it may be, therefore, that feeling should have no say in the realm of reason, 
it is no less necessary that reason should not presume to have a say in the realm of 
feeling. Just by assigning to each of them its own sphere, we are by that very fact 
excluding the other from it, and setting bounds to each, bounds which can only by 
transgressed at the risk of detriment to both" (XIII.2 fu * 1 my emphasis. Cf. Herder page 
237). 
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Letters to be organically complete, an original, a means and an end in itself, "unified and 
transformed by the dominant intention of presenting art as an educative power." He 
intended it to be "[t]ransformed too by [his] evident desire to write not just a treatise on 
aesthetics but an aesthetic treatise," an example of the new discipline of the 'art of 
thinking beautifully' as well as the 'science of the beautiful'" (W&W xxviii).39 
There has always been argument about the unity ofthe letters (which in fact first 
appeared in serial fashion, creating a chronological division). In their Introduction, 
Wilkinson and Willoughby compared the dualism within Schiller's model of the unified 
psyche and the binary structure of the Aesthetic Letters, noting that both oppositions 
resolve into a third synthetic entity. In human nature, the sense-drive and the form-drive 
relate reciprocally in the play-drive; human sense and reason combine in the aesthetic 
state, making the whole man possible. In the work itself, ideal beauty applied to 
empirical humanity opened up new possibilities of transformational human experience. 
Schiller used the same strategy linguistically. When his rhetorical figures, polarities and 
chiasma, all his dynamic play with polar terms resolved into triads of unity, Wilkinson 
and Willoughby saw his word and figure use as a "linguistic analogue of the dynamics of 
the psyche" (xcvii, Appendix 111).40 They concurred absolutely with "Schiller's own 
39 In an essay that was contained in Goethe's Italian Journey, Moritz wrote, "The concept 
of beauty, which for us has arisen from the fact that it need not be useful, thus requires 
not only that it exist as a self-contained whole, but that it be given as a self-contained 
whole to our senses, or can be grasped as such by our imagination. " (Bernstein "On the 
Artistic Imitation of the Beautiful (1788)" 138). "[T]he work of art is a microcosm, 
parallel in its structure to that of nature, and like that, 'a self-sufficient whole,' and 
beautiful only in so far as 'it has no need to be useful,'" continued Abrams paraphrase of 
Moritz, "The work of art 'needs no end, no purpose for its presence outside itself, but has 
its entire value, and the end of its existence, in itself" (Abrams 327). 
40 For paradigmatic chiasma, see XIII.2 fn* 1, partially reproduced on page 257 fn 38. 
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claim that the structure as a whole was unassailable" reminding readers that he wrote 
repeatedly to Komer and Goethe of "its unity, simplicity and severity, of its inner 
consistency ... and of his conviction that it was 'all of a piece'" (xlviii). Finally, for 
them, unity was attained for the art object when the treatise on aesthetics transformed 
into aesthetic treatise.41 They allowed, however, that the "treatise ... has the shape of a 
torso. A torso with one arm missing" if we believe that Schiller left out the "energetic 
beauty" he promised to discuss (lviii).42 In short, the translators argued tirelessly for the 
organic unity of the work. Artistically, structurally, linguistically, etymologically. 
Beiser, as noted earlier, argued for the Aesthetic Letters' philosophic unity and the 
durability of its philosophizing. Admitting that beauty in the essay is both means and 
end, and that in it as well, "education through art becomes an education to art," Beiser 
described the work as a treatise on aesthetic education and an analytic of the beautiful 
41 Wilkinson and Willoughby found Schiller to be a borrower in order to construct an 
original: he pulled in all kinds of materials from his environment for incorporation into 
his work: he of course inherited a model of the psyche "as a bundle of faculties, divided -
according to the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition - into an upper and lower storey .... From 
Fichte ... he borrowed a model of the self and its conditions - reminiscent of the 
theological doctrine of the Person and His Attributes - which served him for describing 
the determinations of the psyche in its goal-directed activities. From his colleague at 
lena, the philosopher Karl Reinhold, he took a model of the psyche as a complex of 
interdependent drives - analogous to a field of forces - which provided him with some of 
the dynamics his other models lacked. And from Herder he appropriated a genetic 
account of the dawn of self-consciousness, in the individual and the race ... 
amalgamated no doubt with mystical doctrines of the Swabian Pietists. [It] enabled him 
to postulate an aesthetic modulation of the psyche in activities not otherwise to be termed 
aesthetic: to distinguish between the structure of the psyche and its modalities, between 
the practical, scientific, or ethical value of an act and its overall aesthetic tone or temper" 
(Model 239). 
42 The justification for its absence is that "energetic beauty" (opposed to "melting beauty" 
XVI, XVII) may have been considered by Schiller to be "identical with the sublime, [and 
therefore] was best treated - according to tradition - as a distinct 'genus,' rather than as a 
'species' of the beautiful" or . .. (lviii). 
259 
united as "an apology for beauty, a defense for the aesthetic dimension of human life" 
(Gadamer qtd. 120, 123). 
Through his work on the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller's understanding of organism 
changed. The concept of means as end, and end as means, of a harmonious and 
balanced-autonomous--economy was not completely adequate. The work of art, like 
an organism, developed and transformed through his effort to apply form to encompass 
new materials, and through its own history. As a form, therefore, the ideal of "wholeness 
was only ... achieved as a changing pattern in time, a constantly shifting hierarchy of 
interests and values and powers, in which the dominant was properly determined by the 
requirements of the immediate situation" (xxxix). This whole encompassed more 
tension, more energy, asymmetry, recovery, reach and adjustment. By the end of the 
century this more dynamic understanding of organism had a life of its own in the larger 
culture - and that model was applied to art. Such an idea of organism was not the 
antithesis of the mechanism of lower nature, but a third, a transformational third, created 
by incorporation of mechanism into the organic. Its metamorphosis promoted the higher 
order management of imbalance, things tilting toward the future, toward the edges of 
space (lxxxiv). As a human product, art is an analogue to human wholeness: art objects 
are harmoniously balanced, yes, but dynamic as well, and they develop in relation with 
us. As instantiations of beauty, they are reciprocally the means and end of our 
development. 
260 
Schiller, a man of his century, was directly engaged "the drama of the present time" 
(II.2, V.3).43 The Aesthetic Letters was his response to the current political situation, 
revolution; it was written in a one-sided epistolary genre that literally reached out to 
engage its readers. In spite of its groundedness, it also connects the author-and-narrator-
subject through the common object (a philosophical work ofliterary art) to the reader-
subjects in a reciprocal relation across time. With respect to us, the readers of this 
century, it is an engagement to play. Right from the outset Schiller shares the results of 
his exploration of "Art and Beauty" (1.1) with us. As readers, each of us is addressed as 
someone with a heart "fully sensible of the power of beauty and prompt to act upon it." 
As an "acute thinker," a liberal citizen of the world [Weltburger]," are you not willing to 
engage, are you not willing to be a good sport, to pitch in and do your part? (II.5). 
Schiller writes to a sympathetic ear, and each of us is suborned. Each of us is playfully, 
amicably,jorced to be the enlightened one to whom he writes.44 You are in, and so am I: 
we are playing with Schiller before we know it. Pulled onto the dance floor, each of us 
finds himself in the dance and dancing, learning the Kantian steps, the poetic maneuvers: 
43 "Let me tum my attention at once to the object most in evidence on this enormous 
canvass .... The fabric of the natural State is tottering, its rotting foundations giving way, 
and there seems to be a physical possibility of setting law upon the throne, of honouring 
man at last as an end in himself, and making true freedom the basis of political 
associations. Vain hope! The moral possibility is lacking, and a moment so prodigal of 
opportunity finds a generation unprepared to receive it .... And what a figure [ man] cuts 
in the drama ofthe present time!" (V.1-3) 
44 "The freedom ojyour mind shall, I promise you, remain inviolable"(L3), and what 
"better use of the freedom you accord me than by keeping your attention fixed upon the 
domain of the fine arts?" (II. 1 my emphasis) "What an agreeable surprise if, despite all 
difference in station, and the vast distance which the circumstances of the actual word 
make inevitable, I were, in the realm of ideas, to find my conclusions identical with those 
of a mind as unprejudiced as your own!" (II.5) 
261 
each, perspiring with effort, enjoys. Schiller collects us into a form that, like an English 
reel of spinning words, makes means ends and ends means (W & W lxx, cxxxi; Schiller's 
poem "Der Tanz"). You and I, other readers as well, are enticed into an activity of mind 
and body, into our own development. This is Schiller's play. He plays with us as if 
present today and - we play with him. The goal is the activity itself, guided by the 
beauty and all the possibility of human nature. As he promised, "[y]our own feeling will 
provide me with the material on which to build, our own free powers of thought dictate 
the laws according to which we are to proceed" (I.3): the process however is governed by 
the way our minds work in reality, based on Schiller's intuitive understanding of human 
beings. 
As such, the work's vital functions, its sensitivity and irritability as well as the above 
mentioned self-maintenance, generation and development, promote transformation of 
material: the Aesthetic Letters does not just develop narratively in time and spatially as a 
whole, but itself becomes a developmental force in others.45 Generating like a hydra? 
45 Regarding sensibility and irritability: as if poked, questioned or prodded, Schiller 
checked his reader often. He was especially sensitive to any flagging enthusiasm and 
aware of the perhaps unreasonable demands of his text. He often provided 
encouragement and commiseration at the beginning and end of letters: "Have I not ... ? 
That is scarcely the reproach I anticipate ... Such a report, you tell me ... " (Vr.l); "[b Jut 
is this not, perhaps, to argue in a circleT' (IX. 1 ). "I have now reached the point to which 
all my preceding reflections have been tending" (IX.2). "You, are, then, in agreement 
with me, and persuaded ... " (X. 1 ). "I am drawing ever nearer the goal towards which I 
have been leading you by a not exactly encouraging path. If you will consent to follow 
me a few steps further along it, horizons all the wider will unfold and a pleasing prospect 
perhaps requite you for the labour of the journey" (XV. 1). "But, you may long have been 
tempted to object, is beauty not degraded by being made to consist of mere play?" 
(XV.6). "Resign yourself therefore to one more brief sojourn in the sphere of 
speculation, in order thereafter to leave it for good, and proceed, with steps made all the 
more sure, over the terrain of experience" (XVII.5). "At this point we must remind 
ourselves that we are dealing with a finite, not with an infinite, mind" (XIX.9). "You 
need have no fear for either reality or truth ... " (XXVII. 1 ). And of course, "we" know 
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An insect? A plant? An animal? Examples abound: what did Werther create, and how 
were those new subjects and objects created? A functioning Goethe, separated from his 
diseased parts? And what of those parts, the unhealthy feeling, the imitation of the 
characteristic attitude, dress and posture, the sickness unto death? To what 
metamorphosis, but Torquato Tasso? And what ofthis work, the Aesthetic Letters? A 
synthesis of friendship and esteem? What did it generate, but a thousand players 
playing?46 This dissertation. 
Finally, there are a number of ways to interpret the narrative progress of Aesthetic 
Letters, to represent its wholeness. For the purposes of example, a medical model will be 
presented here, a Schein, an epidemiological study that includes individual case 
presentations. The reason is the excuse. Schiller was a physician of objective and 
subjective human nature, who witnessed a catastrophe of reason, the French Revolution 
(11).47 The mortality and morbidity were extremely high. The symptom complex of the 
many things together, for example, what is necessary for the psyche (VI. 1 0), and that 
"[o]ur Age is Enlightened; that is to say, such knowledge has been discovered and 
publicly disseminated as would suffice to correct at least our practical principles" 
(VIII.4). "Man, as we know, is neither exclusively matter nor exclusively mind" (XV.5). 
"We can, then, distinguish three different moments or stages of development through 
which both the individual and the species as a whole must pass ... " (XXIV.l). "We 
have now been led" (XIV. I) and we ponder together many significant questions: "Can we 
perhaps look for such action [toward insuring human wholeness] from the State?" (VII); 
"Is Philosophy then to retire, dejected and despairing, from this field?" (VIII). "How, 
then, are we to restore the unity of human nature which seems to be utterly destroyed by 
this primary and radical opposition [the two original drives, the sense-drive and the form-
drive]?" (XIII. 1 ). "But how is the artist to protect himself against the corruption of the 
age which besets him on all sides?" (IX.5). "But does such a State of Aesthetic 
Semblance really exist? And if so, where is it to be found?" (XXVII. 12). And of course, 
reader: "Dare to be wise!" (VIII.6). 
46 Hegel, Coleridge and the Romantics, Peirce, the twentieth century hermeneuticians, 
and transplanted German philosophers, for example. 
47 Cf. Albert Camus' The Plague (1947). 
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disorder varied in the population: some were sick with a violent illness, one that 
intensified the emotions, manifested itself in lack of self-awareness, empathy and 
capacity with symbols, in a word, in unconsidered, reflexive action (i.e. savages IV.6). 
Others appeared yoked to the ordinary, not alert to the crisis due to muted or over-
controlled feeling, their interests narrowed and their approach to life perversely or 
apathetically self-serving (that is, barbarians IV.6). Schiller's diagnosis of the times and 
its ills: the outbreak constituted a crisis of Enlightenment (European human crisisitis). 
(This affliction was a new illness, unknown in past cultures (VI).) Everyone including 
Schiller worried about the virulence of the epidemic: would it cross national borders? 
While most were concerned about savagery, he saw barbarism, as a more subtle but more 
dangerous, even malignant, manifestation (V.5).48 He recommended safety precautions 
for caregivers, both the artists (IX) and the scientists (XIII.4 fn 2). He performed an 
examination of the population, individual by individual, and then generalized his 
findings. He analyzed mental status in particular and found that basic human dividedness 
constituted a susceptibility to this disease (XI-XIII). To his relief, however, there was a 
natural unified state of human nature, one that could be restored and maintained (XIV, 
XV). The preventative regimen and the cure were essentially the same: restoration to 
this natural unity, a unity to be regained and maintained by exposure to beauty, by each 
person's always developing his own potential. (X, XVIII). This treatment was, as 
Schiller understood it, a life-long one - human beings must learn and relearn how to 
direct and manage their attention pleasurably, how to allow it to be developed by a 
48 "Thus do we see the spirit of the age wavering between perversity and brutality, 
between unnaturalness and mere nature, between superstition and moral unbelief; and it 
is only through an equilibrium of evils that it is still sometimes kept within bounds" 
(V.5). 
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sensate ideal. They must free themselves continuously; they must play (XV). The cure 
might have to be administered homeopathically at first, on an individual basis, and 
increased as the patient himself developed. Schiller was very well aware of the long 
history of the medication's misuse as well as its past history of involvement with 
misconceived host-parasite (subject-object) relations (XVIII). When he reviewed the 
history of beauty's adverse effects and its side-effect profile, he noted that, while the 
racemic mixture is the ideal (X), beauty generally came in two enantiomers (mirror-
image stereoisomers), that is, as melting or as energizing beauty. (XVI, XVII). Wrongly 
administered by a society similarly affected, these cures could be like chemotherapy, as 
bad as the disease. And often, compounders had gotten and still got the formula wrong; 
patients became addicted to certain readily available but impure and adulterated products 
(XVI, XVII). However disappointing these findings were, Schiller was not deterred: he 
reflected next on the patients and their developmental histories. In them, he found reason 
to hope: nature seemed on the side of human potential: self-awareness, empathy 
(sociability), play with its delight in representation developed serially but spontaneously 
in many a healthy individual - and also in certain populations, societies that encouraged 
autonomy. He noted that beauty and freedom (and the aesthetic space that conceives, 
develops and nurtures them) were a part of the history of humanity (XIX- XXII). He 
ended on an optimistic note: if humans could survive this plague, they would do so 
transformed by their bold efforts to heal and stay healthy, and they would transform civil 
society as well (XXVII). 
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The Whole Man: Man Playing Toward Wholeness 
'" Art itself is natural to man,' who is 'in some measure the artificer' of 
his own nature. 'He is perpetuallly busied in reformations.' There is no 
human state of repose" (Ferguson qtd. in Wokler 128). 
Schiller was committed to the complete anthropological and aesthetic view of man, 
of experiencing human wholeness. According to Wilkinson and Willoughby, he 
supported this view with several different models and drew on a number of cultural 
antecedents (Model). He depended on two different representations: first, he proposed a 
drive theory of human nature that achieved human wholeness through the exercise of the 
play drive and through repeated access to the aesthetic state. This theory was part of an 
overall organic model, supported by natural history and philosophy, specifically, vitalism. 
It also elaborated a metaphor system of living forms and organic growth, one that had 
ideals to be "'cultivated,' [ideals like] harmony, perfection and consistency" (240).49 
Then, he also constructed a speculative history as Hobbes, Rousseau, Monboddo and 
Herder had done as a model for the development of man's capacity to play. 
In addition to these models, others were at the time active and near to hand. One of 
them, according to Wilkinson and Willoughby, was the Renaissance uomo universal, 
brought to life again in the Spectator and continued in Germany by Georg Christoph 
49 W&W noted that "[a]t some stage in the process of turning his epistolary drafts into a 
treatise in epistolary form Schiller must have learnt a good deal more about the principles 
of biological organization than the knowledge embodied in such stock formulas as, say, 
that adopted by his friend Komer for his own 'aesthetic credo' in 1790: that a living 
organism is distinguished from a mere mechanical 'aggregate of elements' by the fact 
that in the former 'part and whole are reciprocally means and end.' And it seems 
plausible that he learnt it from Goethe during those exchanges on natural science in July 
1794 which proved the starting-point of their friendship." (Model 249). 
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Lichtenberg.5o Lichtenberg, a contemporary of Schiller's, now remembered principally 
as an aphorist, contributed the following, an appreciation of living form: 
If anyone in the whole world wishes to etch a rule of conduct upon his 
hand with the aid of needles and saltpeter, I would propose the one I once 
read in some number of the 'Spectator': 'The whole man must move 
together.' Transgressions against this maxim are beyond counting, and the 
damage arising therefrom great and often irreparable. Under 'man' 
[Mensch] I include head, heart, mouth and hands. And it takes a master to 
pursue the art of driving these inseparably together, through wind and 
weather, right up to the end where all movement ceases (Model 244_5).51 
Goethe too had an understanding of his own psychic unity, and he developed his 
insights about self-management and creativity into an extended metaphor. As such it is 
instructive of his contributions to Schiller's project. 
It suddenly dawned on me when I came upon Pindar's words the power of 
mastery [epikratein dunasthai]. If you stand up boldly in your chariot, and 
four unbroken horses rear in wild disorder against your curb, and you 
guide their mettle, whipping the one who steps out of line back into the 
ranks, the one who rears up and down to the ground again, and drive them, 
and guide them, and turn them, whip and hold them, and go on driving 
them, until all sixteen hooves carry you to your goal as if in single step -
that is Mastery, epigratein, Virtuosity. And what if all I've been doing is 
to stroll about just taking a peep at this and that. Never really getting hold 
of anything. To get your hands into a thing, seize hold of it, that is the 
essence of mastery of whatever kind ("Letter to Herder July 1772" Model 
131). 
50 Lichtenberg (1742-1799), a physicist colleague of Kant and Goethe, introduced 
Franklin's lightening rod to Germany. He was lampooned by his contemporaries for his 
enthusiasm about physical culture. 
51 A number of complete human models emerged in the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries: for example, Christian Thomasius introduced "bon gout" into German in 1687 
in opposition to the pedant or homme galant. The man of good taste "showed 
discrimination in the affairs of everyday life; he did not slavishly follow fashion or 
cultivate an air of idiosyncrasy but rather demonstrated decorum, elegance, and self-
confidence" (Moore in Herder Aesthetics 20). Many are the ways of being a man, even 
one involved in the humanities: Mendelssohn wrote: "For the virtuoso fine arts and 
sciences are a preoccupation, for the amateur a source of pleasure, and for the 
philosopher a school of instruction" (169). 
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Schiller was much taken with Johann Joachim Winckelmann's contributions, his 
potent mythology, and particularly with his representation of the early Greeks as living 
simply and naturally with beauty. 52 Letter VI reflected Schiller's study of their "noble 
simplicity and tranquil grandeur" [eine edle Einfalt und eine stille GrofJe], their 
expression of the "ideal of humanity, of human completeness and self-sufficiency" 
(Nisbet German 4).53 He used Winckelmann's idealization, "the natural humanity of the 
Greeks" as a counterpoint to contemporary forms of humanity. The Greeks "were 
wedded to all the delights of art and all the dignity of wisdom, without however, like us, 
falling a prey to their seduction. The Greeks put us to shame not only by a simplicity to 
which our age is a stranger; they are at the same time our rivals, indeed often our models" 
(VI.2). 
Winckelmann himself was something of a model. Though Goethe may have used 
Winckelmann as a foil to write about himself and his own responses to the natural world, 
Goethe nevertheless found the occasion (an elegiac essay in 1805) to valorize healthy 
52Winckelmann (1717-68) spent many, miserable years before becoming a research 
assistant to a Count near Dresden and gained access to an excellent library. He studied 
literature and religion systematically and converted to Catholicism before moving to 
Rome in 1755. His "Thought on the Imitation of the Painting and Sculpture ofthe 
Greeks" (1755), from which the quote below is taken, began the German love affair with 
Hellenism. Once in Rome, Winckelmann became an eminent scholar of classicism and 
connoisseur of Greek art; he was appointed to the office of Prefect of Antiquities and 
held a position at the Vatican Library. 
53 "Finally, the universal and predominant characteristic of the Greek masterpieces is a 
noble simplicity and tranquil grandeur, both in posture and expression. Just as the depths 
of the sea remain forever calm, however much the surface may rage, so does the 
expression of the Greek figures, however strong their passions, reveal a great and 
dignified soul. Such a soul is depicted in the face of Laocoon ... " (Winckelmann in 
Nisbet 42). 
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connectedness not only as a state of the body and mind, but as a way being -joyously in 
the world: 
Winckelmann brought to his life a genuinely antique spirit ... not only to 
enjoy happiness but to endure misfortune: for just as healthy fibres resist 
disease and rapidly recover from every attack of illness, so also can that 
healthy sense which distinguished the ancients recover quickly and easily 
from internal or external accidents .... When the healthy nature of man 
functions as a totality, when he feels himself in the world as a vast, 
beautiful, worthy, and valued whole, when a harmonious sense of well-
being affords him pure and free delight - then the universe, if it were 
capable of sensation, would exult at having reached its goal, and marvel at 
the culmination of its own development and being. For what is the use of 
all the expenditure of suns and planets and moons, of stars and galaxies, of 
comets and nebulae, of completed and developing worlds, if at the end a 
happy man does not unconsciously rejoice in existence? (Goethe qtd. in 
Nisbet German 237_8).54 
With the Greeks and with Winckelmann, "[h]owever high the mind might soar, it always 
drew matter lovingly along with it; and however fine and sharp the distinctions it might 
make, it never proceeded to mutilate" (VI.3). 
Schiller's own achievement was to weigh many values and synthesize them all: 
organic humanity, graceful organic movement as lebende Gestalt, and the dignity of 
mastering of all one's powers and circumstances with equanimity, even happiness. His 
over-arching consideration was, however, "the possibility of each and every man 
becoming 'whole' within his own limits of endowment and situation - an essentially 
democratic possibility which was central to [his] theory of education" (246). His image 
of the "whole man" focused on unity through movement and development: it was a 
dynamic model that stressed on-going co-ordination, balance, harmony and symmetry of 
54 H. B. Nisbet: "The exemplary and historic significance which he attributes to 
Winckelmann in the essay ... belongs in even greater measure to Goethe himself: he has 
overshadowed German Literature for the last two hundred years" (235). Goethe in 
conversation with Eckermann on Winckelmann: "One learns nothing on reading him, but 
one becomes something" (qtd. in Nisbet 7). 
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the human psyche within the aesthetic space. Schiller's respite, the aesthetic space, was 
the default position, the reboot for goal-directed activity, a starting-block for actions that 
followed yet another model, one that captured Goethe's sensitivity to irreversible growth, 
a dominant principle, and combined subordination, hierarchy, imbalance, and asymmetry 
(249). 
Again Schiller's model was the complete anthropological view [die vollstiindige 
anthropologische Schiitzung] that "every individual human being carries within him, 
potentially and prescriptively, an ideal man, the archetype of a human being, and it is his 
life's task to be, through all his changing, manifestations, in harmony with the 
unchanging unity of his ideal" (lV.2) The failure of his fellows to live fully and to fulfill 
their potential plagued Schiller: "[b Jut can Man really be destined to miss himself for the 
sake of any purpose whatsoever?" Aesthetic education provided humans the opportunity 
"to restore by means of a higher Art the totality of our nature which the arts themselves 
have destroyed" (VI.15). Based on experiences with beauty, its project was to deepen 
and broaden capacities for self-awareness, empathy and representation in each person. It 
was also a program "designed to make men - all men - willing and active participants in 
the political community, but without forfeiting their inalienable right to the full 
development of their unique and unrepeatable individuality" as well (Models 238). 
It is, then, not just poetic license but philosophical truth when we call 
beauty our second creatress. For although it only offers us the possibility 
of becoming human beings, and for the rest leaves it to our own free will 
to decide how far we wish to make this a reality, it does in this resemble 
our first creatress, Nature, which likewise conferred upon us nothing more 
than the power of becoming human, leaving the use and practice of that 
power to our own free will and decision (XXI. 6). 
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The Man Himself: Portrait of a Zwitterart 
o Aesthetics! in which cavern of the Muses is sleeping the young man of 
my philosophical nation destined to raise you to perfection[?] 
(Herder Aesthetics 2). 
What is man? What is a whole man, but a work of art in time? (cf. Kant Third § 1 0). 
Here is the life of a man working toward wholeness; it is the life that was poured into the 
Aesthetic Letters. Beauty and freedom, autonomy and art were the benchmarks of its 
development. Johann Christoph Friedrich Schiller, one ofthe greatest German literary 
figures, poet and philosopher, wrote almost continuously from his school years. He 
crafted poetry most consistently, but also authored an unfinished novel, a short story and 
ten plays including the trilogy Wallenstein. He also completed an anonymous review of 
one of his own plays, a philosophical dialogue, occasional essays, histories of the Thirty 
Years War and the revolt ofthe Netherlands, and several substantial philosophical essays 
on aesthetics, one of which is the occasion of this dissertation. He often moved back and 
forth between creative endeavors and technical ones, in an effort to reenergize himself. 55 
It was this tendency that set him studying history and philosophy after his disappointment 
with both the process and product of his play, Don Carlos (1787). A period of 
particularly intense attention to Kant's Critiques between 1792-94, provoked the 
development of his own ideas within a Kantian structure and produced his major 
philosophical works between 1793-96. The Aesthetic Letters was a part of this project. 
55 Once, in 1784 in "The Effect of Theatre on the People" (also called "The Theatre 
considered as a Moral Institution" [Vom Wirken der Schaubuhne auf das VolkD, Schiller 
asked his fellows the question, "whether the business to which we are devoting the best 
part of our mental powers is compatible with the dignity of our spirit," that is, are we, am 
I, following my true vocation? His movement back and forth between creator and critic, 
artist and philosopher, physician and patient, allowed for the perspective of ubiquity: it 
empowered him to answer with self-correction (Reed Schiller 33). 
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He wrote plays again only after the publication of "On NaIve and Sentimental Poetry," a 
final philosophical essay that, though an explication of a duality in human nature, 
paradoxically signaled a hard-won unity of his own self-experience and the resolution of 
anxiety about his mixed nature. 
Schiller's life as narrative is a developmental history of his spiral movement in and 
out of the aesthetic state, from determinability to determination, from contemplation to 
project, from freedom in play to necessity - followed by release to reflection once again. 
In beauty's gift, the aesthetic state, was his second mother's loving gaze and her safe lap, 
a holding environment for recalibration (Winnicott). 
[By means of the aesthetic] the personal worth of a man, or his dignity, 
inasmuch as this can depend solely upon himself, remains completely 
indeterminate; and nothing more is achieved by it than that he is 
henceforth enabled by the grace of Nature to make of himself what he 
will-that the freedom to be what he ought to be is completely restored to 
him .... True, he possesses this humanity in potentia before every 
determinate condition into which he can conceivably enter. But he loses it 
in practice with every determinate condition into which he does enter. 
And if he is to pass into a condition of an opposite nature, this humanity 
must be restored to him each time anew through the life of the aesthetic 
.... It is then, not just poetic license but philosophical truth when we call 
beauty our second creatress. (XXI. 4-6) 
At fifteen, Schiller matriculated at Karlsschule (1775-80), the Duke of 
Wi.irttemburg's Military Academy at Solitude. His invitation to attend the academy was a 
recognition of his father's service to the Duke as forester, a consideration proffered to a 
subordinate which could not be regretted. There then he was sent. There, Schiller, who 
longed for a theological education, made a forced choice - first to study the law and then 
medicine. 56 Within that curriculum however there was a species of freedom: the students 
56 "[H]e wanted to be a preacher, dedicated to the cure of souls" (W & W xxxi). When 
Schiller transferred from law to medicine, he gave up intensive study of languages (Greek 
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were offered incredible diversity, an extensive acquaintance with philosophy - the 
ancients, Descartes, Leibniz, the Wolffians, the philosophes, Locke, Shaftesbury, the 
common sense school of Ferguson, Hutcheson and Reid, and the contemporary Germans 
including Sulzer, Garve, Herder Lessing and Mendelssohn. The medicine taught there 
was philosophical as well, oriented toward psychosomatic interpretation. Schiller's two 
dissertations indicated that bias: the rejected "Philosophy of Psychology" ["Philosophie 
der Psychologie"] (1779) and his "Essay on the Connection between the Animal and the 
Spiritual Nature of Man" (1780) reflected Schiller's search for a ground in the physical 
nature of man for the possibility of freedom (Dewhurst 38, W&W xxxi).57 According to 
Wilkinson and Willoughby, "The notion of the human mind as an organic growth, 
reciprocally related to the physical organism, was and remained a genuine interest, as 
genuine as his unshakeable belief in the freedom of the human spirit" (xxxiii). 
There at Karlsschule, Jakob Friedrich Abel (1751-1829) was his mentor, and this 
mentor's method was "reasoning from experience" (xxxi). Keenly interested in the new 
psychology, Abel directed Schiller's attention to Shakespeare and to forensic psychology, 
his avocation. There too, Schiller spent a good deal of time in the Infirmary where he 
wrote The Robbers [Die Rauber] for the desk drawer, expressing in the characters and the 
plot his experience of the tyranny of his Duke, who supported his extravagant lifestyle by 
and Latin) for the study of physiology, anatomy, pathology, osteology, chemistry and 
natural history (Dewhurst 34). 
57 The French figures included La Mettrie and Helvetius in addition to the 
Encyciopedistes. Directly after an example from Shakespeare, Schiller included a 
passage from The Robbers in his dissertation, a nose-thumbing reference from the "Life 
of Moor, a Tragedy by Krake, V.l" (Dewhurst 273). 
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selling troops to fight in the American war and who refused Schiller and other cadets 
family visits. By proxy, the Duke ran a claustrophobic ally regimented institution. 58 
After graduation Schiller, who needed an additional year of education in order to 
practice autonomously, was limited to Duke Karl Eugen's employ. From him, he 
received an undistinguished appointment as a regimental physician in Stuttgart. 
Schiller's responsibilities were light, and the work was unchallenging and repetitive. 
According to Abel, who was his correspondent, Schiller had difficulty managing his 
money and occasionally his alcohol, gaining something of a reputation for dissipation and 
"addiction to conviviality" (Dewhurst 66). A contemporary found him living in 
"picturesque disorderliness" but, beneath it all, Schiller was aware of his capacities. He 
had The Robbers printed at his own expense (July 1781) and prepared a stage adaptation 
for Dahlberg's Mannheim Theatre. Then, in January 1782, Schiller, without permission, 
left his duty station to see his own play produced. An eyewitness reported the behavior 
of spectators after the play: 
58 For very good reason Schiller was spectacularly unhappy at the institution: the Duke's 
idea of discipline created an extremely oppressive atmosphere of constant supervision. 
Pupils were required to wear uniforms and wigs and to request permission to perform the 
most basic functions. It was an inhumane environment as well: he, for example, met his 
two younger sisters only after graduating in 1780. As part of the medical curriculum he 
was assigned to companion his school friend Grammont during that student's bout of 
depression. Confined to the infirmary (June 1780), Grammont was isolated, treated with 
emetics and subject to clinical observation and reportage. Schiller's assessment was 
clinical depression, a condition that seemed partly situational, arising from the cold and 
restrictive institutional environment, homesickness [Heimweh], and distressing nausea 
and anorexia (the side-effects of treatment). In his encounters with Grammont, he 
practiced an empathic psychotherapy but was countermanded from further contact 
because of his "indulgent methods." Grammont's pleas to leave the "repugnant" 
institution were poignant: the patient "longed for the freedom to enjoy the beauty and 
solitude of nature." Grammont was released from the Academy in December 1781; he 
was reported cured by 1783. He married, supported a family as a tutor in Russia and as a 
Gymnasium professor (Dewhurst 177-201). 
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the theatre was like bedlam with rolling eyes, shaking fists and hoarse 
cries in the auditorium. Strangers embraced one another in tears, women 
staggered towards the exit on the point of swooning. There was a 
universal commotion like in Chaos, and from its mists was born a new 
Creation (Dewhurst 69-70). 
Schiller's flamboyant success was an offense against good taste from the standpoint of 
his benefactor, the Duke, and he was warned to refrain from further public lapses of 
judgment. 59 Schiller however was young, lionized and angry; he continued to call 
attention to himself and offend. Once more he disappeared to attend one of his plays, 
was discovered, rebuked, incarcerated for two weeks and commanded to refrain from 
writing and publishing. When the Duke rejected his plea to be allowed to do literary 
work, Schiller left. On September 22, 1782, he and his friend Andreas Streicher, as 
Doctors Ritter and Wolff, rode out to Mannheim. Dr. Ritter did not come back. 
After his escape, Schiller scraped by financially, writing plays and essays, starting 
periodicals to be vehicles of his support - Rheinische Thalia (1784), Thalia (1787), Die 
Horen (1795) - a life-long gambit. Supported minimally by Dahlberg of Mannheim 
Theatre for a year (1783-84), he was saved by strangers, part of his public. Young people 
like himself, fans of the playwright creator of Karl Moor, offered him a home at Leipzig 
(he arrived in 1785), financial support and camaraderie - in short, a life-saving 
community. His mutually satisfying and intellectually reciprocal relationship with one of 
them, Christian Gottfried Komer, lasted the rest of his life. Their lively and intimate 
59 The Duke's displeasure had consequences; Karl Eugen had a history of punishing 
offending subjects with long imprisonments. The poet Schubart, who had called the 
Academy "a slave plantation" in print, thereby identifYing its "strictly instrumental use of 
local abilities," was lured back to Wlirttemburg in 1777, arrested and imprisoned for ten 
years (Reed Schiller 9, 10). 
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correspondence yielded the Kalliasbriefe, Schiller's incomplete but provocative effort to 
provide a deduction of an objective principle of beauty. 
Philosophically, Schiller's oppositions - sense and reason, authority and autonomy-
confronted each other in early works and his search for the middle, once posited in terms 
of Milte/kraft in his dissertation, was articulated in "The Stage as a Moral Institution" 
(1784). In that piece, he wrote: "[o]ur nature ... demands a middle-state [einen mittleren 
ZustandJ which unites the two opposed extremes, moderates the harsh tension between 
them, and facilitates the transition from one state to another" (xxxiv).60 The stage, and 
later all art, became for him a representation of an transformational aesthetic state, one 
that allows humans to "rejoic[e] in the full knowledge of what it means to be a human 
being - 'ein Mensch zu sein' - strengthened and healed to our fellow creatures" (Schiller 
qtd. in W&W xxxiv). During the time in Mannheim, Schiller wrote two plays, Fiesco 
and Intrigue and Love [Kabale und Liebe, originally titled Luise Millerin]; he then 
worked on another, Don Carlos, for the next several years. This play became something 
of a monster; written over too long a time, it escaped the inspiration of its inception. 
Each infusion of content required protean form-switching, and the play lengthened each 
time Schiller wrestled to get it under control. In the meantime, he grew up, he later 
wrote; he simply outgrew the play's principals (Reed Schiller 48-49). 
At something of a loss because of difficulties with Don Carlos and always in need of 
work that would support him, he began to write history. He moved to the Duchy of 
60 In "Anthropology," Reill incorporated Schiller's early work into his argument for 
Enlightenment vitalism. That author traced vitalistic interest in the "middle" through 
Schiller's example of an elaborately represented "expanded" or "extended" middle full of 
paradox and "creative oxymorons" (like "material ideas" and an "organ of thought"). All 
the while Schiller, Reill noted, followed "a logic of the ambiguous, enthroning 
complementarity over unity" (256-261). 
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Weimar in 1787, enjoyed historical research, published and gained a position as professor 
of History at lena in 1789 (partly due to Goethe's intervention).61 By 1790 he was 
granted a small pension by Duke Karl August of Sachsen-Weimar and, therefore, was 
able to marry and support a household. He had prospects of happiness he had hardly 
dared to imagine in his wife, his children, his colleagues and later, his garden. 
He, however, became seriously ill in 1791, so ill that rumors of his death reached as 
far as Denmark. When he recovered, his supporters there were overjoyed at the news. 
Recognizing the precarious state of his health (and of his affairs ifhe were unable to 
work regularly), they decided to arrange financial support: a three year grant from the 
Duke of Augustenburg allowed Schiller the leisure to study Kant and provided him the 
occasion to write On the Aesthetic Education of Man In a Series of Letters. 
In the summer of 1794 he finally met Goethe in a situation that led to private 
conversation and to immediate but formal intimacy. They were involved on an almost 
daily basis through letters and visits for the rest of Schiller's life. Shortly after their first 
meeting, Goethe wrote to him: "I have always had a high regard for the rare integrity and 
seriousness that are plain in everything you have written and done" (Reed Schiller!). 
Integrity. Seriousness. For Schiller, the movement toward wholeness was an 
affirmation of his own humanity. The measures of the goal were autonomy (which 
included all relations and connections) and freedom (within the boundaries of sociability) 
to self-develop and to encourage others. Because he was "addicted to the figure of 
61 Schiller was already reading Kant. Reinhold wrote Kant that Schiller's "universal 
history ... is designed on the lines of your plan, which he grasped with a purity and 
ardour that made him double dear to me" (14.vi.1789). Reed wrote that Schiller set out 
to be "Kant's Newton" of history (which made Schiller quite busy trying to be Newton) 
(Reed Schiller 56). 
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antithesis," because he negotiated a dynamic balance of opposites, of sense and thought, 
of art and science, of necessity and freedom, of autonomy and dependency, he was a 
person who had to strive self-consciously for that development. And because he was 
intimately aware of the tenuousness of existence, he reached for intensivity and 
extensivity in the process of daily living. To this end, "[t]he role of art, the integration of 
the psyche and the possibilities of exercising freedom," wrote Lesley Sharpe, were 
"matters that preoccupied Schiller for much of his creative life" (3). 
Personal autonomy encompassed all the other tasks. The battle for freedom was a 
battle enjoined early on: the struggle against the strictures of Karlsschule and his Duke -
through respites in the infirmary, the subversively written and produced Robbers and his 
escape from medicine. On his own he faced life's basic needs - and struggled to be self-
supporting by writing in the arts and philosophy. His need to establish himself played out 
in battles with his own inner conflictedness, with the overpowering image of another, 
Goethe, and with his own illnesses, his battered physicality. The first he settled with the 
establishment of a career, then a household and circle in lena and Weimar, and a 
reciprocal friendship. In the civic sphere, the Aesthetic Letters was his method to 
promote a sustainable freedom, an enlightenment for himself and others, the possibility of 
autonomy for the whole person with the help of society. 
He opposed himself to Goethe, at first against the famous genius' reputation and then 
within their friendship. Before their meeting, he had circled Goethe like an injured dog, 
and, in effect, kept himself subjectively in the great poet's shadow.62 "This feeling of 
62 W&W noted Schiller's lucidity about his ambivalence. He wrote to Komer of Goethe: 
"It is a curious mixture of hate and love he has aroused in me, a feeling not unlike that 
which Cassius and Brutus must have felt for Caesar. I could murder his spirit, and again 
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being Nature's stepchild was not to be assuaged," according to Wilkinson and 
Willoughby, "until to such knowledge of Self was added knowledge of the Other" 
(xxxvii). It was through that relationship with Goethe, the sociability of that friendship, 
their shared values and co-authorship, that Schiller came to accept himself as an equally 
legitimate type. He was a modem, a sentimentalist made up of creative and self-
reflective capacities. 
More, even as a Zwitterart, he realized he had the same enjoined task as Goethe did. 
In the end both had to be free, each had the duty to fulfill his potential, each must seek 
beauty in his own way and live a graceful life. In this, he always struggled with himself: 
for example, in 1792, after a period relatively barren of creativity, he wrote to Komer that 
he was ready to write creatively again. 
My pen has a veritable itch to start on Wallenstein. It is really only in art 
itself that I feel my full powers; in theorizing about it I always have to 
plague myself with principles. And I'm no more than an amateur there 
anyway. But for the sake of poetic practice I am very ready to 
philosophize about the theory of it. Criticism itself must now make good 
the damage it has done me. And it has indeed done me damage. For the 
boldness, the living fire, I felt before I was aware of any rules at all, has 
been absent for many a year. I now see myself creating and fashioning. I 
observe the play of inspiration, and my imagination behaves with less 
freedom since it feels itself no longer unobserved. Yet once I have got far 
enough for artistry to become as much nature to me as nurture is to the 
truly cultivated man, then my imagination will recover its former freedom 
and suffer no inhibitions except those it freely imposes upon itself. 
(W&Wxxxv). 
love it with all my heart" (2S.ii.1789). And, "I have to laugh when I think of all I have 
written to you about Goethe. You really will have seen me in all my weakness .... The 
long and the short of it is that this man, this Goethe, is in my way, and a constant 
reminder that fate has treated me harshly. How lightly was his genius born along by his 
fate, and how hard have I had to struggle ... " (9.iii.1789) (xxxvii). What a friendship 
Schiller had with Komer and what an opportunity for repair of self-inflicted injury was 
his friendship with Goethe. 
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His progress in overcoming his inhibitions ran through "On Grace and Dignity" [" Ober 
Anmut und Warde"] where he slighted Goethe (for whom he had both respect and envy), 
to the Aesthetic Letters, where he granted Goethe an appearance as the ideal natural 
scientist (XIII) and perhaps as the ideal artist (X), to the last "On NaIve and Sentimental 
Poetry" [Ober nafve und sentimentalische Dichtung 1795-6]. There he presented two 
human types, the naIve and sentimental, the realist and idealist, of equal value. After he 
first articulated his imbalance to Komer, it took him four years to get back to Wallenstein 
with his powers whole. 
Schiller was chronically ill for most of his adult life, and he opposed with his spirit 
the terrible necessity ofthe physical. He was a thin, tall, bird-like presence with a 
delicate constitution and a tendency toward melancholy (which he banished with frenetic 
energy and activity, writing all night when his health permitted and recovering in the 
mornings). From early in his life, he had some respiratory weakness which translated 
into a susceptibility to infection, either bronchitis or pneumonia. In 1791, he became 
desperately ill. His condition, possibly a tubercular empyema of one lung that ruptured 
though his diaphragm to his abdominal cavity, left him an invalid for the rest of his life. 
A limited breathing capacity, severe abdominal cramping (a symptom of partial 
obstruction of the intestines due to the adhesions of past infection) and a weakened 
respiratory and immune system, made terrifying bouts of illness a realistic possibility 
every winter thereafter. He wrote to Goethe in 1794, "I will do what I can and when the 
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building collapses I will perhaps have rescued what is worth preserving from the fire 
(31.viii.1794)" (Reed Schiller 5).63 
In 1776, when Schiller was just a student, Abel delivered his "Speech on Genius" at 
a Karlsschule assembly. 
The genius, filled with a sense of his strength, filled with noble pride, casts 
aside degrading fetters, and, scorning the cramped dungeon where the 
common mortal pines, tears himself free with heroic audacity and flies like 
the kingly eagle far above the tiny, base earth, soaring in the sunlight. 
You curse him for not remaining on the old track, for leaving the confines 
of wisdom and virtue - insects, he flew to the sun (Abel qtd. in Dewhurst 
305, 365).64 
Schiller heard his words eagerly - he intended then to be the eagle he became. 
63 My reconstruction based on information provided by Dewhurst and Reeves 82-85. 
Schiller's comments to Komer over the course of their correspondence, and particularly 
after 1791, show that he anticipated serious illness and death each winter. In 1793, two 
years after his near-fatal illness, he wrote to his friend: "From this letter you can see that 
the asphyxiating angel has passed over me so far. Three weeks have passed since the 
date at which I became ill last year, and four have passed since the day I became ill two 
years ago ... " (Bernstein Trans. Bird-Pollan 147). 
64 Information in this section was distilled from the following sources, Dewhurst 31-86; 





EPILOGUE: SCHILLER TODAY 
"[T]he direction is at once the Destination, and the Way is completed from 
the moment it is trodden" (IX.6) 
Time to sit, with our backs to the garden shed, another lawn chair pulled up, hat put 
on its empty seat, a place to remind us of Schiller - who brought us this far. The dogs 
have chased and flopped, panting, in the shade. Let's look out on the garden. 
Our Schiller, a synthesizer of reason, feeling and development, proposed a drive 
theory of human nature. This archetypal theory described playing as quintessentially 
human and humans as fully human only when they played. 
What happened to this large claim? 
Without its context of vitalistic science, it hid within the Aesthetic Letters like a little 
engine of argument. Only when a few parts of it were lifted out - to be quoted - then, 
what we heard had the ring of an aphorism, as difficult as a koan. What did he say? 
But there is a way to hear his theory as a claim about who we really are, a way to use 
it to play with our identity in earnest. Lately Robert Richards suggested that 
Naturphilosophie (the science that developed out of the vitalism of Schiller and Goethe's 
time) provided Darwin with a way of perceiving nature that led him to his theory of 
evolution by natural selection (Romantic). Richard's insight is instructive: 
Naturphilosophie was not considered normal science; what it and its late Enlightenment 
vitalistic beginnings provided to Darwin was an aesthetic view of nature. Through it, 
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Darwin experienced nature as a confused whole - he intuited nature as Baumgarten, 
Goethe, the Humboldts and Schiller did - as an organism, complete in all its connections 
and relations. Grounded in that experience of nature, supported by his own research and 
the work of many others, he developed the theory of evolution by natural selection. 
Schiller developed, out of his vitalistic context, a theory about the human being as a 
whole, a theory of the mind's structure, one that includes all its relations and connections. 
His theory of human nature may have value for us as a template. It might serve as a 
model for a current general theory of human evolution: as a macroevolutionary 
innovation, play advanced behavioral flexibility and organismic autonomy. Much of 
what we value in ourselves (and consider to be species-specific) can be seen as elaborated 
derivatives of ancestral mammalian play. 1 
1 Schiller's hypothesized mind structure as generative of play and evolved by the success 
of play would constitute a macroevolutionary innovation. According to Rosslenbroich, 
"[ a ]ttempts to explain the origin of macroevolutionary innovations have been only 
partially successful .... [P]atterns of major evolutionary transitions have to be 
understood first, before it is possible to further analyse the forces behind the process. The 
hypothesis is that major evolutionary innovations are characterized by an increase in 
organismal autonomy, in the sense of emancipation from the environment [and] ... 
increasing autonomy is defined as the evolutionary shift in the individual system -
environment relationship, such that the direct influences of the environment are gradually 
reduced and a stabilization of self-referential, intrinsic functions within the system is 
generated. This is [ a] relative autonomy because numerous interconnections with the 
environment and dependencies upon it are retained. Features of increasing autonomy are 
spatial separations, an increase in homeostatic functions and in body size, internalizations 
and an increase in physiological and behavioral flexibility" (623 my emphasis). Schiller 
detected "a glimmer of freedom even into the darkness of animal life" (XXVII. 3 ); 
Rosslenbroich found autonomy to be an active (rather than passive) biological adaptation 
characterized by separation from the environment, homeostatic capabilities, 
internalization of function, increase in size and flexibility within the environment (626). 
These adaptations are to be observed behaviorally in conventional play (637). If such 
play is considered a marker for pleasurable enframed attention, it signals increased 
autonomous adaptation from the broader category of structural and functional changes: 
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In order to bring Schiller's theory forward, to situate it in the life sciences of our 
time, the unknowns that late Enlightenment scientists struggled with must be named (in 
as far as it is possible). What they had attempted to manage with regulative judgment 
were the perceived designfeatures of living organisms that appeared to program future 
development. The reproductive and developmental capacities of living forms have now 
been explained naturalistically through the theory of evolution by natural selection and its 
mechanism, genetics. Applied to Schiller's theory, the theory of evolution reframes the 
play-drive into an adaptation, a trait developing by natural selection over evolutionary 
time. 
How can we, as an exercise in imaginative construction, put Schiller's theory on the 
tracks of evolution? How should Schiller's developmental history of man be retold? As 
he wrote, we were animals like other animals, first physically and then socially playful. 
Then, we developed as hominids expanding our functional behavioral flexibility through 
mental playfulness to aesthetic autonomy. Our play is potentially homologous with, 
directly biologically related to, that of other social mammals, our elaborate capacities but 
descendents of the play of our evolutionary ancestors. This is an interdisciplinary 
separation from environment (creation of a safe space socially and internally), 
homeostasis (keeping internal mental and cultural spaces relatively stable), internalization 
(the social play space is increasingly internalized as mentation), increase in size (more 
and more mental functions remain internal as opposed to being acted out; culture creates 
a larger and larger protective boundary among the individual, his society and nature) and 
flexibility (an infinite number of autonomous internal and external behavioral variations 
possible). That autonomy is adaptive complements Schiller's experience of freedom as 
"enjoined" [aufgegeben]: it is part of our nature, our process, our responsibility to 
develop toward autonomy, and it is the purpose of culture, as macro-play, to make 
individual freedom and autonomy a possibility (XIII.2, XIV.2, W&W xxxiv, Schaper 
"Towards" 159). Play just may be sublime. 
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construct, essentially, a proposal for a shared project of study. To propose that 
playfulness, pleasurable framed and flexible attention, is an inherited adaptive capability, 
one that itself became fabulously elaborated in its history, is to ground ourselves in our 
fixed evolutionary history. It is also to use an intuition of the confused whole to further 
our understanding of our own nature and nature itself. Whether this Anschauung is an 
idea or an experience, playfulness should be taken more seriously by scholars in the 
sciences and the humanities. 
It is important to remember two things about Schiller's theory of play: it is not really 
about behavior, though it has profound implications for all of human behavior, for animal 
and human play behavior. Schiller made a hypothesis about the structure andfunction of 
the human mind. To restate his theory in a more contemporary way (and in broad brush), 
he held that the older emotional part of the mind (the sense-drive) and the newer rational 
part of the brain (the later developing form-drive) interact, and interact in progressively 
more complex, asymmetrically reciprocal ways. For him they interacted in different 
hypothetical stages: the physical (senses and emotions) developing toward the aesthetic 
through the steps he called animal, rational animal, and human. Considering Schiller's 
perspective and what we are learning about animal minds, we might say that the rational 
and emotional interact in animals (and by implication in us) to allow for the experience of 
feelings and for judgments regarding the senses and internal well-being.2 When we were 
2 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was both study and speculation about 
animal's cognitive abilities. Hume, an author with whom Schiller was familiar, wrote: 
"First, it seems evident, that animals as well as men learn many things from experience, 
and infer, that the same events will always follow from the same causes. By this 
principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, 
and gradually, from their birth, treasure up knowledge ofthe nature of fire, water, earth, 
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like "rational animals," our drives interacted as they might in animals with their own 
species of reason. Then they promoted a developing sense of self, sense of the other (first 
as sympathy, then as empathy and a rudimentary theory of mind) and some capacity for 
representation. Our species-specific capacity to play (to combine the two parts of the 
mind for representation, mental and physical expression) was augmented by greatly 
elaborated and co-operatively functioning senses, the eye and the ear. Our pleasure in 
representation further developed our self-consciousness to self-awareness and our 
empathy to knowledge of other minds. Our particular love of Schein motivated us in the 
use oflanguage, the sciences and arts. For us, for Schiller, species-specific, ideal play 
seems like the harmonious reciprocal interaction of those two parts of the nervous 
system, the emotional and the rational, in another relation with a sensate ideal, beauty. 
This complex interaction promotes contemplation (the aesthetic state) and freedom of 
choice. This is what we humans can do: we experience beauty and out of that experience, 
know ourselves as autonomous beings. This is ideal play, and like all of Schiller's ideals, 
it cannot be fully realized, but it is realizable as a process of developing ... ourselves. 
Other interactions of the sense-drive and form-drive, the emotional and rational parts of 
stones, heights, depths, &c., and of the effects which result from their operation. The 
ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the 
cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned, by long observation, to avoid what 
hurt them, and to pursue what gave ease and pleasure" (An Enquiry 59). Exploring the 
cognitive capacities of animals engages many scientists today, and their efforts form the 
basis for both popular and scientific literature. For example, Griffin's Animal Minds 
(1992) and Heinrich's Mind of the Raven (1999); Bekoff, Allen and Burghardt's The 
Cognitive Animal (2002), Russon and Begun's The Evolution of Thought: Evolutionary 
Origins of Great Ape Intelligence (2004), or Geary's The Origin of Mind: Evolution of 
Brain, Cognition and General Intelligence (2005). 
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the brain, are for us species of degenerative play, play not in balanced and dynamic 
tension or harmony. These are less than the best we can be - for ourselves and for others. 
While Schiller's theory is about the structure of the mind, as it is experienced by a 
subject observing his own interiority, almost all modem theories of play rely on 
observable behavior to make claims about that behavior. Generally, modem theorists 
begin with the conventionally identifiable, but impossible to define, attributes of play. 
Pleasure, fun and purposeless activity (action that has no apparent connection to survival 
or reproduction) are the hallmarks of this play. It is animal play, children's playing - and 
adults' "mere play." Behavior defined in this way is only the smallest part of what 
Schiller theorized about: it is like the outward and visible mark of broad subjective and 
objective processes. Schiller brought us a bigger picture (a confused whole) - much 
more than the modem fragmented parts the separate disciplines can generate. He has 
arrived from the opposite pole. This should give us pause. And it does. Can soy-beans 
and durian fruit be compared? Of course not! Schiller would say. But experience proves 
that they will be. This is mental play: Schiller's theory and the theories current about the 
phenomenon of play together can provide a new direction of thought and research. Play 
research is being and will be continually restructured to reflect access to subjective states 
in animals and humans through new technology, and play will come to be defined by 
what happens in the brains of animals and humans correlated with their behavior. This 
combination of theory and the technology is what we have been waitingfor. 
Such play would be part of Schiller's concern and a pledge of what he believed we 
can be. For the humanities, the homology of animal and human play would suggest a 
bio-cultural ground, out of which might come a general theory of human nature, a 
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connection with our long history and our living environment. The recognition of this 
ground, this connection with evolution, would perform a profoundly important realistic 
function: it would focus the humanities on meaning and value of our lives in our world. 
It would tether the humanities to a common, shared reality, evolutionary history. What 
happened has happened. We are our history, and the equipment that promoted our 
survival, through flexibility, would seem to invite our best thought ... and management. 
The recognition that we can and do attend to anything, whether it be bikes, dogs, 
eighteenth-century texts, nuclear weapons, football, clay, guppies, sports bras or 
grandkids (and can make of them a life) puts the work ofthe sciences and the arts in a 
new perspective. Such an intuition would encourage us to be true to what we valorize -
to recognize the arts and humanities as the tools of development, oftransformation.3 It 
would mobilize us against the naturalistic fallacy: just because our flexibility (our 
capacity for pleasurable framed attention) is an amazingly successful adaptation, one that 
has enabled us to overwhelm the earth, does not make it fate, does not make it right, 
should not have it - out of our curiosity and daring-do - make our decisions for us. 
Because it is often easier to play at the lower registers of energy, emotion and cognition, 
doesn't mean we should do that either. As humanists, our concern is Schiller's: might 
3 "How pitiable the man who wants and makes nothing higher with the noblest tools, 
science and art, than what a day-laborer does with the most common! Who in the realm 
of perfect freedom carries with him the soul of a slave! ... Soon enough his specialty 
will disgust him as piecework, desires will quicken within him which it cannot satisfy, 
and his talent will mutiny against his vocation. Now everything he does seems 
fragmentary to him; he sees no purpose to his activity and yet cannot endure 
purposelessness. He is crushed by the wearying details of his work .... He feels himself 
cut off, torn away from the interdependence of things, because he has failed to relate his 
work to the world as a whole" (Schiller "Nature" 323). 
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things be better? How do we ensure our autonomy and that of others, those others who 
now include non-human beings? How do we develop with our fellows?4 
Two Theories: Views from Biological and Social Science 
Science is neither a philosophy nor a belief system. It is a combination of 
mental operations that has become increasingly the habit of educated 
peoples, a culture of illuminations hit upon by a fortunate tum of history 
that yielded the most effective way of reading about the real world ever 
conceived (Wilson 49). 
Just as Schiller's play theory of human nature required the context of vitalistic 
science for its full appreciation, it requires today, the context of to day's science, the 
current study about life and human nature, for its meaningful application. And, as it 
always was, science is influx. The data and theories of science - and the examples 
brought to bear on problems in the humanities from that sector - must be constantly 
updated, corrected, elaborated ... and reapplied. It is as if the time of science runs faster 
than human cultural time. When we decide to incorporate science into our 
considerations, we must be attentive about it, even vigilant. It is easy to be caught out, 
leaning on an old plinth. Nonetheless, theories and data from the disciplines of biology 
and the social and behavioral sciences are as essential for contextualizing the humanities 
as they are for situating Schiller's theory of human nature. And an understanding of the 
theory of evolution by natural selection is basic to the appreciation of any application of 
4 "The Idealist, it seems, is as close to earth as the Realist; he merely does not accept the 
limiting Reality Principle, but holds to his own Possibility Principle - even when its 
demands seem to verge on the impossible." Schiller wrote in his last letter to Wilhelm 
von Humboldt: '''after all, we are both idealists, and we would be ashamed if people were 
to say that things shaped us and not we them' (2.iv.1805)" (Reed Schiller 1 04-1 05). 
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the life sciences.5 With that theory as foundation, we can make a trial context for 
Schiller's theory by considering two recent theories of play, a theory from ethology and a 
summary of theories from the social sciences. In the first study about the ancestral play 
behavior in mammals, ethologists, through observation, experimentation and comparison, 
hypothesized a behavioral archetype. This theory-building operation is familiar to us 
from eighteenth-century morphology, from Goethe's intuition of the Urpjlanze and 
Schiller's drive theory of play. In the next example, from the social and behavioral 
sciences, an interdisciplinary play researcher presented a general theory of human 
playing, one that represents that human behavior as ubiquitous - invading and informing 
all forms of culture. It reads like Schiller's list of late Enlightenment symptoms and 
fragmentations: the play that catches us up and becomes our life. 
These studies provide general forms for the flood of contemporary material; they are 
theories that might excite us, exercise our imagination and reintroduce us to our world 
from a different perspective. They provide a context for reworking Schiller's theory of 
human nature. They are hypotheses, like Schiller's, based on data, and meant to 
stimulate further thought. They are meant to be amended and elaborated. 
Evolution, the Scientific Environment of Our Time 
Nature deals no better with Man than the rest of her works: she acts for 
him as long as he is incapable of acting for himself .... But what makes 
him Man is precisely this: that he does not stop short at what Nature 
5 Resources about evolution range from the simple graphic Introducing Evolution by 
Evans and Selina to Ridley's textbook Evolution. E. 0 Wilson edited and introduced 
Charles Darwin's major works in From so Simple a Beginning: The Four Great Books of 
Charles Darwin; Janet Browne wrote a wonderful two volume biography of Darwin; 
Jones' Darwin's Ghost and Reznick's The Origin Then and Now present the Origin of 
the Species with interpretations and annotations. Lyell's Principles of Geology and 
Paley's Natural Theology are representative of historical works that influenced Darwin. 
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herself made of him, but has the power of retracing by means of Reason 
the steps she took on his behalf, of transforming the work of blind 
compulsion to the work of free choice ... (IlL I ). 
What do we know now about the steps that nature took? 
The first truth which issues from this serious examination of nature is a 
truth which perhaps humbles man. This truth is that he ought to classify 
himself with the animals, to whom he bears resemblance by everything he 
has that is material (Buffon in Lyon 150 my emphasis). 
"Again and again, we shall tum to natural selection to understand animal behavior." 
(Dugatkin 6)6 
Since Schiller's time, two broad new understandings ofliving forms have developed 
that, once they were elaborated, have not only remained stable, but have promoted further 
knowledge and even generated new fields of investigation and discovery. They are 
evolution by natural selection and its support, genetics. Today's theory of evolution 
began with Darwin's hypothesis about natural selection: "Natural selection is ... the 
process whereby traits that confer the highest relative reproductive success (that is, the 
greatest relative fitness) on their bearers and that can be passed down across generations 
increase in frequency over many generations (evolutionary time)" (Dugatkin 6). Another 
one sentence explanatory variation of the theory provides us a species of depth 
perception: "Natural selection is a non-random difference in reproductive output among 
6 Behaviors depend on three factors for transmission: natural selection, cultural 
transmission and individualleaming: in his time, Schiller considered development 
[Bildung] in humans to be a reciprocal interaction of social (cultural) transmission and 
individual education (factors - Dugatkin 6-18). His developmental history (XXIV-
XXVII) was suggestive of development toward humanity as a species but I am not aware 
of any evidence that Schiller entertained anything but a fixed species concept. He 
accepted variation within species - yes - but no transformational or transmutational 
thinking about the species itself. He did not supply a mechanism - only a history of 
development. 
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replicating entities, often due indirectly to differences in survival in a particular 
environment, leading to an increase in the proportion of beneficial, heritable 
characteristics within a population from one generation to the next" (Gregory 156, 161). 
Evolution by natural selection requires variation in traits (as emphasized in the initial 
definition); there must be differences, different phenotypes controlled to some degree by 
genetic endowment, i.e. different alleles for genes, in order for natural selection to 
function. Nature must have choices. Nature as well provides differences: the second 
definition includes a stated acknowledgement of the pressure of "particular 
environments," thereby emphasizing that the right fit can be a local, idiosyncratic and 
even limiting phenomenon. Some fitness is better than others. In summary, according to 
Ridley, "[n]atural selection is easiest to understand, in the abstract, as a logical argument, 
leading from premises to conclusion." First, reproduction and heredity must be posited: 
"The excess fecundity and consequent competition to survive in every species provide the 
preconditions for the process Darwin called natural selection." Then, there must be 
variation in individual characters among the members of a population and also variation 
in the fitness of organisms. (74). 7 
Ancestral Mammalian Play 
Not everything in human lives is culture. There is also biology. Human 
senses, emotions, and thought existed before language, and as a 
consequence of human evolution. Though deeply inflected by language, 
they are not the product oflanguage. Language, on the contrary, is a 
7 The theory of evolution by natural selection's predictive and generative power has been 
huge: it has produced a tremendous amount of new information and insight, and has itself 
been enhanced by the addition of genetics and population theory (The New Synthesis, ca. 
1920-40). It is undergoing further development through evolutionary-developmental 
theory (Evo-devo) and organism theory (ca. 1990-present) (Pigliucci passim). 
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product of them: if creatures had not evolved to sense, feel, [play!], and 
think, none would ever have evolved to speak." (Boyd "Getting" 19 my 
inclusion of [play!], obviously a transgressive act). 
What traits are common to all contemporary playing mammals, ones that may be the 
result of common descent? In a relatively recent article in the Quarterly Review of 
Biology (2001), ethologists Marek Spinka, Ruth Newberry and Mark Bekoffreviewed 
the research literature about play behavior in animals, collected data on the features of 
play in mammals from their own observations and experiments, and hypothesized the 
ancestral function ofplay.8 Based on their findings, they posited that the function of 
ancestral mammalian playfulness was "training for the unexpected." Spinka, Newberry 
and Bekofftheorized that a "major ancestralfunction of play [was] to rehearse behavioral 
sequences in which animals lose full control over their locomotion, position, or 
sensory/spatial input and need to regain these faculties quickly." Further, because 
recovery from awkward scrambling occurs in "biologically significant situations," 
accompanied by intense emotion, animals will be advantaged who "in play learn how to 
deal with the painful emotions of being surprised or temporarily disoriented or disabled." 
Play enhances the ability of animals to cope emotionally with unexpected situations: its 
"self-induced mishaps" and socially relaxed situation help the animal to avoid 
incapacitation by emotional overreaction to stress (142). 
8 Ethology: the naturalistic study of behavior from an evolutionary perspective 
(Burghardt 10). The aims of ethological research include 1) study of the factors that 
cause or control behaviours, 2) inquiry into the ontogeny, the development of the 
behavior and its mechanisms, 3) study of the adaptive value of performance (enhancing 
fitness) and 4) inquiry into the evolutionary origins and phyletic radiation of behavior and 
5) attention to the "private experience" ofthe player (from Tinbergen's four aims plus 
Burghardt's added fifth in Burghardt 11-14). 
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Play is nearly ubiquitous in mammals and, in spite of extremely diverse play styles, 
content, participation and perceived function, mammalian play has common features that 
suggest 
either a common ancestry or a similar set of selection pressures that acted 
in all diverging mammalian orders in the Cenozoic. In our view, [the 
authors continued] it is more parsimonious to assume that there is a basic 
phylogenetic and functional unity underlying mammalian play than to 
assume that the "superficially similar" play patterns widely distributed in 
mammals evolved independently many times during mammalian 
phylogeny. Hence a search for a major function of play seems to be 
justified and important, as it is for other widely distributed mammalian 
characteristics such as sleep (142). 
The common characteristics of mammalian play include the following: 1) the play of 
mammals includes an emotional component - players appear to be "having fun." The 
playing subject shows signs of excitement, pleasure, intrinsic motivation and relaxation; 
such behavior draws adjectives like "bouncy," "capricious ... exaggerated," "frisky," 
"boisterous," and "ebullient" from serious ethologists. This subjective component 
usually gives researchers trouble, but these audaciously 
hypothesize that play is emotionally exciting (perhaps even thrilling, 
though not intensely frightening) and rewarding, maybe even pleasurable, 
while at the same time being relaxed. [They] suggest that this 
combination of affective attributes is unique to play, producing the 
complex emotional state that is referred to as "having fun" in human folk 
psychology (144). 
"Having fun" shows, in their view, in the kinematic, structural, and motivational 
character of play. The animals' excitement "is revealed in the vigor and speed of play 
movements," their pleasure evidenced in the active seeking and "working out" of play 
situations, and their relaxation apparent in the willingness ofthe animal to self-handicap. 
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2) Play involves self-handicapping, deliberate changes in social or physical routines that 
put the playing individual at some disadvantage. Further, play is demarcated by signals 
for beginning and ending that appear to be derived from postures of self-handicapping. 
These self-handicapping actions indicate not only self-evaluation and evaluation of 
playmates' state of mind and fitness but, because the focus of attention on play requires a 
decrease in vigilance, they imply a prior evaluation of the safety of the environment. 
And, 3) play implies rich cognitive content. "It is a cognitively demanding activity" and 
its benefits include locomotor, emotional and intellectual versatility, an enlarged 
behavioral repertoire and an enlarged capacity to handle unexpected events outside the 
play situation (145).9 
Again, play in mammalian species is characterized by intrinsic motivation and 
enjoyment, capacity to focus on some stimuli and exclude others, thus creating an "as if' 
environment and sustaining focus within that zone. As intrinsically motivated, it has an 
internal teleology, but can be considered externally without purpose or goal (hence the 
common consideration that play is purposeless activity). Play occurs when resources and 
9 Other descriptions of animal play from the literature are as follows: animal play 
appears purposeless (in terms of providing immediate survival benefit) to many observers 
but includes structural components like motoric exaggeration, repetition, fragmentation 
or disordering of sequence is currently the common construct which may be practice. 
Some definitions sound downright Schillerian: "A free and creative form of individual or 
social behavior, often occurring without obvious external provocation" (Kortmulder 
quoted in Burghardt 55). And another: "Play is improvised performance, with variations, 
of skilled motor and communicative actions in a context separate from the environment" 
(Fagen in Burghardt 56). In the end, purposeful purposelessness, voluntary performance 
(motivational independence of ends other than pleasure) of modified patterns of repeated 
behavior in a predictable developmental period performed when the animal is healthy and 
free from stress identify play for ethologists (68-82). Miller: "play is activity, motor or 
imaginative, in which the center of interest is the process rather than the goal" ("Ends" 
97). 
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security are sufficient and it releases and increases energy in the system by means of 
transformations. Behaviorally, play is indicated by mimesis, by scrambled imitation, 
repetitions, adding and subtracting, distorting and elaborating parts of instinctive 
routines, by physical, social and mental innovation. The play itself is full of content and 
shows conceptualization through designated space (the safe area), the signals of 
beginning and continuing, the flexibility of social hierarchy and the new meanings of 
gestures within its bounds. It is a natural place to practice rule-keeping and rule-
breaking. lO For example, the play-biting in animals shows self-handicapping, as well as 
play's conventionality and transgressiveness all in a gesture: a bite is not a bite, but it is 
not not a bite. Overall it is an exercise in flexibility and inventiveness. 
Spinka, Newberry and Bekoffhypothesized that "training for the unexpected" 
promoted survival in direct and indirect ways. Play could increase social problem-
solving, self-assessment skills, and ability to cope emotionally. And multi-leveled play 
interactions might develop community by increasing awareness of members (as the 
player exercises his theory of mind). In sum, they posited result of playing to be 
behavioral flexibility outside of play. In the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller proposed that the 
"test for the genuineness of [aesthetic experience] is that we emerge from it with no 
inclination to one kind of activity rather than another, but ready to meet any immediate 
challenge that life may present" (W&W lxxxiv). It should return us, more flexible for 
the experience of play, to the flux of life. 
10 Play is intrinsically transgressive: one can be "bad" without being "bad" but also not 
"good." 
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Based on the shared qualities seen in mammalian play and current work on the 
neurophysiology ofplay,playJulness (that is, the subjective state of the player) might 
then reasonably be described as a general capacity - rather than being a modular one (like 
habitat selection, mating, exploration). We might hypothesize like Schiller that it is a 
system of co-ordination and modulation, a fluid management of hierarchy, a generalized 
use of the mammalian nervous system. II 
The distinction between reason of other species and our own reason is a very active 
line of research in ethology today. Just as Rousseau, Herder and Schiller put human 
beginnings back to the time of language and (eye-and ear dominated) complex 
representation development, Spinka, Newberry and Bekoff hypothesized that there was a 
ground of complex play in animals based in secure social and environmental situations, 
communication of intent, theory of mind and capacity for some representation. It is the 
beginning of a kind of flexibility that would allow judgments relative to survival to be 
extended, modified and expanded. 12 
The Functional Ambiguity of Play 
Brian Sutton-Smith organized the theory of play literature from a broad variety of 
disciplines - ethology, anthropology, psychology and psychiatry, history and politics, 
sociology and the arts - into eight categories based on arguments about play function. 
II An interesting indication of homology is the cross-species communication possible in 
play - we think we know when other animals are playing - and we appear to breed 
(artificially select for) companion animals with perceived playfulness. 
12 These authors referenced Schiller as the originator of "surplus energy hypothesis," a 
common mistake in the English literature, due to a summary of his ideas by Herbert 
Spencer (1898). A short review of play literature confirms that Schiller was typically 
understood and dismissed through this characterization. 
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These perspectives, called rhetorics by the author, cover the entire natural and cultural 
domain of play. Each justifies play according to certain "ends" play serves (such as 
development or skill acquisition) or conversely by the values play was believed to 
support in the individual or his culture (such as striving for excellence or self-
actualization). In this broad view of play, play mode or meta-play is independent of the 
relatively recent dichotomy between work and recreation. 
Sutton-Smith also made his own argument for playas a model of adaptive 
variability. His theory of play, one that includes all the others, is the following. From 
the stand-point of evolutionary biology, play reinforces the plasticity of higher animal 
brains and is therefore a principal author of our survival and the survival of many higher 
animal species. Given that survival is the perfect potential end of adaptation, and 
plasticity the mechanism of survival, Sutton-Smith agreed with Schiller (without 
knowing it), agreed to the latter's suggestion that play promoted pluri-potentiality in the 
species - and in the individual, flexibility to achieve one's potential. His theory, though 
couched in the language of adaptation and selection, refers, I believe, to playas a vast 
generator of cultural variety rather than as a potentiator of organismic structural change 
in the playing animal over evolutionary time. 
Basic to Sutton-Smith's understanding of play is its ambiguity: because play is 
liminal and paradoxical- it hovers between reality and subjectivity, between doing and 
not doing - a sort of not-not doing - it is hard to pin down. 13 These ambiguities provide 
13 Sutton-Smith (S-S) adapted Empson's very literary argument to play (Empson, 
William. (1930) Seven Types of Ambiguity. New York: New Directions, 1966.) Empson 
wrote, "'Ambiguity' itself can mean an indecision as to what you mean, an intention to 
mean several things, a probability that one or other or both of two things has been meant, 
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an environment, like an undulating island of water plants, where creativity develops. 
And that environment, in turn, may provide enough uncertainty to promote development 
of connections and blends that in their own way stabilize through the survival value of 
more autonomous functioning. 
Given that the play experience shimmers, moment to moment, it has proved to be a 
challenging phenomenon for those who study it. The field is so broad and the behavior 
so intrusive into all other human cultural categories like religion, politics and work for 
example, that many have approached play from the stand-point of function and dealt with 
those play modes that seemed productive of a particular end. In this, each group tended 
to adopt a stance of persuasion, a rhetoric, to support their distinctions, inclusions and 
value hierarchies. That defensive posture may be due to what Sutton-Smith was quick to 
point out: players do not experience their playas the rhetoreticians say they might. While 
the motivated experience only lately found an argument of its own (playas individuality), 
even the older rhetorics isolate aspects of play. 
and the fact that a statement has several meanings" (5-6). He located ambiguity in a sort 
of meta sphere, hovering over, between as well as in and out of writer and/or reader. 
Sutton-Smith enjoined this point-of-view for play. So that his reader entered the work 
with an appreciation of the complexity of the ambiguous, Sutton-Smith began by listing 
William Empson's seven types of ambiguity, contending that the multiple ambiguities 
both expand the possibilities of play and increase its tension (and risk). Play is play 1) by 
ambiguity of reference (What is happening, something real, such as choking or some 
sound indicating an angry cat?), 2) by ambiguity of referent (Is the thing itself, say, a 
bicycle or is it standing for something else like an airplane?), 3) by ambiguity of intent 
(Do you mean it or are you kidding, pretending?), 4) by ambiguity of sense (Is it to be 
taken seriously or as preposterousness?) 5) by ambiguity of transition (Are you still 
playing when you said that?), 6) by ambiguity of contradiction (A woman playing a dog 
as in the play Sylvia, or a man dressed as a woman), and 7) by ambiguity of meaning (Is 
it a play or a real punch?) (3). 
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The old rhetoric of playas progress, often applied to children and animals, insists 
that these (and not adults) grow and develop by playing. This view emphasizes the 
imitative element of playas preparatory for adult life. Originally it was believed that 
ontogeny recapitulated phylogeny, that children played their way up the ladder of 
civilization and the developmental stages. From that perspective, play was seen as 
"having value not just for itself but because of other functions that it serves in individual 
development and group culture." Generally though, play is regarded as a "form of 
adaptation ... a preparation for the future, a form of learning or socialization [which] 
generates mastery and feelings of competence" (18). An ambiguity develops in the 
argument that play is progress because the participants of play rarely think of themselves 
as progressing. When asked, children themselves put "little or no emphasis on the kind 
of growth that adults have in mind with their progress rhetoric." They play for fun and 
"are highly motivated to play," so much so that play is often used by adults as part of a 
reward system. Children (and animals) play because they must: they play because they 
cannot do otherwise. 14 
14 Children who do not play suffer from mental or physical illness. Sutton-Smith (whose 
interests lie in child folklore and child play unsanctioned and/or denied by adult culture) 
found that adult culture sought to deny large areas of children's play, to "domesticate" 
cruel play, wild, illicit or sexual play and irrational play. These obviously contradict the 
clean and neat category of progressive play. Play, wrote Sutton-Smith, can be seen as 
"motivated primarily by feelings and not just by images of reality" rather than a 
phenomenon demarcating cognitive development (157). Children's play is filled with 
aberrant images, the bizarre, the fantastic and gruesome, ofparacosms (whole fantasy 
worlds), as well as mockery and extended parody (117). That a group of well-acquainted 
children most resemble a traveling troupe of medieval players summarizes Sutton-
Smith's sense ofthe rootless, theatrical, transgressive and tricksterish aspects of 
children's dark play (159). 
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The next ancient rhetoric has play managing chance, the experience of fate. Here 
play gives the "illusion of mastery over life's circumstances" or the experience of risking 
in a limited way, losing and emerging from play relatively intact (the mastery oflosing) 
(54). Alea, games of chance and gambling, are almost universal. Their appeal may stem 
from our basic need to experience the impersonality of the universe on a personal scale, 
thereby denying it. It may be a way, also, to fail voluntarily, to recover, rise and play 
again; here the player works through the experience of failure in a contained scenario. 
Further, the engagement with fate through luck rather than the engagement of opportunity 
by talent turns progress on its head and brings with it a particular egalitarian justice. This 
makes fate a trickster and maintains tension in a play sphere of unmatched opponents. 
The rhetoric of playas power emphasizes such games as (but not limited to) sports 
contests with clear goals, rules and winners, and describes playas a representation of 
conflict (10). Whether societal, interpersonal or intrapsychic, the player involves himself 
because he feels himself to be a cause, a force. If he wins, he has triumphed without 
destruction; ifhe loses, it is a circumscribed loss. Further, the construction ofthe play 
space may allow a kind of winning that is compensatory, a wish-fulfillment. The contest 
provides clear goals in contrast to the indeterminate competitiveness in everyday life. On 
a cultural level however, this type of play services or sublimates conflict; it either 
habituates players to competition or provides a structured outlet, so it both sanctifies 
violence and trivializes it; whether alea moderate and direct the aggression drive and 
limit its expression, or whether contests honor and therefore encourage the behavior they 
seek to control is controversial. 
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In the rhetoric Playas Identity, parades, religious and secular festivals, graduations, 
and community services like Christmas tree lighting or battleship launching allow 
participants to reaffirm their place in a group. They are "forms of bonding, including the 
exhibition and validation or parody of membership and traditions in a community" that 
function as a "means of confirming, maintaining, or advancing the power and identity of 
the community of players" (10, 91). The ambiguity of this play (which attempts to 
reduce ambiguity about membership) emerges from behind the scenes of such events: 
who is organizing the festival? What commercial or political hegemony, what cultural 
imperialism is in play? 
The last rhetorics are of more recent origin: Sutton-Smith places them in the context 
of the last two hundred years and correlates them to the rise of individual consciousness. 
They are the rhetorics of self, of the Imaginary and of frivolity. The rhetoric of play in 
regard to the self focuses on the psychology of the individual player. 15 Theories within 
this rhetoric begin in the subjective experience of the player and find play to be a state of 
mind, a way of being and seeing, and an attitude toward life. In the study of the 
individual's experience of play, heightened subjectivity is described as play's capacity to 
fully involve and provoke an ecstatic emotional response, a "peak or flow experience," 
through involvement (185). While, through this rhetoric, play lends itself to metaphors of 
15 For Sutton-Smith, the origins of this rhetoric were Freud's explanations (and 
subsequent psychological and psychoanalytic refinements) of particular playing in 
individual mental life, its effects or functions (173). While he mentioned Kant and 
Schiller, he did not describe their contributions in any depth nor did he acknowledge the 
implications of Schiller's presentation. Of Schiller's work he wrote: his "is indeed the 
broad view of the play function" and followed his remark with the usual quotation of 
Xy'9. (131 Schiller's XV.9 is qtd. from trans. Snell). 
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freedom, autonomy, individualism, authenticity and self-actualization, one of its 
troubling ambiguities is the degree to which, when in the flow, the individual experiences 
a loss of autonomy without being aware of his loss. There, his experience is 
(retrospectively described) as unselfconscious and completely absorbed into the proc~ss. 
Because there are these different ways of playing, the player becomes aware of his 
different subjectivities. Where is the self to be located then? 
The rhetorics of play as the engagement in the Imaginary, the association of play 
with the not-real, the fanciful, the visionary and with creativity, derives historically from 
the Romantic period, according to Sutton-Smith, when the concept of imagination began 
to take the place of (or carve out an area from) the idea of soul. To make real the 
heterogeneous nature of this category, he listed all relevant subject fields, ones of music, 
art, literature and the cultural mythologies. He includes personal capacities like 
flexibility and the "art of making what is present absent or what is absent present." From 
his perspective, the justification for such broad inclusion comes from the work of 
Gregory Bateson. This anthropologist 
point[ ed] to the paradoxical and metacommunicative nature of play, 
showing that play is not just play but is also a message about itself (a 
metamessage), being both of the world and not of the world (paradox). 
The child playing mother is both a mother and yet not a mother. Thus one 
can enact something real in play while denying that one is saying anything 
about the world, and thus be both innocent or guilty at the same time; only 
the shared knowledge of secrets allows others to know which truth, if 
either, is most intended. The act of play is always by itself manque, and is 
certainly opaque, but as such it can yield to the most mysterious of 
transformations (139 my emphasis). 16 
16 Sutton-Smith referred to Bateson's Steps to An Ecology of Mind. 
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This last reference to transformation is a critical contribution to the study of play. 
That play's transformative power, that ambiguity and fluidity experienced in the 
protected space of play can lead to qualitative change, is both play's risk and its reward. 
It is also the promise of other cultural forms, based on the model of play, like 
psychotherapy. Sutton-Smith also cites usages in which metaphor is "language play" and 
play is "behavioral metaphor" (127-150). There is now some consideration in cognitive 
science and linguistics circles, however, that metaphor is rather the structural and 
evolutionary ground oflanguage (Fauconnier). It may also be that it is not play that is 
behavioral metaphor, but it is play that is the evolutionary ground of complex 
emotional/cognitive behaviors (Schiller AeL). 
The last historical rhetoric, that of play as frivolity, is the home of Dionysus, the 
fool, the joker and the trickster, the place where nonsense and inversion, the idle, the 
vertiginous, the trivial and the useless reside. It requires the category of work to oppose 
it and the upright and hard-working to denigrate it. It lives in the back-spaces; it can be 
the aristocratic gaming for game's sake or conspicuous consumption (Veblen); it can be 
dirty play of children, the Mardi-Gras alter-identity of a correct businessman, the ride on 
the roller-coaster or the game on the Midway, or the middle-aged women's hobby of 
collecting Barbie Dolls. 
This collection of theories from the various disciplines and cultural domains is an 
implicit acknowledgement of the fragmentation of modem life (and knowledge) that so 
concerned Schiller. By discovering play everywhere, however, Sutton-Smith also 
promoted play to the status of a generic category that contains potentially all species of 
human doing. As such, his work catalogues the manifestations of Schiller's play-drive -
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the balanced and unbalanced, the mere, the dangerous and the ideal - without a 
valorization of the aesthetic as paradigmatic. 17 Are all our cultural extensions play? 
Some retaining, some having lost their motivational pleasure?18 
Applications: Play and its Pleasure, Structure and Attentions 
In struggling to understand and describe the effect of the aesthetic state on different 
personalities, Schiller wrote that "[b]y means of beauty sensuous man is led to form and 
thought; by means of beauty spiritual man is brought back to matter and restored to the 
world of sense" (XVIII. 1 ). In the "middle," there is a place of meeting, made accessible 
by contemplation of a sensate ideal. There, matter and form, passivity and activity, 
feeling and thought, play. Both analysis and experience seemed to oppose the possibility 
of such a transformation - and yet - Schiller saw that we, when we contemplate a 
beautiful object, are irresistibly moved and drawn in, yet kept at a distance. We are "at 
17 Sutton-Smith synthesized the work of the following (by category): I) the work of 
ethologists like Fagen, Groos; affective neurologists like Panksepp; educators like Piaget, 
Erikson and Sutton-Smith; anthropologists like Schwartzmann; psychologists, 
psychiatrists like Winnicott, Erikson. 2) Callois on gambling, Sutton-Smith on cruel 
play. 3) Nietzsche, Huizinga, Spariosu; Goffman, and Geetz; 4) Anthropologists, 
folklorists, Freud and Geetz. 5) Kant, the Romantics, Idealists, Bakhtin, Derrida and 
Barthes. 6) Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Spariosu, Csikszentmihalyi and Hans. 7) Pop 
Culture historians. Schiller was considered of a type with Kant, the Romantics and 
Idealists in the rhetoric of the self. The classic play texts are Huizinga (Homo Ludens) 
and Caillois. 
18 Wilkinson and Willoughby: "[i]t would certainly be worth re-examining [Schiller's] 
whole theory of playas a primary instinct which finds its highest human manifestation in 
aesthetic phenomena. For if some recent investigations of both human and animal play 
have revealed it as not just an excess of animal spirits, or a luxury product of the mind, 
but rather one of the primary message-systems, a means of communication, other 
investigations - such as research into the painting activity of apes - seem to show that 
some form of aesthetic satisfaction may be a primary need even in animals ... But 
[nothing can be undertaken] until the original form of his theory has been unearthed from 
under the rubble of misconceptions that has overlaid it" (clxxxvi my emphasis). 
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one and the same time in a state of utter repose and supreme agitation, and there results 
that wondrous stirring of the heart for which mind has no concept nor speech any name" 
(XV.9). 
Schiller was so imaginative and exuberant, his language and ideas so evocative, that 
his formulations, ones like the preceding, raise more problems than they provide 
solutions. It may have been his playful intent, a sort of self-handicapping way to keep us 
all involved. Nevertheless, many questions linger, and it seems important to highlight 
three interest areas and suggest them as subjects for further study, particularly in their 
function as components of play. They are the following: pleasure, the contents and 
structure of common reason (common sense, innate ideas) and attention. Each has a 
history in the eighteenth century, and some history of scholarship as well; each is 
currently an object of interest in one discipline or another, but may not, like play, receive 
the attention it deserves. 
Pleasure (and Its Special Senses) 
Nature has an equal interest in perpetuating all species and thus inspires us 
each with the same motive. That motive is pleasure, pleasure which in the 
human species sweeps everything before it. In spite of multiple obstacles 
in the way of a union of two hearts, and a thousand torments that must 
follow, Nature still leads the lovers to her desired end (Maupertuis 34 my 
emphasis). 
Pleasure - is the means and the end of a drive, but for play it must be pleasure that 
can be both delayed and sustained, pleasure that can be disengaged from, that is, one that 
does not have the insistency, the immediacy and the necessity of the drives that pertain to 
survival and continuation of the species. Pleasure is vitally connected with well-being 
(pleasure vs. pain), with mental organicity like wholeness, completion or perfection 
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(satisfaction vs. frustration), and it is the indication of emotional involvement, the mood 
ofthe subject and his assessment of the environment (feelings) through his sensations. 
This bolus of pleasure, for Schiller, is a product of the German aesthetic tradition: 
pleasure is a valuable, life-giving source of well-being and the motivator he needed for 
the free will accomplishment of duty. It was basic to the whole man and basic to his 
appreciation of beauty, his entry into the aesthetic state and the achievement of 
autonomy. It makes opening the gate to human potentiality possible. 
Schiller's particular pleasure was the kind that developed out of representation, and it 
came from the two senses. Regarding the elaboration of sense in humans, Schiller 
remarked (as did Rousseau) the importance of that transformation to the course of our 
entire development: 
It is nature herself which raises man from reality to semblance, by 
furnishing him with two senses which lead him to knowledge of the real 
world through semblance alone. In the case of the eye and the ear, she 
herself has driven importunate matter back from the organs of sense, and 
the object, with which in the case of our more animal senses we have 
direct contact, is set at a distance from us. What we actually see with the 
eye is something different from the sensation we receive; for the mind 
leaps out across light to objects. The object of touch is a force to which 
we are subjected; the object of eye and ear a form that we engender. As 
long as man is still a savage he enjoys by means of these tactile senses 
alone, and at this stage the senses of semblance are merely the servants of 
these .... Once he does begin to enjoy through the eye, and seeing 
acquires for him a value of its own, he is already aesthetically free and the 
play-drive has started to develop (XXVI.6 my emphasis). 
Humans have spectacular extension and augmentation of the eye and the ear: each sense 
organ has systems that are reciprocally coordinated and complexly connected to multiple 
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areas ofthe brain. 19 They are together active in language and symbol-production: much 
of language - structurally and strategically - is based on metaphors and visual metaphors 
predominate (Fauconnier). The late development of writing is evidence of further 
involvement of sight with language elaboration. The play of these senses, with the play 
of their systems, is basic to our own mental play. Such play is useful- saves energy, 
increases survival, creates bonds and of course art. 
Just as people did in the early modem period, we also need familiarity with nature, in 
all her peculiarity, in all her particularity and multiplicity, in order to recognize what is 
possible - in order to be able to imagine how things work. Kenneth Catania would have 
us look at the star-nosed mole as an example of how natural selection functions to 
"develop" by differential survival (given evolutionary time) an energy-saving survival 
device, in this case, a sense organ. This little animal, known for a fantastic elaboration of 
sense, also has vestigial features; it is like the one about which Goethe complained to 
Schiller: "The mole" he wrote, "is perfect but ugly because its form permits only a few, 
19 Knowledge about nature helps us to understand - by increasing our imagination and 
thereby stimulating humans to see more reality. For this paradoxical purpose, Brian 
Boyd reflected on vision: "vision does not transfer all the space, shape, surface, and color 
that is out there into the mind in any immediate or transparent way, nor is human vision 
finer, as humans had often smugly assumed .... It was supposed for a long time that we 
were unique in having color vision; in fact we cannot see ultraviolet light as bees do, 
infrared light as pit vipers do, colors at night as some moths do, polarized light as many 
birds, insects, and even plants can; we have trichromatic vision, which is better than the 
dichromatic of many species, but pigeons have tetrachromatic vision. But although 
human vision misses out on much potential visual information, it effortlessly does far 
more than we are aware of, unconsciously integrating some fifty different brain areas to 
make complex, real-time sense of visual input" ("Literature and Evolution" 4). 
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limited actions, and the preponderance of certain parts renders him misshapen (Scientific 
The Star-nosed Mole 
This remarkable little animal, the star-nosed mole, has been extensively studied by 
Catania, and it has made an appearance in Nature and in the best-selling work of popular 
science, Richard Dawkins' The Ancestor's Tale (242-246). Not only has its behavior 
been documented ethologically, but the appendages of its star, the specialty organs on 
each appendage (Eimer's organs) and the apparatus' afferent sensory connections to three 
different mirror-image cortical areas in the brain have been researched 
microanatomically. 
The star-nosed mole (Condylura cristata) has a snout surrounded by 
twenty-two fleshy and mobile appendages. This unusual structure is not 
an olfactory organ, as might be assumed from its location, nor is it used to 
manipulate objects as might be guessed from its appearance. Rather, the 
star is devoted to the sense of touch, and for this purpose the appendages 
are covered with thousands of small mechanoreceptive Eimer's organs 
[found in all Talpidae (moles), a few thousand in most, but the star mole 
has 25,000 - these, in configuration, may be capable of distinguishing 
objects in the lO-lOO/lm range, a new realm of perception for mammals]. 
Recent behavioral studies find that the star acts much like a tactile eye, 
having a small behavioral focus or "fovea" at the center - used for detailed 
explorations of objects of interest. The peripheral and central nervous 
systems of the mole reflect these behavioral specializations, such that the 
small behavioral focus on the nose is more densely innervated in the 
periphery, and has a greatly enlarged representation in [multiple mirrored 
areas ofJ the somatosensory cortex, ... a representation highly correlated 
with patterns of behavior [rather than density of innervation]. The many 
surprising parallels between the somatosensory system of the mole, and 
the visual systems of other mammals [including primates, mentioned in 
20 This is an excerpt from the short paper, "The Extent to Which the Idea 'Beauty is 
Perfection in Combination with Freedom' May Be Applied to Living Organisms." 
Goethe wrote it for Schiller as an aid to thought while the latter was hard at work on the 
Aesthetic Letters. 
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another context,] suggest a convergent and perhaps common organization 
for highly developed sensory systems (Catania, "A nose" 367-8, 371-2). 
What of the evolution of man and his senses? The eye and the ear? What of his hand? 
Common Reason and Innate Ideas 
(Sensus communis, Sensorium commune) 
"Beauty is the promise of function." 
Charles Darwin 
If the basic behavioral endowment of animals is considered from an evolutionary 
point-of-view, every behavior represents historic, deeply historic, antecedents. Darwin 
wrote, considering the Phaedo, "that [Plato believed] our 'necessary ideas' arise from the 
pre-existence of the soul, are not derivable from experience - read monkeys for pre-
existence" (Notebook M, 1838). The Darwinian adjustment of our a priori ideas, our 
innate ideas, our Common Sense,from the eternal to the deep historical, grounded in the 
survival capacities of our animal ancestors, also suits our explorations of culture. One of 
our habits of mind and behavior is playfulness, and it is a linkage, a confused whole, of 
ancient capacities in many, many species. 
Part of Schiller's theory of beauty is that, while beauty is relation, it is without doubt 
in the object as well as from the subject. That beauty was in the object by common 
judgment implied a reciprocal relation between objects and the way we as members of the 
same species represented them to ourselves. His understanding, I believe, of rudimentary 
reason, the reason that first develops from the history of successful surviving, is the 
ground ofthe judgment oftaste.21 The reason that promotes basic survival is augmented 
21 "The logical order of our ideas, according to Condillac, is not primary, but a derived 
fact; it is only a sort of reflection of the biological order. What on a given occasion 
seems to be essential, depends not so much on the nature of things as on the direction of 
310 
by the reason of self-awareness, of empathy (and theory of mind) and the capacity with 
representations. The common reason of his century had various definitions but it 
included these basic judgments, and Schiller, by making formed content the process-and-
product of the play-drive, accepted a particular kind of structure basic to conscious and 
unconscious attention. A central aspect of his theory is the relationship of this structure 
with subject and object. These - it is now possible to consider - are held in tension by 
their relation through evolution by natural selection. We perceive in certain ways 
because even complex perception includes historical judgments that allowed our 
ancestors a measure of relatively more successful survival. 
Did he answer the question, why do we attend to art? Here is a beginning: let us 
assume a deep interest in anything that ensures our lives, our happiness, safety, security 
and well-being. As aproduct of Schiller's play, art is a signal ofa kind of prosperity, ofa 
space where the basic concerns of life are met, and where is found a level of abundance, a 
richness beyond basic survival needs. It is just as surely as animal playing, a signal of 
environmental safety. And because we are social, it is an object of shared attention: we 
assume others will attend to art and they do.22 As such it is a signal of psychical and 
our interest; and our interest is determined by that which is advantageous for us and 
necessary for our self-preservation" (Cassirer 104). Brian Boyd: "If we are evolved 
creatures, our brains are not guarantors of truth, citadels of reason, or shadows of the 
mind of God but simply organs of survival, built to cope with the immediate environment 
and perhaps to develop some capacity to recall and anticipate. Evolution has no foresight 
and no aims, least of all an aim like truth. It simply registers what suffices, what allows 
some organisms to last and reproduce better than others" ("Getting" 22). 
22 "[H]umans are geared to learn from one another through joint attention, the 
expressiveness of the human facial musculature, the precision of human pointing (all of 
which develop before language, and make it possible), and language. Our capacity for 
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social security. Let us assume a deep interest in our own kind, an alerting to the human 
evidence both as a sign of presence, of social safety, of vigilance directed away from 
anticipated threats to objects without utility in the realm of force or need.23 Art is the 
evidence of human action - no, not just doing, but being: each piece of art is a stamp of 
the human mind, a general and a unique artifact of person and culture. It is not just a 
representation of nature: it is our Schein, our take on experience and existence. It 
bespeaks agency, and agency is something we love so well that we make every effort to 
apply it even when it does not exist. Some experience is so deep within us that we sense 
by apperception instead of perception: we often take agency, which includes cause-and-
effect and result, as given in experience rather than created within us below the level of 
self-awareness.24 These experiences in particular are mirrored and reinforced in art 
social learning, for acquiring our own culture, also makes it possible to appreciate and 
enjoy the culture of others" (Boyd "Getting" 28). 
23 Enlightenment thinkers built on Pufendorf's (1672) theory of natural sociability 
[socialitas] (called "unsocial sociability" by Kant). Pufendorf suggested that man 
entered into a situation of interdependent relations when the development of "more 
complex and sophisticated wants required the continual assistance of others for their 
fulfillment." Ferguson (1767) remodeled socialitas, previously "a propensity, [into] a 
capacity" (Wokler 125, 128). 
24 This need of humans may speak to the difficulty that many have in grasping evolution 
by natural selection: though it is explained in language that implies the opposite, 
evolution is not an agent; it does not function by linear cause and effect, it does not have 
results, and it is not progressive. We typically need explanations with concepts imbedded 
in them like agency, cause and effect, result, or goal to help us put pieces together like a 
puzzle - a demand of common reason. Gregory examined common misconceptions 
about evolution by natural selection and he found that it was "notoriously difficult to 
grasp" and that misconceptions persist even in the face of education. The nature, the 
intuitively grasped nature, the reflection of everyday experience and the nature revealed 
by systematic scientific investigation are fundamentally at odds with one another 
(Gregory 166-7). Subjects of several studies included agency, intentionality, teleology 
and response to need in their understandings of natural selection. They saw it as an event 
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objects. Rather than functioning like a reminder of particularity (as might the artist's 
signature tucked into the comer of his work), the art object acts as a relation of 
connectedness and identity, as if the semi-transparent wash beneath the images and 
brushwork called out to our common humanity. And this wash speaks to us of freedom, 
freedom to change things, things as we find them into things that express what is 
humanly experienced, thOUght and felt. As an example of freedom and agency, but 
unique and particular, art speaks the promise of our own potential. We feel this promise 
in the first encounter by taking in the new object of our experience, this work of art, by 
contemplation - when it reciprocally works in and with us to develop something new in 
each ofus.25 
Attention 
In nature everything is connected to everything else .... But with its 
infinite multiplicity nature is a spectacle only for an infinite mind. In 
order that finite minds might have some share in the enjoyment ofthis 
rather than a process, and they considered it an all or nothing, rather than a probabilistic 
process (e.g., unfit individuals all die; all fit individuals live) (164-172). Again, Boyd 
summarized our need for agency: "Evolution has equipped us with fast and frugal 
heuristics, rough ways of knowing that suffice for our mode of life .... We therefore 
have, for instance, a systematic bias toward overinterpreting objects as agents" (23 my 
emphasis). Schiller wrote regarding the advancement of knowledge (science): "If the 
manifold potentialities in man were ever to be developed, there was no other way but to 
pit them one against the other. This antagonism of faculties and functions is the great 
instrument of civilization ... Only through individual powers in man becoming isolated, 
and arrogating to themselves exclusive authority, do they corne into conflict with the 
truth of things andforce the Common Sense, which is otherwise content to linger with 
indolent complacency on outward appearance, to penetrate phenomena in depth" 
(VI.l2). 
25 "In modem works of art freedom, the human capacity for autonomous sense-making, 
appears, that is, art works are unique objects, and as unique sources of normatively 
compelling claims, they are experienced as products of freedom, as creations; their 
uniqueness and irreducibility are understood as the material expression of an autonomous 
SUbjectivity" (Bernstein xi). 
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spectacle, they must acquire the faculty [Vermdgen] of setting limits to 
multiplicity, which it does not possess; the faculty of isolating and 
directing its attention [Aufmerksamkeit] at will. We exercise this faculty at 
every moment of our existence; without it there would be no existence for 
us; for all these diverse sensations [Empfindungen], we would sense 
nothing at all; we would constantly be prey to the present impression; we 
would dream without knowing what we are dreaming. (Lessing qtd. in 
Bell 36). 
What is attention? What was once vigilance for survival, fixation on nutriment, 
scanning for foraging and hunting, the stare of assessment of movement and agented 
danger, became over evolutionary time, curiosity, exploration, assessment of self in the 
social order, interest, and play. 
In the eighteenth century, attention began in sight - seeing, watching, observing, 
attending, contemplating ... these levels bespoke degrees of emotional and cognitive 
involvement. It was recognized in natural philosophy and history as a method, in 
medicine as a potential health hazard, and in religion as a powerful enhancer of dutiful 
feeling, thinking and action (Hagner). Schiller recognized attention early but he 
transformed it into archetypically human play, a method of development, a prescription 
and a cure for the ills of the individual and his society and the way of freedom to explore 
human potential in feeling, thinking and action.26 
26 It "must have been Abel who prompted Schiller to stress attention in [his earlier first 
dissertation] Philosophy of Physiology as the source of freedom in an otherwise 
mechanistically determined perceptual system." Crediting Abel with a psychological 
theory that Schiller built upon, Dewhurst and Reeves identified a combination of ideas 
from Ferguson and Garve relating to attention. Bonnet, according to them, pinpointed 
"attention [Aufmerksamkeit], the ability to concentrate on a particular set of ideas and 
impressions." They acknowledge "self-preservation and material needs stimulat[ing] our 
intellectual power through the goad of pain and the bite of pleasure" as the foundation of 
human attentiveness, one with which Schiller would have been acquainted. The 
provenance of attention theory included d' Alembert in the Preliminary Discourse and 
314 
In positing a contemplative state based on a sensate ideal, one that frees humans to 
real choice, Schiller took a middle course between the uses of attention to approach 
contemplation. He steered between the attention that is observation [Beobachten], a 
virtuoso occupation of many natural historians of the time, and meditation, a religious 
activity [fromme Betrachtung] practiced (variously) by the different Protestant (Lutheran 
and pietist) and Catholic traditions in the German States. 
Given the epistemological streams that mingled to form vitalistic knowledge, the 
level at which the external world could be recognized was extremely important in the 
eighteenth century. Humans glanced, saw, noticed, perceived, apperceived, attended, 
observed, watched ... contemplated. Then, sight was the sense that was most often 
associated with empirical verification, with observation, collection, and comparison. 
According to Lorraine Daston, who examined the natural historical tradition of empirical 
observation and description [Beobachten] in order to understand how nature accrued 
value during the Enlightenment, noted that many empirical projects were tied to natural 
theological considerations. She found that certain areas of nature became "worthy 
objects of study and personal dedication" by the naturalist's often heroic "disciplines of 
attention [by which they] beatified even the most inauspicious objects" (l00). The object 
and the attention were reciprocally valorized as useful, a merging of the fit and the good, 
which within the rationalist aesthetic tradition, was the perfection of sense (beauty). The 
naturalists' delight in observing and their attribution of design became, in her view, "less 
an argument from evidence than an experience of self-evidence," a reciprocal of 
Rousseau's hypothetical developmental history of man as well. How can it be that man 
chooses badly then, ifthese prods are so directive? (Dewhurst 129-130). 
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justification and intensification of their activities. The researchers were self-conscious 
because their one-sided intensities lent to parody and satire, but many could not help 
themselves.27 The particular object, each one's own chosen object was one that fostered 
delight, one that deserved rapt attention, provoked affection, concern and protection from 
criticism. This reciprocal intensification was not mere seeing but the "art of 
observation," practiced by the likes of Bonnet, Deluc, Reaumur, Saussure, Senebier, 
Swammerdam and many, many others.28 Their remarkable feats of attention can be 
imagined from these accounts: 
Reaumur, for example, counted the number of bees leaving the hive in one 
day, arriving at a sum of over eight-four thousand departures in fourteen 
hours (approximately one hundred per minute) (114). 
Genevan naturalist Charles Bonnet dedicated every waking hour from 
5:30 A.M. to 11:00 P.M. for twenty-one days to observation ofa single 
27 The portrait of the virtuoso in Addison, the jabs of Pope's Dunciad and the characters 
of the period's comedies included the type who devoted his time and treasure to the 
miniscule, the insignificant and the despised life forms. Shadwell's character, Sir 
Nicholas Gimcrack of The Virtuoso, "squandered two thousand pounds of his nieces' 
money to finance experiments ranging from the microscopic observation of mites in 
cheese, to blood transfusions from a sheep to a madman, to the reading of the Bible by 
the light of a luminescent leg of pork - all parodies of experiments actually performed by 
members of the Royal Society of London." Locke wrote that it is the "mark ofa little 
genius to be wholly conversant among insects, reptiles, animalcules, and those trifling 
rarities that furnish out the apartment of a virtuoso ... [Such pursuits] make us serious 
upon trifles, by which means they expose philosophy to the ridicule of the witty and the 
contempt of the ignorant. In short, the studies of this nature should be the diversion, 
relaxations and amusements not the care, business, and concern oflife" (102, 103-4). 
28 Schiller's observation that the intensification on one power led to progress in mankind 
but narrowness in the individual included all pursuits and occupations, not just natural 
history. He wrote the following about this kind of dedicated attention: "Only by 
concentrating the whole energy of our mind into a single focal point, contracting our 
whole being into a single power, do we, as it were, lend wings to this individual power 
and lead it, by artificial means, far beyond the limits which Nature seems to have 
assigned to it" (VI. 13 ). 
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aphid in order to detennine whether the species could reproduce 
parthenogenetically .... [H]e became evennore emotionally attached to 
[my little aphid, rna pucerone] . ... When he lost sight of his aphid one 
June morning, he was disconsolate (106). 
While the point of departure of religious meditation may have been the experiences 
of daily life, such contemplation was a dedicated encounter, one with a lesson. The intent 
was to "transport contemplatives to a more abstract, spiritual realm beyond that of the 
senses. Post-Refonnation works of meditation, both Protestant and Catholic, insisted on 
a purely interior realm of religious vision distinct from the carnal and the sensual" 
Schiller tried to find his place in the culture of attention and a way to describe the 
experience of the aesthetic. He wrote to Komer, considering the types of attention given 
to and perceptions received from nature: 
There are two ways of representing appearances. We are either 
intentionally directed towards their cognition; we observe [beobachten] 
them; or we allow things to invite us to represent them. We merely watch 
[betrachten] them. 
When we watch appearances we are passive in that we receive 
impressions; active, in that we subject these impressions to our fonns of 
reason ... (8.ii.93 "Kalla is" in Bernstein 148). 
Contemplation of beauty, for him, was doubly invitational; humans were both passive in 
receiving and active in creating in enffamed attention. He chose beauty because of the 
pleasure of sensate attention, the consensual ground of judgment, and the autonomy it 
29 Daston's sources are late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century ones; it would be a 
valuable project to locate references and research about meditation in the mid- and late 
eighteenth century on the continent and in England. Several historical methods of 
meditation might be researched, including the word-based lectio divina (meditative 
reading) or Torah study, and the use of works of art, icons, stations of the cross, or 
stained glass images to direct and fonnat contemplative experience. 
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engendered. Unlike meditation on the good, the moral or religious, contemplation of 
beauty enjoined freedom, not duty. Play likewise, as a complex of reciprocal 
interactions, combined sense and form. It must begin, end or include pleasure or the 
anticipation of pleasure; it must be invitational, an entry into a different time and space. 
Schiller's claim that human play is pleasurable but flexible formatted attention with 
respect to a sensate ideal (a felt-thought thing, a representation, an appearance [Schein], 
beauty) is itself a Schein of his hope. It was his hope that the huge human capacity to 
attend to anything and format it, the capacity that has made us what we are - shockingly 
successful as a species but wasteful of the individual (Vr.!3) - could be managed on an 
individual basis through the pause (that is, contemplation and aesthetic education) that 
results in the freedom to choose and rechoose our course. Otherwise, unbalanced play 
betrays us to violence (French Revolution), card-playing (Schiller's particular vice), 
virtuoso interests (insect collections, eighteenth-century studies), systems of belief 
(principles over people) or works of a fragmented genius (Kant's Critigue~). Uncoupled 
and unmodulated, it builds on appetites and proclivities; continued by habit or 
perseveration, it loses its own pleasure in addiction. Subverted to utility, it leads to a 
surfeit of materialism; suborned by beliefs, it ends in loss of freedom, inflexibility, and 
hypocrisy. By play, humans can lose contact with reality itself. 
The Last Frontier: the Sublime 
We call an object sublime if, whenever the object is presented or 
represented, our sensuous nature feels its limits, but our rational nature 
feels its superiority, its freedom from limits. Thus, we come up short 
against a sublime object physically but we elevate ourselves above it 
morally, namely, through ideas ( Schiller "On the Sublime" ("Von 
Erhabenen" 1793) Essays 23). 
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Where is the sublime?30 So important and fertile a subject in the eighteenth century, 
it is not apparent today. Perhaps it masquerades, hidden in plain sight, on cable news, in 
gothic genres, in what computers can do, in what we can do with computers or the 
genome, but it is not the open and vital interest that it once was. Should it be recovered? 
The sublime is a huge subject, without bounds. With respect to both art and life, 
German aesthetics struggled not only with understanding beauty, but with distinguishing 
it from the sublime, the beauty that trespasses its own boundaries: the "centrality of the 
overstepped limit suggests an efficient approach to the variety of eighteenth century 
versions of the Sublime in both theory and practice ... " (Leidner 3). In terms of 
Schiller's theory of play, the sublime is associated with both world and agent, as the 
unattainable end and the unformable content, as the over-reaching action, the 
overwhelming feeling and the unspeakable thought. It is of profound importance to 
man's creative potential and his motivation.3l The sublime is the well that provides the 
infinite and the eternal, the raw content and novel forms for man's play. Play is our 
30 Where did it all begin? For eighteenth-century aestheticians, theorizing about the 
sublime stemmed from considerations about rhetoric: "The first and most excellent of 
these [attributes of great writing] is a boldness and grandeur in the Thoughts . ... The 
second is call'd the Pathetic, or the power of raising the passions to a violent and even 
enthusiastic degree; and these two being genuine constituents of the Sublime, are the gifts 
of nature, whereas the other sorts depend in some measure upon art" (Longinus trans. 
Clark (1770) qtd. in Monk 13). 
3l The consideration of the sublime interested Schiller greatly: he mentioned it often in 
his work on beauty, used it in plot and character in his drama and treated the subject 
separately on three different occasions: in "Of the Sublime" [" Vom Erhabenen"] (1793), 
"On the Sublime" ["Uber das Erhabene"] (written around 1794-5, published 1801) and 
"On Tragic Pity" (1793) ["Uber das Pathetische"] (along with a number of other essays 
on tragedy). Schiller's "Auch ein ander Heftchen fiber das Erhabene vom Erhabenen" 
was lost, eaten by Herder's dog. 
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world, and beauty is our best way of representing it and making our own freedom 
possible: the sublime is the edge of reality just beyond our attempts to contain it and the 
leap to a humanfunction beyond our current definition of humanity. 
The sublime and beauty are related by play's paradoxical qualities - boundaries are 
intrinsic to it and yet it is freeing. It is freeing until - it is not, until particular playing 
defines, fragments and limits us. If no new form and content breaks the boundaries of the 
old attention, of the old organization, to build ever more broad, balanced and harmonious 
mental environments, play becomes insipid and regimented; we are bored. Luckily, 
humans are curious; we seek stimulation and change, or we are simply dragged from 
ourselves by the new. We actively seek or are sometimes forced to think or act beyond 
the boundaries of our experience as well. Passively, we position ourselves for 
experience with the unbounded or the ungoverned. Actively, we transgress. We break 
bounds ourselves, delight in others' exploits or thrill at nature beyond all bounds, 
experience beyond hope, fear and imagination. What is beyond play? What is it in 
beauty, or what in life, that provokes us to break the conventional form, to seek the next 
new content? to redraw the boundaries? 
The sublime is problematic: it is relative. In conventional situations, times and places 
of safe play, knowns are managed and play is tame. The frame is obvious, itself an 
elaborate work of art. And inside it, the beauty is full and round, turning on itself, away 
from the comers before they are even approached. The bounds between the culture and 
the non-included rest (nature) are stark as cliffs. In a culture like that, deviance is 
transgression, and transgression leads to banishment, to living beyond the Pale. 
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Internally, such an entrenchment turns to boredom and trivialization, acceptance 
sometimes, but occasionally, defiance and a dangerous, but sublime break-out. 
In times or cultures of heterogeneity, when engagement is more diverse, where the 
play of self, community, country, and religion do not heavily reinforce each other, the 
boundaries are liminal: the ocean of the sublime can be tested from the beaches of play. 
The home of beauty, which is the representation of as-much-of-reality we can gracefully 
manage and the image of as-much-of-ourselves as we can freely actualize, can be left and 
the new, the intense and unknown brought back. 
The sublime is relative to the experience of each individuaL As a comet of the new, 
the strange, the terrifying, the surprising and the unbelievable, it drops into each one's 
own play; it calls out the fresh, the courageous, the unusual, the shocking and the 
novelty-seeking agent from his mental home. That is why education is individual for 
Schiller: each person must dare to perceive, to attend, to know - to incorporate new 
content into play. Each must audaciously own or create new forms. In this way, we 
exercise our capacities and develop human potentiaL 
Sublime of Agency and the Sublime Out of Our Context 
But since in the enjoyment of beauty, or aesthetic unity, an actual union 
and interchange between matter and form, passivity and activity, 
momentarily takes place, the compatibility of our two natures, the 
practicability of the infinite being realized in the finite, hence the 
possibility of sublimest humanity, is thereby actually proven (XXV.6) 
For the humanist ofthe eighteenth century, the sublime expression of agency was 
genius. The genius was at once the person to whom the sublime came as the 
overpowering and unpredictable daemon - and the human who stepped up into his 
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chariot to control the thundering team of his powers.32 That through genius, "the talent 
(natural gift) that gives the rule to art," man wrestled form and content into beauty, 
brought it within the bounds of play, is one of the paradoxes of the relationship between 
the beautiful and the sublime (Kant §46).33 
With regard to the environmental sublime: at present many in the humanities believe 
that the sciences are out of bounds - mostly we want their content for metaphors and for 
fun, but we fear their forms?4 For their part, the scientists - even in their play - sense 
32 The genius was susceptible to the daemonic, which has the inhuman, unknowable 
quality of the sublime. Goethe described it as follows, "[ e ]verything that limits us seemed 
penetrable by it, and it appeared to do as it pleased with the elements necessary to our 
existence, to contract time and expand space. It seemed only to accept the impossible 
and scornfully to reject the possible. This essence, which appeared to infiltrate all the 
others, separating and combining them, I call 'daemonic' [damonische] after the example 
of the ancients and others who had perceived something similar. I tried to save myself 
from this fearful thing by taking refuge, as usual, behind an image" (Goethe qtd. in 
Steigerwald "Goethe" 315). 
33 The ideas of genius reframe (transgress); they create a bickering about boundaries, 
rules and definitions and often a scramble to claim the new space. There is a founder's or 
possessor's advantage. The new frame, for those whose attention is attracted, becomes 
the territory to be controlled and administered, the place of display. In this way, the new 
is the bridge to the sublime that many can travel across. What was beyond human 
imagination at first, beyond our immediate grasp, is made accessible by someone who 
fashioned, discovered or promoted it, a "supra" human, a genius. It is he who parents 
new representations in our minds, engenders new mankind as well. Schiller's theory 
about play has something to say to us about this process, about Beauty and boundedness, 
about transgressivity and the Sublime, about genius. According to Abrams, genius 
"cannot indicate scientifically how it brings about its product, but rather gives the rule as 
nature. Hence, where an author owes a product to his genius, he does not himself know 
how the ideas for it have entered into his head, nor has he it in his power to invent the 
like at pleasure, or methodically, and communicate the same to others in such precepts as 
would put them in a position to produce similar products" (Abrams 207). 
34 We love their data for our metaphors: humans, writers and artists must constantly dip 
into reality. In the March 2008 PMLA (123:2, 340-357), M. Allewaert's "Swamp 
Sublime: Ecologies of Resistance in the American Plantation Zone," a critique of 
Bartram's Travels (1791), explored intersecting cultural spaces in the eighteenth century. 
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our sublimity: they want only so much of us as well. They probably think that, though 
we inhabit the land of play, we really float above it like wind-surfers. It is, as you know, 
such a beautiful- pleasurable, exciting and relaxing - view, from above. 
Sometimes then the sublime is, as Schiller intimated, a species of beauty, part of 
what play includes, an energetic beauty (XVI, XVII).35 And it is accurate to say that 
She claimed Bartram had failed to colonize the sub-tropical swamps of North America 
through the Enlightenment practice of description, including collection and classification 
of everything, especially plants. In spite of the task and his relish of it, Bartram was 
nearly overwhelmed by overgrowth, inundation, disease and danger, i.e. the natural or 
environmental danger threatens the sublime (as what can be at some point gotten under 
control): it just barely survives as does he. In fact, perhaps only writing retrospectively 
did he rescue life-threatening conditions to the sublime. Here, the play of pleasurably 
attended content enclosed in a safely intelligible form; its Sublime is alternately defined 
by European sensibility as nature refusing to be tamed, by "savage" sensibility as the 
European Master and then by transformed European sensibility as the practice of slave-
holding. What was for Bartram a sublimity that could easily devolve to terror---the dense 
foliage, the camouflaged predator, the sucking mud---provided escaped slaves, Maroons, 
opportunities for hiding, escaping and visualizing their enemies: a perspectivally 
reformatted content. As a result of his experience, consciously sublime but 
unconsciously fraught with fear, Bartram was transformed: he projected the power of the 
swamp on the Maroons and, through his paranoia, became acutely aware that the cultural 
form, slave-holding (which concentrated shame and rage in its subjects) made revolt 
inevitable. Ergo: Bartram wrote that slavery should be abolished. In his article from the 
same number, "From Idiot Beast to Idiot Sublime: Mental Disability in John Cleland's 
Fanny Hill," D. Christopher Gabbard traced the use of La Mettrie's L 'homme machine in 
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (1748-9). Gabbard charted Cleland's 
raucous excursion into the mid-century controversies in this way: Cleland managed the 
natural philosophical issue, the definition of the human species, from two perspectives -
Fanny is a voyeur of the prodigious sublime, i.e. what is beyond human nature as 
admirable potential, a potential that is in this case parodically lodged in the sensual 
(sensual appetite and its sign, an erection) and sees the boundary between the human and 
the animal, the natural Sublime (the instinctual drive for satisfaction) traversed by both 
Good-natured Dick and Louisa. 
35 There are two species of beauty actually in evidence, according to Schiller, with the 
ideal functioning as the generic. "Energizing beauty can no more preserve man from a 
certain residue of savagery and hardness than melting be~uty can protect him from a 
certain degree of effeminacy and enervation. For since the effect of the former is to brace 
his nature, both physical and moral, and to increase its elasticity and power of prompt 
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ideal beauty is sublime, that is, that it is the beauty that is beyond the bounds of possible 
expression or instantiation but nonetheless always to be sought. Sometimes, however, 
the sublime is just beyond bounds, the form before it is form and the content before it is 
content. Thrust at us unsuspecting, it confronts us with the demand that we bring it into 
play. Our sublime agency thrills at the chance to manage it with new form and full 
feeling, with the opportunity to create beauty, to represent life in art. Today, humanists 
can choose to play with our century's biological sublime: we can, for example, grab hold 
of its theories and its data to put Schiller's theory into play. After all, through him we 
have been training for the unexpected.36 
reaction, it can happen all too easily that the increased resistance of temperament and 
character will bring about a decrease in receptivity to impression; that our gentler 
humanity, too, will suffer the kind of repression which ought only to be direct to our 
brute nature, and our brute nature profit from an increase of strength which should only 
be available to our free Person. That is why in periods of vigour and exuberance we find 
true grandeur of conception coupled with the gigantic and the extravagant, sublimity of 
thought with the most frightening explosions of passion; that is why in epochs of 
discipline and form we find nature as often suppressed as mastered, as often outraged as 
transcended" (XVI.3, 4). That Schiller dealt mainly with melting beauty in the Aesthetic 
Letters, led to the representation of the work as a torso with one arm missing. 
36 Schiller: "Because it is our calling to orient ourselves, in the face of all sensuous 
limitations ... the sublime must come to the assistance of the beautiful in order to make 
the aesthetic education a complete whole and expand the human heart's sensitivity to the 
entire scope of our calling, extending even beyond the world of the senses" ("Concerning 
the Sublime" ("Uber das Erhabene" 1794-6) Essays 83-84.) 
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